also more likely to return to work
For this analysis, workers are broadly categorised into four caste groups - scheduled caste (SC), scheduled tribe (ST), other backward classes (OBC) and general category (GC). General category workers were much less likely to be impacted as a result of the lockdown relative to the socially marginalised castes. While 69 per cent of GC workers followed a no effect trajectory, the corresponding figures for SCs were 49 per cent, 55 per cent for OBCs and 63 per cent for STs.
The relatively less drastic impact for STs (out of
all non-GC groups) could be partly explained by higher dependence on agriculture, which was least impacted in terms of employment loss.
Interestingly, having lost jobs, lowers caste groups were more likely to recover relative to general category workers. While 17 per cent of GC workers followed a recovery trajectory, the corresponding percentage for SCs and OBCs was 27 and 30 per cent, respectively. The higher likelihood of job loss as well as recovery for these caste groups can potentially be explained by their involvement in relatively more informal and flexible work, characterised by ease of entry and exit.
Across religious groups, Muslim workers tend to be relatively worse off, in terms of employment trajectories, although the difference is not substantial. Fifty-eight per cent of Hindu workers were unaffected during the lockdown, while the corresponding percentage for Muslims was 54 per cent. Furthermore, Muslims were more likely to experience a delayed job loss, with 8 per cent Muslims experiencing a delayed job loss, relative to 5 per cent Hindus. There was, however, no significant difference between Hindus and Muslims in terms of the recovery and no-recovery trajectories.
It is likely that individual attributes intersect to exacerbate some of these effects. For instance, among women, being married or being Muslim further increased the likelihood of not recovering from job loss (Abraham, Basole, and Kesar 2021).
Similarly, in Azim Premji University CLIPS women, in general, were less likely to return to work, but Muslim women were even less likely to do so (see Box 3.4).
3.3.3 / Young workers were more likely to lose employment. More educated workers were less affected
The extent of impact and subsequent recovery varied significantly by age groups. Older age groups were more likely to remain employed during and after the lockdown, that is, follow the ‘no effect’
trajectory compared to younger age groups. For example, six out of ten workers in the 35-44 age group followed the no effect trajectory, compared to only three out of ten workers in the 15-24 age group (Figure 3.7). This indicates that younger workers may be more likely to be in employment that is relatively less secure. Further, firms faced with a contraction in demand and an economic downturn fire young workers first as they are
‘cheaper’ to lose, given their lower experience and lesser firm investment in their skills and knowledge (ILO 2020).
Figure 3.7 : Young workers most vulnerable to job loss with no recovery
Sources and notes:
Authors' calculations based on CMIE- 32.8
30.7
22.9 13.6
7.9
54.4
30.3 7.3
5.5
29.1 1.8
8.9 3.6
3. Employment loss and recovery
Younger workers were more impacted not just in terms of higher job loss, but also in terms of returning to work. Thirty three per cent of those in the 15-24 age group followed the no recovery trajectory, relative to 6 per cent in the 25-44 years group. At the same time, only 23 per cent of those in the 15-24 age group are following a recovery trajectory compared to 29 per cent in the 35-44 years age group. Together, this indicates that job losses among the younger workers were more permanent in nature. By the end of the year, only 54 per cent of the younger age group workers were back at work. In contrast, among the older workers, between 85 to 93 per cent were back in employment by December 2020. Young workers are constrained in terms of their job search abilities, access to networks and in skills which hinder their return to work (Verick 2009).
As we saw in Chapter Two, unemployment rates among the youth, particularly, educated youth were already a matter of concern prior to the pandemic. In 2019, as per CMIE-CPHS, 44 per cent of 15-24- year old youth in the labour force were unemployed.9 The disproportionate impact of the economic shock on young workers implies that unemployment rates are going to rise even further.
Indeed, in 2020, the unemployment rate among the 15-24 year old labour force rose to 53 per cent, with a large share of this increase coming from those reporting as unemployed but not looking for work, indicating the rise in the number of discouraged workers in the labour force. The exit is particularly high among graduate youth, and unemployment rates for this group of workers rose from 65 per cent to 77 per cent in 2020.
The large exodus of young workers is manifested in a change in the overall age structure of the workforce. In 2019, the young 15-24 year old workers comprised 10 per cent of the workforce. By the end of 2020, their share in the workforce had fallen to 8 per cent. For a young nation, the massive job losses coming on the back of an ongoing economic slowdown are likely to have scarring effects for the youth (Kahn 2010).
Education, expectedly, appears to be a crucial factor determining the extent of job loss. Those with higher levels of education, particularly graduates and above, were significantly less likely to lose employment as a result of the lockdown, as is evident in Figure 3.8 where the share of workers unaffected in terms of job loss increases as the education level increases. Among graduates, 70
per cent of workers followed the no effect trajectory. The corresponding share for those with education below the 5th Standard was 53 per cent. While job loss is high among the less educated, it is also the case that these workers also experienced higher rates of recovery. Thirty three per cent of the least educated workers returned to work, having lost employment, compared to only 16 per cent of graduates. In fact, having lost employment, the least educated workers were three times more likely to return to work, than not. For graduates, on the other hand, the likelihood of returning to work was only twice that of not returning. Less-educated workers are more likely to be employed in sectors and arrangements that are more flexible. The increased precarity of this kind of work also implies more ease of entry, enabling a quicker return to employment.
More educated workers, in relatively more secure employment, may not be as susceptible to job loss, but find it harder to return to work, if they lose employment.
Younger workers were more impacted with higher job loss, but also weak recovery. Thirty three per cent of those in the 15-24 age group followed the ‘no recovery’ trajectory, relative
to 6 per cent in the 25-44 years group.
Sources and notes:
Authors' calculations based on CMIE- CPHS. Data is for the December 2019-April 2020-December 2020 panel. See Appendix section 2 for details.
Figure 3.8 : Less
educated workers more likely to lose work as well as return