Power and Decision Making
7 Power and Decision Making in
actually made. Initially, the three latter models were promoted in the scientific literature as competing models to explain the decision-making process. More contemporary theorists, however, believe that they are most usefully employed as complementary models. Each model helps in explaining particular aspects of the decision-making process or provides a different but supporting perspective.
The basic rational decision model
This model suggests a linear, step-by-step process for decision making, where one step is completed and logically leads to the next. It begins with a clear defini- tion of the problem and the stating of an equally unambiguous set of objectives.
This process largely assumes an ideal world where all the necessary information is available at the right time and that this information is in an appropriate and usable form. It further assumes that the decision maker has a broad range of skills and strategies available to solve the problem and that she/he is clearly able to rank all aims objectively and rationally. This model takes for granted that all those involved in the decision think and act in the same way as a single individual does; all buy into the chosen decision and work in a coordinated manner to implement it. In summary, decisions tend to be explained as a unified conscious choice to attain a single calculated and agreed upon objective (McGrew and Wilson, 1982, p. 8).
Rational models
Procedural rational models
Organizational processes models
Political bargaining models
Singular coherent unit Purposeful behaviour Maximizes benefits –
minimizes costs Includes reason why,
what and how Disregards constraints Groups simply
redefined as if an individual
Conscious choice for a calculated objective Prioritization of objectives
Rational within bounds Objective setting
fundamentally subjective Goals are dynamic Decision makers ‘satisfice’
Adverse to risk
Emphasizes differences between individuals and organizations Assumes no ‘super-
individual’; no single definable goal Decisions are
fragmented Profoundly different
from individual decision making Emphasizes importance
of groups Subunit complexity Recognizes individual
goals
Subunit control of resources
Disjointedness and bias affect feasibility Appears to be non-rational
Implicit rules of bargaining Search for politically
viable solutions Intricately linked issues Informal power Outcome generally
supported by elites Neither rational nor
routine Table 7.1. Decision-making models: general concepts.
Evidence from decision-making research suggests that such an idealized decision process is impossible to achieve in practice. In reality, even when natu- ral resource managers consciously try to follow a rational decision-making pro- cess, they resort to circular or iterative processes where the linear, step-by-step process is broken up by frequent returns to earlier stages in the decision-making process (called feedback loops). Here, earlier ‘decisions’ are refined in the light of changing needs, evolving objectives, new information and the recognition of various barriers to earlier plans. In most IREM decision-making situations, it has to be recognized that the decision-making process is normally a highly complex affair involving a broad range of management players, agencies and decision influences. In such circumstances, any evidence of a pattern of a rational decision-making process is often limited. As will be seen, the decision models described below generally have greater efficacy in the real world of natural resource management, where many different values and priorities abut (see Table 7.2).
The bounded rationality models
For decades, two public policy analysts, Simon (1947) and Lindblom (1980), debated the true nature of bureaucratic decision making. Despite their differ- ences, each, nevertheless, dismissed the usefulness of the rational model and in
Model type
Rational models
Procedural rational models
Organizational processes models
Political bargaining models
Key variables Characteristics
Unit of analysis Key behaviour
determinants Nature of decision-
making process Role of Individuals
Level of routines Information
management Inducement for
change Prevailing ideology Non-competing
models
Individual Objectively set
goals Goal directed Professionalism
emphasized High
Available and open Radical Professional
Individual Bounded goals
Goal directed Blend of profes-
sionalism and bureaucratism Moderately high Generally open
and available Radical–
conservative Realism
Organizational structures Individual and
organizational survival Fragmented Bureaucratism
predominates Moderate Selective
disclosure and gathering Conservative Bureaucratic
Power Self-interests
Concentrated within elites Elites predominate
Low
Used as basis for bargaining Conservative Market driven Table 7.2. Comparison of decision-making characteristics.
Many features are incommensurate
its place advocated what are now termed procedural or bounded rationality models. While Simon emphasized that goals and expectations were lowered or shifted with policy experience (lowering or shifting the goal posts), Lindblom argued that policy makers simply muddled through without much thought for goals or objectives. In general, each agreed that decision makers’ skills, technical knowledge and habitual ways of addressing problems and solutions ‘bounded’
or limited rational or truly reasoned approaches to decision making. They also agreed that goals were forever evolving as a result of continually changing circumstances and they were set subjectively rather than objectively.
While the idealized basic rational model implies that a broad range of poss- ible solutions are considered before a final decision is made, the procedural rationality models stress that only a narrow range of options are ever considered in practice. Not only is a rather narrow range of options considered, but also the decision maker’s training, areas of interest and the standard decision-making ways that the decision maker has used in the past limit those options. Bounded rational models also reflect situations where risk is avoided if at all possible, and the potential consequences of a policy decision are regularly ignored or under- estimated. This is particularly relevant to the field of natural resource manage- ment as environmental consequences are often ignored or underestimated; such practices reinforce the need for IREM. In a world of bounded rational decision making, typically politicians or policy makers advocate only small incremental changes to present practice, while professional experts rely on rules of thumb and established ways of addressing problems. Whether policy maker or profes- sional expert, each normally seeks compromise to limit the type of solutions implemented. They tend to favour those processes and procedures with which they are most familiar and comfortable.
In the resource management field, such limiting behaviour tends to favour physical solutions to most social problems, for example building larger landfills, rather than considering the possibility of behavioural changes such as reducing solid waste in the first place. Scientific observation of policy decision-making practice suggests that only limited effort is made to find the best possible solu- tion; the search for solutions is more often confined to selecting a solution that
‘will do under the prevailing circumstances’. This has been termed as ‘satisficing’
(this word is a contraction of satisfactory and sacrificing). Satisficing implies sacrificing a search for an optimal solution for one that is merely satisfactory given all the time pressures and limited financial and information resources available (Rees, 1990).
Organizational models
Organizational models of decision making first and foremost recognize that a group of individuals in an organization involved in a collective decision do not make decisions in the same way that a single individual does. There is no one individual working within organizations who is capable of handling and sifting through huge amounts of information. These models recognize the frailties of humans working in organizations who have communication failures, harbour
self-interests such as maintaining or expanding power, have differing objectives and priorities from their colleagues and the organization, and have differing capacities in information processing. As a result, organizational decisions are often observed to be an aggregate of disjointed rather than coordinated actions throughout an agency, which lead to very different kinds of decisions from those conceptualized by more rational models. For example, in this way, a decision to build an access road into a sensitive ecological area may be conceived at head office involving a whole host of environmentally sound practices, but may be executed in the field quite differently because of the lack of training and expertise, or simply a lack of conviction.
It is important to understand that organizations make most of the important decisions in our society (this is very true in natural resource management), and as a result it is critical to distinguish between the ways in which individuals and groups, different individuals within groups, and different groups or organizations within larger entities such as professions or industrial sectors, make decisions.
Generally, as group complexity increases, through either greater numbers or organizational intricacy, so it becomes more unlikely that subunits will agree on policy objectives, priorities or methods. Organizational staff such as senior managers, field supervisors and ground level workers tend to value more per- sonal goals, such as job security, professional status, peer recognition and pro- fessional networking as well as personal risk avoidance, above the goals of the organization. These personal motivations often interfere with and distort organi- zational decisions. This is particularly important in the implementation of IREM strategies that often require considerable cooperation between agencies, units within agencies and individuals within subunits. Unfortunately, bureaucracies and large corporations rarely outwardly acknowledge such decision-making influences although they routinely appear to accommodate such interference on a day-to-day basis. In attempting to formulate and implement natural resource management policy, therefore, it is important to recognize the capacity of indi- viduals and subunits within an organization to control, manage, suppress and otherwise distort decision-making processes.
Political bargaining models
Although, on the surface, organizations may seem to be rational and working towards a common and well-articulated goal, this is regularly some way from the truth. Often organizational decisions can best be described as a process of bargaining between individuals and units based on the power and influence that each holds, and their commitment to reaching the best possible outcome for themselves or their units. Although individuals or units initially may define their position by determining a reasonably rational solution to a resource manage- ment problem, the decision that results rarely takes into consideration the best available information, considers the optimum evaluation criteria or uses the most advantageous methods to reach the agency’s explicit policy objectives. The final outcome of a collective decision is dependent on the interplay of power among those with influence and what in the end amounts to a politically viable
solution. An organizational decision in this case represents the outcome of a bargaining process where, at least temporarily, a mutually satisfactory outcome among those negotiating the decision has been reached or for the time being some actors involved in the decision-making process do not expect to get a better arrangement.
The underlying principle of the political bargaining decision-making process, whether concerned with individuals, groups, organizations or nations, is that each has self-defined interests to protect. In this decision-making process, bargaining continues at all levels for as long as possible to ensure that individual or unit interests are least compromised by the final decision. The major forces acting on the decision process and its final outcome are then the underlying informal structure of power, the resources that players are able to devote to the issue and the negotiating skills that each player possesses. The effectiveness of each decision is thus defined by what individual actors and units consider ‘key issues’ to protect their own well-being as much as it is about the well-being of the agency.
Political bargaining in the resource management context is rarely seen – once the analysis is broadened beyond the scope of the individual or isolated decision – as a ‘rational’ decision process, nor does it appear to follow an estab- lished rational or reasoned routine (McGrew and Wilson, 1982). Political bar- gaining clearly emphasizes a new dimension to the decision process, placing considerable emphasis on individuals within an organization or unit and the informal power that an individual or unit holds. Because of the continued bar- gaining process that takes place until a decision is considered irreversible, all manner of distortions can be expected to affect a decision throughout its life.
Such bargaining, based on evolving interests, frequently leads to concerns about natural resource management policy or decision-making inconsistency.
Multiagency decision making
The idea of organizational processes and political bargaining already apparent and influential within the boundaries of an agency draws attention to the increased challenges of coordinating and implementing decisions in the multi- agency and multi-interest resource management situation. As will be seen later in this book, especially in Chapter 10, the challenges of implementing IREM at the landscape scale, where numerous agencies with broad-ranging and differing resource management objectives may be invovled, are especially difficult. Also working to influence resource and environmental management in this broader organizational context is the interplay of government (the state), the market including various resource management sectors such as the mining industry, and civil society such as NGOs. While the relationship of market, state and civil society (which is of considerable importance in the implementation of resource management policy) is dealt with at some length in the next chapter, the following section examines various theories of power that are typically applied at the regional or national levels but also have importance for understanding the dynamics of the policy process on a smaller scale.