The Issues

The Problem of Meaning: The Issues 3 6 7

M

OST READERS OF THE BIBLE ASSUME THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO DISCOVER ITS INTENDED

meaning. However, an extensive debate rages today over both the possibility and the importance of a critical examination of Scripture (or any other text) in order in order to ascertain its original message. These challenges have thrown the hermeneutical enterprise into disarray, for they have appeared from every side. Does “hermeneutics”

mean principles of interpretation or the act of appropriating a text’s “meaning” for one’s own situation? What is the meaning of “meaning? These questions form the topic of this appendix.

The process of discovering the “meaning” of a written utterance has three foci: the author, the text and the reader. I

AUTHOR + T E X T + READER

The author “produces” a text while a reader “studies” a text. Yet which of the three is the primary force in determining its meaning? As we will see, the focus has shifted from one to another of these as various theories of meaning have been propounded. Since an author is no longer present to explain the meaning of the text once it is written, is the text “autonomous” from the author? And since the reader provides the grid by which the text is interpreted, what place does the text itself have in the process of understanding?

These are valid questions that demand answers.

In 1967 the literary critic Paul de Man spoke of a similar “crisis” in criticism: “Well- established rules and conventions that governed the discipline of criticism and made it a cornerstone of the intellectual establishment have been so badly tampered with that the entire edifice threatens to collapse” (1971:3). In defining this crisis, he spoke of “the incredible swiftness with which conflicting tendencies succeed each other,” the extensive appearance of books inaugurating “a new kind of novelle nouvelle critique,” and the replacement of philosophy by the social sciences at the helm of literary criticism (pp. 3- 4). There is no sign that this incredible productivity is waning, and one is bewildered to discover that by the time news appears regarding a “new” school, someone is already writing that the movement is passe. In these appendices I hope to make sense of the scene

and to attempt a possible map for finding our way out of the maze to the kind of “field approach” that J. D. Crossan suggested a few years back when things seemed so much simpler (1977:39-49).

The problem is indeed a serious one. Some have charged proponents of a reader- oriented criticism with undue skepticism, but the difficulties of objective interpretation are far too great for such a charge to be valid. The simple fact is that all of us read a text on the basis of our own background and proclivities. It is not only impossible but dangerous to put our knowledge and theological tradition aside as we study a biblical text. That very knowledge provides categories for understanding the text itself. At the same time, however, these traditions have potential for controlling the text and deter- mining its meaning. This constitutes reader-response interpretation-meaning produced by the reader rather than by the text. As Jeanrond says, texts are not so much objectively understood as they are read anew in each situation, a dynamic process that is often open- ended and produces a new image of reality in the act of reading (1987: 11-12).

The point I wish to argue is not whether this is ever the case; any observer has to admit that it is usually so. But I do challenge whether this must or even should be the case.

This is the task of hermeneutics, not only to determine principles for interpretation, but also to delineate the proper goal(s) of interpretation. The thesis of these appendices will support the priority of determining the author’s intended meaning as the true core of biblical interpretation.

Hermeneutics originated as a biblical discipline. Yet many fields of study have provided input. Until recent decades, the primary influence was always philosophy. Then with structuralism linguistics came to the fore, and at the present time literary criticism has seemingly assumed the throne. Of course, no single force is behind the hermeneutical enterprise, and each of the above as well as sociology, anthropology, psychology and so forth are important. Jane Tompkins provides a helpful summary of the historical devel- opment in literary criticism (198O:ix-xxvi). She describes the evolution of the focal center of interest from text to reader to response, and it is illuminating to discover the parallels between literary critical thinking and biblical hermeneutics. We will trace this basic pattern below.

Thr Problem of tha Reader and the Text

The problem of interpretation begins and ends with the presence of the reader. How does one get back to the perspective and message of an ancient text? The problem is difficult enough when we try to interpret one another in oral communication, for each of us has a slightly different perspective, and we use the same terms but with different content.

Often my wife and I will discuss an issue for some time before we realize that we are looking at the problem from quite different vantage points. Only when we align our perspectives do we actually begin to communicate. When we multiply this by 2,000 years of development from biblical times to the current period, the problem becomes almost insurmountable. The tendency is to read modern issues back into the text, and a purely

“objective” approach that re-creates the original situation without recourse to the modern preunderstanding is exceedingly difficult, indeed impossible.’ The act of interpretation

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itself is done from within a cultural and theological framework. In fact, this framework is both positive and necessary if understanding is to take place. Yet where does that leave the text?

Hans Frei has shown most persuasively that this issue is hardly new to the twentieth century.* Biblical scholars throughout history have struggled with the difficulty of literal or text-oriented and nonliteral or cultural/theological approaches to the Bible. Never- theless, the issue has surfaced in a new way in the last three decades. Frei states that the apologetic cast of hermeneutics has until recently eclipsed a realistic approach to narra- tive because “the historical-critical method was a powerful antidote to a serious consid- eration of narrative interpretation in its own right”(1974:141; see 124-54). In short, a true hermeneutics was rendered impossible by an approach that failed to let the text speak for itself. The hermeneutical switch from the text to the individual resulted from a switch of focus from the accessibility of the text (in terms of methodology for interpreting a text) to inquiry into the structure of understanding itself.3 The focus of interest has thus shifted from the text to the self, and the significance of this shift is still being explored.

1. Author-centered Hermeneutics. Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) is the father of modern hermeneutics. For him the purpose of interpretation is the reconstruction of the author’s original message. Interpreters, through historical and critical reflection on the text, align themselves with that intended meaning. Schleiermacher wedded the spirit of the Enlightenment to the process of interpretation by eschewing a dogmatic approach and treating the Bible like any other book. A German pietist and Lutheran preacher, Schleiermacher nevertheless refused to allow his philosophical system to triumph over his religious consciousness. His response was to wed idealism (which teaches that reality is determined by the rational process) with romanticism, which led Schleiermacher to say that religious faith is grounded in the feeling of absolute dependence upon God. Yet for Schleiermacher this “feeling” was a function of the intellect, and his hermeneutical system reflects this. The key to interpretation, according tu Schleiermacher, is a common ground of understanding between subject and object, between reader and text.4

Schleiermacher’s system has two major factors, the grammatical and the psychological, which correspond to the two spheres of knowledge-the external linguistic codes and the internal consciousness. Grammatical inquiry attempts to develop the linguistic dimension by demarcating the meaning of individual concepts on the basis of the surrounding words. Schleiermacher was ahead of his time in demanding that meaning be seen in the whole, not in isolated parts. Yet he is best known for the psychological aspect. Schleier- macher taught that the interpreter should align himself with the mind of the author and re-create the whole thought of the text as part of the author’s life. The interpreter’s task then is to reconstruct not only the text but the whole process of creating the thought on the part of the author.

Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) takes this psychological approach to its logical conclu- sion. Interpretation for him involves the union of subject and object in a historical act of understanding. Dilthey called this the “rediscovery of the I in the Thou,” by which he meant that one discovers one’s self in the act of reading (1969:235). For this reason

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Dilthey wrote his Critique of Historical Reason as a corrective to Kant by developing a system that united science and life, theory and praxis. The process of understanding is a historical process that seeks objective knowledge of an author’s meaning. From Schleiermacher he borrowed the idea of readers identifying with authors but went further by positing the possibility that readers are in a position to understand the meanings of texts better than the authors themselves. Since readers intersect authors’ minds from outside and bring to bear many techniques, they can recreate meanings that go deeper than the authors themselves realized (see Bleicher 1980: 19-26 for a good discussion).

This approach has obvious weaknesses, and few have followed Schleiermacher or Dilthey this far. By making the author, more than the text, central to the hermeneutical process, they have moved beyond the possible bounds of hermeneutical theory. They have been guilty of reductionism by simplifying a complex process of understanding into a psychologistic study of the author.

2. The Movement Away from Author-Text: Gadamer. However, with the rise of the dialectical movement via Barth and especially Bultmann, this historical approach increas- ingly came under ittack. Here I will attempt to chronicle the attack from a two-pronged perspective, the phenomenology of Heidegger and Gadamer and the semiotics of the poststructuralist school.

It would be instructive before I begin, however, to compare with this the parallel but distinct evolution of literary criticism. Similar to Schleiermacher’s influence at the turn of the century, the school of New Criticism dominated from 1930-1960: With an em- phasis upon the form and texture of the text rather than upon its historical dimensions, the New Critics took an intrinsic approach to the text that failed to consider adequately the subjective involvement of the interpreter. The onset of phenomenological and struc- turalist concerns appeared later on the scene than in biblical studies but accomplished a reorientation of the literary discipline much more quickly, to the extent that literary criticism has now moved further along the path of reader-oriented dynamics than has biblical hermeneutics (see Detweiler 1980:3-23). This is not to say that the school of New Criticism has been replaced. Indeed, it has spawned a number of off-shoots, such as the neo-Aristotelian “Chicago School” with its stress on a philosophically grounded “mime- sis,” or “imitation.” Yet the scene today is controlled by the reader, rather than by text- oriented approaches.

In recent criticism we must begin with Hans-Georg Gadamer, whose magisterial Truth and Method typified the word-event theologians of the post-Bultmannian school. What Fuchs and Ebeling (founders of the “New Hermeneutics” school) label the “hermeneutical circle” is seen by Gadamer as the “fusion of horizons”; namely, the horizon of the text and that of the interpreter. Building upon the thought of the later Heidegger, Gadamer argues that language is grounded in our very “Being” rather than just in our thought- life, and thus both language and text are autonomous entities with a life of their own (see Thiselton 1980:327-56 for an excellent survey). The act of interpretation does not so much unlock the past meaning of the text as establish a dialectic with the text in the present, The psychologistic attempt (of Dilthey and others) to ascertain the author’s

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intention is not a part of this, Gadamer argues, for in the act of writing “meaning has undergone a kind of self-alienation” and must be “stated anew” or reawakened to spoken language by the reader (1965354-55).

In other words, when I study those passages where Paul reflects on his past life-such as Romans 7 and Philippians 3-I do not study Paul but the texts he wrote, and the texts speak to me in my present situation rather than re-create the original author’s past situation. Gadamer states, “To understand it does not mean primarily to reason one’s way back into the past, but to have a present involvement in what is said” (p. 353). This is because “texts do not ask to be understood as a living expression of the subjectivity of their writers. . . . What is fixed in writing has detached itself from the contingency of its origin and its author and made itself free for new relationships” (pp. 356-57). The language of the text as presently constituted is determinative for meaning.

scientific method. Rather, he argues that it can provide only a degree of certainty and can never truly re-create the “intended” or “original” meaning of the text. There are not two (interpretation and understanding) or three (with application) separate aspects in the hermeneutical enterprise but rather one single act of “coming-to-understanding.” Past and present are fused together. One cannot interpret “God so loved the world” merely from the Johannine perspective; John 3:16 is always considered from the perspective of one’s present experience of divine love.

Yet at the same time, Gadamer insists, interpretation is not an “action of one’s sub- jectivity” but a historical act, a “placing of oneself within a process of tradition, in which

past and present are constantly fused” (p. 258). The key is the “temporal distance”

between subject (interpreter) and object (text); this allows one to sift the preunderstand- ing or historical tradition so as to select only those aspects which prove meaningful in understanding the text. Contrary to the Enlightenment’s negative appraisal of preunder- standing as a barrier to interpretation, Gadamer makes it a positive factor, indeed the key to true understanding. Here Gadamer’s use of “preunderstanding” is similar to Schleiermacher’s: it is the common ground between the interpreter and the world of the text, that store of knowledge which allows one to grapple with the ideas in the text. The interpreter’s prejudgments interrogate the text and are interrogated in turn by the text.

Thereby subjectivity and objectivity merge together, and interpretation becomes appli- cation as new horizons of possibility are opened.5 In short, both text and interpreter take part in the historical process of interpretation. The openness of the text is paralleled by the openness of the reader and the historically conditioned horizons of both merge in the act of coming-to-understanding. Most importantly for Gadamer this process occurs in the present and cannot be controlled by the past subjective component of authorial intention.

In sum, Gadamer’s aesthetic hermeneutic moves from the author and the text to a union of text and reader, with roots in the present rather than in the past. Yet there are several weaknesses inherent to this theory. As is true also of the New Hermeneutic, it is not so clear how Gadamer avoids the danger of subjective interpretation. For him there are two controls against subjectivity-the past horizon of the text and the present com- munity of the interpreters (the “tradition” that challenges subjective interpretations).

However, there are no clear criteria for avoiding subjectivism. In fact, each moment of reading can produce a new and innovative understanding.

Also, Gadamer does not develop a methodology for distinguishing true from false interpretation. As Jeanrond points out, “systematically distorted communication” can twist the meaning of the text (1987:14-16, 22-37; see also Thiselton 1980:314-16), but Gadamer develops no criteria for noting inadequate understandings. Furthermore, he has an uncritical view of the role of the reader in interpretation. It is difficult to see how he can avoid polyvalence (multiple meanings), since each present situation or perspective is free to guide the text wherever it wishes. Anarchy could easily be the result. Finally, Gadamer gives tradition an uncritical role in the act of coming-to-understanding. As Hirsch points out, “The reader who follows the path of tradition is right, and the reader who leaves this path is wrong”( 1967:250). However, there is no stability in this approach, for tradition is ever developing and changing depending on the community and the data.

Gadamer follows Heidegger in orienting all understanding to language: understanding comes not so much through the “methods” of interpretation (as in the classical schools of hermeneutics) as in the act of “disclosure” (or “truth”) within communication. Fur- thermore, it is an aesthetic experience and occurs more readily in oral than in written speech. In the former one has a ready-made context within which to interpret the com- munication. With a “text,” however, the past thought-world is missing, and the message is open to the subjective perspective of the reader. The only solution is the universal basis of language. The interpreter comes to the text aware of his preunderstanding and utilizes it to ask questions of it. The thought-world of the text opens itself up and in the dialogue that follows reshapes the questions of the interpreter. This is Gadamer’s version of the hermeneutical circle, called the “fusion” of horizons. The past (the text) and the present (the interpreter) merge.

Moreover, this results in a radical change in the definition of truth since it would differ depending on the tradition that develops it. Truth would have no universal or absolute basis that would bridge from one community to another. While this may indeed be the case, it does not have to be so, and in these appendices I will attempt to establish the viability of seeking the original intended meaning of a text.

3. Structuralism.6 In France structuralism filled the vacuum left by a growing disen- chantment with Sartrian existentialism; in biblical studies it filled a similar void caused by the disenchantment of many scholars with the results of form and redaction criticism.

Current biblical criticism, proponents of structuralism argue, is preoccupied with the historical traditions rather than with genre and plot development and as a result has produced an impasse in which the interpreter is unable to cross the chasm between meaning and significance. Historical truth (Geschichte) is sacrificed on the altar of history (Historic). Structuralism takes the opposite pole and argues that such diachronic (his- toricist) interests are a barrier to true meaning and that the interpreter must consider only the synchronic (literary) presence of the text as a whole.

It is important to realize here that Gadamer never denies the place of objective or ’ A movement further away from the priority of the author and text occurs within

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