is an “aSean community” achievable?

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Asian Survey, Vol. 52, Number 6, pp. 1043–1066. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2012 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permis- sion to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2012.52.6.1043.

R av i c h a n d R a n M o o Rt h y a n d G u i d o B e n n y

is an “aSean community” achievable?

A Public Perception Analysis in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore on the Perceived Obstacles to Regional Community

a B S t R ac t

The formulation “ASEAN Community” has been criticized for being too elitist and lacking serious efforts to solicit public opinion. This article examines how the people in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore view the concept of “community building”

and the obstacles this initiative may encounter.

K e y wo R d S : ASEAN, regionalization, regionalism, obstacles, public perception

i n t R o d u c t i o n

After Europe’s success in establishing the EU, several regional organizations including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have stated their aspiration to emulate this regional community-building initiative.¹ The Bali Concord II in 2003 paved the way for ASEAN to begin concerted initiatives to forge regional integration through an integrated regional community by the year 2015.² This declaration stipulated that the envisaged ASEAN

1. Tobias Lenz, “Spurred Emulation: The EU and Regional Integration in Mercosur and SADC,”

paper prepared for the European Studies Association Conference panel, “When Europeanization Travels Abroad,” Boston, Mass., March 3–5, 2011; Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, “Diffusing (Inter-) Regionalism: The EU as a Model of Regional Integration,” KFG [Kolleg-Forschergruppe], Working Paper, no. 7, “The Transformative Power of Europe,” September 2009; Sanoussi Bilal,

“Can the EU Be a Model of Regional Integration? Risks and Challenges for Developing Countries,”

paper presented at the CODESRIA [Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa]—Globalization Studies Network (GSN) Second International Conference on “Globalization:

Overcoming Exclusion, Strengthening Inclusion,” Dakar, Senegal, August 29–31, 2005.

2. ASEAN Secretariat, Declaration of Bali Concord II (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2003), <http://

www.aseansec.org/15159.htm>, accessed July 1, 2011.

Ravichandran Moorthy is Senior Lecturer at the Strategic Studies & International Relations Program, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM) in Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia. Guido Benny is Lecturer at the Department of Administrative Sciences, University of Indonesia (UI), in Jakarta.

Emails: <[email protected]>, <[email protected]>.

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Community should rest upon the three pillars of the ASEAN Political Secu- rity Community (APSC),³ the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC),⁴ and the ASEAN Socio-cultural Community (ASCC).⁵ The declaration proposes that ASEAN community building could materialize by promoting greater regional security engagement, economic collaboration, and sociocultural or people-to-people interaction among member states. This prompted ASEAN to adopt the APSC, AEC, and ASCC blueprints in 2009. Through these frameworks, advocates hope, ASEAN will be able to further strengthen its regional integration amid global challenges and the imminent rise of China and India as world economic powers.⁶

However, compared with the EU, ASEAN’s initiative toward regional integration seems to be taking a different route. The EU, an economic and political union of 27 European countries, has its roots in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (ECC), going back as far as 1958. The EU began to take shape during the intervening years by way of accession of new member states and an expand- ing policy scope. The EU was formalized in 1993 through the Maastricht Treaty, and in 2009, it adopted a constitutional amendment in the Treaty of Lisbon that further strengthened the grouping. The EU was essentially formed after many consecutive years of consultation along multiple channels at various levels of government; the directly elected European Parliament and the Eurobarometer public opinion surveys were (and still are) employed as indispensable tools to gauge public sentiment on a wide range of issues concerning this regional system.

In contrast, the “ASEAN Community” was conceptualized, drafted, and began to materialize within a very short time frame. Some have even argued that the 2015 target appears amorphous. There have been accusations that ASEAN policy makers and diplomats were hasty in pushing through the community-building initiative, especially when many of the more than 584 million people within the member states were oblivious of the drive. Virtually

3. Idem, ASEAN Political Security Community Blueprint (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2009),

<http://www.aseansec.org//5187-18.pdf>, accessed July 30, 2011.

4. Idem, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2009), <http://

www.aseansec.org//5187-10.pdf>, accessed July 30, 2011.

5. Idem, ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2009),

<http://www.aseansec.org/5187-19.pdf>, accessed July 30, 2011.

6. Guido Benny and Kamarulnizam Abdullah, “Indonesian Perceptions and Attitudes toward the ASEAN Community,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 30:1 (2011), pp. 39–67.

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M o o Rt h y a n d B e n n y / ca n a S e a n ac h i e v e c o M M u n i t y ? • 1045

no structured public opinion surveys were conducted to gauge the level of acceptance among the populace regarding this new initiative. ASEAN policy makers have also been criticized as being elitist and high-handed, with a lackadaisical attitude toward soliciting public opinion.

In the document ASEAN Vision 2020, the regional organization envisages a community that is broadminded, peaceful, stable, and prosperous, bound together in a partnership that is both dynamic and caring.⁷ This idea, for many, was extraordinarily ambitious. However, it is also a pragmatic notion that the region will become strategically and economically stronger through integration, given its combined population of 592 million, its total area of 4.44 million square kilometers, and its combined gross domestic product (GDP) of some US$3.1 trillion (in 2011 at PPP [purchasing power parity]

dollars, current price).⁸ While there is a general consensus that ASEAN stands to benefit from regional integration, scholars of regional studies have also remarked that the community building process appears to be both elitist and state-centric, with little effort thus far to consult the voices of the masses.⁹

The conception of “community” in ASEAN lacks one of the fundamental components of success in the European Community: the involvement of the general public. Still, it should be noted that the ASEAN situation is rather intricate compared to the EU because of historical differences. In Europe, liberal democracy originating from the Liberation movement became a powerful force in the Age of Enlightenment, rejecting earlier approaches to government based on hereditary status, an established religion, absolute monarchy, and the divine right of rulers. Advocates instead promoted the concept of natural rights, a social contract, and the rule of law as preferred precepts of governance. This facilitated the values of liberal democracy as conditions, much later, for the creation of the EU. However, in Southeast Asia, the differing histories, beliefs, values, levels of development, and political systems have made ASEAN regionalism more difficult to comprehend.

7. ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Vision 2020 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1997).

8. Idem, ASEAN Community in Figures, 2011 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2012), <http://www.

asean.org/images/archive/documents/ASEAN%20community%20in%20figures.pdf>, accessed November 21, 2012.

9. Amitav Acharya, “Democratisation and the Prospects for Participatory Regionalism in South- east Asia,” Third World Quarterly 24:2 (2003), pp. 375–90; idem, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009);

Sung Won Kim, “Human Security with an Asian Face?” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 17:1 (2010), pp. 83–103; Thi Thu Huong Dang, Examining the Engagement Between Civil Society in South- east Asia and ASEAN in the ASEAN Community Building Process (Santa Cruz: GRIN Verlag, 2008).

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Public sentiment and opinion provided vital feedback for policy formulation, and the public has been one of the key actors in the process of regional integration. In fact, major theories of regional integration—transactionalist, neofunctionalist, and democratic—have adumbrated public opinion as an integral part of the regional integration process, and the success of such an initiative may well depend on public support.¹⁰ In the case of ASEAN, thus far, there has been a clear dearth of studies of public opinion in regional integration. Although over the years, the organization has managed to capture scholarly interest, much of the focus has been on the involvement of elites and states in organizational processes, political-economic relations, the development of ASEAN as a regional institution, and ASEAN’s socioeconomic challenges.¹¹ While some work has been done on the obstacles confronting ASEAN,¹² none of the studies has included public opinion.

Having defined the problem, the main purpose of this article is to examine the obstacles to the establishment of an ASEAN Community as perceived by the public in three member countries. The central argument set forth is that public opinion surveys will provide a certain level of legitimacy for the regional integration process. Without this mechanism, the whole process may remain mere rhetoric in the higher echelons of society. Without public support, the initiative runs the risk of becoming redundant in future. This

10. Alan Collins, “A People-Oriented ASEAN: A Door Ajar or Closed for Civil Society Organiza- tions?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 30:2 (2008), pp. 313–31; Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community in the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe’s Would-be Polity (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1970); Miles Hewstone, Understanding Attitudes to the European Community: A Socio-Psychological Study in Four Member States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

11. Amitav Acharya, “Democratisation and the Prospects for Participatory Regionalism”; Denise Hew, Road Map to ASEAN Economic Community (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies [ISEAS], 2005); Denise Hew, Chin Kin Wah, and Lee Hock Guan, Towards Realizing an ASEAN Community (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004); Rosabel B. Guerrero, “Regional Integration: The ASEAN Vision in 2020,” Irving Fisher Committee (IFC) Bulletin 32 (2008), pp. 52–58.

12. Sajid Anwar, Christine Doran, and Sam Choon Yin, “Committing to Regional Cooperation:

ASEAN, Globalisation, and the Shin Corporation-Temasek Holdings Deal,” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 50:3 (2009), pp. 307–21; Alice D. Ba, “Regionalism’s Multiple Negotiations: ASEAN in East Asia,”

Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22:3 (2009), pp. 345–67; Mark Beeson, “Southeast Asia and the Politics of Vulnerability,” Third World Quarterly 23:3 (2002), pp. 549–64; Laurence Henry, “The ASEAN Way and Community Integration: Two Different Models of Regionalism,” European Law Journal 13:6 (2007), pp. 857–79; Rodolfo C. Severino, “The ASEAN Developmental Divide and the Initiative for ASEAN Integration,” ASEAN Economic Bulletin 24:1 (April 2007), pp. 35–44; Hide- taka Yoshimatsu, “Collective Action Problems and Regional Integration in ASEAN,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs 28:1 (2006), pp. 115–40.

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article argues that public perception has not been given enough attention in conceptualizing the ASEAN Community. In addition, the primary empirical data used in our analysis may contribute to the body of knowledge of regional integration, especially the construction of Southeast Asian regionalism.

Below, we outline the methodology and samples used in the study, followed by analysis of the public opinion surveys, and finally, discussion of the findings of the study on the establishment of an ASEAN Community.

M e t h o d o L o G y

The article was written based on primary data derived from public opinion surveys conducted by the authors in 11 cities of three ASEAN countries, namely Indonesia (Jakarta, Makassar, Medan, Surabaya, and Pontianak); Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Melaka, Johor Bahru, and Kota Kinabalu); and Sin- gapore. The three countries were chosen because, first, they were the founding members of ASEAN in 1967, apart from Thailand and the Philippines. Sec- ond, they were considered significant in ASEAN in terms of size of territory and population and economy. Third, traditionally these countries have had close ties among themselves. Fourth, the surveys were limited to three countries only because of limited research time, logistics, and resources.

The cities were chosen for their influence on the political and socioeconomic dynamics of their respective countries and for their connectedness to other countries in the region. Since the surveys were restricted to only three countries, the study does not make any claim that its findings can be generalized to other countries of ASEAN. The surveys employed several structured close-ended and open-ended questions in three national languages (Indonesian in Indo- nesia, Malay in Malaysia, and English in Singapore) to solicit feedback from respondents in these cities. The questionnaires were pilot tested to a group of 30 respondents to ensure validity. Because of the level of difficulty of the questions, only respondents with at least a tertiary education were selected to participate in this survey. Table 1 shows the profile of respondents who participated.

The surveys were conducted between June and December 2009 and in- volved a total of 1,256 respondents: 511 from Indonesia, 451 from Malaysia, and 294 from Singapore. Among the three major occupations represented in the surveys were university students (46.2%), lecturers (university teaching faculty) (21.9%), and private-sector employees (15.1%). Respondents were selected through convenient quota sampling to balance genders and the

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table 1. Respondents’ Profile

Countries

Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Overall

Total 511 451 294 1,256

% % % %

Gender Male 48.0 51.1 55.5 50.8

Female 52.0 48.9 44.5 49.2

Age 18 to 34 83.8 73.1 63.7 75.4

35 to 49 13.4 20.9 22.0 18.1

50 or more 2.8 6.0 14.3 6.5

Marital status Single 74.6 70.7 63.6 70.7

Married 25.2 28.2 35.7 28.6

Widow(er) 0.2 1.1 0.7 0.7

Education

Undergraduate 89.2 67.0 50.7 72.4

Master’s degree 10.2 22.6 14.4 15.7

Ph.D. 0.6 10.4 34.9 12.0

Occupation

Lecturer 7.1 26.4 40.8 21.9

Civil servant 8.2 6.4 5.8 7.0

Private employee 33.5 2.7 2.0 15.1

Soldier/police 0.0 5.1 0.0 1.8

Doing business 3.1 0.0 0.7 1.4

Housewife 1.8 0.0 0.3 0.8

Student 40.9 54.3 42.9 46.2

Not working 3.1 1.3 0.0 1.8

Other 2.4 3.8 7.5 4.1

Income class Lower 34.7 32.7 18.8 28.7

Lower middle 21.8 38.5 27.3 29.2

Middle 11.9 19.6 21.4 17.6

Upper middle 7.9 6.0 19.6 11.2

Upper 23.8 3.2 12.9 13.3

source: Results of field surveys conducted by the authors in 2009.

notes: The Categories for Income is different in each country. In Indonesia, the categories are $220 or less,

$221 to $330, $331 to $440, $441 to $550, and $551 or more. In Malaysia, the categories are $300 or less; $301 to

$1,500; $1,501 to $3,000; $3,001 to $4,500; $4,501 or more. In Singapore, the categories are $960 or less; $961 to $2,690; $2,691 to $4,615; $4,616 to $7,690; $7,691 or more.

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proportion of students to staff. In terms of gender, the respondents were 50.8% male and 49.2% female. In terms of age, 75.4% of respondents were between 18 and 34 years old, 70.7% were not married, and 72.4% were undergraduate students. It was also observed that most of the respondents (75.5%) came from the lower to middle level of the household expenditure segment of society.

e M P i R i ca L a na Ly S i S o F P u B L i c o P i n i o n S u Rv e y S

The surveys solicited opinions from the public pertaining to their perception of obstacles to establishing an ASEAN Community. From a list of 10 suggested obstacles, respondents were asked to respond in three options—

definitely, possibly, or definitely not, as illustrated in Table 2. Note, however, that the illustration in Table 2 does not include the option “definitely not”

because the research only analyzes affirmative responses.

The statements in Table 2 are designed to gauge the level of agreement among participants pertaining to what they perceived as obstacles to the establishment of the ASEAN Community solicited from the respondents. Based on the ranking order, Item 1 (disparity in levels of education) registered 92% agreement.

Items 2 to 6 also registered high agreement rates, in the range of 82%–88%.

Items 7 and 8 registered 77% agreement, while Items 9 and 10 registered 64%

and 60% agreement, respectively. These figures suggest that there has been overwhelming agreement among respondents that ASEAN community-building initiatives will face the listed obstacles. There were no items that registered below 50% agreement. In relation to the descriptive items outlined in Table 2, the empirical comparison of the significance of these categories was analyzed in Table 2. The analysis shows that with regard to Items 1 to 4 and Item 7, there were no significant differences in the feedback received from the three countries. The other items showed significant differences among the countries, further elaborated in the following sub-sections.

disparity in Levels of education

As indicated by Item 1 of Table 2, a sizable majority of respondents indicated that the low level of education in many ASEAN countries will pose a substantial challenge to the ASEAN Community initiative: this item ranked number 1 on the list. The figures in Table 2 showed that 91% of Malaysians, 92% of Indonesians, and 92% of Singaporeans shared this perception; this

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table 2.Perceived Obstacles to the Establishment of an ASEAN Community RanksObstacleMalaysian RespondentsIndonesian RespondentsSingaporean RespondentsThe Three Countries Tests of Responses Comparison Conclusion from Kruskal-Wallis Tests Conclusion from Mann-Whitney U Tests 1Low level of

education & unequal access and distribution of educational oppor

tunities

Definitely: 44%

Possibly: 47% Total: 91%

Definitely:

52% Possibly: 40% Total: 92%

Definitely: 46%

Definitely: 47%

Chi square = 4.92 Asymp. sig = 0.08 No significant differences

No significant differences in the three countries 2Lack of competitiveness in the economy

Definitely: 27%

Definitely: 31%

Definitely: 29%

No significant differences in the three countries 3Dependency on the dev

eloped

countries, especially for financing

Definitely: 42%

Definitely:

Definitely: 34%

Definitely: 39%

No significant differences in the three countries 4Socioeconomic disparity & wide income gap betw

een

member countries

Definitely: 37%

Definitely:

Definitely: 35%

Definitely: 36%

No significant differences in the three countries (Continued )

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RanksObstacleMalaysian RespondentsIndonesian RespondentsSingaporean RespondentsThe Three Countries

Tests of Responses Comparison Conclusion from Kruskal-Wallis Tests Conclusion from Mann-Whitney U Tests 5Differences in legal & political systems

Definitely: 35%

Definitely: 36%

Definitely: 50%

Definitely: 40%

Chi square = 27.88 Asymp. sig = 0.00 Significant differences

More Singaporeans than those in Malaysia and Indonesia perceived the item as an obstacle; no difference among Malaysians and Indonesians 6Limitation of mastery and creation of technology

Definitely: 43%

Definitely: 47%

Definitely: 33%

Definitely: 41%

More Indonesians and Malaysians perceived the item as an obstacle than those in Singapore; no difference among Malaysians and Indonesians 7High levels of poverty in many member countries

Definitely: 31%

Definitely: 32%

Definitely: 29%

Definitely: 31%

Chi square = 4.34 Asymp. sig = 0.16 No significant difference

No significant differences in the three countries 8Internal conflicts, ter-

rorism, and insurgency in the r

egion

Definitely: 33%

Definitely: 19%

Definitely: 36%

Definitely: 29%

More Singaporeans and Malaysians perceived this item as an obstacle than those in Indonesia; no difference among Malay- sians and Singaporeans

table 2.(Continued ) (Continued )

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table 2.(Continued ) RanksObstacleMalaysian RespondentsIndonesian RespondentsSingaporean RespondentsThe Three Countries

Tests of Responses Comparison Conclusion from Kruskal-Wallis Tests Conclusion from Mann-Whitney U Tests 9ASEAN economy is dominated by the ethnic Chinese group

Definitely: 22%

Definitely: 14%

Definitely: 19%

More in Malaysia perceived the item

as an obstacle than those in S

ingapore and Indonesia; no difference among Indonesians and Singaporeans 10Ethnic and religious plu-

ralism make it difficult for the r

egion to integrate

Definitely: 22%

Definitely: 12%

Definitely: 36%

Definitely: 23%

More Singaporeans agree

that it is an obstacle than those in M

alaysia and Indonesia; more Malaysians agree that

this item is an obstacle than the I

ndonesians source: Ibid. to Table 1. notes: Categories: “Definitely”: the suggested item is definitely an obstacle to ASEAN integration; “Possibly”: the suggested item is a possible obstacle to ASEAN integration; “Total”: is the total percentage of respondents who “definitely” and “possibly” agree that the suggested item is an obstacle to ASEAN integration. The Kruskal-Wallis and the Mann- Whitney U Tests compare the asymptotic significance with the cut-off point 0.05.

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was confirmed by Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U tests. This perception perhaps stems from public knowledge regarding the poor levels of education in less-developed ASEAN countries such as Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. In fact, the World Bank’s Education Statistics showed that education levels in those five countries were among the lowest in the region.¹³ The average duration of schooling in those countries stands at less than seven years—6.2 in Indonesia, 6 years in Cambodia, 6.4 years in Vietnam, 5.1 years in Laos, and 4.6 years in Myanmar—meaning that on average, students drop out before finishing the first year of junior high school.

In terms of adult education levels, only 47.27% of the adult population in the region have attended secondary school, out of which Vietnam and Cambodia registered the lowest with 31.22% and 25.44%, respectively. Simi- larly, tertiary education is still a luxury that most people in the region cannot afford. Only 8.39% of the population in Indonesia, 4.96% in Vietnam, and 1.40% in Cambodia have higher education. The figures above suggest that the lack of education may hinder most people in the region from grasping the benefits of integration. These countries have sizable rural populations, with low standards of education, which are largely domiciled in rural areas with scarce facilities. As such, it can be construed that the opportunity to be acquainted with concepts such as “regional integration” is quite remote.

Lack of economic competitiveness

As indicated in Table 2, Item 2 (lack of competitiveness in the economies of most ASEAN countries) received the second highest ranking, with 90% of Malaysian, 85% of Indonesian, and 90% of Singaporean respondents agree- ing that this item would pose an obstacle for the achievement of regional integration. Although many poor ASEAN economies such as those of CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) have made reasonable economic development progress in recent years, their disparity with more-developed ASEAN economies is still notable. For example, the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index 2011–12, which compared 142 countries or economies,¹⁴ showed that only five of the 10 ASEAN countries performed well: Singapore (in 2nd rank globally), Malaysia (21st), Brunei Darussalam

13. World Bank, Education Statistics, August 2012, <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/

ed-stats>, accessed November 21, 2012.

14. World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2011–2012, <http://www3.weforum.

org/docs/WEF_GCR_Report_2011-12.pdf>, accessed November 21, 2012.

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(28th), Thailand (39th), and Indonesia (46th). Other ASEAN countries were ranked above 50: Vietnam (65th), the Philippines (75th), and Cambodia (97th). The disparity in the levels of development among ASEAN countries and in their economic competitiveness may impinge on the success of this integration initiative. Challenges pertaining to the shortage of skilled labor, lack of a developed product quality standards system, unsophisticated consumer markets, insufficient physical and institutional infrastructure, and inadequate intellectual property-rights protection pose numerous governance and competitiveness problems in ASEAN.

dependency on the developed countries

Item 3 (dependency on developed countries) received the third-highest agreement among respondents as an obstacle for regional integration. The opinion surveys indicate that 90% of Malaysians, 84% of Indonesians, and 88% of Singaporeans agree that dependency on developed countries, especially for financing development and business, will impinge on regional integration.

External debt has been a major problem for many less-developed ASEAN economies. The World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance statistics showed that most ASEAN countries depended heavily on foreign financing. Only Singapore and Brunei Darussalam do not possess external long-term debts. Five out of 10 ASEAN countries relied heavily on foreign financing for development and business.¹⁵ The condition of Cambodia and Laos was even worse: their long-term debts exceeded their domestic credit provided by the banking sector.¹⁶ Domestic banking systems in five out of 10 countries were also notorious for their inefficiency in distributing finances to the community—and their interest lending rates each ran more than 9%.¹⁷ This situation left the governments and business people with no choice but to rely on foreign creditors and foreign direct investment (FDI) for financing.

15. World Bank, World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance, 28 September 2012,

<http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-development-finance>, accessed November 21, 2012.

16. The figures for Cambodia (domestic credit $2.6 billion vs. external debt stocks $4.4 billion in 2010) and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) (domestic credit $1.9 billion vs. external debt stocks $2.9 billion in 2010) show that external debts are higher than domestic credit provided by the banking sector. These figures illustrate the heavy dependence of those countries on foreign sources of financing. See ibid.

17. The lending interest rates were 9.3% per annum in the Lao PDR, 15% in Myanmar, 23% in Cambodia, 11.9% in Vietnam, and 12.8% in Indonesia. See ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Community in Figures, 2011.

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FDI has played a pivotal role in Southeast Asia’s economic development.

In fact, FDI in the region came mainly from developed countries, where the banking systems and accumulation of finance for investment are available in vast amounts.¹⁸ Investment from the EU, the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and China contributed 58% of total investment into ASEAN countries in 2010,¹⁹ while intra-ASEAN investment stood at only 16.1%. Further, rapid liberaliza- tion of global trade and investment in the past two decades, and the precedent of the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, has made once-economically attractive ASEAN less competitive, especially for certain industries, thus redirecting investors to other developing regions. As a result, ASEAN began numerous initiatives in order to make itself more strategically and economically relevant to the region and beyond. One such initiative was the promotion of regional economic integration to muster regional strength and build up shared resources and expertise. The ASEAN Economic Community was one such initiative aimed at creating a single market and production base and a region that is highly competitive, equitable in its economic development, and fully integrated into the global economy.²⁰

Socioeconomic disparity

The low levels of socioeconomic progress and the wide gap between countries (see Item 4, Table 2) received the fourth highest agreement among respondents.

The opinion survey indicated that 89% of Malaysians, 81% of Indonesians, and 93% of Singaporeans agree that socioeconomic disparity is an obstacle to ASEAN integration. The analysis using the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U tests confirmed that respondents in the three countries share the same position on this issue (see Table 2). Different histories, colonialism, and domestic factors have caused significant socioeconomic disparity among ASEAN societies. The Human Development Index (HDI) published by the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), which captures countries’ development indicators, revealed the degree of socioeconomic disparity. Human Development Reports in 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 consistently placed most ASEAN countries within

18. Daljit Singh, “Southeast Asia: An Overview,” in Southeast Asia in a New Era: Ten Countries, One Region in ASEAN, eds. Rodolfo Severino, Elspeth Thomson, and Mark Hong (Singapore:

ISEAS, 2010), pp. 1–24.

19. ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Community in Figures, 2011.

20. Idem, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint.

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the medium and low levels of HDI.²¹ For example, the life expectancy at birth scorecard showed that life expectancy in Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia stands only at a meager 67.5, 65.2, and 63.1 years, respectively.

There were also wide gaps in education levels between the top three HDI ASEAN countries and the rest. In Singapore, the expected schooling years total 14.4 (with a mean of 8.8), while in Laos and Myanmar, the schooling years stand only at 9.2 (mean = 4.6). In terms of income per capita, there were clear gaps between the top three HDI ASEAN countries and the rest. For example, in 2008, the per capita gross national income (GNI) for Singaporeans and Bruneians was US$52,569 and $45,753, versus $2,805 in Vietnam, $2,242 in Laos, $1,848 in Cambodia, and $1,535 in Myanmar. The socioeconomic gaps between the ASEAN-6 (Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Brunei) and the CLMV countries have been quite significant. There were also some isolated pockets of underdevelopment existing within ASEAN-6 countries.

differences in Legal and Political Systems

The significance of differences in ASEAN legal and political systems received the fifth-highest agreement among respondents. The opinion survey indicates that 87% of Malaysians, 80% of Indonesians, and 95% of Singaporeans agree that these differences pose serious obstacles to ASEAN’s integration. The Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U Tests confirmed that more Singaporean respondents considered the issue to be “definitely” an obstacle than those in Indonesia and Malaysia.

ASEAN was a conception that arose after the decolonization period, when ASEAN countries were gradually securing independence from their colonial mas- ters. Except for Thailand, in their recent history, all countries in this region were colonies of one or several Western powers. Both the spice trade and national zeal for conquest drove European powers—namely, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and France—and the U.S. to colonize a large part of Southeast Asia. With colonialism, Western systems of administration, governance, and laws were introduced. Because several colonial powers were competing for influence, the systems that were eventually adopted by the Southeast Asian countries also differed during the post-colonial period. For example, the legal systems in Malay- sia and Indonesia have different origins. Malaysia, being a former British colony,

21. UNDP, Human Development Report, 2011, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2011/

download/>, accessed November 21, 2012.

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uses a legislative system originating from Anglo-Saxon law, and inclining toward the Common Law. Indonesia adopted a legal system similar to the Continental Law system of the Netherlands, its former colonial master. Given the historical background, it would be a gargantuan task to harmonize the legal systems of the various countries in the region. Any move in this direction could easily stir up sovereignty issues among ASEAN members.

As a result of the heterogeneous nature of political systems, it is difficult to find uniform political values to bind the countries together. The re gion hosts myriad forms of political entities, from the absolute monarchy of Brunei Darussalam to democratic republics in Singapore, the Philippines, and In- donesia; to constitutional monarchies in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand;

to communist polities in Laos and Vietnam; to slowly softening military rule in Myanmar.²²

Although there have been clarion calls within ASEAN for greater expres- sion of democratic values, there are disparities in the inculcation of these values in different member countries, reinforcing the point that political integration is impossible to attain in the near future. This disparity is also captured in Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland’s “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited Dataset” which categorizes states as “democratic,” “democratic with no alternation” (regimes that have remained in power since national independence or formation), and “undemocratic.” The poll shows that Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines are democratic governments; Malaysia and Singapore fell into the “democratic with no alternation” category; and Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam are “undemocratic.”²³

Some have argued that essaying apples-to-apples comparisons on democracy between Southeast Asia and the West is a mistaken approach because they have extremely different historical experiences. Traditionally, Southeast Asia experienced long periods of authoritarianism: the region’s precolonial rulers (chiefs, rajas, and sultans) were absolute rulers, exercising tight control

22. Severino, Thomson, and Hong, eds., Southeast Asia in a New Era; Kristina Jönsson,

“ Authoritarian States in Southeast Asia in Times of Globalization: Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar,” in Globalization and Its Counter-forces in Southeast Asia, ed. Terence Chong (Singapore:

ISEAS, 2008), pp. 21–50; David Roberts, “Democratization, Elite Transition, and Violence in Cam- bodia, 1991–1999,” Critical Asian Studies 34:4 (2002), pp. 520–38; idem, “Political Transition and Elite Discourse in Cambodia, 1991–99,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 18:4 (2002), pp. 101–18.

23. Jose Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland, “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited Dataset” (2009), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, <http://netfiles.

uiuc.edu/cheibub/www/DD_page.html>, accessed November 21, 2012.

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over their subjects. In fact, the Hindu rituals conducted by Brahmin priests in many early Southeast Asian kingdoms in the Hindu-Buddhist period as early as the third to sixth century b.c. were meant to elevate the status of raja (king) to devaraja (god-king), sanctioning the rulers with a godly legitimacy to rule over their subjects.

The subsequent colonial powers also ruled the region with high levels of authoritarianism. Some colonial powers, especially the Spanish, Dutch, and French, were repressive, placing Europeans in a superior legal position, limiting subjects’ civil and political freedoms, and restricting educational and economic opportunities. As a result of these experiences, regional governments have been increasingly state-centric and less amenable to liberal democratic ideals. Political cultures take a long time to change, and these traditional systems still retain their influence on the political imagination of post- colonial Southeast Asia.²⁴

the Limitation of Mastery and creation of technology

Concern with limits on mastery and creation of technology received the sixth- highest agreement among respondents. The opinion survey indicated that 89% of Malaysians, 84% of Indonesians, and 86% of Singaporeans agree that technological limitation is an obstacle to ASEAN integration. Most countries in the region except Singapore are still backward in technology. In terms of knowledge acquisition and access to technology, there is a clear disparity in the region. For example, the diffusion of Internet technology is still exceptionally low in the CLMV countries: in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, less than 9%

used the Internet in 2010.²⁵ In terms of the export of high-technology products (as a percentage of total exports), in 2010 only Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia registered more than 30%. Indonesia and Vietnam registered high- technology exports of less than 6% of total exports, while the Cambodian, Laotian, and Burmese economies register below 1%.²⁶

Even though the diffusion and mastery of technology in the region have been weak, technology creation is even weaker. For example, between 1990–2010, in terms of patents granted annually to residents (per million people), only

24. Singh, “Southeast Asia: An Overview,” pp. 1–24.

26. This variable was measured by the value of exports of aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery products. See United Nations, Comtrade Database, 2011, <http://www.comtrade.un.org>, accessed November 21, 2012.

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Singapore topped the chart with 140. Indonesia and Vietnam registered only one patent per million people, and there were none in Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. In addition, for the receipts of royalties and license fees from patents and intellectual property rights annually in the past 10 years, Singapore again topped the list at US$367 per person. The other ASEAN economies fared much worse, with Malaysia (the region’s second best) at US$9.20 and Thailand at US$2.30 per person. The other seven ASEAN countries were below US$1 or even zero.²⁷

Another important indicator of technological advancement is research and development (R&D) indicators as measured in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2012.²⁸ R&D can be measured through budget allocation and expenditure, the generation of researchers, and the number of academic publications. The data reveal that the commitment to R&D was low in most ASEAN countries. Singapore was the only country in the region for which R&D expenditure stood above 1% of GDP in 2010.²⁹ In fact, Singapore has the highest number of R&D researchers with 5,659 researchers (excluding post-graduate students) per million population in 2010.³⁰ There were less than 500 researchers per million population in each of the other nine ASEAN countries.³¹

Poverty in the Region

The opinion survey indicates that “poverty” ranks number seven on the list of possible obstacles for the formation of an ASEAN Community, as perceived by respondents. The survey indicates that 75% of Malaysians, 70% of Indo- nesians, and 86% of Singaporeans agree that poverty is an obstacle to ASEAN integration. With the exception of Singapore and Brunei, there were sizable levels of poverty, marginal in some countries and more adverse in others.

In order to gauge the levels of poverty in society, “income poverty” has been used widely as a reliable indicator. In ASEAN, measured by the international

27. World Bank, World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance, 28 September 2012.

28. Idem, World Development Indicators, 2012 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2012), <http://

www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/world-development-indicators-education-2012-en.pdf>, accessed November 21, 2012.

29. Ibid. shows that Singapore, with R&D expenditure of 2.66% of GDP, is the only country in Southeast Asia with more than 1% R&D expenditure.

30. Department of Statistics Singapore, Research and Development, <http://www.singstat.gov.sg/

pubn/reference/yos12/statsT-research.pdf>, accessed November 22, 2012.

31. World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2012.

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standard of US$2 in daily income, the number of poor in the region was 42.37% of the population in 2010. Based on this indicator, the poverty level in five of 10 ASEAN countries between 2006–10 exceeded both the world and regional average: Laos registered 66.0%, Cambodia 56.5%, Indonesia 50.6%, Vietnam 38.5%, and the Philippines 45.0%.³²

Arguably, the income poverty line may not capture the true nature of poverty.

To accommodate this criticism, the UNDP’s multidimensional poverty indicators (MPI) in its 2011 Human Development Report can be used. The MPI classifica- tion goes beyond income categories by measuring poverty through deprivation in health, education, and living standards, indicators considered fundamental to human development.³³ Based on these measurements, seven of 10 ASEAN countries were considered to have a multidimensional poor population in 2008. In general, 15.69% of people in the region experienced deprivation, while another 18.41% were at risk of multidimensional poverty. Further, Laos (47.2%) and Cambodia (52%) were the two ASEAN countries with extremely poor populations.³⁴ However, poverty in Indonesia also warrants attention: while only 20.8% of Indonesians were multidimensionally poor, because of the country’s large population, the figure contributes to more than 50% of the total poor in the region.

internal conflicts, terrorism, and insurgency

Internal conflicts, terrorism, and insurgency in ASEAN countries have been cited as plausible factors that could deter regional integration. The survey reveals that 85% of Malaysians, 85% of Singaporean respondents, and 61%

of Indonesians ranked the issue at number eight on the list of 10 possible obstacles to establishing an ASEAN Community (see Table 2). Further, the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U Tests confirmed that there were significantly more respondents in Singapore and Malaysia who considered the issue to be an obstacle than in Indonesia.

Although Singapore never faced any imminent threat from terrorism, there have been traces of activity there by Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiah organization. The Singaporean authorities have remained vigilant through numerous counter-terrorism initiatives. Being a small state and surrounded by Islamic countries, Singapore has remained wary about the emergence of Islamic

33. UNDP, Human Development Report, 2011.

34. Ibid.

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militancy in the region. The Malaysian authorities have also enunciated a strong intolerant stance toward terrorism and insurgency. The rise of several home-grown militant groups linked with al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah, and the involvement of several Malaysians in bombings in Indonesia, brought the severity of the problem to light for the Malaysian authorities. Malaysia has also been very active in counter-terrorism initiatives. Therefore, it is plausible that many Singaporeans and Malaysians see the issues of internal conflicts, terrorism, and insurgency as hindrances to regional integration. In contrast, Indonesians are more accustomed to incidents of conflict and insurgency, and perhaps may not see this issue as a major hindrance.

The region has experienced a proliferation of violent conflicts in recent decades as a result of internal problems, communal strife, ethnic conflicts, terrorist acts, and insurgencies. Former President George W. Bush, in his so-called War on Terror, classified Southeast Asia as the world’s second front for combating terrorism. Almost all countries in the region have experienced some levels of violent conflict. According to the Conflict Barometer 2011, there were 32 internal conflicts in the region in 2011. Among them were struggles involving Muslim extremists in parts of Indonesia, southern Thailand, southern Philippines, and Myanmar.³⁵ Those conflicts become more complicated over time because they involve systemic ideological issues of nationalism and religious identity, as well as secessionist problems that have proved almost impossible to resolve.

Daljit Singh argues that the internal conflicts in the region were often the legacy of Western colonialism, incomplete or unsuccessful nation building, and/or the political and socioeconomic marginalization of minorities.³⁶ He contends that the borders of ASEAN countries were drawn by the colonial powers, dividing geographic areas based on their own interests and spheres of influence and leaving many ethnic or religious minorities on the “wrong side” of the border, cutting them off from their compatriots. For example, the Pattani Muslim minority in Thailand was segregated from their Malay- Muslim brothers in Malaysia as a result of a border agreement between Britain and Siam (now Thailand), which placed this community in two separate states. Identifying more as Malay than Thai, the Pattani Malays found it hard to integrate into the Thai system and society, a situation that eventually spawned bloody uprisings in the southern Thai province.

35. Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Conflict Barometer 2011 (Heidelberg:

University of Heidelberg, 2012).

36. Singh, “Southeast Asia: An Overview.”

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Singh further illustrated unsuccessful nation-building and socioeconomic marginalization of minorities, giving several examples: ethnic insurgencies in Myanmar; racial riots in Malaysia; Acehnese, Mollucan, and Papuan rebellions in Indonesia; Muslim secessionist movements in the southern Philippines and Thailand; and periodic violence in Cambodia against its Vietnamese minorities.

ethnic chinese economic domination

The opinion survey indicates that “ethnic Chinese economic domination”

ranks ninth on the list of 10 possible obstacles to the formation of an ASEAN Community. In the survey, 75% of Malaysians, 61% of Indonesians, and 58% of Singaporeans agreed that this issue was an obstacle to ASEAN integration. The Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U Tests revealed that there were “significantly” more respondents in Malaysia who considered the issue an obstacle than there were in Indonesia and Singapore. Ethnic Chi- nese constitute some 5% of the region’s population, and they are the sixth- largest ethnic group in the region after the Javanese (14.96%), Vietnamese (12.77%), Thai (9.24%), Sundanese (5.94%), and Malays (5.09%). Al though the Chinese ethnic groups are minorities in their respective ASEAN countries, in almost all member states they control a large share of the economic wealth.³⁷

The degree of acceptance of Chinese ethnic groups by indigenous populations varies from one country to the next. In Thailand and the Philippines, the local Chinese were historically assimilated or integrated into the local populace. But it is a different story elsewhere. The Chinese have often been viewed with envy, even resentment, and they have been periodically blamed for national problems.³⁸ The Chinese community in New Order-era Indonesia (1968–98) were often insulted by local people and were severely discriminated against by the government for their so-called domination of the economy. Even naturalized Chinese citizens faced discriminatory regulation under the Suharto administration. Manifestations of their ethnic/cultural identities through language, education, and ritual were denied practice. Public celebration of the Chinese New Year was banned for decades until the rule was

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

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lifted in 1999 under President Abdurrahman Wahid. Periodic outbreaks of violence directed toward Chinese persons and property occurred, particularly in Java.³⁹ In Malaysia, there were several ethnic conflicts directed at local Chinese. Examples include the 1957 “Chingay Riot,” the 1964 racial riots in Singapore (then under Malaysian administration), the 1967 “Hartal Riot,” the May 1969 riots in Kuala Lumpur, and the Operasi Lalang events of 1987.⁴⁰

Pluralism in the Region (ethnicities, tribes, and Religions)

The opinion survey shows that “pluralism” ranked last on the list of 10 possible obstacles to the formation of an ASEAN Community. In the survey, 66% of Malaysians, 39% of Indonesians, and 75% of Singaporeans agreed that this issue is an obstacle to ASEAN integration. As a matter of fact, the region’s people come from a variety of tribes, ethnicities, and communities and embrace many religions. As shown in Table 3, Javanese, Vietnamese Kinh, Thais, Sundanese, and Malays are the five major ethnic groups. However, none of these groups holds more than 15% of regional population share.⁴¹ We note also that there are approximately 1,518 tribes and ethnic groups living in the region, conversing in some 1,272 languages and dialects.

The diversity of religious beliefs also has been a notable feature of the region. A World Bank report has suggested that no single religious group can claim an overwhelming majority.⁴² Muslims, the largest religious group, constitute 38.8% of the regional population, with Buddhists and Christians making up 25.4% and 20.2%, respectively. Some scholars have argued that the multiplicity of ethnicities and beliefs, while making a regional melting pot of Eastern cultures, has been a contributing factor to ethnic and communal strife within and between countries. The ethnic conflicts in Southeast Asia may be grouped in several categories:

1. lowland versus highland people,

2. neighboring states whose political borders do not coincide with the cultural boundaries that define their peoples,

39. Clark E. Cunningham, “Indonesia,” in Countries and Their Cultures 2, eds. Melvin Ember and Carol R. Ember (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2001), pp. 1034–56.

40. Johan Saravanamuttu and Ooi Kee Beng, “Malaysia,” in Southeast Asia in a New Era, eds.

Severino, Thomson, and Hong, pp. 113–31.

41. Joshua Project Peoples Data, 2010, <http://www.joshuaproject.net>, accessed March 28, 2010.

42. World Bank, World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance.

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3. states experiencing demands for autonomy or separation by minority groups,

4. states divided by the competing interests of their long-settled native in- habitants and more recent immigrant populations.⁴³

43. Carl H. Lande, “Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Accommodation, and Nation-Building in South- east Asia,” Studies in Comparative International Development 33:4 (1999), pp. 89–117, <http://www.

table 3. The Distribution of Major Ethnic Groups in the ASEAN Countries No. Country

No. of Ethnic Groups/Tribes

No. of Languages and Dialects Spoken

Five Largest Ethnic Groups/Tribes (% of the Population in the Country)

1 Brunei 26 23 Malays (45.1%), Chinese (15.7%), Filipino (8.0%), Dusun Kadazan (7.1%), and Iban (5.6%)

2 Cambodia 42 33 Khmer Central (85.3%), Vietnamese

(4.2%), Chinese (4.1%), Cham (2.2%), and Kampuchea Krom (1.7%) 3 Indonesia 785 715 Javanese (38.19%), Sunda (15.6%), Madu-

ra (3.38%), Minangkabau (2.76%), and Bugis (2.53%)

4 Laos 147 139 Lao (44.33%), Khmu (8.82%), Hmong

Daw (3.68), Hmong Njua (3.16%), and Phu Thai (2.91%)

5 Malaysia 183 160 Malay (41.64%), Chinese (25.20%),

Indian (7.50%), Iban (2.78%), and Minangkabau (2.08%)

6 Myanmar 142 135 Burmese (56.12%), Shan (8.51%), Karen (8.99%), Rakhine (3.92%), and Yang- bye (3.62%)

7 Philippines 186 179 Filipino (26.93%), Visayan (19.99%), Ilocano (9.11%), Hiligayno (7.69%), and Bikol Central (4.17%)

8 Singapore 52 41 Chinese (63.7%), Malay (13.9%), Tamil (5.6%), Filipino (2.9%), and Thai (1.1%)

9 Thailand 114 105 Thai (81.5%), Chinese (10.76%), Malay (2.52%), Khmer (1.71%), and Pu Thai (0.71%)

10 Vietnam 114 110 Vietnamese (84.5%), Chinese (2.65%), Tay (1.9%), Muong (1.5%), and Khmer Central (1.4%)

Total 1,518 1,272

source: Adapted from Joshua Project Peoples Data, <http://www.joshuaproject.net>, accessed March 28, 2010.