Notes

1 See Parsons (1995: 27) for a list of the key texts on the study of public policy.

2 In an appendix to his book on politics, values and public policy Fischer (1980) points at some early examples of comparative research aiming at establishing causal linkages between dependent and independent variables of policy models. He mentions Rae and Taylor (1971), and, for a critical review of the literature, Jacob and Lipsky (1968). He also refers to Hammond and Adelman (1978) for an illustration of the integration of social scientific data about policy variables and normative judgements about the variables elicited from the political environment. As a ‘post-positivist’, Fischer is critical of the extent to which what he calls ‘the scientific approach’ – formal modelling – can contribute to integrating empirical and normative judgements.

3 Compare Popper’s statement (1959) on the preliminary character of all scientific knowledge.

4 For a relatively early use of the term, see Wittrock (1983).

5 Though we cannot trace anymore where and when, it was Robert Golembiewski who introduced this distinction to us.

INTRODUCTION 17

Positioning Implementation Studies

Introduction

It has become conventional to see implementation studies as emergent in the 1970s. Hargrove then (1975) wrote of the ‘missing link’ in the study of the policy process while Pressman and Wildavsky’s influential Implementation was published in 1973. The reaction of one of us to Pressman and Wildavsky’s claim that they could find next to no literature on implementation was to draft a short paper for his colleagues headed by a quotation from Molière’s Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme: ‘Gracious me!

I have been talking prose for the last forty years and have never known it.’ While not at that stage being able to claim forty years experience of academic work, earlier work had involved trying to reinforce longstanding concerns in public administration with ideas from organization theory in the implementation part of the policy process (Hill, 1972). Obviously, implementation was a central concern, though that word was seldom used. Pressman and Wildavsky’s bibliography, ostensibly demonstrating the absence of an implementation literature, did not contain such classic American works as Blau’s The Dynamics of Bureaucracy(1955), Kaufman’s

CONTENTS Introduction 18

Concerns about implementation: historical origins 20 The rule of law 22

The implications of the idea of democracy 28 Institutional theory 32

Postmodernist theory 37 Conclusions 39

Notes 40

The Forest Ranger(1960) and, above all, Selznick’s TVA and the Grass Roots (1949).

Van Meter and Van Horn, in another of the seminal contributions to the modern implementation literature, were similarly critical of Pressman and Wildavsky’s omissions:

While we share Pressman and Wildavsky’s concern that far too little attention has been paid to the question of policy implementation, their criticism of the literature is unnecessarily harsh and shortsighted. Our argument is put simply: there is a rich heritage from the social sciences which is often over- looked by those purporting to discuss the policy implementation process.

This literature includes theoretical and empirical work in several disciplines, including sociology, public administration, social psychology and political science. While most of these studies do not examine specifically the policy implementation process, close inspection reveals that it takes little imagi- nation to comprehend their relevance. (1975: 452–3)

Hargrove, obviously stung by such comments, argued in a later paper:

It could be argued that I misstate the problem. In fact, there is plenty of theory around to be applied to cases. One could cite organization theory in general or, more specifically, the rich literature of public administration.

However, very little of this work deals with the contemporary problems of policy implementation which preoccupy political scientists and analysts.

(1983: 280)

He went on to claim that the new implementation theory addresses prob- lems not faced in the older public administration literature.

Of course we could leave it there and launch immediately into a dis- cussion of the implementation literature that has developed since the 1970s. That was a time when academic work in the social sciences was exploding, and when there were all sorts of efforts to apply social scientific ideas to the policy process. However, we think it worthwhile briefly to look back in time. We consider that to do so helps us to develop a clear view about the literature on implementation, and particularly on the difficulties that have been encountered in advancing the ‘implemen- tation perspective’. This is what we will do first in this chapter. The discussion will develop into an examination of literature that, even after the so-called ‘discovery’ of implementation as an issue, explores ques- tions pertinent to that subject without using the term ‘implementation’

or making explicit connections with implementation theory. Within that literature concerns are expressed that are very central to controversy within implementation theory: about the rule of law, accountability and the roles of civil servants within the policy process. Then we look at insti- tutional theory in political science and sociology, which has concerns that overlap with those of analysts of implementation research. This section is followed by some observations on postmodern perspectives, which develop the viewpoint of those institutional theorists who question the

POSITIONING IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES 19

feasibility of systematic generalization about the policy process. Overall this mixture of topics offers an account of a range of work that in one way or another ‘talks’ about implementation without explicitly using the term or developing the analytical approach to that topic that we will be explor- ing in the rest of the book.

Concerns about implementation: historical origins

Clearly some of the earliest human activities must have involved the setting of objectives. It is pointless to speculate to what extent achievements identifiable today arose out of purposive activity, just as it is difficult to make assumptions about the relationship between actions and preceding objectives when we observe the behaviour of others. Where analysis does become possible is where (a) individuals secured actions from others and (b) left information that enables us to infer that they were setting goals for these actions. The evidence we have of the earliest collective actions comes from the relics that have survived. We can observe some extraordi- nary achievements – stone circles, pyramids, palaces, and so on – that must have been products of collective action, and in many cases there is evidence that this action was on behalf of some dominant individual or group.

There is nothing in the basic definition of implementation that ties it, as the modern literature does, to the idea of publicpolicy. That fact suggests that the study or analysis of implementation should be seen as a part of the study of organizational behaviour or of management. That chimes in with a very modern view that the management of public policy should be regarded as no different from the management of any other activity (see Dunsire, 1995, and Gray and Jenkins, 1995, for discussions of this view).

There is obviously something to be said for seeing the study of public policy implementation as being simply the study of the management of organized behaviour. We must therefore consider what might make public policy implementation different.

Again it is helpful to explore this issue in historical terms, confronting the question: Under what circumstances may we identify some imple- mentation activities that were different from simple private efforts to manage collective endeavours? What then seems to be the case is that there were, from very early times, some sustained activities over a long period or a broad geographical area that were led by people who sought to exercise some overall system of government. At this stage, little progress can be made with any analysis of implementation without grap- pling with the two topics very central to political science – authority and the state. The evidence we have of the earliest ‘states’, ‘kingdoms’ or

‘empires’ consists of the relics they left behind. Where there are no written

records these are the remains of constructions, as has already been noted.

With these we know only of the implementation successes of these very early political systems (though we may perhaps infer failure too from the fact that many remarkable achievements were ultimately left to decay).

Later, written records are available, of varying but increasing sophistica- tion, which enable us to identify accounts of organizational achievements.

A significant amount of Greek and Roman literature is about the imple- mentation problems confronting those who sought to organize societies and engage in war.

Much of this early material tends to be read as concerned with explain- ing the ‘power’ of rulers or the effectiveness of quasi-democratic systems.

We cannot easily make interpretations about the relationships between objective setting and the carrying out of those objectives. Systems of rule can be perceived to have been set up, to have survived for a period and then to have been modified or undermined. Wars were conducted with inevitably varying degrees of success. Cities came and went, trading systems operated with mixed achievements. Perhaps the most interesting phenomena were those that must have required sustained co-ordination over long periods of time. Systems for the control of water – to prevent flooding, provide irrigation, and so on – have attracted particular atten- tion. These have been seen as explaining ‘empires’ (Wittfogel, 1963), but the questions about how they were achieved are equally interesting.

Similarly the extension of power systems across great tracts of territory, where it could take months to send a punitive expedition against rebels, has long attracted the interest of scholars. (Above all, the rise and fall of the Roman Empire involved a complex sequence of ‘implementation problems’.)

It is not our intention here to offer an elaborate historical analysis of implementation. We have already noted that what we see of the activities of the distant past depends very much upon what has survived. It should also be noted that those who have left us records of these activities were largely those in dominant roles, or closely allied to such people. Much less easily recognizable are the many implementation successes that depended upon bottom-up forms of collective action. The history of

‘empires’ tends to be very much the history of those who controlled them.

The study of power in these early states has of course generated a liter- ature that seeks to explain the puzzles about how control was exercised.

We know quite a lot about the various ways in which naked power was exercised, a topic that we could translate into the language of implemen- tation studies in terms of bloody reprisals for implementation failure. We can trace a variety of complex devices – the use of spies, eunuchs, foreign- ers, and so on – to try to ensure the loyalty of subordinates over whom it was very difficult to exercise direct supervision. There is much evidence of the use of approaches to power that depended upon a feudal system of some kind in which a sort of hierarchy of opportunities for gain was operated. These can perhaps be seen as power systems that allowed for

POSITIONING IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES 21

implementation deficit. So long as the ruler got the taxes and the military support when it was needed, other control over local events could be traded down the hierarchy. Tax farmers, for example, profited if they could collect a surplus over what their ruler required, and were punished if they achieved a deficit. The criterion for implementation success was simple.

There has also been an enormous interest in the extent to which it was possible to legitimize rule. Here of course we are in the realm of the liter- ature about Max Weber’s systems of authority (1947). It is appropriate to be in Weber’s ‘company’ as we jump forward from speculation about very early systems of power. If we look at implementation in terms of Weber’s three types of authority, we can dismiss one type – charismatic authority – as essentially involving no concept of separation between goal setting and sustained independent action and as being ephemeral in nature unless

‘routinized’, transforming it into one of the other types. On the other hand we cannot so readily move on from the concept of traditional authority.

After all there have been long periods – in European history from the early Middle Ages until even the nineteenth century, almost throughout recorded Chinese history and in much of the history of the Islamic world – in which extensive policy implementation occurred. That was legitimated largely in terms of adherence to goals set by religious leaders or absolute rulers (or both in concert). During this long period of traditional author- ity the modern notion of the state began to emerge with some very explicit assertions of rights to rule – over territories much more explicitly defined – and thus clearer expectations of implementation success.

Over a period between about the fourteenth and the twentieth centuries legitimizing ideologies within states gradually took on three new charac- teristics. One of these involved assertions of the idea of the nation state– see- ing collective action as legitimized by notions of shared racial, cultural or linguistic characteristics. This is not particularly pertinent to the study of implementation, except inasmuch as it provided a context for the other two developments. These were the emergence of the idea of the rule of law and the development of democracy. These ideas need careful consideration for the implications they have for the way we think about implementa- tion. They are in various respects connected, but can be analysed sepa- rately as they raise rather different themes for this discussion.

The rule of law

The issues about the rule of law are important for the study of imple- mentation because implicit in that concept is the notion that citizens should be able to predict the impact of the actions of the state upon them- selves and secure redress when affected by illegitimate actions. Wade (1982) suggests that the ‘rule of law’ has four aspects:

• ‘Its primary meaning is that everything must be done according to the law’, which when applied to the powers of government means that

‘every act which affects the legal rights, duties or liberties of any person must be shown to have a strictly legal pedigree. The affected person may always resort to the courts of law, and if the legal pedigree is not found to be perfectly in order the court will invalidate the act, which he can then safely disregard’ (p. 22).

• ‘The secondary meaning of the rule of law ... is that government should be conducted within a framework of recognized rules and principles which restrict discretionary power’ (p. 22).

• Disputes about the law should be settled by a judiciary that is inde- pendent of government (p. 23).

• The ‘law should be even-handed between government and citizen’

(p. 24).

The particular way those principles are enunciated by Wade may have characteristics that are peculiar to the Anglo-Saxon countries, but the general thrust of the principles is accepted wherever it is claimed that governments operate within the ‘rule of law’. For the purposes of this discussion it is what Wade calls the primary meaning that is important, for what it implies is that there should be some connection between policy implementation and the statutes that authorize it. This provides one of the foundations of the concerns of the top-down approach to implementation, which will be given much further consideration later in this book.

The importance of the ‘rule of law’ as a basis for legitimate rule is explored in Weber’s third type of authority: ‘rational legal’. Weber argues (in a text originally put together in the early years of the twentieth century): ‘Today the most usual basis of legitimacy is the belief in legality, the readiness to conform with rules which are formally correct and have been imposed by accepted procedure’ (1947: 131). He goes on to distin- guish order derived from voluntary agreement from one that is imposed – but calls this distinction ‘only relative’. The first of the ideas that he sees as central to the ‘effectiveness’ of legal authority is

That any given legal norm may be established by agreement or by imposition, on grounds of expediency or rational values or both, with a claim to obedi- ence at least on the part of the members of the corporate group. This is, how- ever, usually extended to include all persons within the sphere of authority or of power in question – which in the case of territorial bodies is the territorial area – who stand in certain social relationships or carry out forms of social action which in the order governing the corporate group have been declared to be relevant. (p. 329)

In that rather convoluted argument, of course, lies the concept of the state.

The second idea is that ‘every body of law consists essentially in a consis- tent system of abstract rules which have been intentionally established’

(p. 330).

POSITIONING IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES 23

The remaining ideas go on to emphasize other aspects of the system by which this body of rules is established, in which we see glimpses of Weber’s emphasis on the importance of bureaucracy. There is no sugges- tion that democracy is essential for the rational legal order. On the con- trary, elsewhere, Weber says of France: ‘Without this juristic rationalism, the rise of the absolute state is just as little imaginable as is the Revolution’

(Gerth and Mills, 1947: 94). In Weber’s approach to the concept of the

‘rational legal order’ there are two notions that need separating. One of these is the idea that obedience is to an identifiable body of rules. This is clearly very like the key principle embodied in the idea of the rule of law.

In this sense the ‘rationality’ is embodied in the structure of the rules, wherever they come from. The other is that Weber is concerned to stress the importance for their legitimacy of the way the rules are made – even though he does not invoke the idea of democracy – in terms of the extent to which they are the product of the work of a body of officials working in a systematic and impersonal way. In short the idea of the rational legal order and the idea of bureaucracy are closely linked together. This is the controversial aspect of Weber’s work. Whilst a body of rules could be created in a variety of different ways, and could even be developed and renegotiated through ‘bottom-up’ processes, the bureaucratic model is essentially hierarchical and by implication the rules are dominated by principles dictated from the top of that hierarchy, and are conservative and very stable.

The arguments about Weber’s ideal-typical model of bureaucracy are not our concern here, but it is important to recognize the extent to which one of the roots of the concern about implementation as a controlled and predictable process comes from a widespread belief in the need for this.

Weber was not so much prescribing (though that is a matter of dispute) as identifying bureaucracy as taken for granted in the organization of government in the early twentieth century.

In the examination of Weber’s ‘rational legal’ and ‘bureaucratic’ ideal- types by sociologists in the mid-twentieth century, questions were raised about the limits to control through bureaucratic models. That examination closely paralleled discussions in management theory about the case for formal organization along what are often called Fordist lines, based upon the very strict organization of motor assembly lines influenced by the management theory of F.W. Taylor (1911).

With the development of the social sciences in the 1940s and 1950s, two developments in organization theory – one stimulated by the work of Max Weber, the other by work that questions the formal management model (see particularly Mayo, 1933) – began to come together. Sociologists, using Weber’s work (or their understanding of it) as their starting point, set out to show the importance of patterns of informal relationships alongside the formal ones. Social psychologists, on the other hand, sought to explore the conflict between human needs and the apparent requirements of formal organizations. Drawing on this work, administrative theorists