In the stalemate scenario, both the US and North Korea take a half-hearted approach, and the Six-Party negotiations neither succeed nor collapse. On the negative side, Japan has taken steps to pressure North Korea militarily and economically. In addition, Japan should pursue a bilateral agreement to eliminate North Korea's medium- to long-range ballistic missiles.
If North Korea does not return to the Six-Party Talks and shows no willingness to make concessions, Japan, together with the United States, will have to adopt a coercive approach. To implement the positive approach, the United States must first agree to hold bilateral talks with North Korea to seriously negotiate agreements. If the United States and North Korea reach an initial agreement on the eventual dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear programs, Japan should resume normalization.
Introduction
Assessing North Korea’s Nuclear Program
Prospects of the Six Party Talks
Japan’s Response: Reviving the Regional Approach
Conclusions
The Multi-layered Nature of North Korea’s Nuclear Issue
All these developments meant that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime comprising the IAEA and the NPT could not adequately control North Korea's further development of its nuclear program. The Agreed Framework signed by North Korea and the United States in October 1994 represented a regional agreement intended to strengthen and complement the global nonproliferation regime already in place. Second, North Korea has continued to develop longer-range ballistic missiles such as the Taepo Dong 1 and Taepo Dong 2.
Finally, the September 11 attacks on the United States have heightened concerns that fissile material from North Korea could end up in the hands of terrorists, linking North Korea's nuclear issue to the war against global terrorism. However, the members of the Six-Party Talks do not always share the same concerns and priorities when it comes to the problem of North Korea. For Japan, meanwhile, the nuclear threat from North Korea is seen in line with the threat from its missiles.
Finally, while it is difficult to describe China and Russia as threatened by North Korea's missiles, these nations are nevertheless very concerned about its development of nuclear weapons, which has a significant impact on the security of the region as a whole. Furthermore, China believes that if it succeeds in getting North Korea to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons, it will strengthen its standing as a valuable strategic partner in regional security in the eyes of the United States. In North Korea's case, it is also not out of a desire to establish regional dominance in Northeast Asia.
North Korea has long sought to create such a situation by abrogating the 1953 Armistice Agreement and replacing it with a peace treaty with the United States. However, what South Korea, the United States and even China have asked North Korea in the quadrilateral talks (the two Koreas along with the United States and China) is to establish such a peace regime bilaterally with South Korea , which would have been guaranteed and supported by the United States and China.
Achieving a Multilateral Regional Solution
Needless to say, the fundamental obstacle to resolving this issue is that North Korea is not fully committed to comprehensive disintegration. "I" or "irreversible" means that a system must be put in place to make it virtually impossible for North Korea to resume nuclear activities. Denying North Korea's right to the peaceful use of energy as articulated in Article 4 of the NPT would be a maximalist position.
The goal of the talks is to achieve a nuclear weapons-free Korea through a “comprehensive dismantling” of North Korea's nuclear program. From this perspective, it was entirely conceivable that North Korea would try to keep open the potential for nuclear development even as it sought to improve relations with Washington in the Agreed Framework. By retaining the option to resume its nuclear program at any time, North Korea prepared itself for the possibility that the United States would at some point turn its back on the Agreed Framework.
While the Agreed Framework itself may no longer be in effect, its lessons are relevant as guidance in relation to North Korea. Under the terms of the Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United States, Pyongyang pledged to comply with the NPT, even while claiming that it enjoyed "unique status" in relation to that treaty. The Clinton administration offered North Korea bilateral security guarantees in the form of the negative security guarantee (NSA), a fundamental norm of the NPT, in exchange for promises that North Korea would freeze operations at its nuclear facilities and eventually dismantle them.
In the Six Party Talks held so far, North Korea has not only sought security assurances, but also energy and economic assistance. Basically, China understands that, in order to reach a final solution to the issue, there will have to be a preliminary stage during which North Korea is in temporary possession of nuclear weapons.
Diplomatic Resolution
While such a conclusion would not provide 100% certainty, North Korea's attitude toward inspections and the extent to which it cooperates will indicate its willingness to abandon its nuclear program. North Korea's cooperation will be measured by the level of access it provides to documents, data, scientists to be interviewed and nuclear facilities. As we negotiate an agreement to dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons, we should keep these findings in mind and seek to clarify how these major works should proceed in line with other military and diplomatic steps.
Next in this scenario is to link the above process to other regional security concerns, especially North Korea's medium- to long-range ballistic missiles. If the North achieves nuclear warhead miniaturization, North Korea could launch nuclear strikes against Japan. This was part of the reason why Japan decided to join the Six-Party Talks and focus on ensuring that North Korea halted its nuclear development program before addressing the missile problem.
In particular, by assuming a greater role in providing counter-fire capabilities to deal with North Korea's long-range artillery as well as multiple missile launches and to counter North Korean special operations forces, South Korea will be able to help reduce the sense of burden on the United States. After a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue, North Korea's deterrence must be based on non-nuclear conventional forces such as long-range artillery, multiple rocket launches and short-range ballistic missiles. Combined with multilateral security guarantees, such arrangements would encourage North Korea to abandon its nuclear programs.
In addition, North Korea's chemical and biological capabilities must be reduced and eliminated over time through inter-Korean or multilateral agreements, but in any case it will take a long time. As North Korea's nuclear and other weapons programs are dismantled, a new military balance must be established to maintain a stable local and regional security environment.
Stalemate
Underlying this scenario is the widely held expectation that North Korea will not use nuclear weapons or export them to entities hostile to the United States, as such a move would make the US policy of "benign neglect" effectively work to avoid a dangerous conflict between North Korea and other countries. It also makes it relatively easy for North Korea to maintain its current regime, leaving the other members of the six-party talks with no choice between accepting North Korea as a nuclear state and risking a major crisis by putting pressure on the country.
Furthermore, because Kim Jong Il's regime is isolated, it could crumble, and the eventual collapse of the regime could end the North Korean nuclear issue. However, unless the North Korean regime collapses, the policy of “benign neglect” will inevitably create a situation in which North Korea continues to acquire enough fissile material for two nuclear weapons every year, and continues to miniaturize such devices for loading onto ballistic missiles. With improved nuclear and missile capabilities, North Korea will be in a better position to exert military-diplomatic coercion on its neighbors.
This would increase the likelihood of their outflow from North Korea---which will encourage nuclear proliferation---and the unauthorized use of North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles. If the United States continues its policy of "benign neglect" and allows a heavily armed nuclear North Korea to emerge, it will make it more difficult for the United States to intervene in regional contingencies due to Japan. A policy of "benign neglect" will avoid a crisis in the short term, but it will also result in acquiescing to a growing potential threat, making it more difficult to solve the problem.
It may ultimately convince North Korea to concede and make the "strategic decision" or encourage an internal political change in North Korea. Nevertheless, it may not as North Korea continues to build its nuclear and missile capabilities.
Crisis
- Staying the Course: Japan’s Unwavering Policy Objectives
- Preparing Carrots and Sticks: Policy of “Dialogue and Pressure”
- Pursuing a Regional Solution
- Resolution of Abduction, Nuclear, and Missile Issues
- Military Preparedness
- Abduction Issue and the Debate over Economic Sanctions
North Korea may anticipate this development and propose to South Korea's Roh Moo-hyun administration that the two Koreas hold a summit. Ten years ago, US-DPRK bilateral talks led the process to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. In other words, Japanese involvement in efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue is much more essential now than it was ten years ago.
Taken as a whole, Japan carries a bigger stick with a bigger carrot in the face of North Korea. In July 2002, North Korea began taking a series of measures to improve its economic management. However, few foreign companies are interested in investing in North Korea under the current circumstances.
In addition, Japan and South Korea can jointly provide North Korea with human and technical assistance in such a case. In this context, it is worth noting that Japan expressed its intention to join South Korea, China and Russia to provide collective energy assistance to North Korea in the third round of the Six-Party Talks. If North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities become a clear and present danger, Japan may be forced to consider such an option.
For starters, in the third round of six-party talks, Japan has expressed its willingness to join South Korea, China and Russia in jointly providing energy assistance to North Korea. On the other hand, pushing North Korea off the brink could inadvertently provoke war. If North Korea does not engage in serious negotiations in the six-party talks or show a willingness to make concessions, Japan will have to use a coercive approach in conjunction with the United States.
We should first strengthen the PSI and bring the matter to the UNSC to discuss imposing economic sanctions against North Korea.
