among these various aspects o f h u man personality. Does economic, social, or cultural deprivation which may be associated with some form o f instability make it less likely for individuals to stress the concept of a benevolent God in their belief system?
At best the findings in this study help only to discern trends of belief in a religious concept. They do not provide clear-cut answers to ques
tions originally raised. In fact, they lead to more questions about the nature o f the relationship between religious belief and sociocultural factors.
whole being tend to harmonize with the very concept o f love.4
Second, the trends discerned in this study also seem to suggest some implications for an under
standing o f the processes involved in learning religious concepts. Upon exposure to a concept, the individ
ual may reject or accept if for rea
sons known or unknown. Whether he will reject or accept it may de
pend upon the interaction o f a number o f factors, three o f which are discernible in this study.
1. The individual’s openness or disposition to believe in a concept may depend upon physio-psycho
logical forces within him. These inner forces include his inner sta
bility, the sense o f deprivation or fulfillment as far as his needs are concerned, his perception o f the world around him, as well as his own self-concept. The individual tends to appropriate a particular concept, probably it harmonizes with the forces, feelings, and perception w ith
in him. As the cognitive theorists would stress, the individual is pur
posive and creative; his learning is affected by how he perceives the environment and what he makes out o f his own perceptions. 5
2. A person’s feelings about him
self are affected by the environment, consisting o f the mediating factors between the learner and the concept to be learned. As identified in this study, the sociocultural factors may refer to the individual’s economic stability as indicated by income, his social stability as may be implied from marital status, and his cultural stability as may be deduced from his educational attainm ent. These factors may either foster or hinder the individual’s response to a con
cept. He may learn it b ut not ne
cessarily believe in it. If he comes to believe in it, the intensity with which he believes may vary.
3. Between the forces within the learner and sociocultural factors w ithout, there seems to be a trans
actional area where the individual experiences a dynamic interaction with a variety of forces, some ob
servable and others not. At this point o f convergence between the individual’s physio-psychological state o f being and the sociocultural factors surrounding him, it seems appropriate to leave room for the possible influence o f other dynamic factors. Although it is not the in
tention o f this study to delve into 4Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), pp. 196-199.
5Max Wertheimer, Productive Thinking (New York: Harper and Row, 1959).
metaphysics, the recognition o f re
sponses that could not be taken into account by statistical averages which only describe the typical or “con
servative m an,” 6 leads to a posture o f reverence for the Source of pow
er that enables man to transcend the pull o f forces within him and
without.
Third, for the educational insti
tutions o f the church, this study may have some bearing upon the decisions they make for the physi
cal, emotional, social, and spiritual welfare o f the individuals they serve.
It suggests that religious workers continue to explore innovative min
istries which take into account the sociocultural situations in which their parishioners live. That eco
nomic status, as well as marital sta
tus and education, show some posi
tive correlation with religious belief may suggest that the church must be concerned not only with m an’s spiritual regeneration, b ut also must be involved in the alleviation of hu
man deprivation in its various forms It must be concerned with helping to shape the environment for the blossoming o f the human spirit.
The church may express involve
ment in aggressive participation in the policy-making level of commu
nity life as well as in vigorous pro
grams for improving living condi
tions in the community. It may encourage involvement in politics and in school boards. It may help to provide vocational guidance, counseling services for maximizing individual potential, and workshops for developing skill in creative ac
tivities which could enhance family resources.
It may also be pointed out that the church can help individuals who are economically or socially de
prived in ways th at make them strong, not servile and submissive as Freire described the oppressed. 7 It can extend its ministering hands to set men free to be themselves and to develop a mature faith not goad
ed by deprivation or fear but m oti
vated by love and gratitude.
Fourth, the result of this study may have some implications for theological education in emphasiz
ing the value o f sociological courses
6Charles Hampden-Turner, Radical Man: The Process of Psycho-social Development New York: Anchor Books, Double Day and Co., Inc., 1971).
7Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970 ). p. 29
and other experiences geared to en
able seminary graduates to deal more adequately with the economic and social problems o f the parish. Con
tinued attention should be given to an increased understanding o f the sociocultural factors that impinge upon the lives o f individuals. Socio
logical foundations should be in
cluded among the background courses in religious education. Stu
dents should be encouraged and sup
ported in conducting sociocultural researches to gain more insights into the factors that correlate with reli
gious belief and behavior.
The outcome o f this study seems to lend support to ongoing attem pts at finding new approaches to reli
gious work. As L. Schneider reports, there are signs that seminarians are turning away from conventional jobs in the parish. These new min
istries are being sought in social work and pastoral services in shop
ping centers, coffee houses, and vacation spots. 8 Such forms o f min
istries give added justification for double-degree programs where semi
narians are enrolled in combined
curricula and graduate with two de
grees simultaneously; e. g., psychol
ogy and theology, agriculture and pastoral theology, education and re
ligious education. These are in line with Westberg’s forecast that “more clergymen will be preparing them selves for dual occupations: ministry and law, ministry and social work, ministry and medicine.” 9
Fifth, this study may have sug
gestions for educators in general such as the need to give more atten
tion to the critical study o f econom
ic and social factors which may have some effect on the learner’ s belief or value system. This posture leans toward what Cole and Cox envision to be the future trend in ed
ucation. 10
Sixth, this study serves as a refer
ence for those who desire to study further the relationship between economic conditions and religious beliefs. It also points to other fac
tors or variables which may have some influence upon the shaping o f religious belief. Recognition o f the existence o f the potential influence o f many sociocultural factors upon
8Louis Schneider, Sociological Approach to Religion (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1970), p.176.
9 Granger E. Westberg, “Theological Education for Dual Occupations: Medicine and Minis
try,” Theological Education, VII, 3 (1971), 177
10William E. Cole and Roy L. Cox, Social Foundations o f Education (New York: American Book Company, 1968), p. 441.
religious belief and behavior makes an interdisciplinary approach to research in this area desirable and commendable.
Proceeding on the conviction that this study might serve as a spring
board for further research, this in
vestigator makes a few recom men
dations for further study.
First, for purposes of comparison and of extending the application of results. It is recommended that this study be replicated in different situations, such as among various denominations and sects, among economic groups in the general population, in different geographi
cal or cultural settings: e.g., agricul
tural, industrial, and even post-in
dustrial society; rural and urban communities.
Second, it is recommended that more studies be conducted on reli
gious beliefs and sociocultural fac
tors to help remedy the situations described by Faulkner and Dejong, and supported by this investigation, that not much has been done in this area. More work needs to be done towards understanding the develop
ment of religious beliefs as well as
the factors that mediate between what the church attem pts to teach and w hat the individual devotee be
lieves. 11
Third, it is recommended that the questionnaire used in this study be improved. More items may be added or other items may be placed with more discriminating ones. It is suggested as a variation of this study that the concept o f God as Judge, rewarding the saint and pun
ishing the sinner, may be used as a basis for measuring belief in the same way that the concept of a benevolent God was used here. The task of developing more question
naires and instruments for research is to be considered as one o f the priorities in the educational work o f the church.
Fourth, it is recommended that other ways of isolating the effects o f related factors. Other variables such as race, church affiliation, cul
tural background be considered for classifying the sample. The proce
dure will help to define further the nature of the interaction between religious belief and sociocultural factors.
11 Joseph E. Faulkner and Gordon F. DeJong, “Religiosity in 5-D: an Empirical Analysis,"
Social Forces, XLV (1966), 246-254.
Toward Their Regional International Problems of Today and Tomorrow
Salahuddin Malik
Now that peace seems to be very much in the offing in Southeast Asia, it is highly desirable to have a somewhat closer look at the opin
ions o f the natives o f Southeast Asia toward their regional and in
ternational concerns.
A small-scale random sampling of the opinions and attitudes o f the educated citizenry o f Southeast Asian countries by means o f a questionnaire indicated that the leadership o f tom orrow in th at im
portant part o f the globe is split over questions o f war and peace, East-West international relations, capitalism, communism, and social
ism, the reality o f China, the role of the United Nations as a peace keeping body, and the U.S. involve
ment or disinvolvement in Vietnam, This writer undertook a four week tour o f Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and Burma
and polled public opinion by means o f a questionnaire and personal in
terviews. The opinions discussed below are based on tabulated re
sults o f 225 questionnaires, here and there interspersed with com
ments stemming from personal tete- a-tetes with over one hundred per
son.
In doing this the author, himself an Asian from Pakistan, had to face a variety o f difficulties. For exam
ple, quite a few o f the faculty at Chulalongkorn University in Bang
kok refused to fill out the question
naire because it had not come to them from the Government of Thai
land or from the Dean’s Office.
They feared to express their opin
ions in writing even though the questionnaire could be answered anonymously as a large percentage o f those who answered it did. The students at the same campus, how ever, were much more independent
*This was presented at the Upstate New York Conference on Asian Studies, October 9—10, 1971. The author is Associate Professor of South and Southeast Asian History, State University of New York at Brockport, New York.
sential to note that the majority o f the people polled were students at Lao-America Centre. The Centre is run by USAID and is mostly staffed by American teachers. As it is clear from the above breakdown, most o f the respondents gave more than one choice.
To the question “how essential do you consider the U.S. economic assistance to the welfare o f your country? Extremely essential--- , Essential--- , Needed--- , Would help--- , Unessential--- , Com
ments, if any--- ,” only twen
ty thought that it was unessential.
A sizable number argued between extremely essential (19) to would help (77). Essential and needed polled thirty-eight and sixty-four respectively. Seven respondents did not answer this question.
This widespread desire to receive economic assistance from the Unit
ed States was frequently punctu
ated with remarks like: “Im portant that economic assistance be given with no strings attached,” “No di
rect aid in loans or gifts bu t sym
pathetic tariff policy and education
al help,” “ But only if it (economic aid) comes w ithout . . . any en
croachment upon national honour,”
“ Such help is harmful to human dignity . . . until a sense o f equality (? ) prevails,” (contrast this with
“beggars cannot be choosers” re
mark o f another Asian) to “Trade not aid,” “We need investment, not assistance,” and the “U.S. econom
ic assistance,” decried a Saigonese in transit in Vientiane to the United States for graduate educa
tion, “must go through a bilateral well-studied plan aimed at develop
ing the industrial as well as agricul
tural potential o f the recipient country rather than decide the na
ture o f the aid herself as she (the U.S.) does now .”
A majority of the people sur
veyed confidently rejected the idea that Communist ideology alone of
fered sure solutions to their knotty economic, educational, technical know-how, and population prob
lems. “Which of the following do you think would most suit the fu
ture needs o f your country? Com
munism--- , Capitalism--- , So
cialism--- , Comments, if any,”
only seven opted for Communism, fifty-four for Capitalism, nineteen for Islamic Socialism (Malaysia), and a large majority o f 122 regarded some kind o f national socialism to be the only cure o f their current problems. It must, however, be understood that the large vote for socialism was not entirely unquali
fied; quite a few in this group set forth preconditions on the adop
tion o f a socialist philosophy and suggested public interference only when and where private initiative failed, such as: education, health, communications, works o f public utility, and certain kinds o f indus
try. They further added th at the
“restricted socialism” suggested a
bove was not to be accepted as a permanent remedy and that it must make room as time and conditions perm itted for a fuller and freer en
terprise.
These attitudes, however, radi
cally changed when it came to the problem of war and peace, U.S.
Asian policies, and the mainte
nance o f U.S. bases in Asian and Far Eastern countries. Their an
swers to these questions reflected a certain degree o f concern and, at times, disillusionment, resentm ent, and anger at U.S. international pol
icies in Asia since 1945, in general, and 1954, in particular. Only fifty- eight o f the 225 wholeheartedly ap
proved of the U.S. policies in Asia, seven offered conditional approba
tion, one hundred and thirty-one expressed disapproval, and the rest (29) abstained from expressing any opinions. One general complaint was that “U.S. was still far from comprehending the peoples and the problems o f Asia.”
Likewise, the question “Do you
think that the war in Vietnam is civil in nature and one which should be fought or negotiated by the Vietnamese people themselves? Yes
, N o , Comments, if any,”
was answered in the same vein. One hundred and forty-one voted yes, sixty-three no, with twenty-one ab
stentions.
The crucial question “Who do you think to be an aggressor in Vietnam? N orth V ietnam , South Vietnam, China, Russia, United States, France, Others, Comments, if any,” seventy-five thought that North Vietnam was the “real cul
prit,” a much larger number (106) regarded the U.S. as an aggressor country, only nine picked at China, three at Russia, and the rest seemed to be divided beyond comprehen
sion. In utter confusion they nagged at every country listed above. Sev
eral regarded more than two coun
tries responsible for the tragic situa
tion in Indo-China.
Bitter and hostile comments how ever, were reserved for the next in
quiry which solicited their opinion about the possible “reasons for United States’ involvement in Viet
nam: Communist containm ent---.
Honour treaty com m itm ent--- . Moral obligation--- , Assist South Vietnamese--- , Imperialism--- . Others--- , Comments, if any."
one hundred thirty-seven believed that American desire to contain Communism had led to U.S. en
tanglement in Southeast Asia, twen
ty-four would not admit o f any other reason than imperialism, twen
ty-seven thought that both Com
munist containm ent as well as im
perialism were the motivating for
ces behind U.S. involvement in Vietnam, only thirty-four would go along with the Pentagon contention that the American presence in South
east Asia was born o f treaty com
mitm ent and her desire to assist the people o f South Vietnam in their effort to resist outside aggression.
A little more than one per cent (3) did not answer this question.
The aforem entioned question e
voked highly interesting comments, such as: “The U.S. has economic interests in continuing the war,”
“American pride,” “Power politics with China,” “The United States considers China as her major enemy and wants to encircle her with her military bases. (As already stated the questionnaire was polled before Kissinger’s visit to Peking.) The war in Vietnam enables the U.S. to do so.” “ Self-imposed policeman of the world. It is for the Vietnamese people to decide what is right or wrong (for them) and not for the U.S. to tell a nation what is in their
interest. A bout thirty million Viet
namese are not fools.” “Communist containm ent and the ‘Chicago gang
steristic’ nature o f the Americans.”
And. finally, “Communistphobia and the preservation o f (a) dignity which has already been shattered.”
There were a few and only few good comments as well, such as: “Sincere American com m itm ent to help pre
serve democracy in Southeast Asia,”
“Americans are a brave and generous people.”
When asked, “Do you think that the United States should continue its com m itm ent to South and South
east Asian countries in situations similar to the one that exists in Vietnam? Yes--- , No--- , Com
ments, if any,” fifty-one, strangely enough, answered in the affirmative, one hundred forty-two in the nega
tive, and thirty-two offered no opin
ions, Quite a few o f the second group, however, were inclined to accept military aid from the U.S.
but were against any kind o f direct involvement in the cold war. Sever
al pointed out, “You see, direct involvement creates Vietnams,” and an English woman lecturer o f six
teen years residence in Singapore observed: “ I do not think any other country in Southeast Asia would like to be another Vietnam .”
Naturally, a vast majority of Southeast Asians considered the
presence o f American military bases on their soils prejudicial to their national interests on several counts.
It was feared that the existence of bases would inevitably lead to their involvement in the cold war o f the big powers, 2) provide the oppo
sition parties as well as anti-state ele
ments with an easy handle to dis
credit the government, 3) lead to increased American interference in the civil and military administration o f the recipient country, 4) was against national dignity and sover
eignty, 5) would lead to loss o f confidence in the state among the people and thereby lower national morale, and, finally, would tend to provide a sense o f artificial security and arrest national development in the most sensitive fields.
The people o f Southeast Asia seem to be markedly divided over the extent to which Communism in the neighbourhood poses a threat to their society and institutions.
The reaction to my survey revealed th at out o f every seven respondents four believed that Communism did constitute a serious threat; the re
maining three, however, did not consider it a problem o f much con
cern. The ones who felt convinced o f the threatening posture o f Com
munism agreed at their multiple ex
posure to the advancing tide of
Communist ideology and felt espe
cially concerned about the future of democratic institutions in their countries. The consensus was that weak and errant socio-political insti
tutions (especially the latter) in Southeast Asian countries offered a fertile ground for Communist en
croachment, Communism, they add
ed, would become a sure threat if the political leaders o f their coun
tries showed lack o f wisdom, ener
gy, and tact in dealing with the so
cio-economic problems besetting their societies.
Nevertheless, the pro-China lobby had a slight upper edge over the Sinophobes. More people thought that the development o f Red China would either be beneficial or indif
ferent to the future of their coun
try than harmful (128 to 88, with nine abstentions). The pro-Peking group attributed China’s “unpre
dictable and belligerent” mood to her sense o f past wrongs and pre
sent insecurity against the United States and Soviet Russia. As China has continuously (until then) been denied her rightful place in the comity o f nations, as she has been refused recognition by the U.S. and her allies, she felt the necessity of, it was argued, forcing recognition and acceptance upon others, more particularly upon her geographical