Science, as we all know, is in contrast to the subjectivity of qualia. We can be engulfed in qualia as can be people in terrible pain or even the opposite, as people engulfed in overwhelming love. Science is distanced and impersonal. If a finding is valid, it is valid for all of us. Not so with quale. Quale is important because it describes our direct, irreducible, individual experience. In so far as this is true, qualia are impor- tant, no question, but it is the opposite of science. It bears repeating that quale is criti- cal to consciousness because without it there is nothing to be conscious of.
David Chalmers (2002) is known as perhaps the most accomplished scholar in the philosophy of consciousness.1 He divided up consciousness up into two issues – the soft problem and the hard problem. The soft or relatively easy problem is explaining how the brain manufactures sensations in the first place. We have already made important headway with this. For example, when we are not con- scious our bodies wilt, our eyes roll up in their orbits and our brain waves become large and regular.
1 But see M. Gazzaniga, Consciousness and the Social Brain. (2013).
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The hard problem derives from the irreducible nature of quale that is not ame- nable to science. Consciousness may function like time and space. How do you explain time and space without using a tautology or repeating yourself? That is, time is how long it takes you to get to another space. There is no satisfactory way to explain time and space; they are simply “a priories”; that is, you begin with them.
Consciousness has no known prior causes. We can only use it as a launch pad to begin our analysis.
References
Chalmers, D. (2002). Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Emirbayer, M. (1997). Manifesto for a relational sociology. American Journal of Sociology, 103(2), 324–341.
Gazzaniga, M. (2013). Consciousness and the social brain. New York: Oxford University Press.
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© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2019 D. D. Franks, Neurosociology: Fundamentals and Current Findings, SpringerBriefs in Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1600-8_6
Chapter 6
The Post-Freudian Unconscious: Agency and Awareness
Abstract Dissatisfactions with Freudian notions of the unconscious are stressed, and two topics follow: a history of original meanings of the unconscious and view- ing the unconscious as a process plus the consequences of this. Comments on the subject by the neurologist Gazzaniga are presented. Striking research by Amodio on implied racism comes next followed by Eisold’s discussion of seven realms of research increasing our knowledge of the unconscious. Next, Tomas Scheff empha- sizes the surprising speed of social interaction compared to awareness. Next to be discussed is emotion, namely Scheff’s undifferentiated shame and his by-passed shame. Considered next is unconscious memory starting with patients with amne- sia. Damasio’s stronger argument for the unconscious is then presented and his conclusions are discussed. Work by Zajonc and then Frith follow after this. An important theme throughout this book, why we lack self-understanding is consid- ered next. Strategies by governments to make their publics willing to fight wars are provided, and how emotions make this possible are identified. “Systems justifica- tion theory” producing unconscious biases toward identification with power struc- tures is considered next and measures used for them are discussed.
Keywords Freud · Unconscious · Cognitive unconscious emotion · Scheff · Amnesia · System justification theory · Self-understanding
The new unconscious is rapidly approaching the time that it is not so new. In fact, its history is still being written. It was given birth by John Kihlstrom in 1987 under the name of the “cognitive unconscious.” Kihlstrom, like current researchers inter- ested in the unconscious, has been skeptical of the turn of the century Freudian notions of the unconscious. This is primarily because of their lack of an empirical
We know more than we can say: We know more than we can tell and we can tell nothing without relying on our awareness of things we may not be able to tell. Polanyi (1958) the Social Phenomenologist.
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base and also the asocial nature of the ego, id, and the super-ego, not to mention infantile omnipotence and universal Oedipal complexes with their castration fears.
At least the female Electra complexes did not have to deal with that. A serious flaw in Freudian notions of the unconscious was that he saw it as negative. This is espe- cially true if one accepts his theories of repressed and insidious desires. This makes self-acceptance difficult. Two parts of Freud’s old theories remain vital however:
defense mechanisms and transference. The latter is seen as the tendency to project onto others’ attitudes that were significant in one’s early life.
The number of defense mechanisms is large and important. They include projec- tion, rationalization, denial, repression, and sublimation. Among other things that they testify to is how easily humans can deceive themselves and ultimately, they testify to the fragile nature of the human self that needs such defenses.