Kukatassa bhàvo = kukkuccaü = the state of having done amiss.
According to the commentary evil that is done is ku + kata, and so is good that is not done. Remorse over the evil that is done is Kukkucca, and so is remorse over the good that is not done.
It has the characteristic of grieving over the evil that is done and the good that is not done.
Dhammasaïganã explains:—
“What is worry?”
“Consciousness of what is lawful in something that is unlawful, consciousness of what is unlawful in something that is lawful; consciousness of what is immoral in some- thing that is moral; consciousness of what is moral in something that is immoral—all this sort of worry, fidget- ing, over-scrupulousness, remorse of conscience, mental sacrificing—this is what is called worry.”
(Buddhist Psychology — p. 313.) Kukkucca is one of the five Hindrances and is used together with Uddhacca. It pertains to past things only.
According to Vinaya, Kukkucca is healthy doubt with regard to rules, and is commended. According to Abhi- dhamma, on the contrary, it is repentance which is not commended.
26. Thãna—Derived from
√
the, to shrink, + na.Thena = thàna = thãna.
It is the shrinking state of the mind like a cock’s feather before fire. It is opposed to Viriya. Thãna is explained as Citta—gela¤¤aü, sickness of the mind.
As such It is the antithesis of Cittakamma¤¤atà, adaptability of the mind, one of the Sobhana cetasikas.
27. Middha—Derived from
√
middh, to be in- active, to be inert, to be incapable.This is the morbid state of the mental factors.
Both Thãna and Middha are always used in conjunc- tion, and are one of the five Hindrances. They are inhibited
by Vitakka, initial application, one of the Jhàna factors.
Middha, too, is opposed to Viriya. Where there are Thãna and Middha there is no Viriya.
Middha is explained as the Kàya-gela¤¤a, sickness of the mental body. Here body is not used in the sense of mate- rial form, but is applied to the body of mental factors, viz., Vedanà, Sa¤¤a and Saïkhàrà (feeling, perception, and the remaining fifty mental factors). Hence Middha is the anti- thesis of Kàyakamma¤¤atà, Adaptability of mental factors.
Both Thãna And Middha are explained in the Dham- masaïganã as follows:
“What is stolidity (Thãna)?
“ That which is indisposition, unwieldiness of intel- lect; adhering and cohering; clinging, cleaving to, stick- iness; stolidity, that is, a stiffening, a rigidity of the intellect—this is called stolidity.
“What is torpor (Middha)?
“That which is indisposition, unwieldiness of sense, a shrouding, enveloping, barricading within; torpor that which is sleep, drowsiness; sleep, slumbering, somnolence this is called torpor.”
(Buddhist Psychology, pp. 311, 312.) 28. Vicikicchà—See Ch. 1, note 13.
Vicikicchà, as a Hindrance, does not mean doubts with regard to the Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha, etc.,
Majjhima Nikàya commentary states — “it is so called because it is incapable of deciding that it is as such,”
(Idam’ev’idanti nicchetuü asamatthabhàvato’ti vicikicchà).
29. Saddhà—Saü, well; +
√
dah, to establish, to place, to put.Saüskrt Sraddhà is composed of Srat = faith +
√
dhà to establish.According to Pàli, Saddhà is well-established confi- dence in the Buddha, Dhamma, and the Sangha. Purifica- tion (sampasàdana) of its mental associates is its chief characteristic. It is compared to the water purifying gem of the universal monarch. This particular gem; when thrown into water, causes mud and water-weeds to subside. The water is consequently purified. In the same way Saddhà purifies the mind of its stains.
This Saddhà is not blind faith. It is confidence based on knowledge.
One might question whether a non-Buddhist could also possess this Saddhà.
Atthasàlinã raises this very question and provides an answer which is rather unsatisfactory and inadequate.
“Do men of false opinions not believe in their own teach- ers?” questions Venerable Buddhaghosa. His answer is:—
“They do. But that is not Saddhà; it is a mere acqui- escence in words (Vacanasampañicchanamattameva).”
If Saddhà is limited only to Buddhists, what shall we say when a non-Buddhist places his faith or confidence in his teacher? Surely his mind also gets purified to some extent when he thinks of his particular religious teacher.
Could it be Diññhi-false view? Then it is immoral (Akusala). In such a case there is no occasion for a non- Buddhist to experience a moral consciousness.
Would it not be more correct to say that Saddhà is mere confidence or faith, instead of restricting to the Triple Gem?
Dhammasaïganã explains Saddhà as follows:—
“The faith which on that occasion is trusting in, the professing confidence in, the sense of assurance, faith, faith as a faculty and as a power:”
(Buddhist Psychology, p. 14.) Saddhà is also apprehension intuitively of experience or knowledge gathered in past births.
30. Sati—Derived from
√
sar, to remember.Sati does not exactly correspond to the Western concep- tion of memory. Mindfulness is a better equivalent for Sati.
It has to be developed. In the Satipaññhàna Sutta are described in detail various methods to develop this Sati.
When it is highly developed one acquires the power of remembering past births. It is this Sati that is regarded as one of the factors of the Noble Eightfold Path.
Sati tends to present before oneself good things with- out allowing them to be forgotten. Its chief characteristic is
‘not floating away’ (apilàpana). Unlike pumpkins and pots that float on water, Sati plunges into the object of thought.
It should be noted that this particular Sati is not
found in immoral types of consciousness.
What is found in immoral consciousness is Micchà Sati (wrong mindfulness.)
Dhammasaïganã explains Sati as follows:—
“The mindfulness which on that occasion is recollect- ing, calling back to mind; the mindfulness which is remembering, bearing in mind the opposite of superficial- ity and of obliviousness; mindfulness as faculty: mindful- ness as power, right mindfulness”.
(Buddhist Psychology, p. 16).
Commenting on Sati, Mrs. Rhys Davids says:—
“Buddhaghosa’s comment on Sati, in which he closely follows and enlarges on the account in Mil. 37, 38, shows that the traditional conception of that aspect of con- sciousness had much in common with the Western modern theory of conscience or moral sense. Sati appears under the metaphor of an inward mentor, discriminating between good and bad and prompting choice. Hardy went so far as to render it by ‘conscience’, but this slurs over the interesting divergencies between Eastern and Western thought. The former is quite unmystical of the subject of Sati. It takes the psychological process or representative functioning (without bringing out the distinction between bare memory and judgment), and presents the same under an ethical aspect.”
(Buddhist Psychology, p. 16.) 31. Hiri & Ottappa—See Ahirika and Anottappa