The diplomatic and security environment in Northeast Asia is changing rapidly in the 21st century. In other words, no power wants an abrupt transformation of the regional balance of power in the short term. However, there are diplomatic and security challenges that could cause major powers to rewrite their strategy in the medium to long term.
Obviously, these challenging factors are expected to directly and indirectly affect the security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula.
Situation in Northeast Asia
Structural Background
This is because the course of the regional order may be maintained or changed depending on how states in the region respond strategically to various domestic and international variables. In other words, the current mixed landscape of cooperation and competition in East Asia indicates that conflicts and tensions will continue to coexist amid the rise of China and the US response to a rising China, although there is no serious threat of a military clash . for the moment. In the long term, the negative aspects of the security environment resulting from maintaining the status quo will accumulate over the next 20 to 30 years and combine with deepening internal instability.
Therefore, compared to the present, it will be much more likely that there will be security competition to the point of triggering a crisis or completely changing the paradigm in the true sense of the word.
Major Trend until 2030
North Korea’s Internal and External Relations
This paper explains the policy changes in North Korea that were initiated with the inauguration of the Kim Jong-un regime and the resulting changes in inter-Korean relations in three different areas - North Korea's policy/foreign policy towards South Korea, interior and power relations and the economy. Each area was analyzed in two different categories - the main content of structural changes and the main trends in each area resulting from structural changes.
North Korea’s External Policy/Policy on South Korea and
At times when North Korea increases its nuclear capabilities, the probability of a sincere attempt to improve inter-Korean relations and the possibility that this will be successful drops dramatically. If North Korea's attempt to increase its nuclear capability structurally sets the stage for confrontation and conflict with neighboring countries, inter-Korean relations cannot be immune to such confrontation and conflict. Accordingly, North Korea's opposition to the international demand for denuclearization was triggered. a phase in which structural instability in inter-Korean relations is inevitable.
This meant that North Korea broke the inter-Korean strategic modus vivendi, which supported the “reconciliation and cooperation” phase between the two Koreas between 2000 and 2007. The gradual expansion of assistance to North Korea by South Korea, based on the principle of peaceful coexistence between North and South; gradually expanding inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation; and improving inter-Korean relations. As a result of North Korea's second nuclear test and its 2009 declaration of commitment to nuclear possession, the phase of compromise and cooperation with neighboring countries, including South Korea and the US, shifted to one of confrontation and conflict.
North Korea's responsive means include enhancing nuclear and missile capabilities, diplomatic efforts, intensified provocations against South Korea, and political offensive against South Korea. Therefore, North Korea's relations with its neighbors including South Korea and the US will shape around confrontation and conflict. With North Korea persistently pursuing the enhancement of nuclear capabilities and refusing to denuclearize, inter-Korean relations will remain structurally volatile amid the inevitable rising tensions.
In addition, South Korea would play an essential role in making North Korea's byungjin (simultaneous nuclear and economic development) line fail. This is because South Korea has taken the most important measure of banning North Korea's foreign currency earnings through trade.
Internal Politics and Power Reshuffle
Therefore, some scholars strongly argued that Kim Jong-un's power is still tumultuous. In addition, his method, judging by the brutality and bizarreness of the purges committed by the Kim Jong-un regime, is not particularly and shockingly extreme compared to the behavior of. Political instability in the narrow sense means that some upper-class figures are systematically plotting against Kim Jong-un.
Due to the terribly fearful atmosphere that Kim Jong-un creates, countless elites take little action and are passive in dealing with the impending problems. Based on the foregoing events, the predictable cases are as follows: the frequent withdrawal and reversal of Kim Jong-un's directives; In the case of Kim Jong-un, one could point to the November 2009 revaluation measure as an unfortunate domestic policy failure.
Nevertheless, when the adventurous confidence afforded by the position of suryong is combined with Kim Jong-un's inherent pro-violence personality, the likelihood of provocation against South Korea will remain higher than any other situation. The combination of the adventurist trend of new nuclear-armed states, Kim Jong-un's megalomania and arrogance, deepening isolation and prodding by South Korea and the United States against North Korea increases the likelihood of North Korea's reckless provocations. Unconditional commitment to Kim Jong-un's impromptu decision on flashy construction projects could deplete the sources of investment in the people's economy or cause a drain on state/regime finances.
As Kim Jong-un focuses on supporting the well-being of soldiers in the Korean People's Army, other spending in the defense sector decreases. If combat capabilities are strengthened, guided by Kim Jong Un's attention, other sectors may suffer.
Economic Policy
Population Trend
Based on this trend, North Korea is predicted to become the "elderly society" by 2034, with people over 65 making up 14% of the entire population. First, in the short term, Pyongyang should pursue policies that combine industrial restructuring and labor force adjustment. From 2015 to 2020, North Korean society will have the youngest population structure in the coming years, considering the population pattern and labor force structure.
The Nordics will also face increasing demands for improving the workforce and industrial structure for regime consolidation in the medium to long term. Also, the increased workforce in the service sector due to marketing should be fed into the rebuilding of the manufacturing industry. Nevertheless, taking into account the number of people receiving rations and the utilization rate of the factory, the establishment of the underlying infrastructure will be an obstacle.
Second, given that the DPRK will enter the aging society in 2020, the country must prepare for this in advance over the next decade. When considering the industrial structure, policy considerations can be followed in the second sector that carries the potential to improve labor skills and substantial productivity. This will have an effect on the perception of Korean unification and the direction of forming inter-Korean relations.
In the medium to long term, the North Korean authority will have to ease the control over the use of ICT equipment to some extent. This is because the North Korean authority would consider the development of ICT technology as a crucial means of economic growth and wants to use it to strengthen the legitimacy of the regime.
Expansion of Electronic Communications
Numerous information and communication technology (ICT) devices such as personal computers, TV, radio and mobile phones are more widely distributed in North Korea than ever before. Although these social changes simply facilitate the sharing of criticism about North Korea's current status among the North Korean people, they have not yet led to people mobilizing the will for the political action to change reality. As a result, the use of ICT technology is predicted to increase continuously for the next 15 years.
Two models can be referenced when it comes to information control of non-democratic states, which can also be used to make a projection on the relevant changes caused by the circulation of ICT equipment in North Korea; Cuban and Chinese models that were built reflecting the needs of Internet control. Given the North Korean leadership's view of external conditions and the trend so far, North Korea appears to be replicating the Cuban model of slowly expanding its use of the Internet for economic gain and acquisition of expertise while separating the Internet from the intranet. Once data transfer becomes possible through mobile phones and the intranet, the economic activities of the North Korean people will be greater.
The phenomenon of increasing users of ICT devices in North Korea has attracted attention because of its political ramifications. The following projections on the effect of ICT circulation can be made in relation to political change in North Korea. Third, if the time comes for the North Korean people to work for political change, North Korea's ICT infrastructure can be used sufficiently to expand political acts.
North Korea's vulnerability to natural disasters is one of the essential factors threatening the regime. Even after this accident, North Korea frequently suffered from food shortages and economic hardships caused by climate change, and natural disasters, etc.
Climate Change and Venerability to Natural Disasters
According to the UNEP report, DPRK Environment and Climate Change Outlook, published in 2012, average annual precipitation will increase by at least 2.12% to 6.1% at most in the worst case scenario. In terms of temperature changes in North Korea, the average temperature is projected to increase by at least 0.46℃ and a maximum of 1.33℃ in 2030 based on the temperature in summer (June-August). For 35 years from 1971 to 2006, the average temperature increased by 0.38℃, and the temperature increase in the next 20 years will exceed that of 35 years, which indicates that nature and environment will undergo changes larger than the previous ones.
Widespread investment in water control facilities is likely in major cities such as Pyongyang given the current financial status, but unlikely in rural areas where collective farms are located. Decreasing productivity in the agricultural sector is causing grain prices to rise. Especially, until reform and opening-up measures are implemented, the 'smuggling' trade will expand.
In conclusion, socio-economic changes, weakening of government influence and international intervention caused by natural disasters will lead to increased autonomy in the social sector.
