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THE ASEAN INTERGOV ERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN R IGHTS
This assessment of the progress in Southeast Asia on human rights begins in the wake of the ‘Asian values’ debate and culminates in the formal regional institutionalisation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). The book examines the arduous negotiation of AICHR, the evolving relationship between ASEAN states and the international human rights system, and the historical and experiential reasons for hesitancy.
The book concludes with a discussion of how the evolving right to development impacts upon AICHR and international human rights in general, and how their preference for economic, social, and development rights can help ASEAN states shape the debate.
ta n h s i e n - l iis Research Fellow and Executive Director of the ‘ASEAN Integration through Law’ project at the Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore, which investigates the role of law and the rule of law in Asian legal integration.
T H E A S E A N
I N T E RG OV E R N M E N TA L C O M M I S S I O N O N H U M A N
R I G H T S
Institutionalising Human Rights in Southeast Asia
TAN HSIEN-LI
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sa˜o Paulo, Delhi, Tokyo, Mexico City
Cambridge University Press
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Tan, Hsien-Li, 1979–
The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights : institutionalising human rights in Southeast Asia / Hsien-Li Tan.
p. cm.
ISBN 978-1-107-00449-8 (Hardback)
1. ASEAN. Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. 2. Human rights–Southeast Asia. I. Title.
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For my parents
CONTENTS
List of tables page ix Preface xi
1 Charting the human rights institutionalisation process in Southeast Asia 1
Whither a regional or sub-regional human rights system for Asia? 1 The framework of human rights in ASEAN 5
Chapter outlines 12
2 Enough of ‘Asian values’: roots of the ASEAN states’ reticence towards human rights 24
Introduction 24
Pre-modern foundations of international human rights: the conspicuous exclusion of coloured peoples 28
The advent of modern international human rights: the UN Charter and Bill of Rights 32
Developments after the Bill of Rights: from the middle of the Cold War to the twenty-first century 42
Where was Asia in the making of international human rights law?
Possible roots of ASEAN states’ aversion to human rights 60 Conclusion 69
3 Self-determination and democracy: the human rights experiences of five ASEAN states 72
Introduction 72
Case-studies of Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore 77
Conclusion 136
4 Instituting the regional rights regime: the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and the role of civil society 139
Introduction 139
vii
The dichotomy between the ASEAN Way and human rights 144 ASEAN’s rejection of norm change: neither participatory regionalism nor flexible engagement 147
How ASEAN softened its stance on human rights 151
The promotion and protection of human rights by AICHR 157 Track 2 and 3 influences on human rights 163
Consolidation of the Working Group’s initiatives with that of the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) 167
The next phase: regional human rights transformation through AICHR 176
5 Human rights understanding between the ASEAN region and the United Nations: convergence, regional cohesion, and national responsibility 181
Introduction 181
Convergence of UN and ASEAN agendas on human rights issues 183 Relating UN initiatives to ASEAN: maximising domestic impact 192 Moving forward: establishing national human rights institutions
(NHRIs) in ASEAN states 197 Conclusion 202
6 The unexplored aspect of human rights: what ASEAN needs to understand about the right to development 206
Introduction 206
The ‘generational theory of human rights’ and the ‘right to development’:
mere terms of art? 209
Meeting each other half way: the development discourse adopting human rights practices 213
The five ASEAN states and the Millennium Development Goals 220 Improving human rights and development: how to get states to act on trade, aid, and good governance? 227
Conclusion 245
7 Sustaining AICHR’s substantive empowerment:
implementation, integration, and international law 248
Implementing human rights norms 248
Integrating a human rights culture into ASEAN societies 251 Developing international human rights law at the ASEAN regional level 254
Bibliography and sources 257 Index 286
viii
TABLES
1 Status of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) attainment for the five ASEAN states page223
2 National statistics of the five ASEAN states 229 3 Governance ranking (percentile rank) 245
ix
PREFACE
This book is the culmination of four years of work, during which time the institutional structures for human rights in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region changed dramatically, and for the better, I believe, despite what critics might say.
While it is true that the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) is not yet a fully fledged commission that promotes and protects human rights according to international stand- ards in this region, I believe that this will change in time. ASEAN peoples are becoming more aware of human rights, and civil societies are now more dynamic and vibrant. Even within the ASEAN states themselves, slowly but surely, government officials are becoming less wary and more accepting of and familiar with human rights and its modalities. I believe that in time to come, with generational and internal transformation, human rights will one day take root as part of ASEAN’s identity. It will doubtlessly be a long process with many obstacles along the way but it will come about.
Through the course of my research into the evolution of human rights in the ASEAN region and my participation in the Track 2 and 3 processes on the subject matter, I have discovered much in which to keep faith.
This is primarily the many human rights proponents comprising civil society actors, academics, and state officials who have worked and are still working tirelessly to bring about a comprehensive human rights system in the ASEAN region, both within their national societies as well as in ASEAN as a whole.
While there is undoubtedly much to do before human rights takes root in ASEAN – and critics are quite justified in pointing out the longstanding human rights violations, which continue to go unad- dressed in the region – for ASEAN to progress this far to explicitly incorporate human rights officially into the ASEAN Charter of 2007, and to set substantive goals for human rights cooperation, is already
xi
a remarkable achievement, especially in light of the ‘Asian values’ debacle and that the topic of human rights is especially sensitive, if not taboo.
For a long time, therefore, human rights institutionalisation in ASEAN did not seem possible. Even when state–civil society engagement on human rights began in the 1990s, the setting up of a regional mechanism to promote and protect human rights appeared to be several generations away in the future. However, the ASEAN Charter’s provision for the setting up of an ASEAN human rights body in Article 14 was a welcome surprise. It gave the necessary boost to human rights, making it a legitimate issue for discussion at the official regional level, and it set in motion the oft-conflicted process of establishing the first human rights mechanism in Asia, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, in 2009.
The journey of ASEAN and human rights has been extremely fatiguing and disappointing at times, but as we enter the inaugural phase of AICHR’s operation, it also holds much hope and promise, in which I and my colleagues working on human rights in the region keep faith.
My work on human rights in ASEAN would not be possible without the support of mentors and colleagues whom I have met over the years – many of whom have preferred to remain anonymous – in the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism; the Singapore Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (MARUAH); ASEAN-ISIS (a grouping of institutes of strategic and international studies); Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM); Forum-Asia; the National Human Rights Commissions of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand; and, last but not least, the officials of ASEAN member states.
In writing this book, I owe a debt of gratitude to Simon Tay for introducing me to the ASEAN processes and stakeholder groups without which I would not have been able to begin my project; Yeo Lay Hwee for providing the opportunity to work in-depth on specific Southeast Asian issues and enabling me to understand ASEAN more deeply; Marzuki Darusman, Braema Mathi, Carlos Medina, Vitit Muntarbhorn, Sriprapha Petcharamesree, and Arpee Santiago who, through their long experi- ence in working on human rights in ASEAN have encouraged and inspired me to keep forging ahead; and Andrew Byrnes, Jean d’Aspre- mont, Andrea Durbach, Michael Ewing-Chow, Thio Li-ann, Hitoshi Nasu, Dianne Otto, Catherine Renshaw, and Kevin Tan, who provided insightful comments, challenged me to think more broadly and deeply and, most excitingly, whose words and works have sparked off new ideas for the next stage of my research on international law, human rights, and xii
ASEAN. I would like to thank especially Simon Chesterman for his generous mentorship and guidance of my work as the Asian Society of International Law Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore. Professor Chesterman has taught me much in terms of scholarship and work ethic, and above all has shown me what it means to be a truly sterling scholar.
Finally, I must thank all of my friends and family whose good cheer, encouragement and belief in me kept me going. It is to my parents that I dedicate this book, for their patience and unflinching support of my endeavours even while they could not quite understand my work, espe- cially in the earlier years when international law and human rights had not yet become familiar issues in the ASEAN region.
Tan Hsien-Li Feast of St Francisco de Capillas xiii
1
Charting the human rights institutionalisation process in Southeast Asia
Whither a regional or sub-regional human rights system for Asia?
For years, it was widely deemed a disappointment to the universality of human rights that Asia did not have a regional human rights mechanism,1unlike the Americas, Europe, and Africa, notwithstanding the varying standards of efficacy these bodies possess.2 As such, there were unabated calls to correct this anomaly. This was most volubly witnessed in the ‘Asian values’ debate of the 1990s.3
Realistically speaking, however, an Asia that spans from the Middle East to Japan is geographically, politically, and culturally too diverse for human rights to be managed effectively by a single overarching mechanism.
Enthusiasm for Asia to have a system of human rights protection must recognise the disparate political structures that range from communism like in China and Vietnam; the ‘semi-authoritarianism’ of Singapore and Malaysia; to full democracies such as India, the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan. Even while universal human rights must take centre stage,
1 Virginia A. Leary, ‘The Asian Region and the International Human Rights Movement’, in Claude E. Welch and Virginia A. Leary (eds.), Asian Perspectives on Human Rights (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press,1990), 13, at 13–14.
2 It is recognised that there exist counter-arguments to the school of thought which holds regional human rights bodies as ‘satellites’ of the United Nations (UN) system. Critics of the latter school hold that regionalism, and the opportunity for cultural adaptation and justification, can lead to a dilution of the universal values of human rights. I would generally agree with Christoph Schreuer that although variations do exist among the regional systems, ‘the basic unity of human rights as a universal set of standards has prevailed over cultural relativism and regional fragmentation’. See Christoph Schreuer,
‘Regionalism v. Universalism’, 6(3) European Journal of International Law(1995) 477, at 485.
3 See, for instance, Ralph Wilde, ‘NGO Proposals for an Asia-Pacific Human Rights System’, 1Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal(1998) 137. This has also been noted by Vitit Muntarbhorn, Regional Protection of Human Rights in Asia, Lecture at the International Institute of Human Rights, Strasbourg, France, July 1997, at www.
hurights.or.jp/asia-pacific/no_10/no10_protection.htm.
1
distinct cultural traditions, social practices, and environments result in particular needs for each Asian country. A ‘margin of appreciation’ – to borrow the term from the Europeans – should, as far as possible and without making a travesty of human rights, be respected so as to encour- age enculturation and ownership of the system.
Local and regional ownership of a system adhering to international human rights standards in Asia is especially important to deflect misguided notions on cultural particularism – as evidenced in the cacophony of Asian voices stressing each state’s individual priorities in the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights held in Bangkok (‘Bangkok Conference’) in 1993. This meeting was intended to coalesce the regional perspectives on human rights so that they could be tabled at the subsequent World Conference on Human Rights held later that year in Vienna (‘Vienna Conference’) to re-affirm the universality of international human rights. However, the wide range of opinions pertaining to the different socio-political con- texts of the participating states at the Bangkok Conference made it extremely difficult to agree on the terms of the Final Declaration of the Conference (‘Bangkok Declaration’). Moreover, the Asian states’ rigid stance on cultural relativism, trenchant opposition to ‘ideological imperialism’ in the international human rights project, the insistence on the right to development, and the pre-eminence of socio-economic priorities caused anxiety among the international community that the Bangkok Declaration would ‘hijack’ the Vienna Conference’s aim of concluding universal principles of human rights for the world community.4
Against such a background, therefore, even if an overarching Asian human rights mechanism is possible in the future, present circumstances do not permit such a structure, let alone the ambitious plan of having an institution that spans the Asia Pacific or even on a smaller scale focusing only on East Asia. The continent of Asia does not possess a regional
4 Copies of statements by representatives of Asia governments at the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights are with the author. For instance, the then Indonesian foreign minister, Ali Alatas, had declared on 14 June 1993:
We . . . voice our concern at . . . international media reports that tend to give the impression that the success of the Conference is being threatened by a clash of values between the developed countries of the North and the developing countries of the South . . . This depiction is not only erroneous but also unwarranted and therefore counterproductive.
political organisation like the African Union or Organisation of American States that can help to spearhead human rights efforts. The states also do not share a common objective borne out of catastrophic experiences to sustain the institution of an independent human rights mechanism as seen in the establishment of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights after the Second World War. It is thus unsurprising that proposals for a pan-Asian human rights institution did not progress past the 1980s and 1990s.5
If human rights mechanisms are to be successfully established in Asia, it is my opinion that sub-regions need to be clearly defined within the larger Asian environment such that sub-regional human rights systems can be built first.6 While some may think that this is an inefficient method of institutionalising human rights and unfair for the Asian peoples who fall outside the ambit of protection and that Asia should follow the prototype of a continent-based human rights system,7I believe that the benefits arising from such smaller groupings are likely to outweigh such disadvantages.8 Sub-regional systems can count on some shared history, closer intra-state relations, and a smaller
5 Since 1982, the UN has organised workshops on regional human rights arrangements in the Asian and Pacific region with the aim of establishing a regional mechanism. See Regional Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Asian and Pacific Region, atwww.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/apw.htm.On the non-governmental level, the Asian Human Rights Commission convened a conference to declare anAsian Human Rights Charter – A People’s Charterto further the movement towards a state-sponsored human rights charter for the whole continent, atwww.ahrchk.net/charter/mainfile.php/
declaration. The Law Association for Asia and the Western Pacific (Lawasia) also organ- ised theSeminar on National, Local and Regional Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Asian Regionin Colombo, 21 June – 2 July1982, to discuss the need for a regional human rights structure. See Lawasia,Human Rights in the Asian Region: Recent Trends in Human Rights, Vol. II (Sydney: Lawasia,1982); and Wilde, supranote 3. Not much has resulted from these initiatives.
6 The prospect of an East Asian mechanism was considered initially. However, given the nature of East Asia relations, there has not been much enthusiasm for a system solely limited to this sub-region as the mechanism would be most likely hit many political hurdles. For an overview of East Asian human rights, see Hidetoshi Hashimoto,The Prospects for a Regional Human Rights Mechanism in East Asia(New York: Routledge, 2004).
7 This of course does not discount the protections afforded at the domestic level by constitutions, and where applicable, the upholding of international human rights law in national courts.
8 Gains in sub-regional initiatives have been recognised in the Conclusions of the 11th Workshop on Regional Cooperation for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region, Pakistan, 25–7 February 2003, at www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/
islamabad.htm, at para. 16.
geographical area which would facilitate the system’s manageability.
Also, as will be seen in this book, the political will that is so essential for the successful institutionalisation of human rights protection worldwide is especially necessary in Asia. Asia is made up of states which remain very protective of their sovereignty and it would be much less complicated to facilitate confidence, trust, and state ‘buy-in’ on the smaller sub-regional scale.
This proposition has already proven true in Asia. While variations of human rights initiatives continue to be mooted for Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has pulled away from the fold to establish the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) on 23 October 2009, subsequent to the pronouncement of Article 14 of the Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (‘ASEAN Charter’) that ASEAN should establish a regional human rights body.9 In view of all the above, I have chosen to study the human rights institutionalisation process for Southeast Asia under the auspices of its regional organisation.10
To have all the ten ASEAN member states explicitly promise in the Charter to promote and protect human rights through a regional mechanism is of seminal importance not least because it was the first statement of positive action for the establishment of such a system (as compared to the vague promises of the years prior); also, this statement waslegally bindingupon ASEAN by virtue of it being enshrined in the Charter.11 One cannot overlook the importance of this as ASEAN seldom makes binding agreements and when it does, they usually pertain to economic matters.12With respect to the Charter, however, ASEAN states intend that it be a binding regional pact that serves ‘as a legal and institutional framework of ASEAN to support the realisation of its goals
9 Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 20 November 2007 (entered into force 9 December 2008). Article 14(1) states: ‘In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body’.
10 For convenience, I shall use ‘Southeast Asia’ and the ‘ASEAN region’ as synonymous, even though Timor Leste is considered a part of Southeast Asia but is not a member of ASEAN.
11 This will be discussed inChapter 4.
12 ASEAN has traditionally eschewed overt legalism in favour of diplomacy – except for the areas of economic cooperation and dispute settlement – and these tend to be in the form of agreements, declarations, memoranda of understanding (MOU), policies and frame- works and roadmaps. The two key regional security treaties remain theTreaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), signed on 24 February1976,and theTreaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), signed on 15 December1995.
and objectives’ through the codification of ‘all ASEAN norms, rules, and values’ – and this includes the promotion and protection of human rights.13Thus the Charter is the first step by which human rights are codified within the ASEAN operative rules. It would follow that the promotion and protection of human rights would henceforth have higher priority and more credence than its pre-Charter status.
Of course, ASEAN’s advancement in regional human rights institutionalisation does not materialise solely and unilaterally from the ASEAN Charter. It builds upon a decade and a half of annual declarations and action plans that were part of the overall plan to build a cohesive ASEAN Community based on the three main pillars comprising a Political-Security Community, an Economic Community, and a Socio- Cultural Community.14 It is hoped that ASEAN’s human rights institutionalisation process flourishes and eventually leads to the full functioning of the AICHR, a body of human rights norms (hard law and soft law inclusive) in line with international standards, and a court to adjudicate on rights disputes. For now, the exact scope of the AICHR’s work is still being mapped out. It is uncertain what the full extent of AICHR’s powers exercised and its level of interaction with civil society and national human rights institutions will be as it proceeds into its first phase of operation.
The framework of human rights in ASEAN
It is important to note that the sea-change in ASEAN’s attitude towards human rights has only gained pace at the turn of the twenty-first century. Hence, there is little, if any, recent analysis of regional human rights movementsand the number of critical studies on this topic is few and far between.15In large part, this is understandable as Southeast Asia does not lend itself easily to scrutiny. Not only is information difficult to obtain due to official restrictions or otherwise, the language and technological barriers within the region are also obstacles. For instance,
13 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter, 12 December 2005.
14 SeeASEAN Community, atwww.aseansec.org/about_ASEAN.html.
15 For more recent analyses, see Maznah Mohamed, ‘Towards a Human Rights Regime in Southeast Asia: Charting the Course of State Commitment’, 24(2)Contemporary South- east Asia(2002) 230; Thio Li-ann, ‘Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries:
Promises to Keep and Miles to Go Before I Sleep’, 2Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal(1999) 1; Philip J. Eldridge,The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge,2002).
regional human rights websites – whether the states’ or civil society groups’ – can be notoriously difficult to access due to technological problems. Scholars may be further deterred by the reticence shown by the states towards moving the human rights process forward.
As little has been documented about ASEAN and its human rights institutionalisation process, this book seeks to synthesise the Southeast Asian progression on human rights beginning in the wake of the ‘Asian values’ debate and culminating in the formal regional institutiona- lisation within ASEAN as the AICHR. It should be noted that the book focuses on substantive issues of international human rights law and emerging norms rather than being a strictly theoretical discussion of human rights in the ASEAN region. This is meant to aid interested readers in forming nuanced perspectives beyond the dated ‘Asian values’ debate and also to alert them of the superficiality of seeing human rights only within the context of the ASEAN Charter. This is deliberate as existing international legal theories do not explain the Southeast Asian situation very well. I believe that human rights theories in relation to the ASEAN and human rights will arise only after AICHR’s establishment, especially with the advent of specific norms which the ASEAN states wish to pro- mulgate through its ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights. This would mirror the experience of the international human rights system, where as Louis Henkin noted, theoretical and philosophical justification was largely a ‘post-establishment’ venture.16
Nonetheless, I would like to posit three main propositions as lenses through which to view the region. They, to my mind, are hallmarks of ASEAN’s interaction with human rights without which one cannot truly understand the emerging human rights framework of ASEAN. These are, namely, (1) ‘Asian values’ – the need to accept the justifiable demands of cultural particularities with respect to human rights and discount those which are merely excuses for continued violations; (2) the predominance of state sovereignty; and (3) the transformative power of regional and domestic rights movements.
This exposition will thus leave aside the circuitous arguments of the
‘Asian values’ debate to concentrate on actual measures that have been taken to improve the receptivity of human rights in the ASEAN region.
This is especially important, I feel, as although the ‘Asian values’ debate of the 1990s was promptly quashed by the Asian financial crisis in 1997
16 Louis Henkin,The Age of Rights(New York, Oxford: Columbia University Press,1990), at 6.
and examined thoroughly by many academics,17concepts of ‘universal- ism versus particularism’, ‘Asian or Confucian notions of rights and duties’, ‘cultural differences’, ‘communitarianism versus individualism’, and ‘socio-economic and development rights preceding civil-political liberties’ unfortunately continue to pervade many discussions on human rights in Asia and, in particular, Southeast Asia.18 Furthermore, Southeast Asia has often been subsumed under East Asia in the debate such that over-generalisation has often happened.19This has resulted in the overlooking of the crucial details particular to Southeast Asia, not to mention the diverse backgrounds of its component states, including the obvious fact that societies such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines are distinctly non-Confucian, while even for Singapore it remains an artificial construct.
Although much has since been written to unveil these common misconceptions,20 they unfortunately continue to plague scholarship
17 This is a selection of the voluminous literature on the said debate. For an overview, see for example, Victor Mallet,The Trouble with Tigers: The Rise and Fall of South-East Asia (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999); Michael Jacobsen and Ole Bruun (eds.), Human Rights and Asian Values: Contesting National Identities and Cultural Representa- tions in Asia(Surrey: Curzon,2000); Lucian W. Pye, ‘“Asian Values”: From Dynamos to Dominoes?’, in Samuel P. Huntington and Lawrence E. Harrison (eds.),Culture Matters:
How Values Shape Human Progress(New York: Basic Books,2000), 244; Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (eds.),The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press,1999); Onuma Yasuaki, ‘In Quest of Intercivi- lizational Human Rights: “Universal” vs. “Relative” Human Rights Viewed from an Asian Perspective’, Asia Foundation’s Center for Asian Pacific Affairs, Occasional Paper 2, March 1996; Yash Ghai, ‘Asian Perspectives on Human Rights’, 23(3) Human Rights Quarterly (1993) 342; Daniel A. Bell, ‘The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights:
Reflections on an East West Dialogue’, 18Human Rights Quarterly(1996) 641; and Dato’
Param Cumaraswamy, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Is it Universal?’, 18 Human Rights Law Journal(1997) 476.
18 ‘Asian values’ are often tabled at the conferences I have attended on human rights – the ASEAN-ISIS Colloquium on Human Rights (AICOHR) 2005 and 2006. Moreover, politicians have not appeared to change their minds about democracy and human rights in relation to Asian societies. See for instance, ‘Prosperity, Democracy Linked? History Says No,Straits Times, 27 August 2004.
19 See for instance, Mahathir Mohamad (Hashim Makaruddin, ed.),Democracy, Human Rights, EAEC and Asian Values: Selected Speeches(Selangor: Pelanduk Publications for the Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia,1995, 2000, in press); Fareed Zakaria, Culture Is Destiny; A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew, 73(2)Foreign Affairs(March/April1994) 109; and Bilahari Kausikan, An East Asian Approach to Human Rights, 2(2)Buffalo Journal of International Law(1995–6) 263.
20 Simon S. C. Tay, ‘Human Rights, Culture, and the Singapore Example’, 41McGill Law Journal (1996) 743; Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights and Asian Values: A Defense of
“Western” Universalism’, in Bauer and Bell (eds.), supra note 17, 60; Amartya Sen,
on human rights in Southeast Asia.21While this is slowly changing, the
‘Asian values’ blinkers must be cast off in examining the present case of human rights in Southeast Asia as that episode was unfortunately more political wrangling than a real debate on human rights.22 To enable reasonable cultural practices to be respected at the same time that human rights are upheld, it is inevitable that the AICHR, ASEAN states and domestic courts begin to work out the solutions wherever there is a culture–rights juxtaposition.
In the course of my investigations, I have realised that the post-‘Asian values’ progress in ASEAN regional human rights is largely due to the combined efforts of states, civil society comprising non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – both local and international – grass-roots organ- isations, international organisations like the UN, and a politically aware and active citizenry. The increasing democratisation (albeit still in its primitive stages) of Southeast Asian societies and the onset of new and more ‘liberal’ leadership (though this remains contentious given the ASEAN states’ predilection for authoritarianism) have enabled a more conducive atmosphere for human rights discussion and empowerment to flourish. This has been seen in the thawing state–civil society engagement over the years. For instance, an NGO, the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (‘Working Group’) has persuaded ASEAN officials to take a more amenable stance through diplomatic persistence.
In its turn, ASEAN has named the Working Group as a key partner in facilitating human rights in the region.
Going on to the substantive aspects of establishing a regional system, several components must be present if an ASEAN human rights body is to materialise. First, a steady and persistent effort in engaging and encouraging ASEAN officials to undertake the regional institutional- isation of human rights is needed. As will be seen in the following
‘Human Rights and Economic Achievements’, in Bauer and Bell (eds.),supranote 17, 88;
Onuma Yasuaki, ‘Toward an Intercivilizational Approach to Human Rights’, in Bauer and Bell (eds.),supranote 17, 102; and William Theodore de Bary,Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective(Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1998), at 3–5.
21 For an excellent analysis, see Randall Peerenboom, ‘Beyond Universalism and Relativism:
The Evolving Debates about “Values” in Asia’, 14Indiana International and Comparative Law Review(2003) 1.
22 However, the concepts raised during the 1990s furore are not in themselves wrong as difficulties such as cultural relativism do in fact exist. Hence, it would be necessary to sift out the salient from the misleading, and take it into consideration with respect to the establishment of AICHR.
chapters, previous attempts to convince the ASEAN states to institute a formal human rights regime in the region through philosophical justi- fication or international legalisms have not borne fruit. Declarations of the universality of human rights based on humankind’s inherent dig- nity and shared brotherhood, and the parallels drawn with various religions to show the roots of inalienable human rights during the
‘Asian values’ debate, did little to convince Asian states, including the ASEAN region.23Even if these theories were indubitable, truth often does not prevail over realism or ‘hard cases’ in international politics.
Given the continuing emphasis on sovereignty, ASEAN states cannot and will not be made to do anything against their will. Moreover, even if all the states accept that human rights emanate from human nature, the liberal conceptualisation of human rights and democracy in the international sphere are not ideals that Southeast Asian societies are naturally familiar with or whose governments are anxious to promote wholesale.
Second, even if they are becoming more congenial to the idea of human rights, ASEAN states have tended to prefer a systematic and ‘step-by-step’
approach with proper consultation and consensus in building the regional human rights mechanism.24It is obvious that attempting to strong-arm them into instituting such an AICHR with international standards of human rights protection by merit of their promises made in international declarations have not worked. While this does signal continuing hesitancy on the part of ASEAN states, I feel that one has to be astute in making this trenchant stand of ASEAN work in favour of universal human rights. It is, I feel, unconstructive to dismiss AICHR as without real impact. It is much better to be mindful of its shortcomings and help it to achieve its poten- tial. Theprocessof increasing and improving human rights in Southeast Asia is as important as thegoalof establishing a regional human rights mechanism. Although the advantages of having a regional system imbued with universal norms are undeniable and should be striven towards, this must be done in manageable stages by putting the necessary infrastructure and fundamental institutions in place as AICHR begins to function.
23 For a concise discussion, see Hilary Charlesworth, ‘The Challenges of Human Rights Law for Religious Traditions’, in Mark W. Janis and Carolyn Evans (eds.), Religion and International Law(The Hague: Kluwer Law International,1999), 401.
24 This has been the modality adopted by the Working Group in their interaction with ASEAN officials. SeeSummary of Proceedings of the Annual Workshops on an ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights, at www.aseanhrmech.org/conferences/index.
html.
Third, timing, sufficient resources, and a citizenry that understands how the mechanism works and governmental support are indispensable to AICHR’s proper functioning. The instant establishment of a regional human rights mechanism cannot be held as an immutable good. It is impossible to set up AICHR and expect it to work merely because of its overriding merit. Arbitrary imposition of a mechanism that both states and people are unfamiliar with and do not know how to utilise will become an empty shell. It is doubtless that many things need to be changed in the ASEAN region, but that cannot be successfully achieved at the expense of the necessary period of internalisation and
‘enculturalisation’. The UN and European systems of human rights took decades of progress and are still adapting, while the inter-American and African systems are similarly in the adjustment process. The same is true for AICHR.
Even today, despite the significant (if incremental) successes, it would be all too easy to write off the human rights situation as stagnant. This is because even if collective agreement has been made at the ASEAN level to improve the standing of human rights regionally, the individual states alone can portray very different attitudes. For instance, the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand are avid supporters of the human rights movement while Singapore and Malaysia prefer a ‘wait-and-see’
attitude.25It is hence often good to take a practical and guarded view of such developments. Given the capricious nature of state behaviour, one cannot underestimate when the compulsion for state sovereignty will rear its head, given the entrenched preference for the‘ASEAN way’, thereby negating any success on the human rights front.26
Additionally, in the evolutionary fashion of human rights, I have noticed that while ASEAN states are more accepting of international norms, the converse also holds true. While Southeast Asia no longer stridently proclaims the precedence of ‘Asian values’, there are fewer clamours from international quarters that civil and political rights should precede the economic, social, cultural, and developmental.
Instead, the emphasis on the shared equality of the right to develop- ment and economic, social and cultural rights has come to the forefront. International human rights have thus come full circle in translating into real action what has always been professed the moment
25 Per Carlos Medina during his presentation at ASEAN-ISIS Colloquium on Human Rights (AICOHR), 15 May 2006.
26 The ‘ASEAN way’ will be further explained below.
the International Bill of Rights came into being – the indivisibility of civil- political and socio-economic and cultural rights. This recognition is all the more significant as not only does it vindicate the ideals erstwhile championed by the developing world (including the ASEAN states) it also justifies their socio-economic and developmental claims. This is reinforced through the UN Millennium Development Goals as the inter- national community tries to eradicate poverty and raise living stand- ards.27Moreover, regard for social justice and the right to development would give renewed impetus to the stalled Doha talks due to disagreement over abolition of quotas and the guarantee of fair trading grounds.28 ASEAN states, alongside other developing nations, havebeen repeatedly calling for the resumption of the Doha trade discussions.29
On another note, however, while socio-economic and developmental rights have consistently been emphasised in the context of the estab- lishment of an ASEAN human rights mechanism, there has never been any concrete enunciation of how they are to be formulated. It is therefore timely to introduce a new dimension to this process by incorporating the latest developments at the level of international human rights into the consciousness of the rights movement in South- east Asia. It is these complexities that are enmeshed within the potential establishment of an ASEAN human rights mechanism which necessitates revisiting concepts and debunking myths that surround regional human rights. A stock-taking assessment of the practical difficulties that may impede progress, as well as the consideration of the ‘new’ socio- economic and developmental aspects of human rights in the ASEAN context, is thus timely and necessary so that the newly established AICHR knows where to begin its mammoth task of promoting and protecting human rights in the region.
It must be noted that I have chosen to concentrate on studying the five member states of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand as they have been the more supportive ASEAN members of AICHR’s establishment. Even if it is arguable that these five states still do not possess the unwavering political will and respectable human rights records to be seen as the proponents of regional human rights, I believe they are better placed now to initiate concrete action than they were a decade ago. Moreover, I feel that the political structures of the other five
27 The UN Millennium Development Goals can be found atwww.un.org/millenniumgoals.
28 Doha Development Agenda: Negotiations, Implementation and Development, atwww.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm.
29 ASEAN Statement on the WTO Doha Negotiations, atwww.aseansec.org/18695.htm.
ASEAN states – Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Brunei – are at present, relatively speaking, not as open to the scrutiny of human rights.30 Strict supporters of the ideal of universal human rights may criticise this approach as acceding to and prolonging authoritarian rule in the countries which arguably need human rights most. Conversely, it is precisely because the establishment of a successful human rights system is so tricky that I have borne in mind the real and practical considerations and have avoided considering the issue in absolute terms. For instance, even though the Myanmarese junta now acquiesces to participate in the regional human rights initiative, Myanmarremains adamant about keeping to the national ‘brand’ of human rights.31It is hoped that regard for human rights will grow within ASEAN and that in time all ASEAN members will agree to adhere to human rights in creed and action as AICHR’s operations get underway.
Chapter outlines
To begin, therefore, Chapter 2 will provide the background to the beginnings of human rights in Southeast Asia by tracing how the international rights movement arose in the French and American Declarations through to the present UN system and regional regimes.
It will be seen that many of the recurring contentions that Southeast Asian (and other developing) states hold against international human rights have their roots in the formation of the Bill of Rights after the Second World War.
For one, the international institution of human rights that encompasses civil, political, economic, social, cultural, and developmental aspects, and vested in the UN as guardian of its norms, is really a post-war construct with strong Western liberal democracy influences.32 Contrary to the
30 Strictly speaking, ASEAN is a loose association of states without supranational powers.
However, given the intrusive nature of human rights, it will be inevitable that some form of bilateral and multilateral scrutiny will occur when human rights are enshrined within the ASEAN framework. This human rights divide has also been noted by Tommy Koh who was involved in the negotiations for the ASEAN Charter and who noted in the 7th Workshop for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism that Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand are enthusiastic about ASEAN and human rights, while Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam are markedly less so. The middle-liners are Singapore and Brunei. See ‘ASEAN’s Human Rights Divide’,Today, 13 June 2008.
31 See Myanmar government,Political Situation of Myanmar and its Role in the Region, at www.myanmar-information.net/political/english.pdf, at 21–36.
32 Liberal political thought that arose during the Enlightenment and its development thereafter – theories propounded by Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, Jean Jacques
popular portrayal that the ‘inalienable’, ‘inherent’, and ‘universal’ qualities of human rights emanate from the natural dignity of humanity, the modern international human rights institution is a product of post-war politics. It is not as commonly believed to come from philosophy or religion or any other belief system. This was apparent when attempts to append ideological or philosophical meaning to human rights in the preparatory phases of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) were reduced to simple generalisations that were meant to be all-inclusive.33Unsurprisingly, this vagueness (and perhaps parochialism) caused a lot of tension when different value systems subsequently tried to justify the case for and against human rights such as in the ‘Asian values’
debate of the 1990s, or whether Confucian or Islamic tenets could be squared with international human rights.34
Another myth due torealpolitikwas that of civil-political rights being of a higher status than the socio-economic, flagrantly breaching the ideal of equality and indivisibility of all the substantive human rights enshrined in the UDHR. This false schism ensued from the US–Soviet Union rivalry after the Second World War. With the Western bloc supporting the former and Socialist bloc, newly decolonised, poor, and developing states the latter, the argument continued through the 1990s.
This bias is only now diminishing with the gradual recognition of the importance of socio-economic and developmental aspects of human
Rousseau,et al. – had a decisive role in shaping political society and the law of the nations. Naturally, the precursor of modern human rights – the French and American Declarations – has also followed somewhat in the same vein, and so have present-day international human rights and the attendant laws. See Jerome Shestack, ‘The Philo- sophical Foundations of Human Rights’, in Janusz Symonides (ed.), Human Rights:
Concept and Standards (Aldershot, UK; Burlington, VT: Ashgate; Paris: UNESCO, 2000), 31; and Stephen Hall, ‘The Persistent Spectre: Natural Law, International Order and the Limits of Legal Positivism’, 12(2) European Journal of International Law (2001) 269.
33 For instance, the Islamic and Confucian views brought up by Saudi Arabia and China.
SeeChapter 2.
34 Admittedly, such questions of religion, philosophy, and ideology are difficult to prove.
While I support the existing international human rights system and recognise that to use the liberal democratic model is somewhat expeditious, substantively, this institution has its limits – such as the lack of provision for human responsibilities alongside rights.
Where the metaphysical nature of human rights is concerned, I am of the view that this is best explained by traditional natural law along the lines of Thomistic and Finnisian thought. See, for example, John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford:
Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press,1980); and Saint Thomas Aquinas (William P. Baumgarth and Richard J. Regan, eds.), On Law, Morality, and Politics (Indianapolis: Hackett,1988).
rights. This is seen in the expansion of the field of development and more recently, the global effort to eradicate poverty in the Millennium Development Goals.
In addition, the advent of the ‘twin package’ of human rights and democracy will be looked at. During the Cold War, democracy began to be seen as concomitant with human rights. When developed nations started to make aid to developing nations conditional upon political freedom, they incurred great animosity from the developing world.
This tying of aid to democratisation and human rights continues to be a sore point with Asian and other developing states. Moreover, the role of small states in the formation of human rights during the post- war and independence-movement period will also help to explain the stance taken by Southeast Asian states regarding self-determination, racism, decolonisation, and national development discussed in the later chapters.
After the Cold War, the human rights movement accelerated as the UN Security Council broke free of its US-Soviet deadlock to be able to tackle international crises, like those in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia.35 Concern for human rights and humanitarian standards thus increased as atrocities reached new heights.36The determination that there should be universal jurisdiction for grave international crimes paved the way for the establishment of the International Criminal Court.37 The inter- national crackdown on Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism after the 11 September 2001 bombings in the US also raised human rights concerns.38 To all these developments in international human rights, Southeast Asian states have sometimes remained ambivalent, or else are selective in the areas where they choose to make a stand. It will be illustrated that on top of their national priorities, the way these states react to the changing geopolitics in their attitudes and practices of
35 For discussion on international humanitarian law and the laws on the use of force, see Simon Chesterman,Just War or Just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law(New York: Oxford University Press,2001); and Christine Gray,International Law and the Use of Force(Oxford: Oxford University Press,2000).
36 Theodor Meron, The Humanization of International Law(Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff,2006).
37 Karin N. Calvo-Goller,The Trial Proceedings of the International Criminal Court: ICTY and ICTR Precedents(Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff,2006); and Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice(New York: New Press,2006, 3rd edn.).
38 Giuseppe Nesi (ed.),International Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism: The United Nations and Regional Organizations in the Fight Against Terrorism(Aldershot, UK; Burlington, VT: Ashgate,2006).
human rights depends in large part on balancing domestic exigencies with the need to satisfy hegemonic (the US) demands.39
Chapter 3goes deeper into how Southeast Asian discontent stemming from the bias against the developing nations in international relations has impacted the region’s substantive human rights practices. Case studies of Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore will illustrate state behaviour where human rights clashes with national priorities. In particular, an understanding of how these five states democratised will help illuminate their standing human rights attitudes.
Summarily, all except Thailand have experienced decolonisation.
Severe discrimination during colonial rule caused the general citizenry to rally behind the local leaders who fought for the right to self- determination. However, once that was achieved, and despite national constitutions explicitly safeguarding the selfsame rights as those stipulated in the UDHR,de factoadherence was superseded by the zeal for the consolidation of power and national building in what were very volatile and poor post-colonial societies. Inevitably, years of chafing under strong governments, growing disenchantment and a growing educated middle-class that fuelled civil society growth, have led to a more active citizenry calling for rights that corresponded to their particular needs.
In the more extreme examples, ‘people power’ toppled the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines;40 Suharto was ousted from office in Indonesia during the 1990s;41 while the Thai public demanded an end to military rule in 1992.42 Other forms of calling for more
39 Simon S. C. Tay, ‘Asia and the United States after 9/11: Primacy and Partnership in the Pacific’, 28(1) Fletcher Forum of World Affairs (Winter 2004) 113; and L. R. Penna, Response of Southeast and East Asia to the International Criminal Court, Presentation at the International Committee of the Red Cross Regional Delegation Symposium on Contemporary Issues of International Humanitarian Law, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 8–10 December2004.
40 For example, Amy Blitz,The Contested State: American Foreign Policy and Regime Change in the Philippines(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,2000), at 157–92.
41 For example, Lee Khoon Choy,A Fragile Nation: The Indonesian Crisis(Singapore: World Scientific,1999).
42 For example, Kevin Hewison (ed.),Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Partici- pation(London; New York: Routledge,1997); Duncan McCargo (ed.),Reforming Thai Politics (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2002); Ake Tangsupvattana,
‘Thailand Election 2005: Towards Authoritarian Populism or Participatory Democratic Governance’, in Simon S. C. Tay and Yeo Lay Hwee (eds.), Elections in Asia: Making Democracy Work(Singapore: Marshall Cavendish,2006), 67.
autonomy are evidenced by the constant demands for media freedom in Thailand during the former Thaksin administration and military rule headed by coup leader General Sonthi Boonyaratglin and its interim government led by former prime minister, Surayud Chula- nont,43and the tumultuous period Thailand has suffered subsequently.44 The Thai and Filipino peoples have also tried to impeach Thaksin and former Philippine president, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.45 In Malaysia, racial equality and the freedom of religion are again being championed against the government, while the provision of jobs, prices of basic goods and a stable socio-economic climate were what the Indonesian voters wanted (and still demand) from endorsing President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as their president.46In Singapore, socio-economic demands have also been made of the government, and its prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, has declared that Singapore will continue to grow into an
‘open’ society.47
These public demands have taken on differing degrees of intensity – such as those states with a history of public demonstrations against the state such as Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, and the milder forms of public discontent witnessed in Singapore and Malay- sia. Whatever the case may be and no matter how strong these states are, domestic demands for greater rights and empowerment have to be carefully heeded. Parochialism and an attitude of ‘the state knows what is best for the people’ seldom sits well with the citizenry.
Moreover, the states which have domestic mechanisms like the NHRIs in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, which monitor human rights compliance, tend to have an active civil society and vocal parliament which enable the rights movement to grow. Increas- ingly, it will be observed that beyond a certain point – whether or not the governments are supportive – the human rights movement takes
43 ‘Thailand: Govt Panel to Control “Inappropriate” Media’,Bangkok Post, 29 March 2007.
44 International Crisis Group,Bridging Thailand’s Deep Divide, Asia Report No.192, 5 July 2010.
45 Pankaj K. Jha,Thailand’s Political Crisis, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, IDSA Strategic Comments, 21 September2006; and ‘Arroyo Escapes Impeachment Bid’,BBC News, 6 September 2005.
46 ‘Malaysia’s Melting Pot on the Boil’,Asia Times Online, 24 March 2007; ‘Race, Religion and a “Rough” Time – Malaysia’s Domestic Woes’, Seapsnet, 1 February 2007. On Indonesia, see Michael Vatikiotis, ‘Indonesia’s Elections and the Ordinary Voter’, in Tay and Yeo (eds.),supranote 42, 36.
47 Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong,National Day Message2006, at http://sg2.
mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/chinanews/200608/20060802857382.html.
on a life of its own, such as the increasing number of civil society groups that have arisen to deal with social challenges. These internal changes have helped to foster more governmental openness (albeit within certain limits) to social expectations and political views.
An interesting point to note is that the states with domestic mechanisms for human rights tend to be the most enthusiastic for a regional mechanism. Yet, ironically, these are the same states that are guilty of widespread violations like extrajudicial killings by the security forces and brutality, endemic corruption exacerbating poverty and socio-economic problems. For instance, the Philippines’ reputation for freedom of speech is undermined by the killings of journalists.48 Conversely, Singapore (though often criticised for its lack of freedoms and openness) arguably maintains a generally clean human rights record but is comparatively reticent about having a regional mechanism.
Another curious occurrence is that the popular demands refer more to constitutional rights or to their expectations of the government than to the international human rights standards that the states have signed up to. This may be partly due to the lack of public education and human rights promotion or a general attitude of lip-service to international norms.
Building upon the five states’ human rights experiences, Chapter 4 details ASEAN’s attempts at human rights regionalism and details how and why Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines are the stronger supporters of AICHR. As is commonly understood, ASEAN abides by the ‘ASEAN Way’ epitomised by mutual respect and strict non-interference in the domestic affairs of the other member states.49With this close guard over sovereignty, it is no surprise that the numerous calls for an establishment of a regional system of human rights fell on deaf ears for many years even though its members were members of various major human rights treaties. Even the suggestion by Thailand in the late 1990s that domestic issues of ASEAN member states with bilateral or multilateral ramifications – like the haze or trans-border migration – should be tabled at the regional level for discussion, was met with fierce opposition as many member states opposed interference in its domestic
48 ‘RP Lives up to Status of Killing Fields of Media Men’,Manila Mail, 2 April 2007.
49 For a detailed exposition of the ‘ASEAN Way’, see, for example, Ju¨rgen Haacke,ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects(London: Routle- dgeCurzon,2003); and Amitav Acharya,Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order(New York: Routledge,2000).
affairs.50Gradually, however, democratic transitions, the rise of NHRIs, and the engagement of civil society with ASEAN all helped to pierce these intractable barriers. Human rights began to be mentioned in ASEAN documentation and, most significantly, were incorporated into the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action (ASCPOA) – a high-priority regional agenda to enhance relations and safeguard regional stability.51 These were then repeated in the AICHR Terms of Reference and the ASEAN Political-Security and Socio-Cultural Community Blueprints.
Presently, the AICHR Terms of Reference includes suggestions such as
‘establishing a network among existing human rights mechanisms;
protecting vulnerable groups including women, children, people with disabilities, and migrant workers; and promoting education and public awareness on human rights’.52These uncannily borrow almost word-for- word the proposals the Working Group had time and again tabled before the ASEAN states. The Working Group has gained substantial goodwill through regular engagement with the ASEAN officials at a pace that is comfortable for each member state, as well as scaling back the suggestions that did not garner a favourable response – such as the proposition for an adversarial system of regional human rights monitoring through a supra- national institution. It is significant that an NGO has gained this degree of acceptance at the ASEAN governmental level such that it has conducted workshops in cooperation with the foreign affairs ministries of Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and, most recently, Singapore.53
Even while ASEAN omitted any official mention of human rights in its regional meetings and declarations, human rights-related concerns were not overlooked. These were generally tabled under human security issues such as drug and human trafficking, the protection of vulnerable groups such as children, women, and migrant workers, transnational crime and environmental problems such as the haze.54 While the language,
50 For more on ‘participatory regionalism’, see Amitav Acharya, ‘Democratisation and the Prospects for Participatory Regionalism in Southeast Asia’, 24(2)Third World Quarterly (2003) 375.
51 ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action, atwww.aseansec.org/16826.htm;Annex, at www.aseansec.org/16829.htm.
52 Terms of Reference of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, at www.aseansec.org/DOC-TOR-AHRB.pdf.
53 7th Workshop on Human Rights Mechanism for ASEAN, atwww.siiaonline.org/?q=events/
7th-workshop-human-rights-mechanism-asean.
54 For ASEAN action on the environment, see www.aseansec.org/4916.htm; for trans- boundary crimes, see www.aseansec.org/4964.htm; and for social development, see www.aseansec.org/8558.htm.
