1. On the motives of bureaucrats, see, for example, Niskanen (1971, 36, 38- 39); Simon (1976, 110-11); Downs (1967, 81-88); Johnson (1989, 8). In Japan, the allure of elite social status and a sense of national service also drive the actions of state officials. As Johnson observes, "The ancestors of the modern Japanese bureaucrats are the samurai of the feudal era." A career in the central bureaucracy—particularly. the economic ministries, such as finance or MITI—continues to "attract the most talented graduates of the best universities in Japan, and the positions of higher-level officials in these ministries are . . . considered the most prestigious in the country"
(1982, 20 and 36). Moreover, in interviews I conducted, a wide range of current and former bureaucrats expressed patriotism and a commitment to the general welfare that exceeded mere lip service. During these interviews, MOC officials emphasized the desire to achieve nationwide "balance" in decisions concerning the allocation of public resources. Given their lower salaries relative to former university classmates employed in the private sector, myopic material self-interest could not be the only goal of Japanese government bureaucrats.
2. On the politicization and reputation of MOC, see Ramseyer and
Rosenbluth (1993, 124); Okimoto (1989, 202); Calder (1988, 153-54, 190- 91, and 292); Marshall with Toyama (1992, 37); Kanryo kiko kenkyukai (1978, 46-47); Kusayanagi(1975, 154); Saito (1978, 89).
3. Ohashi went on to serve ten terms in the Lower House of the Diet, representing his native Shimane. As for the "Gang of Four"—Miyashige Mamoru, Kono Tsutomu, Kato Yutaka, and Wada Tsutomu—each proceeded to enjoy a successful career at MOC. S. Matsumoto (1974, 139), Johnson (1982, 59-60), and Kanryo kiko kenkyukai (1978, 27) discuss this matter.
4. Kato (1992) shows how Finance Ministry officials shaped agendas and persuaded politicians of the merits of a consumption tax. For examples from MITI, see Johnson (1982). One of the MITI episodes involved a protracted tug-of-war between Tanaka Kakuei and Fukuda Takeo in seeking to promote
the careers of officials within the ministry sympathetic to their respective interests. Another case concerned pressure that led to the resignation in 1993 of a bureau chief Naito Masayuki, who had approved the "gilded
promotion" of a junior official. It so happened that the junior official was the son of the administrative vice-minister, and the promotion took place
immediately prior to the junior official's resignation from MITl in order to run in the 1993 Lower House elections.
5. Nishioka (1988) provides a detailed description of the events summarized here. Contemporary newspaper accounts include Asahi shinbun (5 Dec.
1951; Tokyo ed., 3 Apr. 1952; Tokyo ed., 4 June 1953); Nihon keizei shinbun (19 June 1951, 27 Aug. 1951); Mainichi shinbun (13 Mar. 1959);
Yumiuri shinbun (3 Dec. 1948, 27 Dec. 1952); Shakai taimusu shinbun (14 Mar. 1953).
6. Chalmers Johnson (1974) was among the first scholars to recognize the political importance of amakudari ; my analysis drew inspiration from his work. The findings presented here are based on data concerning the post- retirement fates of 114 former upper-level officials (bureau chief and above) who served between 1948 and 1988. The post-retirement fates of noncareer civil servants is far more harried: "Having no real authority or law-making power, these retired officials are obliged to grow old in a 'second life' making the rounds with résumé in hand" (S. Matsumoto 1974, 151). See also
Kanryo kiko kenkyukai (1978, 151) and Yamamoto (1975, 140-41).
7. Amakudari hakushio (1985, 138) provides information about the post- retirement reemployment pathways for officials of selected ministries:
Reemployment Post Construction Transport Agriculture
Public corporation 46 29 73
Industry association 56 177 633
Private sector 146 220 635
Elective politics 14 6 15
Academic positions 9 4 61
Miscellaneous 4 47 ——
Unclear 23 43 316
Total 298 526 1,733
8. Despite the striking parallels and differences between pantouflage and amakudari , I am unaware of any in-depth comparative analysis of their origins and functions. For example, in contrast to the one-way street taken by Japanese bureaucrats, French government officials need merely take a leave of absence from the civil service in order to run for elective office.
Criticism surrounds the practice in both countries. The statement of a French observer (cited in Cohen 1969, 198) applies equally well to Japan: they
"decide everything among themselves behind a curtain of opaque 'technicity," in clandestine meetings where agreements are too easily reached among civil servants who have already pantouflés (moved into private firms) and civil servants who would like to pantoufler ." The term pantouflé (literally "bedroom slippers") refers to how high civil servants slip back and forth from lifetime appointments in the grand corps to high-placed private-sector jobs. I am grateful to David Wilsford for insights.
9. For example, an official posted to MOC's Road Bureau discovered that the de facto strongman in the area of road administration was not the incumbent bureau chief but, rather, a retired director of the bureau and (and former vice-minister of construction) who exercised "cloistered rule" from the post of president of the Japan Highway Corporation.
10. Jin et al. (1981, 198-99); Asahi shinbun (13 Sept. 1993). Between 1974 and 1984, among the "descending angels" who landed at the five public corporations under MOC jurisdiction, over 40 percent were former MOC officials ( Amakudari hakusho 1985, 161):
Former Agency of "Old
Boys"
Public Corporation MOC MOF Other
Housing 21 5 8
Japan Highway 13 5 13
Metropolitan Highways 5 2 7
Water Resources 8 2 16
Hanshin Superhighway 9 0 13
Total 56 14 57
11. Thirty-eight MOC officials descended into national elective politics between 1950 and 1994:
Date Elected Diet Chamber Party Factional Lineage Awaya Toshinobu 1986 Lower LDP/Shinsei Sato
Fujiwara Setsuo 1960 Lower LDP Kishi
Imai Isamu 1972 Lower LDP Ikeda
Inaura Shikazo 1956 Upper LDP Sato
Inoue Shohei 1989 Upper LDP Sato
Inoue Takashi 1980 Upper LDP Sato
Ishiba Jiro 1974 Upper LDP Sato
Ishii Keiichi 1993 Lower Komeito ——
Iwasawa
Tadayasu 1950 Upper Jiyuto/LDP ——
Jinnouchi Takao 1988 Upper LDP Sato
Kamijo Katsuhisa 1974 Upper LDP Ikeda
Koga Issei 1990 Lower LDP/Shinsei Kishi
( continued )
Date Elected Diet Chamber Party Factional
Lineage
Koga Raishiro 1971 Upper LDP Sato
Kutsukake Tetsuo 1986 Upper LDP Sato
Maeda Takeshi 1986 Lower LDP/Shinsei Sato
Majima Kazuo 1992 Upper LDP Sato
Masuoka Koji 1977 Upper LDP Sato
Matsushita Tadahiro 1993 Lower LDP Sato
Matsutani Soichiro 1992 Upper LDP Sato
Mochizuki Kunio 1974 Upper LDP Sato
Nagata Yoshio 1992 Upper LDP Sato
Nakata Masami 1952 Lower Jiyuto ——
Nemoto Takumi 1993 Lower LDP Ikeda
Norota Hosei 1977 Lower LDP Sato
Onimaru Katsuyuki 1967 Upper LDP Kono
Ozawa Kyutaro 1953 Upper Jiyuto/LDP Kishi
Sakano Shigenobu 1974 Upper LDP Sato
Sawada Issei 1962 Upper LDP Kishi
Shimizu Yasuo 1992 Upper LDP Sato
Shiojima Dai 1983 Lower LDP Sato
Takeuchi Fujio 1971 Upper LDP Sato
Twara Takashi 1979 Lower LDP Sato
Ueda Minoru 1968 Upper LDP Sato
Ueno Kosei 1992 Upper LDP Kishi
Yamamoto Sachio 1963 Lower LDP Sato
Yamanouchi Ichiro 1968 Upper LDP Ikeda
Yokouchi Shomei 1993 Lower LDP Sato
Yoneda Masafumi 1959 Upper LDP Sato
12. The 1980 Upper House election, in which two MOC former vice-ministers won seats, clearly illustrates the Construction Machine's success in directing the vote in each administrative jurisdiction (Jin et al. 1981, 188):
MOC Jurisdiction Inoue Takashi Sakano Shigenobu Hokkaido Development Agency 76,691 3,285
Tohoku Regional Bureau 240,455 1,331
Kanto Regional Bureau 179,029 121,510
Hokuriku Regional Bureau 144,788 48,266
Chubu Regional Bureau 21,365 162,449
Kinki Regional Bureau 178,150 13,917
Chugoku Regional Bureau 86,239 2,811
Kyushu Regional Bureau 24,764 227,518
Okinawa Development Agency 2,179 12,304