Adams, C. 174, 177
Addison, T. 24, 30; et al 27; and Murshed, S.M. 29, 30
Adonis, A. and Jones, S. 17 Africa 24, 25, 26, 30
agency 2, 6; lobbying model 148, 149–54, 159–60
Aidt, T.S. 153, 160 Akerlof, G. 2
Alesina, A. 64, 65; and Drazen, A. 66; et al 57, 65, 69, 90; and Perotti, R. 57;
and Spolaore, E. 90; and Tabellini, G.
57, 58, 68 Ally, A. 74 Andorra 84
Andreoni, J. et al 164, 177 Angola 28, 29, 30, 31
AOSIS see Association of Small Island States
APEC see Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
Aristotelous, K. and Fountas, S. 115 Arkwright, Richard 121
Armstrong, H.W. et al 73, 76, 77; and Read, R. 77, 79, 80, 81, 101 Arndt, S.W. 103
Arunatilake, N. et al 31 Ashoff, G. 75
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 82, 144
Asian crisis 27 Åslund, A. 50–1
Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) 77
Asteriou, D. et al 57, 58, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68
asymmetric information 2; adverse selection 2; auditor 6–7; moral hazard 2
auditors 6–7, 162; beliefs/optimal inference 167–9; boundary cases 169–71; equilibrium interactions 167–9; and equilibrium outcomes 171–5; imperfect but effective deterrence 173; and incentive traps 172–3; incentive wage scheme 163;
interdependence of auditor/taxpayer incentives 174–5; and legal procedures 166; moral hazard 7, 162, 164–5;
overstatements/understatements 167;
payment schedule 166; relationship with taxpayers 164, see also income tax
Australia 84
Auty, R.M. 28, 39, 41, 42, 44, 53 Avenhaus, E. 165
Ayres, R.W. 36
Azam, J.-P. 33; and Hoeffler, A. 29; and Mesnard, A. 26
Azerbaijan 39, 48, 49 Bagshi, A.K. 1 Bahamas 93 Bahrain 94
Baiman, S. et al 165 Balassa, B. 82
Baldone, S. et al 108, 115 Baldwin, R.E. 44 Ballance, R.H. et al 115 Baltagi, B.H. 111 Baltic Republics 44 Barrell, R. and Pain, N. 115
Barro, R.J. 57, 58, 72 Benedict, B. 73
Berdal, M. and Malone, D. 23 Berman, E. et al 115
Bernheim, B.D. and Winston, M.D. 148 Bessemer, Henry 122
Bevan, D. et al 44 Bhaduri, A. et al 74 Bhagwati, J. 124 Bird, R.M. 10 Birdsall, N. et al 41
Blazic-Metner, B. and Hughes, B. 76 Blöchliger, H. and Frey, R.L. 17 Bloom, D.E. and Williamson, J.G. 41 Bolton, Matthew 122
Boone, P. and Fedorov, B. 45 Borkakotti, J. 124, 125 Breton, A. 10
Bretton Woods 90, 99 2n Briguglio, L. 73, 75, 76, 78 Brunei 82
Buchanan, J.M. 1, 3, 12, 17 Buitler, W.H. 93
bureaucracy 2 Burundi 25, 26 Cambodia 23, 29
Campos, N.F. and Nugent, J.B. 3 Canada 133, 135, 136, 142, 143–4 CARICOM (Caribbean Community) 82 Cartwright, Edmund 121
Casella, A. and Frey, B.S. 16 Caspian Basin 45, 49, 52 Caves, R.E. 108
CEC see Commission for Environmental Cooperation
Central African Republic (CAR) 93 Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 44, 45,
52
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) 17
Chadha, J.S. and Hudson, S.L. 98 Channel Islands 84
Chenery, H.B. et al 72; and Syrquin, M.
72
civil war 3, 4; background 22–3; causes 35; and contest over natural resources 27–9; as criminal acquisitive desire 23;
and diasporic contributions 29; and
discrimination in public spending/
taxation 25; and economic mismanagement/recession 26–7;
economic/political aspects 24; as greed/grievance 23; and high asset inequality 25–6; intensity/financing of 29; origin/persistence of 24–9; and relative deprivation 25–7; and religion/
ethnicity 24; and superpower assistance 29; and U-shaped relationship with democratic institutions 23–4; uncertainty following 30, see also conflict clubs, Buchanan-type 12, 13; convergence
76, 77 Coase, R.H. 106
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. 23, 27, 33 Commission for Environmental
Cooperation (CEC) of NAFTA 138–9, 140, 141, 142
Commonwealth Consultative Group 75 Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) 44, 52 communication 105
comparative advantage 10, 113; and fragmentation 104–5; of small states 77; in transition economies 48–9 competition, equilibrium in 61; exit
options 12–13; market 12; political 12–13
competitive advantage 130
competitive industrialisation model, early start 41; interlocking social circle 41;
postponement of 43; reform at low per capita income 41; virtuous economic circle 41
Conconi, P. 148, 160
conflict 4; between nations 23; and criminal activity 23; diasporic involvement 23; low-intensity 29;
management 22; and peace 30–1, 35;
and political/civil rights 22; post- conflict situations 30–1; and reconstruction/rebuilding of social contract 31, 33–5; and rent-seeking 23;
resolution 22; social 22–3, see also civil war
Congo-Brazzaville 28 Connell, J. 84
corruption 26; and natural resources 42;
political 65; and rent-seeking 42, 50–2
Costa Rica 94
crime, criminals 23, 54n Crisp, J. 30
Crompton, Samuel 121
Cuff, R.D. and Granatstein, J.L. 136 currency areas 90
currency unions 80–1 Darby, J. et al 57 Davis, M. 1
De Melo, M. et al 44 Deardorff, A.V. 103, 115
decentralisation, political see functional overlapping competing jurisdictions (FOCJ)
defence 78–9 Demas, W.G. 71, 73
democracy 30; effect of human/social capital on 41; move towards 41 Deno, K.T. and Mehay, S.L. 16 dependency theory 1
DeSombre, E. 143
developing countries 1, 6, 90; civil war in 23; quality of governance, institutions, public services 32
development economics 1
Devereux, M. and Wen, J.-F. 57, 58 diamonds 23, 28, 31
DiLorenzo, T.J. 16 dispute settlement 3 Dixit, A.K. 2, 3, 30, 31 Dobb, M.H. 1
Dommen, E.C. and Hein, P.L. 73 Downs, A. 13
Drazen, A. 57, 65, 67
Driffield, N. and Munday, M. 111 Dunning, J.H. 108, 132
Dutch disease 40–1, 43, 54n; effect on Russian restructuring 48–50, 53 East African Currency Union 90 East Asia 45
East Timor 29
Easterly, W. and Rebelo, S. 57 economics, asymmetric information 2;
classical 1; consent/absence in human
interaction 22; dependency theory 1;
libertarian school 1; lobbying/political contribution 2–3; neoclassical 1–3;
normative 1; optimal policies 2;
positive 1; radical/Marxist 1; recent developments 3–7; strategic 2;
theoretical 1–2
Economides, G. et al 59, 64, 66, 67, 68 economies, Type I 84
Ecuador 80 Edgeworth, F.Y. 22 Edwards, S. 73 El Salvador 25
elections 13; and civil war 30; empirical evidence 64–5; and government shortsightedness/inefficiences 59;
politico-economic model 59–67;
re-election probablities 58, 62–3, 64, 65; and taxation 58–9; uncertainty in 5, 57–67
Ellman, M. and Wantchekon, L. 30 emission leakages 148, 150–2 endogenous growth 127 ENGO see Environmental Non-
Governmental Organization Environmental Non-Governmental
Organization (ENGO) 140 environmental regulations 130–1;
challenges/opportunities 144; impact of NAFTA 140–4; institutional responsiveness 131–2, 144; link with trade policy regime 148–9;
multilateral international agreements 131–2; new strategies 134–5, 144–5;
political instruments 136–40; political process 152–5; traditional strategies 132–4; trans-border 6, see also firm environmental strategies; government environmental strategies
equality see inequality Equatorial Guinea 93
equilibrium, and income tax/auditors 167–9, 171–5; and lobbying 154–5;
political 61–2, 63–4, 68 3n Eritrea 24, 29
Esty, D. and Geradin, D. 139 Ethiopia 24, 29
ethnicity 4; and economic mismanage- ment 26–7; and inequality 25
Europe, decentralisation deficit 9–10;
democratic deficit 9; diversity of 9, 10;
flawed concept of 10; and free trade 10; and functional, overlapping, competing jurisdictions 11–19; and governmental competition 10–11; and integration 10; as peaceful 9; vision for 10
European Commission 3
European Constitutional Group 13 European Union (EU) 9, 17–18, 82, 83,
144; bilateral trade 81; integration process 69 18n; proposals for 10–19;
success/failure of 10; trade fragmentation in 108–14 Eurostat trade data 108, 111
exchange rates 5, 80–1; choice of 90;
credibility–flexibility trade-off 91–3;
fixed 5, 90, 92, 94, 98; flexible 5, 90, 93; floating 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 96, 99;
Russian 48; spectral decomposition 96; and sticky prices 89, 92–3, 96;
summary statistics 93–4; unconditional variability 94–6
exogenous shocks 77, 80 exports 49, 133, 135, 141; narrow
structure of 74 external shocks 49 Falvey, R.E. 127
FDI see foreign direct investment federalism 3–4, see also functional
overlapping competing jurisdictions (FOCJ)
Feenstra, R.C. 108; and Hanson, G.H. 115 Fehr, E. et al 174
Figni, P. and Görg, H. 115 Findlay, R. 23
firm environmental strategies, ad hoc exemptions 132–3; California effect 134; coalition-building 136;
convergent national adjustment 137–8;
domestic market producer 135;
domestic market standards 134;
domestic withdrawal 133; high-level diplomacy 136–7; home-based multinational enterprise 135; impact of NAFTA institutions on 140–4;
litigation 136; lobbying 136; market
diversification 133–4; minimum prices in exchange 135; move production closer to export market 134–5; new 134–5, 144–5; pay incremental costs 133; product/production alterations 133;
retaliation 137; subsidisation 137;
traditional 132–4, see also environmental regulations fiscal equivalence 12
fiscal policy 5; pseudo-monetary integration 80–1
FOCJ see functional overlapping competing jurisdictions
FOCUS 12–13, 14
foreign direct investment (FDI) 6, 52, 110, 111, 113
fragmentation 6; analysis 114; defined 103–
4, 114; determinants of 110–14;
empirical results of 114; explanations for 105; international trade 104–6;
measuring for 108–9; theoretical concepts 104–7; transaction costs 106–7
France 109 Frank, A.G. 1
Fredriksson, P. 149, 160
free riding 5; defence as international public good 78–9; and global trade liberalisation 79–80; and international order 77–8; and pseudo-monetary integration/currency unions 80–1; and small states 77–8
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 82, 144, 160 2n
Free-Trade Area (FTA) 138
Frey, B.S. 11, 13, 15, 177; and Holler, M.
174, 177; and Oberholzer-Gee, F. 174 functional overlapping competing
jurisdictions (FOCJ) 3–4; alleged problems 14–15; barriers to 18; benefits 13–14; characteristics 11–12;
comparison to other proposals 17–18;
competition 12–13; condition for 18;
evaluation of 13–15; as flexible concept 19; functions 12; historical precursors 15–16; jurisdictions 13; and need to coordinate activities 15; and overburdened citizens 14; and overburdened consumers 14–15;