Chart 2 Chart prepared by Author from IMB Piracy Report for 2015, p. 10)
3.2.4 Lack of regional stability and cooperation
It is a truism that most piracy hotspots are located in regions engulfed in political instability, civil unrest, insurgency, regional disputes and are basically ravaged by poverty and unemployment. This is evidently witnessed in the West Africa region where boundary disputes, drugs, human and arms trafficking as a result of internal crisis, insurgency and terrorism in most of the countries in the region have contributed to the spread of piracy.306 For 2015. Further, there has been an inter-agency squabbles between the Nigerian Navy and the Nigeria Maritime Police, a branch of the Nigerian Police, caused by selfish interests of the affected security agencies in the country. For more details on inter-agency squabbles, see Dirk Steffen, “Troubled Waters? The Use of the Nigerian Navy and Police in Private Maritime Security Roles,” Center for International maritime Security (CIMSEC), 1 July, 2014
<http://cimsec.org/troubled-waters-use-nigerian-navy-police-private-maritime-security- roles/11918> accessed 18 June 2015.
305) L.B. Dogarawa, supra note 303, pp. 123-124.
306) Both terrorism in Nigeria, Mali, Chad and Cameroon, on the one hand, and internal crisis due to militancy, insurgency and political crisis in Ivory Coast, Nigeria, contribute to the escalation of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. For more details of how regional crisis lead to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, see F.C. Onuoha, supra note 229, pp. 8-9. In Asia, the inability of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore to cooperate in the area of policing their maritime
instance, the maritime boundary disputes between Nigeria and Cameroon as well as Ghana and Ivory Coast may prevent these countries from cooperating for the purpose of effectively suppressing piracy. In other words, long-term political instability of a state and the inability of countries to cooperate in the area of maritime security contribute to the emergence and sustenance of piracy.307 In a similar vein, most of the affected countries due to the absence of “established rule of law, developed and functioning state institutions and an overall satisfactory governance”308 provide conducive environment for piracy to thrive. Besides, connections “to corruption, organized crime, and insurgent groups have provided the opportunity and market availability for organized piracy…”309 in the Gulf of Guinea.
More specifically, this research argues that there is a link between piracy and lack of regional cooperation. Maritime insecurity which is a precursor to piracy is engendered by absence of regional cooperation in monitoring and safeguarding the coastlines of the region. For illustrative purposes, the incidences in the South China Sea show that where there is no cooperation among the coastal states, piracy and other maritime crimes become rife. Instead of cooperating in the area of monitoring and patrolling of their coastline and enhancing their maritime domain awareness, these countries are busy bickering and fighting over uninhabited islands and maritime zones. This is exemplified by recent tensions and hostilities zones has led to increase in piracy acts in the Strait of Malacca. See N. Klein, supra note 178, p. 304.
307) Keunsoo Jeong, “Diverse Piracy Patterns and Different Control Mechanisms,” A Paper for the ISA Global South Caucus Conference, 2015, p. 4
<http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/GSCIS%20Singapore%202015/Archive/e6fad450- 03e9-4946-9d3a-ee793d30de5b.pdf> accessed 30 April 2015.
308) Tina Lovedou, “From the Gulf of Aden to the Gulf of Guinea: Lessons Learned and Best Practices to be Employed by the Insurance Companies,” Briefing Paper, UAE Counter- Piracy Conference, 2014 <http://counterpiracy.ae/upload/2014- Briefing/Dr.%20Tina%20Loverdou-Briefing%20Paper-Final-English%20Website.pdf>
accessed 30 April 2015.
309) S. Whiteman & C. Suarez, supra note 271, p. 31.
between China and Philippines as well as China and Vietnam in the South China Sea.310 Presently, China has started exploiting oil in the disputed maritime zone with Vietnam which has escalated the friction and hostility existing in the disputed maritime area.311
In addition to the above, almost all the countries in the Gulf of Guinea are oil producers or have begun to explore oil and gas, leading to disputes among some of the countries over maritime boundaries. This argument is supported by “the on-going maritime boundary dispute between Ghana and Cote d’ Ivoire. Some of these disputes prevent the states from having a coordinated approach to addressing their security concerns, thereby creating a window of opportunity for criminal activities to flourish in their region.”312 Consequently, in relation to piracy off Nigeria, it is a truism that
“without a regional coordinated response to Gulf of Guinea piracy, including improved maritime surveillance capabilities, any national naval response is unlikely to reduce piracy levels significantly.”313
310) Carlyle A. Thayer, “Efforts of Ensure Maritime Security,” Paper presented to 2nd Tokyo Defence Forum Seminar organised by the Ministry of Defence, Tokyo, Japan, 16 March, 2012, p. 4.
311) China’s decision to move its Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig into waters west of the disputed Paracel Islands has triggered confrontations between China and Vietnam, both on land and the sea. Bill Hayton, “China-Vietnam Tensions: Beijing Vows to Continue Drilling,” BBC News Asia, 16 May 2014 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27434945>
accessed 21 April 2015. See also “China and Japan: Seven Decades of Bitterness,” BBC News Magazine, 13 February, 2014 <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25411700>
accessed 21 April 2015. China has continued to build artificial islands in the South China Sea. This has led to some friction among countries in the region. Emma Graham-Harrison,
“South China Sea Island are Chinese Plan to Militarise Zone, Claims US,” The Guardian, 30 May, 2015 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/30/us-claims-south-china-sea- islands-are-beijing-plot> accessed 22 July 2015.
312) Joana A. Osei-Tutu, “Lowering the Anchor on Maritime Insecurity along the Gulf of Guinea: Lessons from Operation Prosperity,” KAIPTC Policy Brief 11/ 2013
<http://www.kaiptc.org/Publications/Policy-Briefs/Policy-Briefs/KAIPTC-Policy-Brief-11-- -Lowering-the-Anchor-on-Ma.aspx> accessed 13 May 2015.
313) Exclusive Analysis, supra note 291.
Additionally, this research contends that the dearth of maritime domain awareness, which is the effective understanding of anything connected to the global maritime domain that could implicate a country’s security, safety, economy, or environment,314 exacerbates piracy. Evidently, piracy adversely implicates on the safety, security, environment and most importantly, the economy of coastal states. Nonetheless, most of the countries and the regions where piracy is rife do not have a plan for establishing and improving their maritime domain awareness, specifically in the areas of information and intelligence gathering and sharing, inspection of vessels, monitoring of vessels entering their ports and policing of the coastlines. This portends grave danger to maritime activities in those areas.
Osinowo summarises the effects of the absence of maritime domain awareness in the Gulf of Guinea thus: “Government in the region have been late to realize how their absence in the maritime domain not only costs them untold revenue but also undermines security on land, as criminal activities on the sea start and end onshore.”315
3.2.5 Existence of illegal unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing