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Political Rationality in the Field of the Universities

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6.5 The Importance of Political Rationality for the Reform Process

6.5.2 Political Rationality in the Field of the Universities

In the world of politics, however, majorities are needed to win ballots and make laws. In the case of a coalition government, majorities presuppose compromise between the parties in power. The universities’ real needs have not yet been given the necessary priority. The backbone of a mission statement for university policy, a development strategy, a skeleton plan—whatever the terminology—could never- theless be established in the Ministry at any time and made the basis for serious planning—for example, in the framework of performance agreements—were it not for the calls of political rationality.

subject of the annual special funding requirements. The tendency is clear: ‘They (the universities, the Rectors) should have to come and ask us again.’

(Finding majorities): ‘The amendment (i.e. URÄG (2009), M.G.) is really a compromise between the opposing demands of political parties and lobbies’

(Universities Austria). Such compromises are naturally necessary with regard to practically all plans and decisions to be made within the universities, too. Because so many people can participate in the debate and decision-making process or simply drag their feet, while the Rector or the Rectorate remain responsible for the results, there is often a clear disparity between duties, authority and responsibility, and the decisions taken and solutions adopted are often not as appropriate as they should be. But they meet with the approval of the majority.

(Short-term thinking and focus on the present): the role of research and well trained young people for the long-term prosperity of the country is a constant in the hot air produced on the subject of universities and their role in research and teaching. But no one gets hot under the collar because the universities have been starved of funding for years. The blips on the political radar only indicate the next elections; the system is too myopic to really see the long-term economic impli- cations for the country and its future prosperity. The decision to postpone painful decisions (e.g. coordination of study programmes, and teaching and research facilities in the various locations) and to ignore future costs (e.g. future loss of competitive strength) is a tried and tested solution in the current political process for maximising votes here and now.

(Focus on individual interests, clientelism): the parliamentary majority found for abolition of student fees and partial revocation of admission restrictions immediately before the Austrian national elections in autumn 2008 is a good example. In almost autistic style and on a largely independent orbit that has little to do with the implementation of UG 2002 or URÄG (2009) and the real problems of the universities, the students’ representatives and—in mutual resonance—the Austrian media and all the political parties chose to focus on two holy cows: the abolition of student fees and the continued free admission to the universities.

(Spending other people’s money): at the risk of labouring the point about student fees: their introduction contributed about€150 million a year to the federal budget. Now the taxpayers’ money has to be used to help finance individual access to study programmes by students who have no crucial financial problems. The others in any case receive grants.

(Avoiding transparency with regard to costs and avoiding (political) costs in the present): in a world of scarce resources and prioritising constraints, it is unusual that no price tags should be required for the development plans or the draft performance agreements, and that costs, follow-up costs and the availability of the necessary finance do not seem to really play a role. That is a scenario for letters to Father Christmas containing the consolidated wishes of all university units, with no need to tread on anyone’s toes. In the interest of zero cost transparency, no detailed comparisons with universities abroad relating to resources and their uses have been made or published. Nor has any attempt been made to define or make

use of standard costs for a student place at university or the capacity costs of a university place.

(Ordering and letting others pay): in the supplement to URÄG (2009), the authors have this to say on the subject of the financial implications: ‘No miscellaneous costs are to be covered out of the available budgets.’ For the universities that can only be a dangerous threat. Policy makers are good at protecting themselves against the power of facts—as in the case of the Ministry’s refusal to provide capacity-based funding for university places.

(Priority for the status quo): if one were to really compare the universities with regard to the structure of their offerings, and the quantity and quality of their resources, one would quickly arrive at the nitty–gritty of the necessary basic budget, the costs of university places at various locations and the funding backlog confronting some of the universities. Of course, sometimes it is better not to want to know.

(Spin doctoring): the ‘international competitiveness’ to be guaranteed and the

‘international standards in work with the students’ called for (URÄG Art. 13 para.

2e) will remain hollow phrases for as long as available resources remain below that standard, too. If ‘needs-based student capacity development’ in individual study programmes that also largely attract students from abroad is the responsibility of the universities according to URÄG (2009) (and will hopefully receive the nec- essary funding), it is a purely political decision not to apply the same principle to those study programmes that are mainly swamped by Austrian students.

(Open questions, partial information): penalties are not a subject of the per- formance agreements. That provides the Ministry with additional options: from

‘forgetting about it’ to the possibility of sanctions for recalcitrant universities in future negotiations. At the same time, the Ministry—in the absence of a yardstick in the form of a general concept for the universities or the tertiary sector and prior communication of its intentions—is free to select almost any internal funding focus for future performance agreements.

(New projects and add-ons (incrementalism) instead of a revision of the existing performance portfolios; experimenting mindset): supporting additional and new projects is obviously more fun than the difficult task of coordinating study programmes, including closures at certain locations etc. It is also quite normal political practice to launch a project (e.g. Bologna or development plans) and worry about the coordination or make improvements later. Experiments and

‘provisional solutions’ offer scope for political compromise and playing for time and constitute an elegant style of muddling through. After all, with the benefit of hindsight one can always change things again later.

(Divide and rule): such an article as this should not be written by an Austrian Rector; both the university and the Rector involved would have a really hard time in subsequent performance agreements or construction programme planning and also within the university itself. Financial resources are also a disciplinary tool—

and generous use is made of that tool in the spirit of political rationality.

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