Dr. W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar
M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D
Teaching & Research
Dr. W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar is currently Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai, India. Dr. Prabhakar was awarded the Doctor of Philosophy Degree for his thesis “Strategic Thought in India Since 1971” from the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Madras, Chennai, India.
He specializes in academic and policy research on the following areas: Nuclear Missile issues in Southern Asia; on Maritime Security issues in the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific Region, Grand Strategy of China and on research in India-United States Strategic Relations; Grand Strategy of India. His primary interest on Nuclear weapons has featured in his projects with the Henry Stimson Center, Washington DC USA; Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC USA and with the Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, Paris, France
Affiliations:
• Associate Member: Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi
• Associate Member: International Studies Association, Tucson, Arizona, USA.
Recent Engagements
International
• Participated and presented a paper on "Rising Powers and Asia’s Stability: Strategic Convergence between India and South Korea" at 10th India-Korea Dialogue India-Korea CEPA: Prospects and Challenges, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi, India
and the Seoul Forum for International Affairs, Seoul, South Korea 8-9, November 2011 Hilton, Chennai.
• Participated and presented a paper on "Issues and Positions on the South China Sea: An Indian Perspective", at the International Conference on the South China Sea, Track-II Forum co-
organized by the Carlos P.Romulo Foundation & Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, Manila, Philippines 16-17 October 2011.
• Participated and presented a paper on "Maritime Security and Energy Flows in the Indian Ocean Region", at the International Working Group on Energy Security, Near East South Asia Center, National Defense University, Washington DC, USA in Ankara, Turkey 13-15 July 2011.
• International Conference on "The Prospects of Cooperation and Convergence on the Issues and Dynamics in South China Sea" co-organized by the Centre for Asian Strategic Studies, New Delhi
& The Habibie Centre & Centre for National Security Studies, Indonesian Institute of Strategic Studies, Jakarta 30-31 May 2011.
• Book project meeting at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University Singapore 1 June to 3 June 2011.
• Co-Chair, International Working Group on Weapons of Mass Destruction and Border Security, Regional Network of Strategic Studies Centres, Near East South Asia Centre, National Defense University, Washington DC, USA meeting, 21-24 April, 2010 in Rabat, Morocco.
• Plenary Speaker, "The Galle Dialogue 2010", Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence and Sri Lanka Navy, Galle, Sri Lanka, 5-6 August, 2010. Presentation on "India’s Maritime Issues, Concerns and Challenges in the Indian Ocean Region".
• Chair, International Working Group on Weapons of Mass Destruction and Border Security, Regional Network of Strategic Studies Centres, Near East South Asia Centre, National Defense University, Washington DC, USA meeting 10-14 November 2010. Presenatation on "Nuclear Futures and Nuclear Renaissance: Issues and Challenges in Nonproliferation in Near East and South Asia".
National
• Lead Presentation "China’s Maritime Strategy and its relevance to the Northeast and the Bay of Bengal Region" National Seminar on "China as a Strategic Challenge" co-organizsed by HQ- Eastern Air Command, IAF & Centre for Airpower Studies, New Delhi at Eastern Air Command Headquarters, Indian Air Force, Shillong 28 November 2011.
• Presentation on "China’s Naval Modernisation and Its Implications for India" in the National Seminar on "India-China Relations: Prospects for Synergy Building in the Twenty First Century"
co-organised by Manipal Centre for Asian Studies, Manipal University along with the Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata conference organised in Manipal, 2-3 December 2011.
Recent Publications
• "Can the Indian Ocean be a Zone of Peace?" in Harjeet Singh (2010) South Asia Defence and Strategic Year Book 2010 (New Delhi: Pentagon Press) ISBN: 818274444X; 9788182744448 pp37-47.
• "Issues and Challenges in India’s Grand Strategy" in the New Century Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations ISSN 0973-5011 (Refereed Journal) Vol. 2 No.1 January-June 2009 (Published in June 2009) pp151-173.
• "China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in Southern Asia-Indian Ocean: Implications for India and Taiwan" Ch.3 in M.J.Vinod, Yeong-kuang Ger, S.Y.Surendra Kumar (2009) Security Challenges in the Asia- Pacific Region: The Taiwan Factor (New Delhi: Viva Books International) pp39-60
• "Maritime Security Triangulation of ASEAN-Australia-India: An Indian Perspective" in William Tow & Chin Kin Wah (2009) ASEAN-India-Australia: Towards Closer Engagement in a New Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Studies Press) Published in September 2009 pp 219-242 (ISBN:
978-981-230-963-1).
• "Global Nonproliferation Dynamics: An Indian Perspective” in Derek Mitchell &Tersita Schaffer (2009) Bridging Strategic Asia: The Rise of India in East Asia and the Implications for the U.S.- Japan Alliance, Washington D.C Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS Press Winter 2008.
• China’s Strategic Culture and Current International Dynamics: Perspective from India in V.P.Malik & Jorge Schultz (2008) The Rise of China: Perspectives from Asia and Europe (New Delhi: Pentagon Press).
more....
Strategic Analysis in Defence Technical Journals
• “India’s Options and role in the PSI: Alliance of Necessity Strategic Affairs (New Delhi: Centre of Asian Strategic Studies) February 2010
• “Singapore Navy: Fulcrum to Southeast Asian Naval Power” Strategic Affairs (New Delhi: Centre of Asian Strategic Studies) December 2009
• “Challenges for India’ “Blue Water Navy” aspirations: In depth Vision Strategic Affairs (New Delhi: Centre of Asian Strategic Studies) November 2009
• “Securing Frontiers: India's maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) initiatives” Strategic Affairs (New Delhi: Centre of Asian Strategic Studies) September 2009
• “Armada Adventures: NCW capabilities of navies in the Indian Ocean” Strategic Affairs (New Delhi: Centre of Asian Strategic Studies) August 2009
• “Pearl’s New Crescent Future role and capabilities of Pakistan Navy” Strategic Affairs (New Delhi: Centre of Asian Strategic Studies) August 2009
• “A small beginning: India’s Aerospace Command” ” Strategic Affairs New Delhi: Centre of Asian Strategic Studies) July 2009
• "Garlanding the Pearl: Hambantota: China’s maritime gambit and India’s Response, Strategic Affairs" (New Delhi: Centre for Asian Strategic Studies) May 2009
• "Adhocism Prevails: Imperatives in India’s Security Paradigm Strategic Affairs "(New Delhi:
Centre of Asian Strategic Studies) March 2009
• "New Challenges: Land Attack Cruise Missiles in South Asia Strategic Affairs" (New Delhi: Centre for Asian Strategic Studies) March 2009
• "Nuclear Submarine Option and overcoming Nerpa Tragedy: Miles to Go” Strategic Affairs" (New Delhi: Centre of Asian Strategic Studies) January 2009.
Books
• Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region: Critical Issues of Debate (New Delhi:Tata-McGraw Hill 2008).
• The Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons At Sea (Singapore: World Scientific Publications, August 2006).
Online Publications and Engagements
• Columns in INTERNATIONAL E-ZINE OPINION ASIA-SINGAPORE
• Skilful or Fiendish: Chinese Checkers in Vienna
• The Emergent India-China Competition: Benign Intent or Aggressive Design?
• Interview to International Online Journal “The Diplomat” TOKYO, JAPAN An Interview with Lawrence Prabhakar on “Indo-US ties and China's growing maritime presence in the Indian Ocean”.
Positions
• Adjunct Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology-Madras, India.
• Founding Member, Centre for Security Analysis, (An Independent Non-profit Policy Think Tank) Chennai, India.
• Co-chair of the International Working Group on “Weapons of Mass Destruction and Border Security”, Regional Network of Strategic Studies Centres, Near East and South Asia, National Defense University, Washington DC, USA.
• Visiting Professor, Department of Geopolitics, Manipal University, Manipal and Member of the Constituting Committee and Board of Research and Studies of the department Manipal University, Manipal, India.
• Adjunct Senior Fellow, Centre for Asian Strategic Studies, New Delhi, India.
• Media Commentator on Asia-Pacific Strategic Issues, BBC World Service, London, UK.
Research and Consultancy
Consultant for several projects by the Net Assessment Directorate, Chiefs of Staff Committee Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India with principal authorship in the following projects:
• “The Role of the Dragon: Strategic Role and Posture of China in the India-Pakistan Conflict Spectrum” in the Simulation-cum-Scenario Development Exercise: India-Pakistan Conflict Spectrum Under the Nuclear Backdrop at the Army War College, Mhow Feb 2003.
• “Extra-regional Naval Presence and Posture: Implications for the Indian Navy” in the Project Regional Maritime Balance in Indian Ocean 2020.
• Escalation Dynamics Based on Nuclear Doctrines and Force Postures in Southern Asia (March 2004).
Fellowships
• Academic Research: Fulbright Fellowship Center for Political Studies; Institute of Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA; (June-August 1996)
• Policy Research: The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington DC & Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia, USA (May2001-August 2001);
• Academic Research: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore August 2004- February 2005;
• Teaching and Research S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore March2007-June 2007)
Besides, research assignments with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC and the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.
Research Awards
• Project on Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean International Symposium On The Changing Oceanic Landscape in the Indian Ocean Region: Issues and Perspectives of Debate Project Commissioned by Centre for Security Analysis, Chennai & Sponsored by Hanns Seidel Stiftung, Munich Germany, Chennai 13-15 December 2006
• “Competitive and Cooperative Maritime Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific: A Study of US, Japanese, Chinese and Indian Maritime Doctrines and Strategies” Maritime Security Programme, Institute of Defence & Strategic Studies (IDSS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639798 (August 2004- February 2005)
• The Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine: Perspectives of Regional and Global Nuclear Powers, Visiting Fellow, The Henry L.Stimson Center, Washington DC USA May-August 2001
• Indian Security Perspectives of the PLA Navy in South Asia Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia USA & The Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, Taipei June 2001
• Role of Regional Research Institutions in South Asian Security Regional Center for Strategic Studies Colombo Sri Lanka. March 2000
• Federal Publicity in Religion and Society in USA and India 1988, Resource Person in the Project Dr. William Johnson Everett, Director, Candler School of Theology, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.
Contacts
E-mail: [email protected]@gmail.com External web links: Wikipedia ♦ Centre for Security Analysis
An Interview With Lawrence Prabhakar
December 01, 2009
By Madhav Nalapat
The Diplomat speaks with Lawrence Prabhakar, Professor of Political Science at India's Madras Christian College, about Manmohan Singh's recent trip to Washington, Indo-US ties and China's growing maritime presence in the Indian Ocean.
The White House hosted its first official state dinner last week, for Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. What do you make of criticism that the Obama administration has tilted toward China and shown less interest than the Bush administration did in deepening ties with India?
Lawrence Prabhakar: I think one of the main points here is that the Obama statements in Beijing sent a discordant note through Delhi and the surrounding region. What was expected by the Indian government was that the Obama administration would fairly balance the interests of India, Japan and its allies, as well as those with China. But the kind of statements that came from Beijing in the joint communiqué of Obama and Hu Jintao turned out to be a little more tilted towards China.
The explanation among commentators here has been that the United States had to concede a lot of ground to China because of the current economic difficulties the US faces, and because of its reliance on China for putting pressure on Iran, the fiscal pressures it faces in balancing its deficit and bailing out its banks. This has been openly stated in New Delhi. So even though there were some hawkish elements that said the Singh team shouldn’t go to Washington DC with this new US tilt to China, moderation prevailed and Prime Minister Singh went. One of the positive things that came out of that has been the final shape that has been given to the Indo-US Civilian
Nuclear agreement. But overall, New Delhi doesn’t seem satisfied with this tilt and it has the
feeling that these moves will hamper its efforts as it tries to balance a rising and also potentially aggressive China.
What’s the perception in India on US engagement — is there any feeling there that the US sees India mainly as a counterweight to China?
Prabhakar: New Delhi and the strategic community here in India feel that the Bush years were good years for India — India always has high praise for the Bush administration’s policies. Not because we were a counterweight to China, but because the previous administration tried to empower India. But it seems that little has been done by the present administration in this regard, despite there having been a lot of hope and optimism generated at the start of the Obama
administration.
The second reason why Delhi is disillusioned is the $7.5 billion package that has been given to Pakistan. This package seems to be going to Pakistan without checks and strings attached. Yet the situation in Pakistan seems to deteriorate from day to day, and the pressures that are being placed on India over Kashmir and other parts of India — and also the China-Pakistan conundrum
— are all reasons of concern for India. India feels that it’s at the forefront of, on the one hand, an Islamic jihadi slant that is coming from Pakistan, and on the other an aggressive China that is starting to probe India’s defences and test its readiness. So these issues are very troubling for New Delhi. This is perhaps one reason why India thought the United States would genuinely understand India’s concerns, being natural allies and democracies with converging interests. But that understanding seems to be missing in the present US administration.
On the issue of China — what do you make of recent tensions over the border between India and China? How serious are they?
Prabhakar: I think the tensions in the border area are very interesting. They’re basically the failure of the working group between India and China that has been meeting for 13 sessions — much has been wrangled over in terms of procedure, but not much has been achieved
substantively. On the one side, the India-China economic relationship has bloomed, and today we find China is, along with the United States, India’s largest trading partner. At the same time, we find the political dimension hasn’t been so cordial and the two sides have many misgivings toward each other.
And this will be especially so as long as you have the border problems and the contentious claims China has over the Tawang District in Arunachal Pradesh, an area that China has been probing for quite some time. In addition, there have recently been tensions in some of the other border provinces. These are giving the impression that China, with its rising economic and military might, is set to test India’s mettle and whether it will respond forcefully, or go back to something like the debacle in 1962 when India beat a hasty retreat.
However, if you look at recent moves by India, it looks like India has pretty well reinforced its positions — there have been air force deployments there and it has strengthened its border infrastructure and sent troops to the border. So the Indian response to China’s provocations has been pretty forceful. The other thing that India faces here is that China-Pakistan collusion will go
against it in many instances. And so the recent news that China gifted Pakistan with about 50 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, as well as its plans to provide fifth-generation airplanes for Pakistan’s air force, are all significant events that are actually sending signs that the
convergence between China and Pakistan is strong and that India has to be very wary.
One of the criticisms by Indian defence policymakers toward China has been over its
‘String of Pearls’ strategy, where it has been increasing influence from the South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca and across the Indian Ocean. How much of a concern should this strategy be to India?
Prabhakar: The String of Pearls is a strategic conceptualization by a US Army War College officer who wrote about this idea, and it’s since gained popularity in US and Indian circles. The fact is that China is trying to build what could be called naval access facilities in the region. They are not called basing facilities — initially they are naval access facilities with a dual civilian- military purpose. In addition, the Chinese have been doing what we call build-operate-lease- transfer projects, with many official projects in Burma and Sri Lanka. The fact is that China and Sri Lanka enjoy enduring and durable relations, with the significant strides in ties demonstrated by the Chinese giving $2 billion to Sri Lanka in 2008 and also praising the Sri Lankan war effort against the Tamil Tigers.
So Hambantota in Sri Lanka is going to be what’s called a civilian port, with bunkering facilities.
And being a natural port, it can basically host many of the Chinese ships that are coming all the way from the Persian Gulf carrying oil. At the same time, we also have the port of Gwadar in Pakistan. Gwadar is clearly going to be an important outpost because the Chinese have been investing millions of dollars, and today the Gwadar port is undergoing its second phase of development. China has also been probing into Marao in the Maldives and has been trying to help them there.
So essentially what we see around the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea have been Chinese attempts to build up access facilities. These facilities have dual civilian-military uses and are basically infrastructure facilities that allow Chinese ships to have preferential access. They could possibly also be basing facilities if there was going to be a dedicated China Indian Ocean fleet, though we don’t see any evidence of that.
China is investing in the future in access facilities — much like mercantile powers like the United States and Britain once did. So this String of Pearls could be similar to the calling stations that Britain had in the 19th century. But they are not just about Chinese access — they also symbolize the kind of concrete friendship that China has with many of these South Asian nations.
In recent years the US, Australia and Japan have conducted joint naval operations and Japanese and India officials agreed last month to bolster defence ties. Do you see India’s future as involving deeper defence and security cooperation with Japan and Australia?
Prabhakar: I think with the geopolitical shifts taking place in the Asia-Pacific — including a rising China, with steady growth of its economic potential and the correlative strategic and
military modernization — there could actually be a convergence of Japanese and Australian interests very much on the Indian side. This is because we find that India is a pivotal power in the Indian Ocean, and if Australia and Japan want to have to access the region to reach the energy hub of the Gulf in the Middle East, then India will be the only natural partner for them to engage with.
I think the United States under the Bush administration facilitated a lot of this strategic
convergence between the United States and India, and India and Japan, and India and Australia.
And then of course Malabar 07-02 was one of the very symbolic exercises that took place that involved the navies of the four nations in an exercise in the Bay of Bengal. And the annual US Malabar exercises have been growing in complexity as well as in the scope of operations. This naval interoperability has been symbolic of what is emerging to be a concert of naval powers in the region, which basically is looking to hedge against the possibility of an aggressive China that could come in the future.
So far, China has displayed a lot of restraint and has expressed it dissatisfaction as to why these powers have come together. But nonetheless, there’s increasing bilateral convergence between India and Australia and India and Japan with regard to how they should contend with the future of Chinese naval power in the region — both in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Indian navy is one of the most robust naval forces in the region and will continue to play a very important role in what I would call the benign, humanitarian operations there. At the same time, the Indian navy also has the capability for coercive and ‘compellant’ missions.
So there’ll be greater naval convergence between India and Japan and India and Australia — not only out of strategic convergence, but the growing economic ties between them. And I’d say that although there are some differences, the fundamentals between India and Japan and India and Australia are as good as those in the US-India relationship.
South Asia
Nov 8, 2011
Russia targets China's clout in Myanmar
By Sudha Ramachandran
BANGALORE - Myanmar's recent suspension of the US$3.6 billion Myitsone dam project has raised speculation over cracks in the "rock-hard relationship" between Myanmar and China, while reviving debate over the extent of Myanmar's
dependence on China.
Myanmar's dependence on its giant neighbor is indeed
immense - China is its largest investor and arms supplier, and its third-largest trade partner - but this is on the decline as
Myanmar seeks out new partners. Contrary to the Western media's portrayal of the country as isolated with few friends, Myanmar has
a string of suitors keen to engage it in diverse ways.
While the role of neighbors such as India, Thailand and
Singapore in trade and investment has been the focus of much analysis, the significance of Myanmar's relationship with a more distant partner, Russia, has gone by largely unnoticed.
Drawing attention to the importance of Myanmar's relationship with Russia, Lawrence Prabhakar, a China expert and associate professor at the Madras Christian College, told Asia Times Online that by acquiring "weaponry and even possibly nuclear power from Russia, Myanmar could get itself space and
autonomy vis-a-vis China and if put together with Indian civilian economic and technical assistance, the China factor [in
Myanmar] could be well-balanced".
"This does not mean that 'weaning away' Myanmar from China would be complete, but at least it would be balanced,"
Prabhakar observed.
Defense relations between Myanmar and Russia have grown steadily over the past decade, but are not as robust as with China, which has provided $1.6 billion worth of military
hardware since 1989. However, Moscow is an important option that Nawpyidaw is turning to.
In 2009, China lost a major bid for a fighter aircraft deal to Russia. The Myanmar government chose to enter into a $570 million deal with Russia for 20 MIG-29 fighter jets, turning down China's offer of its latest J-10 and FC-1 fighters. The MiG- 29s are due to arrive in Myanmar in 2012. Russia's MiG aircraft company has maintained a representative office in Myanmar since October 2006. It is reported to have helped upgrade Myanmar's main military airstrip, Shante airbase (near Meiktila).
Russia has sold Myanmar 10 Mi-35 attack helicopters worth $71 million to Myanmar. In 2001, Myanmar bought 12 MiG-29 fighters and two dual-seat trainers from the Russians reportedly at a cost of $130 million. In addition, Russia has supplied Myanmar with large caliber artillery systems, air defense systems, tanks, radar and communication equipment, among others.
An important area of Russo-Myanmar cooperation is in the field of civilian nuclear energy. In 2007, Russia agreed to build a nuclear research center that would include a 10MW light-water reactor working on 20%-enriched uranium, an activation analysis laboratory, a medical isotope production laboratory, silicon doping system, and facilities for processing and storing nuclear waste. It also undertook to train 300-500 Myanmar research scientists for the nuclear research center, which was part of a larger program under which thousands of
Myanmarese have been educated or received training in Russia.
While the training component of the agreement has made progress, the construction of the nuclear research center has made no headway. According to a report by Anton Khlopkov and Dmitry Konukhov of the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CESS), Myanmar has not yet signed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol or accepted the modified Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), which requires notification of the IAEA of plans to build new nuclear facilities.
These were among the conditions that were to be fulfilled
before the contract for construction of the research center came into effect. Talks between the two countries that broke off in fall 2007 in the wake of monks' protests dubbed the
"Saffron revolution", and are yet to be resumed.
Although the plans for civilian nuclear energy cooperation between Russia and Myanmar have stalled, the fact that the generals turned to Moscow has ruffled feathers in Beijing.
Myanmar's trade with China, which was worth $4.4 billion in 2010, dwarfs that with Russia, which stood at $114 million that year. Still, the pace at which Russia's trade with Myanmar is growing - 54% in 2009 and 110% in 2010 - is important.
Machinery and various transport equipment dominated Russia's exports to Myanmar in 2010.
Unlike China, which dominates infrastructure building in Myanmar - its cumulative investment since 1988 touched $9.6 billion in January 2011, Russia is yet to embark on any major project in this country. However, it took its first step a few months ago when it won a contract to build an underground metro in Myanmar's capital, Nawpyidaw. Quoting the project's chief architect, the Voice of Russia reported in August that geological surveys and designing of the 50-kilometer-long line were underway. Russia is involved in gas exploration and mining projects in Myanmar too.
Russia's value to Myanmar stems from the fact that like China it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
In January 2007, Moscow along with Beijing vetoed a US- sponsored resolution in the UNSC that was critical of the junta's human-rights record. Explaining Russia's position, its
ambassador to the United Nations, Vitaly I Churkin said that Moscow was of the view that the situation in Myanmar "does not pose any threat to international or regional peace"; and that "this opinion is shared by a large number of states, including most importantly those neighboring Myanmar". He pointed out that "attempts aimed at using the Security Council to discuss issues outside its purview are unacceptable."
Russia has in certain cases been more supportive of Myanmar than China in the UN Security Council.
In 2009, the Myanmar government put Aung San Suu Kyi on trial for allegedly violating the terms of her house arrest when she allowed an American who swam to her lake-house to stay there for days. China voted along with the US to support a press statement critical of the junta's decision. In this case it was Russia that did the heavy lifting to defend Myanmar's government.
Analysts have been drawing attention to the role India can play in balancing China's clout in Myanmar. India as well as
Myanmar's civil society believes that India has a major role to play in Myanmar's democratization process. The Indian government, for instance, is hoping to engage in capacity building and sharing its experience of building democratic institutions with Myanmar.
However, Myanmar's nominally civilian government appears to be looking elsewhere for inspiration and ideas. In July this year, a parliamentary delegation from Myanmar led by speaker Shwe Mann visited Russia as part of a "fact finding mission" on Russia's democracy model.
Given their wariness of democracy in the first place and particularly one that is argumentative and noisy like that in neighboring India, Myanmar's rulers, who have often spoken in favor of a "disciplined democracy" are looking to Russia for ideas but also to Indonesia for experience in steering a highly militarized polity towards democracy without ruffling the feathers of the military.
In the wake of recent gestures by President Thein Sein in the direction of more openness and democracy in Myanmar, many have drawn comparisons between him and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's experiments with glasnost (openness) and peristroika (openness) . Will Thein Sein meet the fate of Gorbachev? Will his moves set in process momentous changes like those the Soviet Union underwent two decades ago?
It seems that Russia's role in Myanmar's present and future will
go well beyond simply counterbalancing China's clout.
Sudha Ramachandran is an independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore. She can be reached at
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