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From individual to collective competences

Being competent in terms of CSR concerns every part of the organization.

Although the commitment of individuals is essential to the successful imple- mentation of CSR it is not sufficient. Organizations need to develop shared values and coordinated behaviour. Weick and Roberts (1993) highlight the importance of collective thinking in situations that require continuous operational reliability. In such situations cooperation among individuals is necessary to prevent accidents arising from unexpected incidents. Such cooperation develops during the process of association among the members of a group. Associating within groups consists of contributing, representing and subordination; that is, the group members determine their actions (con- tribute) in the light of the joint task (representation) and their subservience to it (subordination). As Asch (1952, pp. 251–2) puts it:

There are group actions that are possible only when each participant has a representation that includes the actions of others and their relations.

The respective actions converge relevantly, assist and supplement each other only when the joint situation is represented in each and when the representations are structurally similar. Only when these conditions are given can individuals subordinate themselves to the requirements of joint action. These representations, and the actions that they initiate, bring group facts into existence and produce the phenomenal solidity of group process.

The consequence of contribution, representation, and subordination is that the team members act as though they were one. In other words, collective mind’ develops and individual actions converge to meet the overall interest.

Sandelands and Stablein (1987) suggest that connections between actions are much more important for the emergence of a collective mind than con- nections between people. Based on joint experiences, shared history and other forms of interrelationship, an understanding arises of the organiza- tional social system and the actions that should be taken by the group. There are four requirements for the building of collective competences for CSR, as discussed below.

CSR must be anchored in a specific organizational identity

The initial requirement when making CSR a collective competence is a strong organizational identity. Whereas organizational reputation relates to the image that outsiders have of an organization, organizational identity relates to the image that employees, managers and other stakeholders have

of their own organization. It is about who they are and what is central in terms of values, norms and behaviour. Organizational identity defines an organization and distinguishes it from other organizations. It fosters the development of a community of work and serves as a guideline for employees in their day-to-day activities. It is at the heart of the social capital that employees and managers constitute: ‘Social capital consists of the stock of active connections among people: the trust, mutual understanding, and shared values and behaviours that bind the members of human networks and communities and make cooperative action possible’ (Cohen and Prusak, 2001, p. 4).

As with other values, CSR should be discussed throughout the organization in order to define the responsibilities of and establish guidelines for managers and employees. As a value anchored in the organizational identity, CSR gives meaning to the functioning of everyone in the organization (Schoemaker and Jonker, 2004). ‘We care for our environment’ and ‘A world without child labour’ are examples of company statements that reflect core values. Core values should fit the traditions of the organization and the personal values of its employees. If there is no fit between the organizational values and per- sonal values employees might seek new opportunities outside the organization.

Since organizational identity guides collective behaviour, a strong organiza- tional identity and the identification of CSR-specific values can create a sound basis for collective competences in CSR.

CSR requires cooperation at all levels

Another reason for organizing CSR at the collective level is that many responsibilities and functions can only be fulfilled by joint action by several departments, especially in functionally organized organizations with a high degree of task division. For example, when an organization wants to introduce a product innovation with less environmental impact it needs input not only from the R&D department but also from sales, purchasing and produc- tion. This connectedness between departments makes it necessary to have a joint understanding of the meaning of CSR throughout the organization.

Cooperation often even goes beyond the confines of the company. Only if there is cooperation and close interaction among the various parties involved in a commercial chain is it possible to engage in responsible chain management. One initiative to encourage responsible chain management is the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), an international non-profit organization founded in 1993 to support environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial and economically viable management of the world’s forests. Timber and goods with an FSC certificate have been checked at each stage of the chain, from forest to retailer.

The connectedness between the various parties involved raises questions about the scope of CSR. When it is a collective competence it is obvious that it should encompass all departments in an organization; but to what extent

should it also encompass external parties such as suppliers and customers?

Although this is essential to responsible chain management, many organiza- tions are reluctant to force their view of moral responsibility onto others.

This will be addressed later when strategies for CSR are presented.

Individual actions constitute organizational actions

The third reason for making CSR a collective competence is that individual actions take place in an organizational context and affect organizational actions. Every action by an individual employee, and every interaction between an individual employee and another stakeholder reflect what the organization is. This is especially true in the service industry, where employees interact with customers and other stakeholders every day.

Employees are representatives of their organization and the actions of one employee can affect all the other employees because they all represent the same organization. For example, if one employee accepts bribes the others will not be believed if they claim that the organization has a strict antibribery policy. Conversely if the organization has a strong reputation for not being open to bribery the employees will not be approached by potential bribers since the latter will know it is useless.

The connectedness between individual and collective actions raises the question of whether an abstract entity such as an organization can bear responsibility. An organization has no feelings, no conscience and cannot act by itself. Only the decision makers can act and evaluate the values involved. Thus Werhane (1985) argues that organizations can act only in a secondary sense. People in an organization are the primary actors, although they are acting on behalf of the organization and the reasons for acting are determined by the organization and authorized by its charter, goals and directives (ibid.) In this regard French (1984) emphasizes the importance of a formal decision-making structure and associated procedures. This structure focuses on the organization’s interests, and therefore the organization’s intentions may be distinct from the intentions of the individual employees.

This connectedness between individual and collective action makes it impossible for CSR to be organized on a strictly individual basis. It requires the organization as a whole to be moral actor with social, environmental and economic responsibilities. It also requires a collective learning process.

Corporate accountability requires corporate responsibility

The final reason for making CSR a collective competence is that corporate accountability is accompanied by corporate responsibility. When something goes wrong in an organization it is not just the employees who are directly involved who are called to account. First and foremost, the organization itself is called to account: this can include a liability to pay compensation and accept moral accountability for accidents. This second point was addressed above when we explored the interdependence between individual

and organizational actions. Here it is important to note that corporate accountability requires the organization, as a collective entity, to be prepared to bear corporate responsibility.

In order to examine the links between accountability and responsibility it is useful to reflect upon the necessary preconditions for bearing responsibility.

Bovens (1990) argues that accountability means acting in a responsible way.

Lenk (1992) reinforces this position when he asserts that freedom to act and responsibility are indivisible. The degree of responsibility that an individual can reasonably bear is limited by the opportunities to fulfil the accompanying obligations: ‘ought implies can’. There are four preconditions for the ability to get in a responsible way (see also De Leede et al., 1999).

First, freedom to determine the reasons for acting, to be an intentional actor, is an essential part of having to bear responsibility (French, 1984;

Wempe, 1998). This emphasizes the distinction between responsibility and responsiveness. Being responsive merely involves reacting to external stimuli, while acting in a responsible way requires a conscious evaluation of the values, objectives and consequences of potential actions. The latter is the second precondition, or what Thompson (1988) calls the ability to foresee. It extends the condition of internationality by adding responsibility for conse- quences that were not intended but could have been envisaged. Thompson puts this in terms of an advisor: ‘An advisor is responsible for the conse- quences of decisions based on his advice insofar as he could reasonably be expected to foresee that they would follow from his advice’ (ibid., p. 556).

Jonas (1984) builds on this in his analysis of the imperative of responsibility.

If it is not possible to exclude the possibility of adverse consequences, however, small they might be, then responsible actors should refrain from acting.

The third precondition relates to the situation in question. The situation should include options: if an actor has no possibility of meeting the expec- tations that accompany responsibility then responsibility cannot be given to that actor. In other words, in order to take responsibility it is necessary for there to be options available to enable the actor to act in a responsible way.

Finally, responsibility requires the actor to have certain capabilities. In this regard the ability to make a balanced evaluation of the various options is especially important. If an actor is not able to make such an evaluation then it is not possible to give that actor full responsibility.

As noted earlier, corporate accountability requires an organization – as a collective entity – to be prepared to bear corporate responsibility. The above preconditions suggest the types of measure that are necessary to function proactively in this regard (Table 10.1). For example, in a complex and highly departmentalized organization it is likely that no individual will have all the knowledge required to oversee and balance all aspects of important tasks such as assessing the safety of a plant or the possible environmental impacts that will occur during the life cycle of a product. In order to address these issues in an informed and balanced way it is necessary to set up information

and monitoring systems. Only when these organizational arrangements are in place will it be possible to make responsible choices.