The Immersion Stage in Summary
Feature 3: Categorisation
Whether you are the leader of one of the Arab Spring countries, the ex- boss of BP, or a fashion designer prone to drunken, racist out-bursts—if you don’t behave in the right way, people will remove you (Campaign Middle East, 27.4.2012)
Th is list refers to an element of the BP story as an exemplar of, or
“standing for”, unacceptable behaviour.
4. Contrasts and absences: What the events are not
Sometimes the events were categorised with an emphasis on what they were unlike rather than what they were like. In the 2010 data, the expression “We’ve never seen anything like this magnitude” (Associated Press Financial Wire, 27.4.2010) did not imply that nothing as big as this has ever happened anywhere, but that this was an exceptional event amongst the group “oil spills” or “man-made environmental disasters”.
Such exclusions, omissions and redefi nition of categories were worthy of examination.
Findings from the BP Data
Instances of what I call here “categorisation” are rare in the 2010 data set, and only six are identifi ed in the 20 texts:
We’ve never seen anything like this magnitude (Associated Press Financial Wire, 27.4.2010)
We’ve never seen anything like this magnitude (BreakingNews.ie, 27.4.2010)
We’ve never seen anything like this magnitude (Trend Daily News (Azerbaijan), 27.4.2010a, 27.4.2010b)
If we don’t secure this well, this could be one of the most signifi cant oil spills in US history (Carleton Place (Canada), 27.4.2010)
If the missing workers died, it would be the deadliest US off shore rig explosion since 1968 (TendersInfo, 27.4.2010)
In 1990, a similar bid to change the rules failed, in part because it fol- lowed the Exxon Valdez spill. Now observers think the Gulf of Mexico acci- dent could do much the same. (Th e Globe and Mail (Canada), 27.4.2010)
Th ree of these instances are identical, where the words of the same expert source have been quoted. Th e implication of “never seen anything like this magnitude” is that the BP events at this point are so far not one of a group, and I mention in describing my analysis approach that refer- ring to what phenomena are not is one way of indicating what they might be . In the fourth and fi fth examples above, the use of the conditional (“If
… this could be”; “If … it would be”) signals uncertainty and as yet unre- alised potential. In the sixth example, the comparison with the Exxon Valdez spill is highly mitigated (“observers think … much the same”). So in 2010, what categorisation exists is expressed in negative terms, realised in the conditional, or highly mitigated. At this point, writers are not attempting or only cautiously attempting to defi ne what the events are, and where they “fi t” into already processed understanding.
By 2011, instances of categorisation increased to 17 in 20 texts, indicating a greatly increased presence for this language feature. Categorising expres- sions in 2011 locate the Deepwater Horizon events within a number of dif- ferent groups. Th ese include the perhaps surprising group of natural disasters (given that the explosion and oil spill were not naturally occurring events):
Looking back at Katrina, the BP oil spill and other events, it does not appear that we are prepared to respond eff ectively or to recover from natural disasters, let alone a major terrorist attack. (Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International, 27.4.2011)
Secondly, other texts place the events alongside business crises , that is, events that disrupt the normal run of business, and are to be dealt with and normalised:
Recently companies such as Toyota, BP, Johnson & Johnson and Hewlett Packard have experienced crises that distracted management, cost millions of dollars in time and resources, reduced shareholder value and resulted in lawsuits that will take years to resolve. (Executive Counsel, 27.4.2011) Th irdly, the 2010 oil spill is positioned as just one of a number of BP problems , where news, fi nance and business reports in the 2011 data indi- cate that the oil spill is not the only area of BP concern. As 27 April 2011 is another fi nancial results day, there is media interest in the part
Deepwater Horizon is playing in the general business performance of the company. Th e following is an example of a synchronic list, where a set of events contribute to a state at a point in time:
A still-rising bill for the Gulf of Mexico disaster, lower production after selling off assets to help pay for it and a hit from the Budget’s tax grab on North Sea oil profi ts saw BP’s profi ts fall 2 % in the fi rst three months of the year. (Th e Evening Standard [London], 27.4.2011)
An example of diachronic categorisation is the listing of BP accidents and disasters, of which Deepwater Horizon is the most recent:
In 2005, fi fteen workers were killed when BP’s Texas City Refi nery exploded. In 2006, corroded pipes owned by BP led to an oil spill in Alaska. Now, in 2010, eleven men drilling for BP were killed in the blow- out of the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico. (M2 PressWIRE, 27.4.2011)
Th e majority of the lists and groups unsurprisingly set the events into categories of negative experience, but there is one quite interesting excep- tion. Th is is taken from a press release by BP of 25 April, acknowledged openly in the text “According to a release”. Th e writing positions the BP events more neutrally than is typical for this year’s data set:
... Scientifi c understanding of oil spill and dispersant impacts on ocean and coastal systems in the Gulf region, as well as other ocean and coastal sys- tems, and how these systems respond to oil and gas inputs, especially acci- dental inputs. (Wireless News, 27.4.2011)
Th e language is rather opaque—in fact it is diffi cult to see that the research referred to is a direct result of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon events, although these are referred to indirectly twice as “oil spill and dispersant impacts” and “oil and gas inputs, especially accidental inputs”. Oblique forms of reference recur throughout the full text. Th e phrase “scientifi c understanding” serves to position the research as academic and objec- tive, and the listing of the Gulf region alongside other ocean and coastal
systems implies that the research is being carried out for the benefi t of the global community. Similarly “oil and gas inputs” generalises (makes vague) the object of the research. Th e reference to “accidental” inputs (unspecifi ed) again has a role in distancing blame and responsibility. (In making this observation, I do not imply that the 2010 blowout was in any way deliberate, rather that the word “accident” implies unavoidable chance rather than failures of responsibility.)
Th e bulk of categorisation in 2011, then, positions the BP events along- side other business crises, natural crises, BP’s 2011 diffi culties and oppor- tunities to gain scientifi c knowledge for the future. Th ese are expected and conventional groupings, given the topic. Th is process has started to construct the events as an exemplar of something, often something out- side itself, for example, something to be dealt with by the International Association of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals (IACSP).
Th us categorisation works in a metonymic way, with the part that is the reference to BP serving to represent a whole that is a more graspable type of phenomenon. We begin to see the process of myth-making described by Barthes in action—that the signifi ed has become in turn a signifi er of something else. Th ese events are no longer unique, no longer distinc- tive—media confi dence in representation has moved on from the 2010 phrasing “We’ve never seen anything like this magnitude” to positioning the events alongside other phenomena that it is suggested to resemble.
Th e detail about the events that characterised the 2010 reports is no lon- ger a feature; the events are referred to in a shorthand through selected naming practices (analysed earlier), and in lists, comparisons and group- ings that indicate to the reader how he/she is expected to understand and locate this particular phenomenon.
In 2012, categorisation remains a signifi cant feature of media writing, with 18 instances appearing across the 20 texts. Th e categories into which the BP events are placed include some that are similar to those in 2011—
what I have called “expected groupings” such as BP business problems : BP has had a torrid time of late dealing with the costly repercussions of the Deepwater Horizon disaster and the failure of its Russian Arctic venture.
( CompaniesandMarkets.com , 27.4.2012)
Another expected group is the oil spill as the representation of the cat- egory “disaster”. In the fragment below, these are disasters that have aff ected the city of New Orleans:
After the storms, New Orleans endured the 2008 economic crash and the BP oil spill. (Sarasota Herald Tribune [Florida], 27.4.2012)
However, a particular characteristic of categorisation emerges in the 2012 data. Th ere is an increasing unexpectedness and creativity of the group- ings and listings. In 2012, the BP crisis is being made an exemplar of an increasingly disparate set of social phenomena. Th e following examples are illustrative:
Whether you are the leader of one of the Arab Spring countries, the ex-boss of BP, or a fashion designer prone to drunken, racist outbursts—if you don’t behave in the right way, people will remove you, and the weapon they will use is social media. (Campaign Middle East, 27.4.2012)
Th is [the complex issue of debt, both moral and fi nancial] includes BP’s failure to deal with its environmental transgressions, and the years-long dispute between two poor rural clans that keeps the members of one family virtual prisoners in their own home. (Th e New York Post, 27.4.2012) Th e fi rst example in particular is illustrative of the changes in some of the instances of categorisation in 2012. Th e category in this case is individuals who “don’t behave in the right way”, and so is broad and only indirectly related to the BP oil spill. To understand the point being made by the writer, in this case a businessperson writing in the advertis- ing trade journal “Campaign”, the reader needs to have knowledge of a range of unconnected events in the news. To relate to the thought, the reader needs to share a perspective that recognises these three examples as instances of bad behaviour. So the social and cultural resources the reader needs to bring to an understanding of the fi rst example above are far greater than those needed in previous years at an earlier stage of the representation process. Th is later type of categorisation demonstrates a form of meaning-making that depends less on ostensibly objective, fac- tual representation than on construction within a wider, culturally agreed and evaluative context.
In Summary
By 2012, the positioning of BP events within groups can be either expected or unexpected, and can serve as an exemplar for a number of phenomena, in diverse arguments. Th e movement from 2010 to 2011 to 2012 is that from a low level of tentative, provisional categorisation, through a relation with oil spills, crises and BP problems to fi nally a posi- tioning with unrelated events, the world’s ills and general political issues.
Part of the reason for a new creativity in categorisation is that the events are being categorised within the context of evaluative or persuasive rather than descriptive texts. Texts such as editorial and opinion pieces use language that is high in aff ect, with the result that the process of cate- gorisation appears to be less a listing of phenomena, as in 2011, and more an accumulation of evidence within an (often impassioned) argument.
Taking the examples above, in the fi rst fragment the phrases “drunken racist outbursts”, “behave in the right way”, “weapon they will use”, all express judgement, as does “failure” in the second text.
© Th e Author(s) 2017 127
J. Gravells, Semiotics and Verbal Texts, Postdisciplinary Studies in Discourse, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-58750-3_9