Medieval Hungary was a monarchy ruling a territory three times as large as the present day republic. Its history shared the turbulent nature of the other Central European countries. In the early part of the sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire attempted to take over the Kingdom of Hungary. At the Battle of Mohacs the Turks killed King Louis II of Hungary (1516–26) and the Kingdom was divided among the Hapsburgs, the Ottoman Empire and the principality of Transylvania.
Hungary was not reunited until the end of the seventeenth century when the Hapsburg Emperor, Leopold I (1657–1705), managed to push the Turks out of Hungary and the occupied areas of Transylvania. This turn of events made Hungary an important part of the territory held by the Hapsburg monarchy (Macartney and Palmer, 1972: 3, 12, 21, 42).
Although owing allegiance to the imperial court in Vienna, Hungary had managed to acquire political autonomy. This political independence was enshrined in the Ausgleich compromise of 1867, which established a dual monarchy in which Austria and Hungary owed allegiance to the Habsburgs, but had completely independent legislatures, constitutions
and political administrations. There were joint agreements on trade, taxation and transport which were covered by renewable 10-year agree- ments. Any expenditures that fell under joint jurisdiction was paid for through customs duties and separate national contributions. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was held together through the institutions of the Habsburg monarchy and the imperial army. However, the day- to-day running of Austria and Hungary was completely separate and the governance of each part of the empire thus significantly different. Male suffrage, for instance, was introduced in Austria before the First World War, whereas Hungary continued to maintain a more archaic political structure until the break up of the Habsburg empire in 1918.
The break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was a direct result of their being on the losing side of the First World War. Vienna was forced to agree to the same armistice terms as Germany. Under these terms the defeated Central European powers were forced to give up considerable territory.
Similarly, the Wilsonian principles of self-determination would encour- age ethnic minorities within the former Austro-Hungarian empire to lobby for independence at the Versailles Conference. As a result Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory leaving many ethnic Hungarians (Magyars) living under the jurisdiction of other states. The problem of large ethnic groups outside its borders plagues Hungary to the present day.
After 1918, the Hungarian government declared Hungary a republic in protest over its treatment under the armistice. By 1919, it had a socialist government under the leadership of Bela Kun. This develop- ment was inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution. The Soviets, however, saw this development as a threat. Lenin in particular, was quick to criti- cize Hungary’s attempt to establish a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’.
The experiment lasted only 133 days and its collapse was attributed to a number of inter-linked causes, such as the lack of successful land reform, the large reduction in Hungarian territory and an ineffective Communist Party (Molnar, 1978: 20).
The collapse of Kun’s government stimulated a political move towards conservative values. In the inter-war period Hungary reverted to a right-wing authoritarian style of government, and the pre-1918 royalist constitution was reinstated. The throne remained vacant and the head of state was given the title of regent. In 1920 Admiral Miklos Horthy de Nagybana was appointed as regent and held that position until 1944. Horthy’s government was stable but conservative with all major posts being held by noblemen. Horthy’s government last 22 years and was replaced by force when Germany put pressure on Hungary to establish a fascist government.
After the war, communist rule returned to Hungary, but unlike the short-lived Bela Kun government it was not a domestic grass-roots movement. Communism was imposed through the presence of the Soviet Army which occupied Hungary during 1945. However initially, the domination of the Communist Party was not complete: during the post-war years Hungarian governments were made up of a number of popular coalitions. Nevertheless, even though parties such as the Small Landholders Party had more seats than the Hungarian Communist Party (HCP), the HCP had the backing of the Soviet Union. Leaders of other parties were often intimidated into resigning. This, combined with pro-Soviet propaganda, proved successful and by 1948 the major- ity of the other democratic parties had become subsumed into the ruling party which took on the new name of, the Hungarian Workers’
Party (HWP).
Over the course of the next 10 years, Hungary would be governed harshly by the Communist leader, Matyas Rakosi, who transformed Hungary into a highly industrialized state, but the human cost was high. Land was forcibly collectivized and hundreds of thousands of the regime’s opponents were sent to labour camps. The AVO, Hungary’s Department for Defence of the State, was in charge of internal state security. This department was a Hungarian version of the Soviet KGB and would not allow any opposition, peaceful or otherwise, to the Rakosi government.
The years of oppressive government in Hungary spawned a powerful groundswell of opposition. After Stalin’s death in 1953 a branch of the HWP were eager to bring about reform. There were those in the Soviet politburo who were not unsympathetic to the notion of reform. It was Imre Nagy, a former Hungarian Minister of Agriculture, who was the catalyst behind the reform movement. Reform would prove difficult because the Soviets began sending mixed signals regarding what consti- tuted acceptable policy. During the Khrushchev era internal power- plays within the Kremlin would result in erratic Soviet foreign policy.
Hungarian politicians were allowed to begin reform but then would be reined in sharply as Soviet policy shifted.
In 1953 the Hungarian Premier Rakosi, was forced to stepdown. Over the course of the next two years Nagy was put in charge of the adminis- tration. His work was an attempt to de-Sovietize Hungary. In particular, Nagy tried to encourage political pluralism and a radical reorientation of foreign policy. These moves were watched nervously in Moscow and in March 1955 the Kremlin had Nagy forcibly removed. Two Kremlin- approved successors came and went quickly. Eventually, in July 1956
a pro-Stalinist, Erno Gero, became leader of the Hungarian Party, repla- cing Rokosi, who had held the post after stepping down as Premier.
The Soviets reactionary behaviour stimulated calls for a popular upris- ing. The stage was set for mass demonstrations. Beginning in Budapest in October 1956, crowds as large as 200,000 strong gathered in front of the Parliament building. What started as an anti-Soviet demonstration soon grew to a movement that demanded Nagy’s return and the con- tinuation of parliamentary reforms. Nagy was not himself a particularly radical person. He remained a communist and was from a poor rural background. The plight of the less well-off continued to be his concern, but unlike many Hungarian dissidents he continued to believe that the solution would be found in communism. However, his vision of com- munism did not include violence, repression and incarceration. It was his move away from the Soviet Union, especially his declaration of Hungary’s independence from the Warsaw Pact, that was to bring down the weight of the Soviet military.
Soviet troops invaded Hungary occuping Budapest on 4 November 1956. The troops took over the government and arrested Nagy. Both he and the other members of the government were taken back to Russia and were coerced into signing a confession of treason. They were then hung in June 1958. Two thousand others would be killed and an additional 20,000 incarcerated as the Soviet Union attempted to stamp out any remaining resistance to their rule. A taboo on even mention- ing Nagy’s name remained until the 1980s. No one, without fear of reprisal, could admit that Nagy had stood for a political reform move- ment that championed greater democracy and accountability. The Soviet version had branded Nagy as a counter-revolutionary and a usurper.
The 1956 invasion and its political repercussions were to have an enormous impact on Hungary’s political culture. It was the single most important event for Hungarians in the post-war era. As a result, one of the first orders of business after the collapse of the Soviet Union was the rehabilitation of Imre Nagy on 16 June 1989.