MIEG (Game Theory and Microeconomics)
Part 1 (Anirban) Introduction
Lecture 1
What is Game theory; why should we learn Game theory?
One stage games of complete information (Osborne, Introduction to game theory, CH. 2,3,4)
Lecture 2
Strategic form games: Introduction, action and belief Dominant strategy
Lecture 3,4 Nash equilibrium
Issues: Cooperation, co-ordination and conflict
Lecture 5
Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
Lecture 6 Iterated Dominance
Multi stage games of complete information (Osborne, Introduction to game theory, CH. 5,6)
Lecture 7
Extensive form games, Introduction to formal model, history and strategy
Lecture 8
Nash equilibrium, credible threat
Lecture 9
Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium
Lecture 10
Issues: Credible commitment and reputation
Lecture 11
Issues: Imperfect market competition
Lecture 12 (if time permits) Mixed strategies
Repeated games (Text to be announced later)
Lecture 13 Finitely repeated games
Lecture 14
Infinitely repeated game: Nash equilibrium
Lecture 15,16
Infinitely repeated game: Subgame Perfection Issues: Market collusion
Bargaining (Text to be announced later)
Lecture 17 Finite period
Lecture 18, 19
Infinite period: Alternating offer and other protocols
Lecture 20 (if time permits) War of attrition
How good are our predictions? (If time permits)
Lecture 21
Evidence from experimental games
Lecture 22
Multiple equilibria, Evolutionary equilibrium concepts, Trembling hand
Lecture 23 Common knowledge
Part 2 (UBS)
1. Static games of incomplete information Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Auction
Fudenberg and Tirole , Game Theory, Chapter 6 pages 209-211; page 230 Gibbons, R., A Primer in Game Theory, Chapter 3
2. Dynamic games of incomplete information Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Applications
Fudenberg and Tirole , Game Theory, Chapter 8, pages 321-331.
Gibbons, R., A Primer in Game Theory, Chapter 4 3. Information Economics
Moral hazard Adverse selection
Signaling : job market signaling, advertisement signaling.
Mas-Colell, A., M Whinston, and J. Green (1995), Advanced Microeconomic Theory, Chapter 13 and 14.
Debraj Ray, (1999), Development Economics, OUP, pages 474-478.
Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz, Industrial Organization: Markets and. strategies, Chapter 12, pages 283-296.
