NANOTECHNOLOGY
6.2 Preventive-arms-control criteria and molecular NT Because molecular NT (MNT) is not imminent and its military uses can
only be described in general, speculative terms, the consideration of MNT under the criteria of preventive arms control is general and cursory.
Several aspects have been discussed by Gubrud (1997).
6.2.1 Criteria group I: adherence to and further development of effective arms control, disarmament and international law MNT production of nearly unlimited numbers of armaments at little cost would contradict the very idea of quantitative arms control. Practically all types of new MNT-enabled weapons would present dangers to existing or intended arms-control and disarmament treaties. This holds for limita- tions on conventional (heavy, small, light) arms and land mines, and a
space-weapons ban. Artificial intelligence and cyborgs, not covered by treaties up to now, might nevertheless create problems in particular con- cerning limits on personnel. Particular dangers for the Chemical and Bio- logical Weapons Conventions would ensue from self-replicating nano-robots with selective action in the body. With its potential for pre- emptive attacks on nuclear weapons and simultaneously for massive scale- up of their production, MNT would also undermine nuclear-weapon limitation treaties, not to speak of nuclear disarmament. Replicating nano- robots could be used to create widespread, long-lasting and severe changes in the environment, which would violate the Environmental Modification Convention; general conversion of the ecosphere to grey goo would of course go way beyond any intended military effect. MNT would provide chances for better treaty verification, e.g. by ubiquitous nano-robots that monitor practically everything. Of course, this would be highly ambiguous and would bring dangers to humans and society by itself.
Concerning existing norms of humanitarian law, some of the concerns mentioned in Section 6.1.1.2 for ‘plain’ NT could be reduced by MNT.
Because actual fighting would largely be carried out by artificial systems, manipulation of soldiers’ bodies leading to over-aggressiveness would be less of a problem. Assuming (super-)human artificial intelligence in armed autonomous systems including mini-/micro-robots, non-combatants or combatants hors de combatcould be recognized reliably. This could be dif- ferent in small, maybe self-replicating entities. Humanitarian law could be endangered on an unprecedented scale, if artificial intelligence used in warfare did not obey these rules – and this could come about by its own
‘conscious’ decision, deviating from the goals of the original ‘program- mers’. With possibilities to manipulate body and brain by invading nano- robots, many ways of transgressing the legitimate goal of rendering combatants unable to fight are conceivable.
In many respects MNT could be used for weapons of mass destruction.
Production of traditional chemical, biological and nuclear weapons could be drastically increased. New MNT-based chemical or biological weapons could act selectively, but massive destruction could also be built in – or could evolve against the original intent after release during generations of self-replication. Grey goo, if used as a weapon, would lead to extinction of all life forms, even if humans or animals were spared from direct consump- tion. Attacks on people’s brains that would ‘only’ confuse them could lead to breakdown of society and massive loss of life. Positive effects from better sensing of and protection against weapons of mass destruction that MNT may also bring are clearly of much less importance.
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6.2.2 Criteria group II: maintain and improve stability
MNT would strongly destabilize the military situation between potential opponents (Gubrud 1997). In international territory such as the oceans, surveillance and fighting systems of all sizes would be interspersed with each other; in outer space, motion is restricted by the orbital laws. Attacks could start here with zero warning time, and systems would probably be programmed for fast action in case of unclear events. For transport across land borders, longer warning times would apply. However, covert pre- deployment in central installations with the potential to strike at any time would have to be feared, and would be used as a counter. In case of systems that self-replicate in the wild, extremely small causes (one first copy) could have extremely strong consequences. Thus, extensive reaction is plausible on detection of one such cause, and action-reaction cycles in case of erroneous detection could lead to the most serious consequences.
With respect to nuclear stability, nuclear-weapon states would have to fear disarming attacks by nano-robots penetrating the warheads and carriers, together with efforts at reducing the effects of a response strike by missile defence and civil defence. This would strengthen motives for early use and would increase the chances for unintended nuclear war.
With its potential for extremely fast increases in military production, MNT would represent the culmination in quantitative technological arms races (Gubrud 1997). In qualitative terms, extremely fast change could ensue from autonomous R&D of new military systems by (super-)human artificial intelligence. Surprises would have to be expected at any time.
Early start could provide decisive advantages, up to – in theory – the capa- bility of world domination (Gubrud (1997) has written of a ‘new type of strategic instability: early advantage instability’). As a consequence, the military powers would be under extreme pressures to go forward as rapidly as possible when MNT drew close, and thereafter. Because of the potentially huge consequences, even political/military partners might not want to rely on the stability of their mutual relations. Mistrust about what a partner could do with some lead is probable, so technological arms races would not only develop between potential opponents.
The huge military potential of MNT would also create strong motives for horizontal or vertical proliferation/diffusion of military-relevant tech- nologies, substances or knowledge. Export of just one copy of a self- replicating weapon nano-robot would suffice to create billions of them.
Transfer of one universal molecular assembler and the appropriate synthe- sis programs would provide the hardware and software for arbitrary arma- ments growth. If assembly could take place at home or in small businesses using everyday ingredients, weapons, including nano-robots for offensive action in the body, could become available to individuals, not just states.
‘Molecular hackers’ could produce the real-life equivalent of computer
viruses. Whereas the latter directly affect only information-processing systems, MNT sabotage agents would act on the real world. After damage, the world could not just be ‘restarted from the original software’ as a com- puter.
6.2.3 Criteria group III: protect humans, environment and society
Humansin peacetime could be endangered if military MNT developments became available to parts of civilian society. Nano-robots could be used by state agencies, enterprises or criminals to eavesdrop on people, influence them unknowingly, or for attacks on health and life. Unintended releases of self-replicating systems would usually be more dangerous in the mili- tary, since there damaging effects would have been built in. If molecular assembly became used widely, production of old or new weapons, includ- ing weapons of mass destruction, would only need access to the corre- sponding synthesis programs. Independent R&D and testing might be too complex for an individual, but a program made ready in the military and divulged to the outside could be set to action immediately. (Super-)human artificial-intelligence methods developed by the military to influence the thinking of an opponent’s population might also be used to manipulate one’s own people. Given all these dangers, MNT-based options for better protection against them do not count for much.
Dangers to the environment and sustainable development could ensue from releases of damaging agents developed in the military. Another problem may be overuse of resources consumed in a fast build-up of arma- ments. Grey goo would be the ultimate danger to the environment.
Whereas in the civilian sector reluctance is probable, military R&D might nevertheless produce such aggressive nanosystems that could then be released intentionally or unintentionally. Also here, the dangers by far outweigh the potential for protection.
There are many different dangers to the development of societal and political systems that MNT could bring. Superhuman intelligences could take over power. The image of a human could be lost with cyborgs or sub- jects that change from normal life to an existence in software. MNT would provide many new possibilities for crimes that would increase societal instability. All of these should be discussed by society before they become feasible; finding appropriate regulation and arriving at agreement about it will certainly be difficult. Military R&D is obliged to find out all the negat- ive potential uses of a new technology and make them practical, if pos- sible; by doing so it could undermine a broad societal debate and create facts that might otherwise have been avoided.
Criminal misuse of MNT could bring many dangers to the societal infra- structure. Terrorist attacks could be directed against installations supplying
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goods or information services, and even a single nanosystem could, via self-replication, lead to a very large breakdown. Military R&D would create means for such attacks; diffusion to criminals could occur in the form of finished (maybe small, maybe replicating) systems or, with wide- spread molecular assemblers, even only the assembly programs.