The Intelligence Enterprise
2.6 Intelligence Process Assessments and Reengineering
The U.S. IC has been assessed throughout and since the close of the Cold War to study the changes necessary to adapt to advanced collection capabilities, changing security threats, and the impact of global information connectivity and information availability. Published results of these studies provide insight into the areas of intelligence effectiveness that may be enhanced by organizing the community into a KM enterprise. We focus here on the technical aspects of
the changes rather than the organizational aspects recommended in numerous studies.
2.6.1 Balancing Collection and Analysis
Intelligence assessments have evaluated the utility of intelligence products and the balance of investment between collection and analysis. One internal CIA study conducted in 1971 recognized that the early advances in space-based col- lection must be complemented by analytic methods to gain an overall improve- ment in the utility of intelligence:
During the past decade alone, … spectacular increases in collection activi- ties have occurred. Where satellite photography is concerned, the increases have led to greatly improved knowledge about military capabilities of potential enemies. But expanded collection by means other than photogra- phy has not brought about a similar reduction in our uncertainly about the intentions, doctrines, and political processes of foreign powers. Instead, the growth in raw intelligence—and here satellite photography must be included—has come to serve as a proxy for improved analysis, inference, and estimation [19].
The U.S. Congress, monitoring the relative contribution of collection and analysis, has commented on the balance of investments in each of these areas. In 1996 the House Intelligence Committee noted its “desire to focus more atten- tion on the ‘downstream’ activities of processing, exploitation and dissemination of intelligence data and analysis. The Committee strongly registered its convic- tion that collection costs must be reduced over the long-term and funding increased for numerous processing activities. Moreover, we remain very con- cerned about the Community’s ability to utilize the anticipated volume of infor- mation from planned collection increases” [20].
2.6.2 Focusing Analysis-Synthesis
An independent study [21] of U.S. intelligence recommended a need for intelli- gence to sharpen the focus of analysis-synthesis resources to deal with the increased demands by policymakers for knowledge on a wider ranges of topics, the growing breadth of secret and open sources, and the availability of commer- cial open-source analysis. The study offered several recommendations for analysis-synthesis [22]:
• Retain the focus of critical national and military intelligence analytic resources on the most crucial national security threats and hard targets
whose understanding is only amenable to secret sources, methods, and analyses.
• Exploit the growing availability of university experts, think tanks, and commercial (private-sector open-source) analysis, developing means of collaborating with these resources.
• Apply competitive analysis-synthesis—duplicative analysis to ensure independent perspectives and judgments—for only the most critical or ambiguous targets.
2.6.3 Balancing Analysis-Synthesis Processes
One assessment conducted by the U.S. Congress reviewed the role of analysis- synthesis and the changes necessary for the community to reengineer its processes from a Cold War to a global awareness focus. Emphasizing the crucial role of analysis, the commission noted:
Theraison d’etreof the Intelligence Community is to provide accurate and meaningful information and insights to consumers in a form they can use at the time they need them. If intelligence fails to do that, it fails altogether.
The expense and effort invested in collecting and processing the informa- tion have gone for naught [23].
The commission identified the KM challenges faced by large-scale intelligence analysis that encompasses global issues and serves a broad customer base. The commission’s major observations provide insight into the emphasis on people- related (rather than technology-related) issues that must be addressed for intelli- gence to be valued by the policy and decision makers that consume intelligence:
1. Build relationships. A concerted effort is required to build relationships between intelligence producers and the policymakers they serve.
Producer-consumer relationships range from assignment of intelli- gence liaison officers with consumers (the closest relationship and greatest consumer satisfaction) to holding regular briefings, or simple producer-subscriber relationships for general broadcast intelligence.
Across this range of relationships, four functions must be accom- plished for intelligence to be useful:
• Analysts must understand the consumer’s level of knowledge and the issues they face.
• Intelligence producers must focus on issues of significance and make information available when needed, in a format appropriate to the unique consumer.
• Consumers must develop an understanding of what intelligence can and—equally important—cannot do.
• Both consumer and producer must be actively engaged in a dialogue with analysts to refine intelligence support to decision making.
2. Increase and expand the scope of analytic expertise. The expertise of the individual analysts and the community of analysts must be maintained at the highest level possible. This expertise is in two areas: domain, or region of focus (e.g., nation, group, weapon systems, or economics), and analytic-synthetic tradecraft. Expertise development should include the use of outside experts, travel to countries of study, sponsor- ship of topical conferences, and other means (e.g., simulations and peer reviews).
3. Enhance use of open sources. Open-source data (i.e., publicly available data in electronic and broadcast media, journals, periodicals, and com- mercial databases) should be used to complement (cue, provide con- text, and in some cases, validate) special, or closed, sources. The analyst must have command of all available information and the means to access and analyze both categories of data in complementary fashion.
4. Make analysis available to users. Intelligence producers must increas- ingly apply dynamic, electronic distribution means to reach consumers for collaboration and distribution. The DoD Joint Deployable Intelli- gence Support System (JDISS) and IC Intelink were cited as early examples of networked intelligence collaboration and distribu- tion systems.
5. Enhance strategic estimates.The United States produces national intelli- gence estimates (NIEs) that provide authoritative statements and fore- cast judgments about the likely course of events in foreign countries and their implications for the United States. These estimates must be enhanced to provide timely, objective, and relevant data on a wider range of issues that threaten security.
6. Broaden the analytic focus.As the national security threat envelope has broadened (beyond the narrower focus of the Cold War), a more open, collaborative environment is required to enable intelligence analysts to interact with policy departments, think tanks, and acade- mia to analyze, debate, and assess these new world issues.
In the half decade since the commission recommendations were pub- lished, the United States has implemented many of the recommendations. Sev- eral examples of intelligence reengineering include:
• Producer-consumer relationships. The introduction of collaborative net- works, tools, and soft-copy products has permitted less formal interac- tion and more frequent exchange between consumers and producers.
This allows intelligence producers to better understand consumer needs and decision criteria. This has enabled the production of more focused, timely intelligence.
• Analytic expertise. Enhancements in analytic training and the increased use of computer-based analytic tools and even simulation are providing greater experience—and therefore expertise—to human analysts.
• Open source. Increased use of open-source information via commercial providers (e.g., Lexis Nexis™ subscription clippingservices to tailored topics) and the Internet has provided an effective source for obtaining background information. This enables special sources and methods to focus on validation of critical implications.
• Analysis availability. The use of networks continues to expand for both collaboration (between analysts and consumers as well as between analysts) and distribution. This collaboration was enabled by the intro- duction and expansion of the classified Internet(Intelink)that intercon- nects the IC [24].
• Broadened focus. The community has coordinated open panels to dis- cuss, debate, and collaboratively analyze and openly publish strategic perspectives of future security issues. One example is the “Global Trends 2015” report that resulted from a long-term collaboration with academia, the private sector, and topic area experts [25].