The trend of creeping automation that began with Gatling’s gun will continue. Advances in artificial intelligence will enable smarter weapons, which will be capable of more autonomous operation. At the same time, another facet of the information revolution is greater networking. German U-boats couldn’t control the Wren torpedo once it was launched, not because they didn’t want to; they simply had no means to do so.
Modern munitions are increasingly networked to allow them to be controlled or retargeted after they’ve been launched. Wire-guided munitions have existed for decades, but are only feasible for short distances. Long- range weapons are now incorporating datalinks to allow them to be controlled via radio communication, even over satellites. The Block IV
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM-E, or Tactical Tomahawk) includes a two-way satellite communications link that allows the weapon to be retargeted in flight. The Harpy 2, or Harop, has a communications link that allows it to be operated in a human-in-the-loop mode so that the human operator can directly target the weapon.
When I asked McGrath what feature he would most desire in a future weapon, it wasn’t autonomy—it was a datalink. “You’ve got to talk to the missile,” he explained. “The missiles have to be part of a network.”
Connecting the weapons to the network would allow you to send updates on the target while in flight. As a result, “confidence in employing that weapon would dramatically increase.”
A networked weapon is a far more valuable weapon than one that is on its own. By connecting a weapon to the network, the munition becomes part of a broader system and can harness sensor data from other ships, aircraft, or even satellites to assist its targeting. Additionally, the commander can keep control of the weapon while in flight, making it less likely to be wasted. One advantage to the networked Tactical Tomahawk, for example, is the ability for humans to use sensors on the missile to do battle damage assessment (BDA) of potential targets before striking. Without the ability to conduct BDA of the target, commanders might have to launch several Tomahawks at a target to ensure its destruction, since the first missile might not completely destroy the target. Onboard BDA allows the commander to look at the target after the first missile hits. If more strikes are needed, more missiles can be used. If not, then subsequent missiles can be diverted in flight to secondary targets.
Everything has a countermeasure, though, and increased networking runs counter to another trend in warfare, the rise of electronic attack. The more that militaries rely on the electromagnetic spectrum for communications and sensing targets, the more vital it will be to win the invisible electronic war of jamming, spoofing, and deception fought through the electromagnetic spectrum. In future wars between advanced militaries, communications in contested environments is by no means assured. Advanced militaries have ways of communicating that are resistant to jamming, but they are limited in range and bandwidth. When communications are denied, missiles or drones will be on their own, reliant on their onboard autonomy.
Due to their expensive cost, even highly advanced loitering munitions are likely to fall into the same trap as TASM, with commanders hesitant to fire them unless targets are clearly known. But drones change this equation.
Drones can be launched, sent on patrol, and can return with their weapons unused if they do not find any targets. This simple feature—reusability—
dramatically changes how a weapon could be used. Drones could be sent to search over a wide area in space and time to hunt for enemy targets. If none were found, the drone could return to base to hunt again another day.
More than ninety nations and non-state groups already have drones, and while most are unarmed surveillance drones, an increasing number are armed. At least sixteen countries already possess armed drones and another dozen or more nations are working on arming their drones. A handful of countries are even pursuing stealth combat drones specifically designed to operate in contested areas. For now, drones are used as part of traditional battle networks, with decision-making residing in the human controller. If communications links are intact, then countries can keep a human in the loop to authorize targets. If communications links are jammed, however, what will the drones be programmed to do? Will they return home? Will they carry out surveillance missions, taking pictures and reporting back to their human operators? Will the drones be authorized to strike fixed targets that have been preauthorized by humans, much like cruise missiles today?
What if the drones run across emerging targets of opportunity that have not been authorized in advance by a human—will they be authorized to fire?
What if the drones are fired upon? Will they be allowed to fire back? Will they be authorized to shoot first?
These are not hypothetical questions for the future. Engineers around the globe are programming the software for these drones today. In their hands, the future of autonomous weapons is being written.