SECTION III Service Systems
12.2 Organizational Issues in Developing a Comprehensive Ergonomics Process
Why has the workplace been deprived of something so useful as ergonomics? One explanation is that there is something internal to industrial organizations, such as communication breakdowns between designers and operators of workstations, or that there is something lacking in the knowledge base of the key actors, such as engineers who do not understand the principles of anthropometry, that erects barriers to proper ergonomic design. The operators, who often know the problems associated with workstations, do not communicate with the designers of the workstations early enough, and the designers of the workstation may not have the ergonomic expertise to design the workplace properly. This leads to design flaws that can contribute to ergonomic stress.
It is important to understand the complexity of industrial organizations when attempting to implement a health and safety (or any) program in the workplace. These organizations are usually very large and resist change. In order to be effective, the ergonomist or the organizer of the ergonomics program must understand how the organizations work and what can be done to overcome the barriers to change.
Below is a summary of basic organizational theory. This summary will help to explain and justify the need for developing specific types of ergonomics programs in plants.1
Organizational Models — Traditional and New
Traditional organizational theory is largely based on the assumption that organizations are rational entities (Shafritz and Whitbeck, 1978). Allison (1971) calls this the Rational Actor Model. That is, an organization is a “system within which individuals and groups will act in internally consistent ways to
1Note that parts of this section can be found in “A Participative Ergonomic Control Program in a U.S. Automotive Plant: Evaluation and Implications” by Bradley S. Joseph.
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reach explicit objectives” (Tushman and Nadler, 1980). Therefore, organizations and their structures are
“planned and coordinated for the most efficient realization of explicit objectives” (Tushman and Nadler, 1980). The theory blames behavior that violates these assumptions on ignorance, miscalculation, or managerial error within the organization, that is, error independent of either the organizational structure or the management approach. The theory assumes that organizational directions are explicitly and rationally planned. That is, organizations rationally choose goals that optimize an objective function.
Managers’ roles, as defined by traditional organizational theory, are rationally to plan, organize, coordi- nate, and control the organization’s objectives (Koontz, 1964).
Traditionally, organizations are hierarchical systems involving top-down decision making. Top man- agement decides on an objective for the organization (i.e., what it should be pursuing over the next several months) and instructs subordinates to follow a particular plan designed to reach that objective.
These organizations are characterized by an extensive division of labor, including detailed job descrip- tions, tightly controlled departmental budgets, and narrow spans of supervisory control. This pattern effectively limits the opportunity of people to interact with one another either vertically or horizontally within the organization.
This model has done a satisfactory job in explaining why and how an organization, as a whole, reacts to a particular stimulus (e.g., a change in raw material prices). However, it often fails to explain or predict important aspects of organizational life (Tushman and Nadler, 1980). For example, while the organization as a whole may appear to be reacting consistently to crises or other stimulation from the environment, components within the organization often do not react in consistent ways. Too often, these inconsistencies cannot be explained solely by ignorance, miscalculations, or management error. Instead, the inconsis- tencies happen so often and are so overwhelming that they cause changes in the organization. Therefore, a new organizational model must be developed to explain these disparities.
One model that explains many of the disparities in industrial settings is called the Organizational Politics Model (see Figure 12.1). Allison (1971) describes this model (based on the work of Cyert and March, 1963, and March and Simon, 1958) in a book which examines the decisions leading up to and during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. He argues that in this case study the rational actor model does not adequately explain many of the critical events or answer critical questions.
The basic principle of the organizational politics model is the concept of organizational units. Within the bureaucracy, e.g., a corporation, these organizational units will act in their own self-interest to achieve their desired goals. This behavior will lend to conflicts between units with different goals, differing perceptions of how to reach a common goal, or joint dependence on scarce resources (March and Simon, 1958; Pfeffer, 1977; Schmidt and Kochan, 1972).
FIGURE 12.1 Simplified organizational politics model.
The organizational politics model fits well in current U.S. industrial settings, particularly now that budget cutting and increased workloads are placing increasing pressures on individual subunits. All these pressures have occurred without subsequent change in the basic organizational structure. Units are still expected to operate with the same or even greater productivity as before the budget cuts. Because they fear for their very survival, subunits consult their self-interest to a point where it is detrimental to the effective operation of the whole organization. Often these subunits may be organized into a matrix that attempts to break down individual unit self-interest. However, this only works if subunits work with each other as a team.
An example of the organizational politics model is shown in Figure 12.2. The organizational process of a division and plant that produces chassis and suspension components and rear axles was analyzed.
Figure 12.2 shows the complexity of the organizational process required for the installation of new and the maintenance of existing equipment within this division.
In this example, a series of units are grouped together into phases. The phases represent periods of time during which groups of units have to complete a task before passing it on to the next phase. First, new processes are studied (study phase) and designed (design phase) at division engineering. Little plant input is solicited in this phase.
Next, division and plant engineering together install and debug machinery (implementation phase).
This procedure involves a complex series of actions whereby process plans are sent to selected vendors, interpreted and built to specifications, delivered, and installed in the plant, using resources from the plant, the vendor, and the division. Unless the plant is willing to bear costly delays and excessive expen- ditures, few changes can be made on machinery, for ergonomic or any other reason, between the time the vendor builds and the time he delivers it, because the vendor has signed off on machine specifications and is under contract to build it to standards agreed upon by the plant and division. Consequently, the
FIGURE 12.2 Organizational process for the installation of new and the maintenance of existing equipment.
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plant must wait until the machines are delivered and operating under those specifications (known as final sign-off) before changes can be made.
After debugging, normal operation and maintenance proceeds (operations phase). However, there is often a need for process improvements or other redesigns to update equipment (redesign phase). Depend- ing on the cost, the plant usually controls these activities. However, due to limitations on cash and manpower resources, lost production from shutting down the machines, and other plant priorities, this activity is often limited in scope and takes a considerable time to complete.
According to the organizational politics model (Allison, 1971), this complex process, involving the interdependence of so many parties, offers a certain prospect of conflict. Moreover, the fact that those who make key decisions on manufacturing processes are geographically and organizationally separated creates a high probability of communications breakdown (Allen, 1977).
What are the implications of all this for ergonomics and other health and safety programs? In order to implement sound ergonomic design, we have to overcome two kinds of barriers:
• The knowledge-based barriers
1. A lack of general ergonomics knowledge (knowledge of ergonomic principles) — Ergonomics is a technical science. Persons involved in the designing, operating, and maintaining of machin- ery who lack the technical knowledge of ergonomics will be more likely to design workstations poorly.
2. A lack of specific job knowledge by workplace designers — People who operate jobs are most familiar with them. People who design jobs often do not know the specific information that pertains to daily operation (e.g., the process sheets and industrial engineering studies may vary from the designer to actual operation). This information is important when trying to determine job stresses, etc.
• The organizational-based barriers
1. A lack of communication between personnel involved in workplace designs — Players in each organizational unit must be able to interact with adjacent units to ensure that ergonomics is properly transferred along the organizational pathway. If for some reason this does not occur, then ergonomics, and many other considerations, may not be incorporated into the new job design.
2. A conflict between subunit interests — Each subunit has its unique set of goals. Therefore, things like budget, manpower, and time can all be important aspects of subunit performance and may reduce the cooperation between competing and/or successive units along the job installation pathway.
In order to correct this situation and eliminate the barriers, ergonomic or other changes to the workplace will best be accomplished by organizational interventions in combination with technical ergonomics training. Several mechanisms for managing technical change have been researched. They can be grouped into two categories: expert methods and participative methods. These will be discussed below.
Ways to Effect Change in Industry
Traditional Ways to Effect Change — The Expert Approach
Traditionally, major operational changes in large organizations are effected with the help of professionally trained experts. In the case of ergonomics, most manufacturing plants have to import this expertise from the outside. The experts bring their special knowledge to the plant, collect data, return to their labs to analyze it, and make recommendations for change based on their investigations. Once the experts have done their work, there is likely to be no one in the plant with sufficient initiative and interest to follow through with improvements.
Lack of involvement is more often responsible than lack of knowledge for this failure to follow up. In fact, many people in the plant possess potentially beneficial knowledge and skills, but they are rarely
productivity, labor–management communication, and the overall competitiveness of American goods worldwide have not been keeping up with the world pace (Peters and Waterman Jr., 1982). By looking at companies in other countries, notably Japan, American managers have learned to make increasing use of their employees as a source of information for all areas of plant operations. Truly enlightened managers perceive people as their most important resource.
Experience suggests that the participative approach can ensure the effective continuation of a program long after the expert or consultant is gone. However, when contemplating the use of participation, manage- ment and labor must consider how effective it will be in accomplishing specific goals of the workplace.
Participation in Health and Safety Programs
Recently, health and safety issues have become of greater concern in industry, partly because of the creation of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in 1970 and partly because of the real- ization that health and safety is a core process that can affect the bottom line as much as or more than other traditional programs. OSHA has increased both management’s and labor’s awareness of employee health and safety rights under the law, and legislation has inspired workers to take a more aggressive stance against observed violations. In fact, once a labor contract has been negotiated and ratified, most United Auto Worker shops throughout the country can strike for only one of two reasons: health and safety issues and productivity issues. This emphasis on health and safety has given managers who were reluctant to act an incentive to solve health and safety problems.
Several studies on the effectiveness of worker participation have been conducted. The W. E. Upjohn Institute funded a study (Kochan, Dyer, and Lipshy, 1977) to survey plants with union/management health and safety committees. Its intent was to determine how these committees function and to make a preliminary judgment regarding their effectiveness. General findings indicate that the committees with a high degree of continuity or high levels of interaction exist where OSHA pressure is strong, the local union itself is strong, rank and file involvement in health and safety is substantial, or management approaches health and safety in a problem-solving manner. This indicates that the most important attribute predicting a successful program was management and union commitment to solving health and safety problems rather than objective attributes such as frequency and length of meeting, number of members, existence of an agenda, and whether the committee was mandated by the collective- bargaining agreement.
Obstacles to Effective Use of Participative Problem Solving
Participative management and participative problem solving are not universal answers. Participation should be used for the kinds of programs in which it is known to be effective and for problems which are best addressed by a group process.
The quality circle is a good example of how participation can both succeed and fail (Lawler and Mohrman, 1985). In a manufacturing plant, a quality circle is a group which concentrates on solving workplace problems, usually those affecting the quality of the product, the quality of worklife, and working conditions. The quality circle works well with such problems, especially in early stages, and especially with easy problems. However, when the problems become more difficult or if the quality circle
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program is expanded too rapidly, the confidence and the effectiveness developed early on quickly become eroded. Frustration and the increasing cost of the expanded program usually spell disaster.
An additional threat to quality circles, and one which is relevant to the participative approach in ergonomics, comes in the form of supervisor resistance. Supervisors, like many middle managers, often feel that quality circles (and other participative programs) undermine their authority and control. Their unwillingness to support the quality circle program greatly diminishes its possible effectiveness.
Another barrier to success in participative programs arises in the differing perceptions of what con- stitutes participation, and how it should be administered. Workers often have unrealistic expectations about what they can do. Managers often treat participation as a special program or campaign rather than a viable technique; or else they abruptly embrace participation, something which can throw the workforce into confusion. Finally, managers may not have the patience to wait for the long-term benefits of participation to appear before they scrap a program when they fail to secure early success.
In her book The Change Masters: Dilemmas of Managing Participation, Rosabeth Moss Kanter provides guidelines for appropriate and inappropriate uses of participation. These include:
Appropriate Use of Participation:
1. To assemble sources of expertise and experience among the workforce.
2. To tackle a problem that no one “owns” by organizational assignment.
3. To address conflicting approaches or views.
4. To develop and educate people through their participation (i.e., to develop new skills, acquire new information, and make new contacts).
Inappropriate Use of Participation:
1. When there is a “hip-pocket solution” (i.e., the manager already knows the solution).
2. When nobody really cares much about the issues.
3. When there is insufficient time for discussion and the group process.
Kanter also draws attention to five critical challenges, or what she calls dilemmas, which any partici- patory group must face and which must be overcome if the participative program is to succeed. These are the situations which have no easy resolution. They are as follows:
1. The beginning or setting up the program.
2. The organization of the program, in terms of structure and management.
3. The prioritizing of issues to be addressed.
4. The linking of teams with their environment so as to make them compatible with the existing organization.
5. The evaluation process, that is, determining whether the program is working.
Concluding Statement on Needs of a Participative Program Role of Training in Participation
One of the most important requirements for success of any participative program is adequate training.
In general, effective workplace education should consist of a process of instruction, reinforcement, and establishment of norms of behavior for workers (Vojtecky, 1985; Klein, 1984). It should provide guidelines on problem-solving skills and techniques in running a meeting. In essence, it gives participants the tools to perform their required functions in such programs. Many types of participative training programs are available. For example, Ford Motor Company trains all its employees before they are involved in partic- ipative problem-solving groups, emphasizing the basic skills outlined above.
For effective application of ergonomics, Shackel (1980) suggested that six factors must be addressed:
1. Ergonomics should be considered a science and a technology
comes from practical experience. The worker does not need to understand ergonomic models that explain the biomechanical cause of injury. Rather, the training needs to emphasize workplace configurations that lead to health problems and to provide understanding of how to reduce the risk associated with poor ergonomic design. Technical experts should be available to aid participants if they request more infor- mation or need more knowledge (Allen, 1977); they should play a resource, not an expert, role.