Chapter-I: Introduction and Review of Literature
1.3: Agriculture Production in India
1.5.6: Agrarian structure, modes of production and land reforms in Indian agriculture
productivity per acre will be more. In agriculturally backward states like Assam relation of large farm size-productivity could be negative.
From the foregoing discussions, we have arrived at an ambivalent conclusion.
While some scholars found inverse relationship to be true, some other observed a positive on relationship between farm size and yield. Thus, it is a matter of debate and raise the question of validity of small farm size is a cause for low productivity. We could not resolve the debate. No resolution of the disput was made in this thesis. Without doubt the role of institutional factors in this debate has to be emphasised.
1.5.6: Agrarian structure, modes of production and land reforms in Indian agriculture:
The term „Agrarian Structure‟ in a broader sense, denotes all of the existing and lasting production and living conditions found in a rural region and covers all the structural conditions for production in agriculture. It comprises of social, technological and economic elements and determines the achievable productivity, income and its distribution. It also includes the system of land tenure and the system of land management (Kuhnen, 1995). Agrarian structure should cover two aspects: one relating to the distribution pattern of land owned and operated and the second relating to the agrarian relationships. The agrarian relationships are largely determined by the structure of land ownership, but they also reflect several historical, political and social factors (Dantwala, 1986). The system of land tenure (social agrarian structure) and land management (technical and economic agrarian structure) determine agrarian relations (Kuhnen, 1995). The agrarian structure prevailing in an economy at a point of time has a close bearing on its agricultural production and development (Grewal and Rangi, 1989).
Organization of production in Indian agriculture was debated during 1960s and 1970s in the mode of production debate - was it capitalist or semi-feudal? Even though the modes of production debate took place in the 1970s, its influence is still considerable (Lerche, 2013). There have been proponents of capitalism, pre-capitalism, semi- feudalism, colonial and post-colonial modes, and recently, a dual mode. Thorner (1982) in her survey of the modes of production debate stated that while it was generally agreed
„that capitalism today dominates Indian agriculture‟, the more disputed question was how to characterize the kind of capitalist development taking place.
Rudra (1969) takes up the subject of classes among the peasantry and marks three categories of farmers: small peasants, middle peasants and big farmers. He sets forth certain criteria for identifying capitalist and expected that the “capitalist of Punjab would: (a) tend to cultivate his land himself rather than to gave it out on lease; (b) tend to use hired labour in a much greater proportion than family labour; (c) tend to use farm machinery; (d) market an important share of his produce; and (e) so organize his production as to yield a high rate of return on his investments.” Rudra did not find capitalist farmers by using these criteria. Rudra (1975) further argued that today there exist two classes in Indian Agriculture-„a class of big landlords, and „a class of agricultural labourers‟. The latter include landless labourers, landed labourers and poor tenants.
On the other hand, Patnaik (1981) demolishes Rudra‟s arguments. She believes,
“ex-colonial countries like India are characterized precisely by a limited and distorted development of capitalism which does not revolutionize the mode of production”. The colonial period saw a growing commercialization of agriculture with increasing regional specialization but this was not capitalist production (Thorner, 1982). Patnaik initially argued that the most rapidly developing regions of India in the 1970s, the Punjab, experienced the development of „peasant capitalism‟. However, she later specified that this peasant capitalism took place within a capitalist path dominated by landlord capitalism (Lerche, 2013).
Rudra (1975) uses Patnaik‟s argument that concentration should be measured not in acres but in the value of land held. Basole and Basu (2011) also said, “The same size of holdings can go with very different ways of organizing production, i. e., capitalist or
semi-feudal, depending on the availability of water, power, fertilizers, draught animals, other tools and implements, etc.”
Chattopadhyay (1972b) wrote that the existence of a sophisticated instrument of production is not necessary for identifying a capitalist. Given the capitalist mode of production, the existence of „modern equipment‟ would only indicate a higher level of capitalism. Bhaduri (1973), on the contrary, stated that the “dominant character of existing production relations” could best be described as semi-feudal in that they “have more in common with classic feudalism of the master-serf type than with industrial capitalism”. He listed four prominent features of these semi-feudal relations: share- cropping; perpetual indebtedness of the small tenants; concentration of two modes of exploitation, namely usury and land ownership in the hands of the some economic class;
and lack of accessibility to the market for the small tenant. He said “semi feudal production relations operate as a barrier to the introduction of improved technology”
(Thorner, 1982).
Chandra (1974), another supporter of the semi-feudal thesis believes that it would be more useful to characterize agrarian production relations in India as „semi-feudal‟
rather than „lumpen-bourgeois‟ or „rickety capitalist‟. Land ownership being highly skewed tenancy arrangements were predominantly of a traditional kind. Some features of semi-feudal relations as mentioned by Bhaduri and Chandra are still relevant in Indian agriculture and still operates as a barrier to the introduction of improved technology in different states in India and influences the productive capacity.
According to Marxist social scientists in India, the existence of feudal or semi- feudal relations was the real cause of backwardness and poverty in the Indian rural communities (Sengupta Commission Reports, NCEUS, 2007 and 2009). But it is possible to see agricultural productivity as purely a technological phenomenon and it can be raised by the application of superior agricultural methods. Thus, whereas the key to higher productivity lies in technological changes according to one school, it lies in institutional reform according to the other. However, land reforms and technological changes are not mutually exclusive but are complementary in the process of agricultural development (Bhatt, 2014). Land reforms policy in India was conceptualized either from a social justice perspective or from productivity perspectives.
Rawal (2008) has shown through NSSO data that inequality in land ownership increased from 1992 to 2003-04. The Gini co-efficient of ownership of land increased from 0.73 in 1992 to 0.76 in 2003-04, landlessness (except for homesteads) stood at 42 percent, an increase of 6 percent since 1992. In 2003, according to the NSSO data, 63 percent of all landowners fell into the category of „marginal farmers‟. Landlessness had increased dramatically since the inception of reforms (NCEUS, 2008 and Lerche, 2013).
It can be concluded that the agrarian system is skewed against the poorer cultivators.
Feudal Relations of Production:
At the time of independence, three types of land tenure system were prevalent in India- the Zamindari (or Landlord Tenure or Permanent Settlement), the Ryotwari (or the Joint Village Tenure) and the Mahalwari. Approximately 57 percent area of the country was under the Zamindari system where Zamindars were the proprietors of land. They indulged in sub-letting and rack renting rather than showing any interest in agricultural development. On the other hand, the tenants did not have incentive to supply sufficient efforts in agriculture. Ryotwari system (38% area in terms of coverage) was considered to be a relatively better arrangement under which the cultivator was the owner of land and he was responsible for the payment of revenue. The peasants under this system could not be ejected so long as they paid the fixed rent to the Government. However, with the passage of time the Ryotwari system also deteriorated and became very repressive as rent to be paid by the tenants was revised upward many times (Goswami, 2014). Ryots in the Ryotwari system also leased out their land to tenants for cultivation and these tenants were also subjected to the same type of exploitation as prevalent under the Zamindari system. Major part of the Brahmaputra valley was under the Ryotwari system. Under Mahalwari system (5% area in terms of coverage) the entire village was made responsible for the contribution of revenue (Misra and Puri, 2010; Bhatt, 2014). All land tenure systems of colonial time were characterized by the exploitation of the tenants.
Investment made by the landlords for agricultural development was negligible.
After independence, the state governments enacted laws to abolish the intermediaries. However, these were entirely inadequate to have any drastic impact on the agrarian structure. However, detailed discussions on the history of land reform in India are kept outside the scope of this study due to limitation of space.