3 Theorising regional planning
3.7 Major issues in power and democracy
Perhaps the two major process questions in any regional planning context are: (1) Who now reallymakes the key decisions? and (2) Who shouldtake these decisions for the process to be recognised as democratic and fair? There are no easy answers to these questions, but any student or practitioner needs to give them some thought. The first is a factual one, but as any student of political science will know, an extraordinarily hard one to research and to claim a sure answer. The second question is normative, and is aided by some understanding of democratic theorising. The questions are clearly related to the division made above between elite and participatory forms of regional planning, though they may also go beyond that division. Some of the issues are introduced here, to return to these in the final chapter with an overview of where regional planning seems to be going.
3.7.1 Power in planning
Particularly since the mid 1990s planning theorists have been debating the question of power in planning (key references are Flyvbjerg 1998; Healey 2003;
Hillier 2002; Huxley 2000; Ploger 2001; Rydin 2003a). The debate has not been a fully coherent one in the sense that participants have been coming at the issue from widely differing theoretical starting points. The twist given here will be directed to the questions at hand. One essential line of disagreement has been what scope for choice is present in planning, particularly for those doing planning at a local or strategic level. Some scholars emphasise the space for cre- ativity and innovation, because they see power structures or pressures as enabling as much as constraining. Others stress the force of limits, whether coming from dominant discourses, institutional configurations, or the power of greater or lesser resourcing. These may be described as the ‘deep structure’ of power, the
‘third face of power’, or ‘context-shaping power’, in three different formulations summarised by Hill (2005 p. 49).
A particularly valuable set of reflections on power comes from Louis Albrechts, the Belgian planning academic, who led the making of the Flanders Structure Plan in the late 1990s (e.g. Albrechts 1999). He makes a conscious
effort to bring together the sides of the above disagreement (in a sense combin- ing two of the leading social theorists who have influenced planning thought since the 1980s, Michel Foucault and Juergen Habermas). He opts for an approach which seeks radical change, within something like a collaborative and communicative planning approach. But he chronicles clearly how this was not possible in the Flanders case. All sorts of pragmatic decisions were needed to make an adequate plan, bringing out graphically the interactions with the polit- ical process, the role of relevant ministers, the need to embed the regional plan within main line planning, to get allegiance to its proposals, among much else.
In other words, Albrechts reveals the constant compromises with real power, alongside the real scope for creativity and repeated innovation – here, perhaps especially the latter given the novelty of regional planning in Belgium.
The two differing perspectives (enabling, limiting)seem to be grounded partly in personal or temperamental differences, or possibly in experience of change in dif- ferent countries. They also relate to different conceptions of the workings of power.
Those of a more conventional hue see power as operating with particular force in particular directions, for example in governments or armies or in corporations largely from the top down, and that these macro structures have more effect than smaller phenomena. Followers of Michel Foucault see power as much more dis- persed, operating everywhere at all times, and as continually reinforced by all actors, however powerless they might be conventionally seen to be. This may or may not be seen as giving more scope for change (depending on whether micro forces are seen as potentially open to change or not). But it does tend to stress the importance of individual actors, and of the creating and maintaining of discourses.
Partly, this is a matter of how the state is understood. Political scientists have tried to reconceptualise the nature of contemporary states. One split is seen in Table 3.2. The creators of this division in the end reject the hypothesis that we have moved to a more ‘postmodern’ state. They argue that the state has not been hollowed out, but reconstituted, in a strong form with a strong central executive. But they admit that there have been some changes from the more Theorising regional planning: processes 55
Table 3.2 The traditional versus the postmodern state
Weberian bureaucratic state A postmodern state
Government Governance
Hierarchy (Weberian) Heterarchy (networks etc.) Power (1): zero-sum game Power (1): positive-sum game Power (2): concentrated Power (2): diffuse
Elitist Pluralist
Unitary, centralised, monolithic state Decentralised, fragmented, hollowed state Strong, central executive Segmented executive
Clear lines of accountability Blurred/fuzzy lines of accountability State central control State central steering
Single homogeneous public service ethos Heterogeneous service culture Source: Richards and Smith (2002 p. 36, Table 2.2). By permission of Oxford University Press.
traditional form of state (Richards and Smith 2002). These changes are partly in the direction of ‘governance’, with a different form of collaboration between state and private corporations, the goals of the state being more subordinated to those of business. On that basis government may be seen as a modified form of corporatism, and within that frame, regional planning may be seen as a region- alised corporatism to serve this national goal. The term ‘corporatism’ means a systematic tendency by government to include selected interests in privileged positions in decision making, hence excluding the rest.
This can be tackled from another direction. Power in regional planning in the UK might be seen as, at the extreme, either extraordinarily constrained, or as radically dispersed.Those seeing wide open scope and dispersionmight argue that the consti- tutional or institutional reforms since the 1990s have created new opportunities to make fresh balances of the trajectory of each nation or region. This may be seen as particularly true in the cases of Scotland, Wales and (potentially if not quite yet) Northern Ireland, where constitutional reform has handed significant powers to newly legitimate governments, who can in principle come to a new settlement of their territories, stressing whatever priorities they may wish, within the all UK and EU framework. Optimists will argue that spatial planning work since 2000 gives evidence of the creation of such planning space (Chapter 6 will consider that perspective). In the English regions it may be argued, in a slightly different way, that the cumulative effects of change from 1990 onwards have created an instrument, the RSS, adequate to the spatial realities of the English regions. It is then up to regional actors to grasp this opportunity, which is necessarily wider open than that facing local authorities in the past, because of the wider canvas and the more extensive involvement of all regional interests.
Any sense of disempowerment will be merely self-confirming, when the need is for regions to be proactive and assert their interests.
The opposite argument is that the constraints through a whole range of conventional power structures are real and growing. The apparent gift of regional or national autonomy, in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, is so hedged about by a range of factors (economic, party political, by extensive legislation which applies across the UK) that the real range of strategic choices is much reduced. The most powerful baseline is seen as that of a neoliberalising and globalising capital- ism, fully supported by the UK government, whereby every spatial level is called to compete for private investment and for public (UK government) resources. In the English regions more specific impediments may be seen as having been created, including the micro specification of PPSs, the institutional architecture and resourcing of the regions (especially the government decision not to create English elected regional government, but to form regional development agencies controlled from the centre, alongside an extensive central government adminis- tration and agency network), and the continuous weakening of one of the tradi- tional bases of autonomous planning, local government. The real winner in English ‘regionalisation’ is then seen as the Government Offices for the Regions (GORs) – the arms of central government (Mussonet al. 2006).
These arguments are presented in Table 3.3. By addressing explicitly the
Table 3.3Power and regional planning in the UK – two perspectives Dimension of contextRegional planning as enabledRegional planning as constrained New institutionsNew bodies in Scotland, Wales and England all offer Regional institutions, at least in England outside London, good chances for innovative strategising, in varying are too weak to be able to innovate effectively, and so are degreesdependent on central government when major decisions have to be made Political economy of By involving all stakeholders, especially the private Private developers, and some pressure groups, now have ownership and controlsector, planners can make plans which are capable of much greater influence, especially over implementation, implementationthan representatives of public interests Public resourcingFar more resources are available for regional planning Resources for planning activity still meagre, given very activity than ever in the UKheavy new demands, and for implementation of strategies resources are only a small proportion of real needs Changed powers of Weakening of local authorities in England and to Local authorities gave a base independent of government, lower jurisdictionsdegrees in other parts of UK give fresh chance for wider which now can impose its agenda relatively easily vision of the real areas to be planned Central guidanceFaith is placed for the first time in regional planning to Guidance from the UK planning ministry, and to a certain develop regionally specific options, if adequate extent from the equivalent ministries in the other countries, arguments are developedconstrain radically what can be done regionally, making English RSSs little more than regional application of central formulas
power dimensions in the UK context, the wider contours of planning can be seen more clearly. This by no means delivers an answer as to whether the con- straining or dispersed view of power in planning is more true in any one context. It may be hoped that there is much strength in the enabling position, as this would give support for regionally specific innovation. But there seems little doubt that a combination of state and wider globalising forces are tending to narrow the planning agenda, whether locally or regionally, not just in the UK. To shift that, new discourses and imaginations may be needed, to start with.
3.7.2 Planning and democracy
Another perspective on many of the same issues comes from the question of how to make public policy making more democratic. Of course this may not be an objective of planning. Greater overall wealth, or economic efficiency, or ecological sustainability, may be values placed above this. But in the UK and elsewhere many arguments about regional government and by extension regional planning have been phrased partly in democratic terms (Keating 1998). Democracy has been one pole in debates taking place in the UK recently (Beetham 2005; Beethamet al. 2002; Sampson 2004). The reform of the plan- ning system has also been contentious in this respect, with the Conservative Party committed at the time of writing to abolishing Labour’s regionalisation (including RAs) and to returning planning powers to local authorities (David Cameron, Conservative Party Leader speech, 30 March 2006). So a considera- tion of the democratic-ness of current planning, including the regional dimen- sion, can make a useful contribution to thinking about the regional planning process.
As Chapter 5 will show in detail, powers in planning in England (where the democratic issue is at its sharpest) are concentrated at three levels. Two of these are elected, the central government and the local authorities, while the regions in the middle are not, and are not likely to be in the foreseeable future. The legitimacy of the three levels may be seen as differing in form. Central govern- ment depends on its elected status, plus a commitment to consult on new legis- lation and guidance, in which it responds to the concerns of interest groups.
Local government and regional governing bodies are seen to depend much more heavily on consultation processes, a core part of the new planning system, although councils retain some legitimacy from being elected.
Under these circumstances it is by no means clear where a ‘neutral’ democrat would want to locate most planning power. In the past it can be argued that at least a significant quotient lay at the local (county or district) level, even though always since the 1940s with clear constraints from central government.
Now, and particularly since about 2000, it can be argued that the emphasis has shifted to central government, which has taken the lead in a whole range of ways, centrally, regionally, sub-regionally and locally, to influence planning policy. This shift is contested by some local and environmental interests. It
connects to a particular view of the appropriate economic trajectories for these areas, and thus relates to a more or less explicit regional policy, to boost all parts of England economically. Where we stand as to the most appropriate demo- cratic arrangement of planning depends on our conception of democracy, so it is necessary to examine this.
Recent discussions of democracy have stressed the multiplicity of dimensions that need to be taken into account in looking at any particular situation (Beetham 2005; Dryzek 2000; Saward 2003; Weale 1999). Saward emphasises the range of devices that can be combined to make different forms of demo- cratic practice. By devices he means any separable element, such as a referen- dum, proportional voting, responding to interest groups, a citizens’ jury and so on (see Table 3.4). He then discusses how these may be phased or sequenced to make up a coherent democratic storyline or mechanism. This conception is rather neutral as to what general arrangements are more democratic. It gives us no model or template against which to evaluate our regional planning practice.
It says rather: look at the overall devices set– and feel the quality, in some way.
This may not be the simplest advice to institutional designers, and clearly needs development. However, it may be nearer the answer than external prescription.
In regional planning this can be seen in practice in the sequence laid out in PPS11, although it would be necessary to extend that to include antecedents and sub- sequent revision, to see the whole run of regional planning process. It would then be seen that a number of devices are included – a somewhat representative Theorising regional planning: processes 59
Table 3.4 Possible devices that might be used in regional planning, giving different balances of democratic control to different interests
General Electoral Corporatist Deliberative
form of democratic device
Examples Elections at national Interest group activity Public meetings of devices level for central at all levels Focus groups
government Interest group Citizens’ juries Elections at local level representation in Examination in public for local authorities regional assemblies of RSS
Elections for regional Opinion polling (may
authorities (not existing have deliberative
in England) element, if linked to
Referenda at any level group discussions; may
(All may be carried out be carried out by
more or less differernt interests, with
proportionally) different slants), TV,
radio, press Internet based information and exchanges
assembly as regional planning body, a process of interest group involvement, opinion polling, focus group organising, public examination, decisions and guid- ance throughout by an elected central government (or its officials) and so on.
Although the English approach to regional planning has not yet been described in detail, it will be seen that a complex set of democratic or partially democratic devices is being included; equally others are excluded. No elected regional government is there to integrate and legitimise actions, no referendum is present for elements of the plan or for the whole plan, vetoes are not available to potentially excluded groups – to mention some paths not taken.
How the pros and cons of democratic surplus and democratic deficit are bal- anced up is going to remain in part subjective and in part related to our substan- tive goals – in shorthand, political. A large company wishing to get ahead in the European market will in principle prefer a submissive and permissive plan- ning mechanism, subject to few localist or critical voices and forces. People concerned about environmental conditions or about the prospects for weaker interests, may opt for a more open process, more locally controlled. These links of process and substance cannot be avoided. The argument here is not at all for some pure relativism, that it simply depends what your interest is. But it is essen- tial to specify the interests at play, explicitly and consciously, to come to some view on degrees of democracy.