Many Westerners would admit to thinking of Poland as a small and peripheral power. However, Poland has a long and rich history much of which shows it to have been a regional power with considerable influ- ence. In terms of Polish national identity its long history and status as a former power in the region is intensely significant. This is particularly true if we look at its relationship with Lithuania, Belarus and the Ukraine. Early on, even when these countries were sometimes under the rule of a single monarch, it was Polish culture that tended to dom- inate. An example of this was the dynastic marriage, on 18 February 1386 between Poland’s Queen Jadwiga and Lithuania’s Grand Duke Jogaila ( Jagiello), whose lands included most of the Ukraine and Belarus (Burant, 1993: 396). As a result Poles, Lithuanians, Belarussians and Ukrainians came under common rule through marriage. This period
commonly known as the Jagiellonian period has become, in Poland’s national mythology, one that is romanticized as a time of great Polish power and culture. Polish influence in the area remained and in 1569 the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth came into existence (ibid.).
Amazingly the predominant nature of Polish culture in this area was largely uncontested for centuries among the elites who became Roman Catholic and adopted Polish culture as their own. The same did not happen, however, to the peasants who maintained their own ethnic identity.
Polish elites saw themselves as the legitimate transmitters of Western European culture to the east. This belief or self-identity of Poland as a lynchpin between the west and the east remains to the present. How- ever, the assumption was that the cultural transmission would always go from west to east. It was during the sixteenth century that Poland reached its height as a European power. Indeed, it was at one stage in this century one of the largest continental powers. Its national territory ran from the Black Sea in the south to the Baltic in the north, from the Ukraine in the east to the rich plains that ran next to the Vistula river in the West (a further discussion on the rise and decline of Polish power can be found in Tausch and Prager, 1993). Poland’s inclusion in the world economic system at this stage, although important, was in its capacity as a supplier of commodities, not finished goods. Its wealth remained agricultural.
The social system in place during what Polish historians refer to as the ‘long sixteenth century’ was one of feudalism. While landowners made up less than 5 per cent of the population, indentured serfs (peas- ants) accounted for over 70 per cent, the balance being made-up of clergy, small landowners, the urban middle class and Jews (Rotworowksi, 1979: 338). Polish grain was the main export during this period. Despite Poland’s agricultural wealth, the inflexible nature of its social system meant that even though demand for grain increased in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, Poland was slow to respond. Productivity was low on large aristocratic estates, and this, combined with other factors such as continuous war, pushed Poland into decline (Brenner, 1977: 70).
The lack of a bourgeoisie and limited purchasing power on the part of disenfranchised peasants, meant that Poland had no internal market for goods (with the exception of luxury trade for the wealthy landed gentry). The result was economic stagnation. Poland went from being a major regional power to a mere shadow of it former self. By the end of the eighteenth century, Poland’s neighbours, (the kingdoms in what are present day Russia, Germany and Austria in particular) had become
increasingly powerful. The upshot of this situation culminated with the First Partition of Poland in 1772. By the end of the eighteenth century Poland had been divided between the great empires of Austria, Russia and the Kingdom of Prussia.
Despite its temporary revival as a Grand-Duchy of Warsaw by Napo- leon (1806–12), by 1815 Poland had ceased to exist as a separate coun- try. With the Congress of Vienna Poland came under direct Russian control. The collapse of Poland meant that Russia, Austria and Prussia now all shared a common border. Many Poles felt anger and resentment at the great European powers for their division of Poland. In 1794, after the 2nd partition of Poland (1793), a general uprising occurred in both Vilnas and Warsaw, under the national hero Tadeusz Kosciuszko1 (Kinder and Hilgemann, 1979: 285). Both of these uprisings were put down with force by Prussian and Russian troops. The recurrence of Polish nation- alism was a continual source of irritation and conflict to the large powers. With a series of uprisings taking place thoughout the nineteenth century, the result was an irrepressible nationalist movement that kept resurfacing.
The great powers had done themselves a disservice by partitioning a country as long-established as Poland. It would make exiles of people such as the composer Chopin (1809–49). The result was to reinforce claims of submerged nationalities throughout Central and Eastern Europe (Macartney and Palmer, 1972: 6). Russia dealt with Polish dissidence in two ways: (1) violent repression in times of revolt; and (2) the introduc- tion of the doctrine of panslavism in which the Russian language was forced upon minorities in an attempt to wipe out ethnic differences.
The Poles, however, continued their fight for independence during the mid-to-late 19th century aiming for the complete reinstatement of their Polish–Lithuania Commonwealth borders. The Prussians were also plagued by Polish nationalism. During the first part of the century many Germans were not unsympathetic to the plight of the Polish state, however, by 1860 Prussia like Russia had decided that the only way to deal with Poles was through military action and the repression of everything Polish.
The Austrian-Hapsburg Monarchy, unlike the other two Eastern Euro- pean monarchies, found it easier to deal with Polish nationalism with- out frequent recourse to violence. This can be attributed to the large number of ethnic minorities found in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
The Hapsburg Monarchy was adept at playing one group of minorities off against the other. Therefore, as Poles, Czechs, Ruthenes, Serbs and Croats argued over who should or should not have certain rights in the
empire, the imperial government in Vienna remained secure and unchal- lenged. Moreover, the Polish aristocracy formed a large part of the ruling elite in the eastern part of the Hapsburg Empire with both the Haps- burgs and the Poles finding common cause in suppressing the Ortho- dox Christian faith.
The development of radical thought, particularly with regards to communism did not make headway in fragmented nineteenth-century Poland. Each uprising or revolt, whether in Prussian, Russian or Austrian- held territory, suppressed the Poles ability to speak freely. This resulted in a large number of Polish émigrés. It was during the period of 1832–92 that the beginnings of Polish socialism began. Émigrés living outside Poland established intellectual groups, such as the Democratic Society founded in 1832, whose ethos, while not directly socialist, concentrated on the rights of workers (Dziewanowski, 1959: 3). As time went on Polish émigrés became more involved with socialist movements. For instance, Rosa Luxembourg (1871–1919) was Polish born, and worked exten- sively in the creation of the German Communist Party as well as being an important contributor to communist ideology through her writings.
Similarly, men like Jachim Lelewel and Adam Mickiewicz concentrated on legitimizing agrarian communism. Lelewel in particular remained in close contact with the Communist League – the organization for whom Marx and Engels had written their Manifesto (Dziewanowski, 1959: 4).
The nineteenth-century socialist movements by Poles (mostly émi- grés) remained largely agrarian in nature. Poland had no great mass of industrialized workers like that found in Britain. Poland had gone from a feudal system to being an agricultural producing area for the three empires within which it had found itself incorporated. This legacy meant Polish socialism was different in character than its other Western European counterparts. Curiously, while most socialist movements tended to be transnational, Polish socialism often emphasized the need to re-establish a free Polish state. The point being that Poland should become a democratic country and take her proper place in Europe. Calls for democracy in the 1980s used similar arguments. Although much of nineteenth-century Polish socialism was vague and contradictory, it did set the ground work for its development in the twentieth century.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the late eighteenth-century partition of Poland was the economic retardation it caused. Poland had become a peripheral agricultural area to the three empires. The nineteenth century, for Western Europe, brought the development of industrialized capitalism. However, Polish subjugation during this period meant that its development was fragmented and the production of
primary commodities continued to play a larger part in its economy than that of many other European countries.
This legacy, unfortunately, has gone a long way to defining Poland’s role in the world economy in the twentieth century. If we look at trade figures for the CEECs before the communist collapse of 1989, we will observe that 54 per cent of its exports to the developed OECD econom- ies were made-up of mining, food and fuels (UN, Economic Commis- sion for Europe, 1988: 294). The legacy of peripheralization remained.
There continues to be a healthy debate as to when and why Poland became peripheralized. Wallerstein’s world system approach puts it back before the sixteenth century, whereas critics of Wallerstein, such as Brenner, put it closer to the late seventeenth or early eighteenth cen- tury (Wallerstein, 1974: 125ff, 451 and Brenner, 1977: 25–35). Regard- less of which view one may hold it is obvious that by the nineteenth century Poland was well and truly integrated into the world economy and its place was secured albeit as a peripheral economy.
The industrialization that did occur in Poland only further reflected its hinterland status. Out of a total of 15 million Poles, the majority (9 million) lived in Russian-held Poland. There were just 3.5 million in Prussian-held territory and Austrian Poles numbered a mere 2.5 million (Grabiec, 1974: 10–11). Large-scale industrialization occurred in the Russian part of Poland where the workforce was the largest. The condi- tions of a Russian-Pole industrial worker was far worse than a worker in Austrian or Prussian-held Poland. Even by the early twentieth century, by which time wages and standards had slightly improved, a Russian- Pole working in industry would earn 25 per cent less than a Silesian miner (Germany’s poorest paid worker) (ibid.: 157–8). It was the appal- ling working conditions for the majority of Russian-Poles that spawned twentieth-century Polish socialism. By 1893 the Polish Socialist party was formed which aimed to fuse the philosophy of Marx with Poland’s goal of national liberation (Dziewanowski, 1959: 21).
By the early part of the twentieth century Europe began to experience political turbulence. The great empires of Austro-Hungary and Russia were showing signs of instability caused by widespread national move- ments and imperial conflict. The international system was revealing the tension between capitalism, aristocracy, nationalism and the frustration of the disenfranchised. The two defining events were, of course, the First World War and the Russian Revolution. Once war had broke out between the great powers Polish nationalism resurfaced. It was the first time since 1772 that Polish re-unification had appeared to be a real possib- ility. This is not to say that there were no differences between Austrian,
Prussian or Russian Poles. Throughout the First World War, the three groups of Poles supported different sides. However, by the end of the war most Poles in all three areas had come to the conclusion that Poland should be reinstated as a totally independent sovereign state.
There had been some talk in the latter part of the war about the Kingdom of Poland falling under the Russian Empire, but this was rejected. The Russian empire was in any case made defunct after the October 1917 Bolshevik revolution.
With the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1918 the CEECs stood ready for a total redefinition. The collapse of the German, Aus- trian and Russian empires created the opportunity for the rebirth of the Polish nation. this rebirth was not, however, without its difficulties.
Although Poland was recognized by 1918, following the Treaty of Ver- sailles, it received no direct war reparation through the Treaty, and the boundary agreements reached put her in conflict with her neighbours (Epstein, 1973). During the immediate post-war period Poland found herself in a series of border wars. The Polish–Soviet war was fought in 1920 over the eastern border Poland shared with Soviet Union (Gerner, 1985: 43). It also found itself in conflict with Lithuania during 1920, when Polish General Lucjan Zeligowski headed a campaign to seize the Vilnius region. Lithuania never forgave Poland for this act and diplo- matic ties between the two countries were not re-established until 1938 (Burant, 1993: 397).
Polish foreign policy during the inter-war years was fraught with diffi- culty. Tension over borders combined with large ethnic minorities made policy-making a hard task. Nevertheless, Poland did manage to enter into a Pact with Germany in 1934 and the Soviet Union in 1932 (renewed in 1934), an accomplishment only marred by the brevity of the agreements (Kinder and Hilgemann, 1978: 155). Poland was also having its problems domestically. Between 1919 and 1937 it had to grapple with the nationalist tendencies of its own ethnic minorities, agrarian land reform, government instabilities, failure of their republic and finally a military coup d’état. In 1935 a new authoritarian constitu- tion following the military coup was enacted which was billed as ‘guided democracy’, but essentially ended parliamentary democracy (ibid.: 155).
The Poland that was invaded by Germany, was not a particularly demo- cratic one. Having said this, Poles living under the authority of Polish Generals were better treated than Poles who fell under the control of the Nazi Generals.
After 21 years of precarious independence, Poland again ceased to exist as a country in September–October 1939. It began with the German
invasion of western Poland during September 1939, which was quickly followed by the Russian invasion of eastern Poland in late September/
early October of the same year (Macartney and Palmer, 1972: 411).
Germany made few apologies for the military action in Poland. The Russians, however, felt they needed a political excuse for their invasion.
As the Soviet armies started to advance on Poland, Moscow announced that ‘as the Polish state had ceased to exist, Russia’s obligations towards it had become null and void, and it was her duty to intervene and pro- tect her Ukrainian and White Russian brethren’ (ibid.: 411). Regardless of the political rationale, by the end of 1939 Poland had been carved-up between Germany and the Soviet Union. Stalin, in particular, did not want the Polish state to remain in any form and incorporated the country into the Ukrainian and White Russian republics. Some Poles, including the entire government, escaped to Romania.
At the close of the war the allies had to make a decision regarding the future of Poland. In February 1945 at the Yalta conference, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, in addition to sorting out the shape of the post- war world, decided upon the fate of Poland. Poland was to be liberated.
Its western border was to be decided by treaty and its eastern border was to be at the old Curzon Line2 (Kinder, 1978: 209). In reality, however, Poland became a satellite state to the Soviet Union and found itself behind the iron curtain during the post-war years.
The events of 1989 were largely driven by Poland’s dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union and its own Communist Party during the post- war era. The incorporation of Poland into the Soviet sphere of influence meant the severing of many contacts with Western Europe (Gerner, 1985: 47). There was two sides to this severing. Many of the Polish exiles in Great Britain chose to stay rather than return to a Soviet controlled Poland. Western culture, something that formally Poland had identified with, was actively discouraged. Those with post-war influ- ence in Poland, were to be those Poles who had spent the war in Russia or on the Russian front. Russian Poles, a number from wealthy families such as General Jaruselski, were sent to Soviet labour camps. Both men and women were later conscripted into the Polish contingent of the Russian army and given a strong induction into Soviet communism.
They were then put in Polish fighting units and sent to the front. These units had been taught that they were to liberate Poland so that she could take her place in the Soviet Union.
At the end of the war it was the ‘Soviet-Poles’ that were given posi- tions of power in Poland. There were few Polish Jews left. They had been largely exterminated by Hitler. The Germans had been removed
and parts of Byelorussia and Ukraine had been retaken by the USSR.
Poland’s brave new world after the war, therefore, was to be largely constructed by ‘Soviet-Poles’. First, because it served Stalin’s political purpose, but, secondly, because of the high attrition rate among the young during the war. Six million people were killed in Poland during the war – which was more than one-fifth of the pre-war population – the majority of those lost were the young (Rosenberg, 1995: 145).
There may have been a ‘third way’ for Poland had the West been more flexible towards countries with communist parties. Poland’s isola- tion did not happen overnight but grew during the post-war decades.
Ultimately, Cold War tensions soured Poland’s relationship with the IMF, the WB, and the West in general.
Directly after the War in 1946, Poland requested US$600 million in a reconstruction loan from the WB. Negotiations were slow and when a package was approved the amount of the loan was reduced to just US$45 million (Bjork, 1995: 90). This money was only to be used for very specific development assistance. By the 1950s Poland became wary of both the WB and the IMF. The WB’s strict conditionality, and Amer- ican ‘MacCarthyist’ attitudes to communist countries, prompted Poland to withdraw its membership from both organizations.
Although Poland belonged to the Communist bloc and held mem- bership in Comecon (the Soviet trading bloc) and the Warsaw Pact (the Soviet military alliance), its communist experience was less severe then in other communist bloc countries. Unlike many Soviet and East European countries, Polish agriculture was never successfully collect- ivized and much of the agricultural production remained in private hands. In 1956, a common Soviet-Polish declaration was signed which effectively de-Stalinized Poland signalling a change in Soviet govern- ment attitudes. The declaration mentioned that: ‘the union and the fraternal bonds should become broadened and confirmed and be developed on the basis of complete equality . . . sovereignty and non- interference in internal affairs’ (Gerner, 1985: 47). After 1956 Poland remained connected to the Soviet Union through the Communist Party, but the declaration had given it greater freedom to construct its own government and institutions, in its own way. Nevertheless, compared to Western freedoms, political life in Poland for the major- ity of the population would have been restrictive. Multi-party elec- tions and freedom of the press were not permitted. Despite these obvious restrictions in the years after 1956 successive governments would attempt to attain some form of popular support in an effort to create legitimacy.