As discussed in the previous chapters, political decentralization is considered to reduce ethnic violence and demands for ethnic separatism by granting contending groups control over own affairs by means of granting political and territorial autonomy. However, political decentralization has been successful only in some cases and in most cases, it has shown varying responses. This chapter will address the questions, why political decentralization leads to varied outcomes and the conditions under which political decentralization may foster ethnic violence. The chapter tries to understand ethnic violence using elite incentives as an explanatory variable. The chapter argues that elite incentives may foster ethnic violence if there is an intensive power struggle among the political elites.
The competition for elite incentives may be within an ethnic group or sometimes between two or more distinct ethnic groups. When it is within an ethnic group, each sub-group within
176 Report submitted to Commission on Centre State Relations, Government of India by North-Eastern Hill University 2009, “Study on Functioning, Structure of Local Governance in North Eastern Region with Special Reference to Autonomous District Councils/Autonomous Regional Councils”. Data was also collected during visits to different autonomous councils of Northeast India as a Research Assistant under the project Challenges of Building Capacities in Conflict Situations in Eastern India, IIT Guwahati, December 2011- December 2013.
the ethnic group will try to outbid each other and may want to portray that they are the true defenders of ethnonationalism. Examples can be drawn from Sri Lanka and India as defined by Devotta and Chandra which is already discussed in chapter two. The intensive competition among the elites for political incentives widens the gap between communities creating mistrust and suspicion. In the longer run, this can lead to ethnic violence. The emergence of different ethnic parties may create the condition for extremist outbidding for electoral incentives among the political elites of an ethnic group.177 The competition between the elites can take an extremist position where violence becomes inevitable (Mitchell, Evans, & O'Leary, 2009).
Competition for resources among political elites also plays a crucial role in politically decentralized areas which may lead to ethnic violence if land and other resources such as jobs and services are used as political symbols to mobilize the ethnic group on grounds of indigeneity. Politicization of the issue of land alienation is an important factor for ethnic violence which includes competition for resources and territorial space as well. The competition for resources such as land and other services may lead to ethnic violence.
Different ethnic groups living in a decentralized region try to have dominance in the region and access over resources. Sometimes, other ethnic groups demand separate territory/autonomy from the decentralized areas. We can take the example of Bodoland, which is explained in the previous chapter. In Bodoland, claims are made by non-Bodo communities that all resources including jobs and services are taken away by Bodos. On the other hand, Bodos claim that their lands are being taken away by other communities living
177 Ethnic party can be defined as party which is a champion of particular interests of one ethnic group. The ethnic parties seek to forward the agendas of the ethnic group to the government. In the way, they demand power and seek development of the ethnic group (Chandra, 2011).
in the area. The issue of land alienation and other resources play a crucial role in mobilizing and creating mistrust among the ethnic groups which led to ethnic violence.
We can take another example from Bodoland on the basis of interviews conducted at Bhakatpara in Udalguri. In Bhakatpara, Bodos allow Muslim tenants for sharecropping.
However, in 2008 when violence broke out in Udalguri District, Bodo owners harvested the paddy field themselves claiming that Muslim farmers have taken their land which created tensions among the two groups and added to conflicts. In Northeast India, especially in Assam, migration is a contested issue. Claims are made by indigenous tribal communities that migrated communities have grabbed their agricultural land. Though under the Land Regulation Act of 1886, land possessed by tribal communities cannot be transferred to non- tribal communities, different ethnic groups claimed that their lands went to other communities because of heavy debt from other communities.178 The land is used as a political symbol to mobilize groups for ethnic violence (Bennett, 2005).
The power struggle among the political elites has been a concern for politically decentralized institutions because the struggle for power and resources in the decentralized areas promotes violence. The intensive power struggle among political elites has been identified as one of the primary conditions for failure of political decentralization. The elites tend to acquire more power by the process of elections and dominating the resources. Elites try to mobilize ethnic group creating hatred to other ethnic groups by means of campaign and lecture (Brass, 2003). Elites can mobilize the society on the basis of their primordial sentiments. The next section discusses the relation between elite incentives and ethnic
178 Interviews in different parts of Bodoland areas reveal that Bodos lost their land to other communities because of heavy debts from other communities. Because of heavy debt and poor economic conditions they have to sell their lands to repay the debt.
violence in different decentralized areas of Assam. The section will try and explain how the process of political decentralization may foster ethnic violence if there is an intensive power struggle among the political elites.