Chapter II
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Cetasika—Mental States
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(Definition)
§ 1. Ekuppàda–nirodhà ca — ekàlambanavatthukà Cetoyuttà dvipa¤¤àsa — dhammà cetasikà matà.
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§ 1. The fifty-two states that are associated with con- sciousness, that arise and perish together with conscious- ness, that have the same object and basis as consciousness, are known as Cetasiks (mental states).
Notes:—
The commentator cites reasons for attributing these four properties.
No consciousness exists apart from its concomitants.
Both consciousness and its respective co-adjuncts arise and perish simultaneously. But there are some material qualities, such as Vi¤¤àtti Råpa31 (Modes of Intimation) that arise and perish simultaneously with the conscious- ness. To exclude them the third property of having a com- mon object has been attributed. That which possesses these three characteristics must necessarily be endowed with the fourth—a common basis.
According to Abhidhamma, mind or consciousness is accompanied by fifty-two mental states (cetasikas).
One of them is Vedanà (feeling); another is Sa¤¤à (perception). The remaining fifty are collectively called Saïkhàrà. Cetanà (volition) is the most important of them.
The whole group of feelings is called Vedanàk- khandha. So are Sa¤¤àkkhandha and Saïkhàrakkhandha.
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Dvipa¤¤àsa Cetasikà
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(Sabbacittasàdhàraõà—7)
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Katham?
§ 2. (i) l. Phasso, 2. Vedanà, 3. Sa¤¤à, 4. Cetanà, 5. Ekaggatà, 6. Jãvitindriyaü, 7. Manasikàro
c’àti satt’ime Cetasikà Sabbacittasàdhàranà nàma.
31. Kàyavi¤¤atti (mode of action) and Vacã Vi¤¤atti (mode of speech).
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(Pakiõõakà—6)
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§ 3. (ii) 1. Vitakko, 2, Vicàro, 3. Adhimokkho, 4. Viriyaü, 5. Pãti, 6. Chando c’àti cha ime Cetasikà Pakiõõakà nàma.
Eva’mete Cetasikà A¤¤asamànà’ ti veditabbà. (13)
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(Akusala—14)
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§ 4. (iii) 1. Moho, 2. Ahirikaü, 3. Anottappaü,
4. Uddhaccaü 5. Lobho, 6. Diññhi, 7. Màno, 8. Doso, 9. Issà, 10. Macchariyaü, 11. Kukkuccaü,
12. Thãnaü, 13. Middhaü, 14. Vicikicchà c’àti cuddas’ime Cetasikà Akusalà nàma.
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(Sobhanasàdhàraõà—19)
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§ 5. (iv) 1. Saddhà, 2. Sati, 3. Hiri, 4. Ottappaü, 5. Alobho, 6. Adoso, 7. Tatramajjhattatà,
8. Kàyapassaddhi, 9. Cittapassaddhi, 10. Kàyalahutà, 11. Cittalahutà, 12. Kàyamudutà 13. Cittamudutà, 14. Kàyakamma¤¤atà, 15. Cittakamma¤¤atà,
16. Kàyapàgu¤¤atà, 17. Cittapàgu¤¤atà, 18. Kàyujjukatà, 19. Cittujjukatà, c’àti
ek’ånavãsat’ime Cetasikà Sobhanasàdhàraõà nama.
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(Viratiyo—3)
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§ 6. (v) 1. Sammàvàcà, 2. Sammàkammanto, 3. Sammà àjãvo c’àti tisso Viratiyo nàma.
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(Appama¤¤à—2)
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§ 7. (vi) 1. Karuõà, 2. Mudità pana
Appama¤¤ayo nàmà’ti sabbathà’pi—
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(Pa¤¤indriya—1)
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§ 8. (vii) Pa¤¤indriyena saddhiü pa¤cavãsat’ime Cetasikà Sobhanà’ti veditabbà.
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§ 9. Ettàvatà ca—
Teras’ a¤¤asamànà ca — cuddasàkusalà tathà Sobhanà pa¤cavãsà’ti — dvipa¤¤àsa pavuccare.
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52 Kinds Of Mental States
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(Universals32—7)
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§ 2. How?
(i) 1. Contact,33 2. Feeling, 3. Perception, 4. Volition, 5. One-Pointedness, 6. Psychic life, 7. Attention.
32. These ‘Universal’ cetasikas are invariably found in every consciousness.
33. Ven. Nyànatiloka suggests impression, or sense-impression or consciousness- impression.
These seven mental states are common to every consciousness.
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(Particulars34—6)
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§ 3. (ii) 1. Initial Application, 2. Sustained Application, 3. Decision, 4. Effort, 5. Joy, 6. Conation.
These six mental states are teamed Particulars.
Thus these (thirteen) mental states should be under- stood as ‘common to each other’ (a¤¤asamàna35).
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(Immorals—14)
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§ 4. (iii) 1. Delusion, 2. Shamelessness, 3. Fearlessness (of consequences, or to commit wrong), 4. Restless- ness, 5. Attachment, 6. Misbelief, 7. Conceit,
8. Hatred, 9. Jealousy, 10. Avarice, 11. Worry, 12, Sloth, 13. Torpor, 14. Doubt.
These fourteen mental states are termed ‘Immorals’.
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(Beautiful—19)
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§ 5. (iv) 1. Confidence, 2. Mindfulness, 3. (Moral) Shame, 4. (Moral) Dread, 5. Non-attachment, 6. Goodwill,
34. Unlike the Universals these cetasikas are found only in certain classes of consciousness.
35. A technical term applied collectively to all the 13 cetasikas which may be either moral or immoral according to the type of consciousness in which they are found. a¤¤a = another; samàna, common. When the good types of con- sciousness are taken into account the evil are regarded as a¤¤a, and vice versa.
7. Equanimity, 8. Tranquillity of mental states, 9. Tranquillity of mind, 10. Lightness of mental states, 11. Lightness of mind, 12. Pliancy of mental states, 13. Pliancy of mind, 14. Adaptability of mental states, 15. Adaptability of mind, 16. Proficiency of mental states, 17. Proficiency of mind, 18. Rectitude of mental states. 19. Rectitude of mind.
These nineteen mental states are termed ‘Common to Beautiful’.
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(Abstinences—3)
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§ 6. (v) 1. Right Speech, 2. Right Action, 3. Right Livelihood.
These three are termed ‘Abstinences.’
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(Illimitables—2)
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§ 7. (vi) 1. Compassion, 2. Appreciative or Sympathetic Joy.
These are termed ‘Illimitables’.
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(Wisdom—1)
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§ 8. (vii) With the Faculty of Wisdom these twenty-five mental states are in every way to be understood as
‘Beautiful.’
Summary
§ 9. Thus:—
Thirteen are common to each other. Similarly four- teen are common to Immorals. Twenty-five are ‘Beautiful’.
Thus fifty-two have been enumerated.
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Notes:—
2. Phassa36 — Derived from
√
phas, to contact.For any sense-impression to occur, three things are essential—namely, consciousness, respective sense, and the object. For instance, one sees an object with the con- sciousness through the eye as its instrument.
When an object presents itself to the consciousness through one of the six senses there arises the mental state—contact. “It should not be understood that mere col- lision is contact”37 (Na saïgatimatto eva Phasso).
Like a pillar which acts as a strong support to the rest of the structure, even so is contact to the coexistent mental concomitants.
“Contact means ‘it touches’ (phusatã’ti). It has touch- ing (phusana) as its salient characteristic (lakkhana), impact (saïghaññana) as its function (rasa), coinciding (of the physical basis, object and consciousness) as its mani- festation (sannipàta paccupaññhàna), and the object which has entered the avenue (of awareness) as proximate cause (padaññhàna).”
36. See The Expositor, Part 1, pp. 142–145.
37. Ibid. p. 145.
Contact is mentioned first because it precedes all other mental states. “Touching by contact, consciousness experiences by feeling, perceives by perception, wills by volition—(Phassena phusitvà, vedanàya vediyati, sa¤¤àya sa¤jànàti, cetanàya ceteti).” According to Pañicca- Samuppàda, too, Contact conditions Feeling. But strictly speaking, there is no reason for the sequence because all these mental states are coexistent. The Atthasàlinã states—
“For of states, arisen in one conscious moment, it is not valid to say that ‘this’ arises first, ‘that’ afterwards. The rea- son is not because contact is a strong support. Contact is just mentioned first in the order of teaching, but it was also permissible to bring it in thus:— There are feeling and con- tact, perception and contact, volition and contact: there are consciousness and contact, feeling, perception, volition, ini- tial application of mind. In the order of teaching, however, contact is mentioned first. Nor is the sequence of words among the remaining states of any special significance.”
“Contact is given priority of place, as standing for the inception of the thought, and as the sine qua non of all the allied states, conditioning them much as the roof-tree of a storeyed house supports all the other combinations of material.”
(Mrs. Rhys Davids — Buddhist Psychology, p. 6.) 3. Vedanà—Derived from
√
vid. to experience.Feeling is a more appropriate rendering for Vedanà
than sensation. Like contact, feeling is an essential prop- erty of every consciousness. It may be pleasurable, painful, or neutral. Pain and pleasure pertain to body as well. But physical feeling is not of ethical importance.
According to the commentators feeling is like a mas- ter who enjoys a dish prepared by a cook. The latter is compared to the remaining mental states that constitute a thought-complex. Strictly speaking, it is feeling that expe- riences an object when it comes in contact with the senses.
It is this feeling that experiences the desirable or undesirable fruits of an action done in this or in a previous birth. Besides this mental state there is no soul or any other agent to experience the result of the action.
It should be understood here that Nibbànic bliss is not connected with feeling. Nibbànic bliss is certainly the highest happiness (Sukha), but it is the happiness of relief from suffering. It is not the enjoyment of a pleasurable object.
4. Sa¤¤à—Saü +
√
¤à, to know. (Compare Latin cognoscere, to know.)The meaning of this term widely varies according to the context. To avoid unnecessary confusion, it is best to understand the specific meaning used in this particular connection as a universal mental state.
The chief characteristic of Sa¤¤à is the cognition of an object by way of a mark as blue etc. It is Sa¤¤à that
enables one to recognise an object that has once been per- ceived by the mind through the senses. “Its procedure is likened to the carpenter’s recognition of certain kinds of wood by the mark he had made on each; to the treasurer’s specifying certain articles of jewelry by the ticket on each;
to the wild animal’s discernment in the scarecrow of the work of man.”
Sa¤¤à, therefore, means simple sense-perception.
“Perception”, according to a modern Dictionary of Philosophy, “ is the apprehension of ordinary sense- objects, such as trees, houses, chairs, etc., on the occasion of sensory stimulation.”
Perception is not used here in the sense employed by early modern philosophers such as Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz.
As one of the five Khandhas (Aggregates) Sa¤¤à is used in the sense of perception.
Could it be that memory is due to this Sa¤¤à?
Sa¤¤à, Vi¤¤àõa and Pa¤¤à should be differentiated from one another. Sa¤¤à is like the mere perception of a rupee coin by a child. By its whiteness, roundness and size it merely recognises the coin as a rupee, utterly ignorant of its monetary value. A man, for instance, discerns its value and its utility, but is not aware of its chemical composition.
Vi¤¤àõa is comparable to the ordinary man’s knowledge of the rupee. Pa¤¤à is like the analytical knowledge of a chemist who knows all its chemical properties in every detail.