THIS CHAPTER . . .
examines how people come to identify with particular kinds of political groups. It analyses the variety of politically significant groups and the nature of the divisions between them. It considers the significance of these divisions for political stability and change and how technological and external factors affect the nature of the balance of power within and between societies. In considering the processes that result in stability or change, we discuss some of the most potent forces at work in the modern political world – those of class, religion, ethnicity, race and national identity.
POLITICAL IDENTITY
One important clue to the ways in which people identify themselves politically is to consider the names of political parties. Many of the names refer to the ‘ideologies’ which we have already considered – liberal, socialist, communist, conservative. What is striking, however, is the number of names which refer specifically to sectional groups within a state’s population: national – Scottish National Party, Inkatha (‘Spear of the [Zulu] Nation’); ethnic/racial – Malaysian Chinese Association; religious – Christian Democrat, Jan Sangh
5
(Hindu); or class/occupation – Labour, Peasant. Indeed, if we look behind the official name of political parties, we find that they frequently are mainly or exclusively supported by one such sectional group. For instance, the Republican Party of India was formerly called the Scheduled Castes Federation (i.e. the ‘untouchables’), whilst the former grandly titled Nigerian National Democratic Party was in fact confined to a faction of the Yoruba peoples of western Nigeria. Conversely, some parties like the Congress Party of India and the Institutional Revolutionary Party of Mexico seek to unite virtually everyone in the state in the cause of nationalism.
Many studies of voting behaviour reinforce this picture of voters identifying with political parties (however abstractly described) largely as an expression of national, ethnic/racial, religious or class loyalties. Parties are seen as fighting for the interests of ‘our’ group, so that ‘we’ benefit from their success.
On the psychological level such behaviour is unsurprising. Human beings are clearly social animals loyal to the ‘in’-group and suspicious of, or hostile to, ‘out’-groups (see Sherif et al., 1951 for a classic study of boys at a summer camp). The problem, as Tajfel and Turner (1979) point out, is that in building a positive sense of ‘social identity’ in- groups often resort to ‘stereotyping’ out-groups. That is, all members of the out-group are perceived as having a standard set of (inferior) qualities to one’s own. But as students of politics we may wish to consider why the pattern of such loyalties varies from place to place.
The functionalist concepts of ‘political socialisation’ and ‘political culture’ may help to describe and explain these differences, but the explanation they offer is only a partial one as we shall see.
POLITICAL SOCIALISATION AND POLITICAL CULTURE The short answer as to why people identify themselves in different ways is to point to the political experiences that have moulded them – to the processes of ‘political socialisation’ (see Box 5.1). In short, they have learnt who they are. The term ‘socialisation’ does seem preferable to the perhaps more familiar term ‘education’
because it stresses the broader and more informal influences at work.
In particular, home and friends have been demonstrated to be much more important influences than school or college education. The mass media are also an important source of political information and
attitudes. It is also probable that influences in early adulthood, when habits of voting or other forms of political participation are estab- lished, can be crucially important: this would include influences from workmates or comrades-in-arms and key political events at this time. In short, people tend to absorb the political values and ideas of the key face-to-face social groups to which they belong (see Tables 5.1(a) and (b)).
BOX 5.1 DEFINITIONS OF POLITICAL SOCIALISATION
A number of studies have documented the considerable differences between countries and social groups as to their perceptions and level of knowledge of politics and their attitudes towards political power and institutions. Some of these differences in ‘political culture’ are summarised in Table 5.2 and clearly are important in understanding differences between political systems in different countries.
BOX 5.2 POLITICAL CULTURE
the personal and social origins of political outlooks.
(Dawson et al., 1977: 1) is the process of induction into political culture. Its end product is a set of attitudes, cognitions, value standards and feelings – toward the political system, its various roles, and role incumbents. It also includes knowledge of, values affecting, and feelings toward the inputs of demands and claims into the system, and its authoritative output.
(Almond, in Almond and Coleman, 1960: 26–58)
The mental and intellectual environment in which politics is shaped, interpreted and judged. The knowledge, beliefs, values and attitudes of individuals and societies towards government and politics.
(Pye and Verba, 1965)
Attitudes to democracy vary markedly in different countries. Dia- mond (in LeDuc et al., 2002: 217–221) quotes a variety of studies showing endorsement of democratic principles varying from highs of 83 per cent in Costa Rica, 81 per cent in Nigeria and 75 per cent in the Czech Republic to much lower levels of 54 per cent in Zambia and 39 per cent in Russia and Brazil.
One explanation as to why people identify politically with distinct social groups, or adopt particular political values, is that they have been socialised into particular political cultures in which varying lines of social division and commitment are important. However, this does not explain why political cultures vary in this way. For this we have to look at the history and social structures of the specific countries concerned. It can be argued that the concepts of culture and socialisation have merely assisted us somewhat in the systematic description of the problem, rather than solved it.
Table 5.1(a) Typical socialisation research findings: attitudes to president
Agreeing in school grade (%)
2 4 6 8 10 12
‘President cares a lot’ (1961) 75 56 46 43
‘President cares a lot’ (1974) 79 65 32 28 22 16 Sources: Hershey and Hill (1975); Easton and Dennis (1969); Hess and Torney (1967)
Table 5.1(b) Typical socialisation research findings: most popularly used sources of information about foreign people
Nationality USA Bantu (sic) Brazil Turkey
6 year olds TV parents parents parents
movies (contact) friends
(parents)
10 year olds TV parents movies books
movies contact magazines texts
books teachers contact courses
courses magazines
texts magazines Source: Lambert and Klineberg (1967)
LOCALISM, NATIONALISM, RELIGION AND ETHNICITY One sort of division which seems to be almost universal in larger political systems is what Allardt and Littunen (1964) have termed vertical lines of division – those between localities, regions and, in some cases, national areas within states. It can be argued that, other things being equal, the nearer people live together, and hence the more communication and, probably, economic and social inter- dependence there is between them, the more they are likely to perceive themselves as having interests in common. Hence people in the village of Haworth may see themselves first as Haworth residents, then perhaps as people from the Bradford area or West Riding, almost certainly as Yorkshire folk, as English, as British, and possibly as Europeans too. Political (or sporting!) divisions may arise
Table 5.2 Typical research findings: political culture
Agreeing (%)
USA UK Germany Italy Mexico Participation/Parochialism:
‘National govt. has great 41 33 38 23 7
effect on daily life’
Trust/Distrust:
‘Most people can be trusted’ 55 49 19 7 30
Hierarchy – acceptance/
resentment:
‘Expect equal consideration 48 59 53 35 14
from bureaucracy’
Can affect an unjust law 75 62 38 28 38
Liberty – toleration/coercion:
Against cross-party marriage 4 12+ 58*
Loyalty:
Most proud of government/ 85 46 7 3 30
political institutions
Source: Almond and Verba (1963) + = Conservative/Labour
* = Christian Democrat/Communist
between the interests of Yorkshire and Lancashire without either ceasing to feel loyalty to England. Divisions between England and Scotland may not preclude common action in Europe by the British, and so on. Similarly residents of Harlem may also feel themselves to be citizens of New York City, and New York State, as well as of the United States. Clearly the influence of geographical nearness will be influenced by a host of other factors which may affect the strength of local or regional loyalties. For example, how mobile is the popu- lation? If a resident of Haworth is commuting daily to Bradford and was born in nearby Keighley, then the West Riding identity may be more important than to someone born in Lancashire. How socially and linguistically divided are the geographical communities? A Gaelic-speaking Scot may feel a greater separation from England than an English-speaking one. The nature of the economy may also be important, e.g. a self-sufficient peasant agricultural community feel- ing much stronger local ties than a university-based one.
As the Scottish/English dimension also suggests, the influence of historical conquests and of migration is a major factor in these sorts of divisions. Scots have, of course, historically moved (many would say been driven) both southwards into England and across the sea to Northern Ireland and North America. Here they, and their descen- dants, may retain, to a larger or smaller extent, a Scottish identity that may cut across their ‘residential’ identity. In New York almost everyone has such a secondary identity, being for example Puerto Rican, Jewish, Irish or African-American. In Bradford a substantial minority of inhabitants are of Bangladeshi and Pakistani origin. Such secondary or ‘ethnic’ identities are often related to former nationality (e.g. Irish-American), current religion (Jewish) or colour (African- American). Ethnicity may also relate to tribal affiliation, way of life and descent (e.g. Gypsies) or to a hereditary social status (caste in the traditional Indian social system). The term covers a variety of
‘horizontal’ lines of division dividing geographical communities into recognised subgroups with, to some extent, different ways of life and prestige.
These ‘ethnic’ identities may be of greater or lesser social and political importance depending upon a similar variety of factors to those influencing localism. Major factors include their relative size and economic and political power. Thus a small group occupying an unimportant but useful economic role (e.g. Chinese or Indians
running takeaways and restaurants) in an otherwise undivided community may be almost invisible. A similar sized group that owns a large part of the land upon which the majority community lives and farms (e.g. ‘European’ farmers formerly in Zimbabwe) may be extremely visible and vulnerable to political pressure. Another factor may be the degree of linguistic, cultural and religious differences between groups – the greater the differences the less easy it may be for the groups to communicate, integrate and negotiate.
Religious and linguistic differences serve to heighten aware- ness of local loyalties and, indeed, lead to different perceptions of national identity. Thus in Northern Ireland, Quebec and Kosovo, some inhabitants (Protestants, English-speakers and Serb-speaking Orthodox) may see themselves as inhabitants of a locality within a currently constituted state (the United Kingdom, Canada or Serbia).
Others (Catholics, French-speakers, Albanian-speaking Muslims) may feel loyalty to a different national identity – either to another state (Ireland, Albania) or to the region as an independent entity (Quebec, Kosovo).
It can be argued that many conflicts, which appear to be religious in nature, have little to do with theological considerations. Thus divisions between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland appear to relate to a conflict between two social groups for economic and political opportunities. The origins of struggle can be seen his- torically in the British Crown allocating land to Protestant settlers from the mainland. Current differences are much more about nationality than theological concepts such as transubstantiation or papal authority.
Similarly divisions between Palestinians and Israelis may be seen as an Islamic/Jewish conflict, but more realistically may be seen as a conflict between rival national groups for land and resources. In fact many of the founders of Zionism were secular rather than Orthodox Jews, and many ultra-Orthodox Jews refuse to serve in the Israeli army. Similarly Palestinian Christians (a small minority) have generally aligned themselves with their Muslim Arab compatriots.
Another striking example of the extent to which religion may be a dependent variable in social and political conflict, is the trend in modern India for political leaders of lower caste groups to urge their followers to convert to Buddhism. This is not urged for theo- logical reasons, but in order to escape their low prestige and influence
in traditional Hindu society. However it is clear that religious, linguistic, tribal and other ethnic factors loom large in the con- struction of many people’s political identity – but to different degrees at different times and places depending on the political environment.
RACIAL AND ETHNIC CONFLICT
An important psychological and political factor seems to be the
‘racial’ identity of the ethnic groups concerned. By ‘racial’ is meant the existence of real or assumed visible physical differences – particularly in skin colour – between the groups. Such differences are socially rather than biologically defined – existing human com- munities being virtually all extremely mixed genetically and not divided according to the biological definition of ‘race’. For instance, most US ‘blacks’ would be regarded as whites in tropical Africa: most South African ‘whites’ probably have some ‘black’ ancestry. In essence the major socially defined ‘racial’ division is that between
‘whites’ and ‘non-whites’.
The importance of the distinction between black and white ‘races’
seems to link quite clearly with our inheritance from the period of European imperialism in which a racial justification was advanced for both slavery and colonialism. For instance, British imperial prosperity was for long founded on the triangular trade, in which arms, metal tools and trinkets were exported to West Africa, these were exchanged for slaves who were transported to the Caribbean or American colonies to be used in growing tobacco, spices and cotton. These valuable commodities, in turn, could then be transported back to Liverpool, Bristol or London. Each leg of the journey was enormously profitable, but the subjection of black slaves and the conquest of the Caribbean and North America had to be justified in terms of the superiority of white Christian civilisation over the alleged barbarity of the ‘natives’. As the European powers, and later the United States, continued their competitive acquisition of much of the globe, their success in subduing less well-armed and aggressive societies was, in turn, held to be an indication of this alleged superiority.
This historical legacy of racism has been accentuated by a web of cultural and literary symbolism – with black seen as the colour of evil, white the symbol of innocence – and racist pseudo-scientific findings about the inherited lower intelligence of ‘non-Aryan’ races.
The importance of racism is dramatically illustrated if we consider the history of ethnic relations in US cities. Waves of ethnic groups – Irish, Russian, Italian, Jewish, Puerto Rican – have arrived succes- sively in many American cities to go through similar processes of accommodation, integration and assimilation. At first such groups have been accommodated in the worst city centre slums, in multiple occupation ‘tenements’. They have taken the worst-paid lowest status jobs and usually formed isolated groups seeking help from already established members of their own community. Very often first- and even second-generation immigrants sought to maintain their own cultural, religious and linguistic traditions and planned to return to their country of origin on retirement.
However, such groups have consistently gradually assimilated to the American ‘way of life’. First they have become politically organised – even if through corrupt ‘bosses’ (local party leaders) and trade unions. Their votes and bargaining power were sought first by others then by members of their own community. Next, second- and third-generation immigrants have sought acceptance in the wider American society by anglicising names, obtaining college education and moving out into the affluent suburbs. Integration has gradually occurred partly on the basis of the new immigrant group accepting American values and citizenship, but also on the basis of America accepting a rich kaleidoscope of cultural traditions and religious beliefs within society. The power of many ‘immigrant’ groups has been comfortably accepted in many respects – consider the giant St Patrick’s Day parade every year in New York and the political power of the Kennedy family. Whilst Catholicism was, at first, regarded as a badge of inferior immigrant status, and, as late as the 1920s Al Smith’s candidacy for the presidency may have been defeated by a Protestant backlash, it is now just one more fully acceptable deno- mination of Christianity (Jones, 1960).
In contrast to this, the African-American group was one of the first to arrive in what is now the United States. But this group has been the last to achieve anything near equal status with the WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) majority. For many years blacks were mainly detained as slaves on southern rural farms and plantations.
But even after emancipation in 1865 they remained the victims of massive social and political discrimination. They long ago lost their specific African languages and cultures, and they have contributed
greatly to the development of a distinctive American culture and interbred extensively with the white population. However, it was only with the Civil Rights Act of 1965 that they can be said to have achieved full and effective citizenship.
DOMINANCE, ASSIMILATION AND SOCIAL PLURALISM
As far as both ethnic and racial relations are concerned, three main alternative social and political patterns seem possible. First, a relationship of (usually racial) social and political dominance – the South African term of ‘apartheid’ being appropriate. An extreme expression of this pattern is where one group is enslaved by the other.
In more recent years, however, such a frank state of affairs has seemed unacceptably bad public relations in a world in which the rhetoric, at least, of democracy predominates. Therefore the language of equality and nationalism usually prevails. In America the official doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ prevailed between the landmark Supreme Court rulings of Plesseyv Ferguson(1896) and Brownv the Board of Education of Topeka(1954), until it was conceded that such a doctrine was a contradiction in terms. In Africa, white dominance in South Africa was justified by the creation of ‘homelands’ in which blacks were accorded the trappings of sovereignty – millions of blacks being declared aliens in the land of their birth. In contemporary Europe there is a similar tendency to declare immigrant ‘guest- workers’ of unsuitable ethnic origin to be non-citizens without rights. Similarly, in Malaysia, ‘Malays’ (those who speak Malay, practise Islam and conform to Malay customs) have a special status in citizenship and land law as opposed to others – in effect those of Chinese and Indian origin (Suffian et al., 1978: 94).
The most extreme expression of the attitudes towards racial and ethnic difference implicit in a pattern of dominance is where the state machinery is employed in an attempt to eliminate an ethnic, national or racial group from a particular geographical area (or indeed totally).
This is known in international law as genocide. The best known example is the Holocaust in which the Nazi state attempted to eliminate the European Jewry. Unfortunately more recent examples of ‘ethnic cleansing’ can be cited in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. This is usually accompanied by attempts to stereotype the