This excerpt from Primal Leadership by Daniel Goleman and his colleagues illustrates the importance of understanding your audience and the type of decision you want them to make. 1 The excerpt contrasts how two executives from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) informed their audience of about 200 journalists and editors of upper management’s plan to shut down their news reporting division. Notice how unsympathetic and immature the fi rst executive appears to be as he reports on the success of the other divisions at the BBC and then adds that the apparently unprofi t- able news reporting division is to be shut down. Giving such a report to a different audience, say the BBC’s board of directors with oversight responsibility for upper management’s plans, might have been totally appropriate. In order to make an informed oversight decision, most board members would appreciate the comparative information the fi rst executive shared as well as his apparent con- cern for profi tability. But for this audience of soon-to-be unemployed journalists, the fi rst executive appears to have no clue to whom he is speaking or the type of decision he wants them to make:
Does he want the journalists to decide to go along with upper management’s plan or to fi ght it? No doubt this executive was surprised by the journalists’ angry response to his speech; it seems likely his speaking experience was limited to delivering similar factual reports.
Notice, on the other hand, how empathetic and leader-like the second executive appears to be.
The second executive addresses the group’s values, their sacrifi ces, and the diffi culties they will face.
He knows his job is not simply to report the facts but to inspire and rally the journalists’ fl agging spirits. To inspire the group, the second executive elicits what this text terms a rallying decision from the journalists. Chapter 2 shows us how we can be more like the second executive. We too can know what to say and when to say it, even when circumstances are most trying and diffi cult.
As we saw in Chapter 1 , to be effective communicators, professionals must fi rst be aware of their audiences’ decision schemata. But how can professionals ever prepare for such a task when the number of individual decisions their audiences make is seemingly infi nite? Physicists who want to persuade their audiences to fund new research projects are often able to interact with them directly to learn about their information requirements and concerns. 2 But many professionals do not have the time or the opportunity to interview audience members, much less to conduct a Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis, build a linear model, or conduct a think-aloud study in order to discover the deci- sion schema of their audience. Instead, professionals need a classifi cation scheme that makes sense of the bewildering array of audience decisions and helps them produce the numerous documents and presentations, and orchestrate the many interactions, required to elicit those decisions.
Chapter 2 proposes a scheme that classifi es a large number of audience decisions, as well as the documents, presentations, and interactions designed to elicit them, into 13 major types: oversight , compliance , staffi ng , employment , exonerative , rallying , investment , lending , usage , sourcing , budgetary , borrow- ing , and policy decisions. For example, a student’s decision to apply an instructor’s lesson, a patient’s decision to follow the doctor’s orders, and a customer’s decision to try a free sample after hearing a salesperson’s product pitch can all be classifi ed as usage decisions—decisions to use or try out certain products, services, or information. And all usage decisions require communicators to address similar decision criteria and thus to deliver similar types of information. Moreover, the instructor’s lesson, the doctor’s orders, and the salesperson’s product pitch can all be classifi ed as documents, presentations, or interactions whose communicative purpose is to elicit a usage decision. Interest- ingly, a growing number of scholars agree that the most productive way to classify any form of communication is according to its communicative purpose. 3
The major benefi t of such a classifi cation scheme is that it can help professionals predict the information or content their audiences expect them to provide. In contrast, knowing the format of a document, presentation, or an interaction—such as an email, an impromptu presentation , or a team meet- ing —says little about the content the audience expects. Although letters to the editor are formatted as letters , they are usually exhortations advising needed change. The contents of letters to the editor are more similar to the contents of political speeches than to the contents of many other types of letters. 4 Likewise, knowing the source of a message says little about the content audiences require. For instance, knowing that an attorney generated a particular document says little about an audience’s content expectations given the many different types of documents attorneys generate. In the same way, simply identifying the audience to whom a message is directed tells practically nothing about the content required in it. For example, consumers, one of salespeople’s primary audiences, are asked to make compliance, investment, usage, sourcing, staffi ng, exonerative, borrowing, and rally- ing decisions. And again, each decision type requires professionals to provide quite different types of information to their audiences.
In addition to helping professionals predict the information or content requirements of their audiences, the scheme can also be used to classify genres , or categories of discourse to which various documents, presentations, and interactions belong. 5 Business genres, for example, include business
plans, quarterly reports, directives, job interviews, policy meetings, and standard operating pro- cedures, as well as many other types of management documents, presentations, and interactions.
Although one might reasonably assume that all documents labeled plans differ from all documents labeled reports , an understanding of decision types reveals that strategic plans and annual reports are both designed to elicit an oversight decision, and thus both require similar information. An under- standing of decision types also reveals profound differences among documents and presentations that seemingly belong to the same genre. For example, not all documents or presentations called plans are meant to elicit an oversight decision. Some plans are meant to elicit an investment deci- sion (e.g., many business plans), some a lending decision (e.g., some acquisition plans), some a usage decision (e.g., most medical treatment plans), and so on.
The 13 decision types this chapter describes cover a wide range of rhetorical situations profes- sionals face. They can be used to meaningfully group dozens of genres, to address scores of different audiences, and to accomplish many different communication goals. However, some types of deci- sions are not included among the 13 in this classifi cation scheme. For instance, this classifi cation scheme does not include domain-specifi c decisions professionals are more likely to make them- selves, as opposed to ask an audience to make, such as judicial, marketing, regulatory, fi nancing, and technical decisions. Table 2.1 illustrates a few of the many audience decisions and the documents, presentations, or interactions designed to elicit them that are readily classifi ed as belonging to one of the 13 major decision types described in this chapter.
One of the best-known types of decisions—policy decisions—will be discussed last in this chapter. This category includes many of the decisions world leaders, legislators, and CEOs make every day. Policy decisions are nonroutine decisions to which little routine decision-making expertise can be applied. In addition, many policy decisions are quite con- troversial and generate much debate. Unlike routine decisions, policy decisions sometimes require professionals to generate decision criteria and to convince their audiences to accept those criteria. 6
The remaining 12 types of audience decisions this chapter includes can be divided into two groups of six. The fi rst group helps audiences manage their professional relationships both within
TABLE 2.1 Many Audience Decisions Can Be Classifi ed as One of Thirteen Types
Professional Audience Document,
Presentation, or Interaction
Audience Decision Decision Type
Politician Voters Campaign speech Vote for candidate
or not
Rallying
Applicant Recruiters Job interview Hire applicant
or not
Staffi ng
Attorney Jurors Defense
arguments
Acquit defendant or not
Exonerative
Consultant Clients Project proposal Hire consultants
or not
Staffi ng
Executive Directors Strategic plan Approve strategy
or not
Oversight
Teacher Students Lesson Apply instructions
or not
Usage
Commander Subordinates Intent statement Follow orders or
not
Compliance
Salesperson Customers Sales pitch Try out product
or not
Usage
an organizational hierarchy and outside it. The second group helps them manage their own or their organization’s fi nancial resources.
Before we go into more detail about each of the 13 major decision types the audiences of profes- sionals make, we should be aware of several important caveats regarding decision types and the extent to which they can help professionals predict the audience’s information needs. First, even when two genres are meant to elicit the same type of decision, the decision criteria audiences use to evaluate the content in one genre will vary slightly from the decision criteria they use to evaluate the content in the other genre. For instance, strategic plans and marketing plans are both meant to elicit oversight decisions. But where board members expect strategic plans to address the corporate objective, the corporate strategy, the corporate-wide action plan, and so on, top management expects marketing plans to address the marketing department’s objective, the marketing department’s strategy, and the marketing department’s action plan. Similarly, commercial bank loan offi cers require somewhat dif- ferent fi nancial information when making lending decisions about requests for credit from small privately held companies as opposed to requests from large publicly held ones. 7
Second, audience members are free to make any type of decision they wish, no matter what type of decision a professional intends to elicit from them. For example, a supervisor might imagine her request for a productivity increase from her staff would elicit a straightforward compliance decision from them. But while considering her request, some staff members may make employment deci- sions instead and decide to look elsewhere for a less demanding job. Similarly, an employee might imagine his request for a salary increase would evoke a straightforward budgetary decision from his boss. But while considering the employee’s request, the boss may make an oversight decision and decide to eliminate the employee’s position altogether. In general, any unilateral request for change can trigger an unintended decision type.
Third, some genres, such as annual reports, are routinely used by different audiences to make different types of decisions. For example, board members and shareholders may use annual reports to make oversight decisions when casting their votes on management’s recommenda- tions. Potential investors and fi nancial analysts may use them to make investment decisions when buying shares or recommending the purchase of a company’s stock. Job applicants may use them to make employment decisions when applying for a new position. Customers may use them to make usage decisions when educating themselves about a company’s new product line. Bankers may use them to make lending decisions when considering a company’s creditworthiness. Some fi rms try to address the information needs of their annual reports’ different audiences in different sections of their annual reports. Some fi rms only address the needs of the primary audience—
their shareholders.
Finally, a few situations exist in which a professional may not care what type of decision the audience makes or even if it makes any decision at all. Some communications may be purely per- functory. Others may be routine exchanges of information. In these cases a professional may not need to consider the type of decision the audience will make. The following sections describe the types of audience decisions professionals do need to attend to seriously.
Audience Decisions About Principal/Agent Relationships
In order to understand the fi rst group of six decision types—oversight, compliance, staffi ng, employment, exonerative, and rallying decisions—we must fi rst understand the differences between principals and their agents. Principals are the people to whom agents must answer. Principals of managers, for example, include their fi rm’s shareholders, board members, and upper management.
More broadly speaking, principals of managers can also be said to include their clients, custom- ers, and creditors, or else anyone to whom they are contractually obligated. Managers themselves
function as principals to their subordinates, suppliers, and borrowers. Principals set the terms and conditions of any principal/agent relationship. They write the employee contracts, draw up the requests for proposals, and stipulate the covenants for loans.
Agents , on the other hand, are the people who are obligated to act on behalf of principals. Agents who are unhappy with the principal/agent relationships they have entered into may decide to leave them once they have met their obligations to the principals. Employees may resign and leave an employer; credit card holders may transfer their balances to another bank; suppliers may refuse ship- ment to untrustworthy customers. Table 2.2 lists common principal/agent pairs as this text more broadly defi nes the terms.
The six decision types concerned with the management of principal/agent relationships can be further divided into three complementary pairs. The fi rst pair, oversight and compliance decisions, execute principal/agent relationships that have already been established. For example, board mem- bers make oversight decisions when they approve or reject executives’ plans and when they approve or disapprove of executives’ performance. And executives make compliance decisions when they decide whether to comply with directives from their board.
The second pair, staffi ng and employment decisions, establish principal/agent relationships within an organization or between individuals. For example, employers make staffi ng decisions when they hire, fi re, promote, or demote employees. And job applicants make employment deci- sions when they accept or reject a job offer.
The third pair, exonerative and rallying decisions, help maintain good principal/agent relation- ships. For example, customers make exonerative decisions when they decide whether to exonerate from blame a supplier who failed to meet a delivery deadline. And suppliers make rallying decisions when they decide whether to make an extra effort to provide high-quality service to their custom- ers. In each of these three complementary pairs of decision types, one type is typically made by the principal in the principal/agent pair and the other type by the agent. The principal typically makes oversight, staffi ng, and exonerative decisions. The agent typically makes compliance, employment, and rallying decisions.
Oversight Decisions: Responses to Requests for Permission
Audiences who are the superiors of others within an organization or to whom others are con- tractually obligated, in other words principals, make oversight decisions about their agents’ plans and performance. For example, board members, acting as principals, make oversight decisions when they decide whether to approve management’s plans to pursue a new strategy; clients, acting as principals, make oversight decisions when they decide whether to allow consultants to continue working on a project that has fallen behind schedule; employers, acting as principals,
TABLE 2.2 Examples of Principal/Agent Pairs
Principal Agent
1. Stockholders Board members
2. Employers Employees
3. Customers Suppliers
4. Clients Attorneys
5. Legislators Bureaucrats
6. Investors Fund managers
7. Creditors Borrowers
8. Funding agencies Scientists
make oversight decisions when they decide whether to approve an employee’s creative new product proposal. U.S. presidents make oversight decisions when, as Commander in Chief, they decide whether to permit their top military offi cers to implement their plans for battle.
Principals make oversight decisions in order to protect the interests of the projects, organi- zations, or even countries for which they are responsible. Agents seek oversight decisions from principals when they attempt to gain approval for their past performance or to obtain permission to implement their plans for the future. Documents and presentations agents produce in order to elicit oversight decisions from principals include strategic plans , annual reports , marketing plans , progress reports , and operating reviews .
In the following letter, we see how President Abraham Lincoln approached making an impor- tant oversight decision during the American Civil War. The letter is the president’s response to a 22-page plan of attack that his top general, George B. McClellan, submitted to him for approval.
The general presented his plan as an alternative to a plan Lincoln himself had proposed a few days earlier. Lincoln was not persuaded by the general’s plan, in part because he had been disappointed by the general’s poor performance in the prior year.
In the letter, Lincoln enumerates the criteria for his oversight decision in a list of questions about the objectives, competitive strategy, implementation, and risk mitigation of the general’s plan. He says he will agree to the general’s plan if the general can demonstrate his plan has a better chance than Lin- coln’s of meeting those criteria. Although the general never addressed Lincoln’s decision criteria, the President reluctantly permitted the general’s plan to be implemented out of respect for his top offi cer.
LINCOLN’S RESPONSE TO GENERAL MCCLELLAN’S PLAN
Executive Mansion, Washington Feb. 3, 1862
To Major General McClellan My dear Sir:
You and I have distinct, and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac—yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the Railroad on the York River
—mine to move directly to a point on the Railroad South West of Manassas.
If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours.
1st.Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time, and moneythan mine?
2nd.Wherein is a victory more certainby your plan than mine?
3rd.Wherein is a victory more valuableby your plan than mine?
Much like U.S. presidents oversee the plans and performance of their top military com- manders, an organization’s board of directors oversees the plans and performance of its top management team. 8 When top management does not meet the performance objectives set by the board, board members may decide to replace the CEO, 9 much like Lincoln soon replaced General McClellan.
In addition to overseeing the fi rm’s past performance, board members oversee the fi rm’s mission, competitive strategy, and operating plans. 10 But unlike Lincoln, board members can usually trigger change in management’s strategy by simply expressing their concerns about it. 11 Related oversight responsibilities of board members include setting strategic parameters, monitoring strategic coher- ence, and evaluating consistency among management’s proposed strategies. 12 In addition, board members see themselves as responsible for overseeing the risks taken on by management, including legal, geopolitical, and reputational risks. 13
The following list of questions subsumes many of the criteria identifi ed previously and provides a starting point for predicting a principal’s decision criteria for any particular oversight decision.
The list can also serve as an outline for the documents and presentations agents produce in order to elicit oversight decisions from principals.
• What is the organization’s or project’s past performance?
• What are the reasons for that performance?
• What are the financial objectives for the future?
• What is the competitive strategy for meeting those objectives?
• What is the action plan for implementing the strategy?
• What are the contingency plans for mitigating risks?
In addition to agents’ answers to the previous questions, principals in both for-profi t and non-profi t organizations may also require benchmark information about the organization’s or project’s historical performance, the average performance in the industry, alternative strate- gies and plans, as well as competing fi rms’ and projects’ fi nancial results, strategies, and plans. 14 Research fi nds that most annual reports do a good job of describing the fi rm’s past performance, explaining the reasons for the fi rm’s past performance, and communicating the fi rm’s objectives and plans for the future, but they rarely benchmark the fi rm’s plans and performance against those of the competitors. 15
Table 2.3 displays some of the think-aloud comments made by two experienced audience mem- bers (a Ph.D. in fi nance and a Ph.D. in business policy, both with high-level corporate experience)
4th.In fact, would it not be less valuable, in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?
5th.In case of disaster, would not a safe retreat be more difficultby your plan than by mine?
Yours truly, A. LINCOLN