Dominique Bessire 155 Initial studies conducted on the application of article 116 show that, confronted with this device, firms have behaved in various ways: some have taken into account a broad area (but most often without defining it very precisely); others have stuck to the legal text. Moreover, among the 900 firms which should have applied this device, more than one-half have published nothing without auditors making any remark on the subject (Alpha Etudes, 2003; KPMG, 2003; MEDEF – Pricewaterhouse- Coopers, 2003; Novethic, 2003; Terra Nova, 2002 and 2003; Utopies, 2003).
Focalization on measurement, the use made of the resulting numbers, discourses on neutrality and on objectivity of these measures, are indeed part of legitimation and reinsurance strategies (Quairel, 2004). However, they fulfil another and more pernicious function: they prevent confrontation with the thorny question of subjectivity and relevance;
fundamentally, they occult the necessary political dimension of any decision or action. Accounting measures, far from serving CSR, become a means for irresponsibility.
Subjectivity as a founding principle for any evaluation: the
156 CSR and Stakeholders: Measuring or Discussing?
reflection onto the object of the subject always expresses itself through aproject’ (1995, p. 15, our translation and our emphasis). One of the specific contributions made by Nifle (1996a) lies in the visualization he gives to this perspective: he incorporates into a geometric diagram each of the dimensions (subject, object and project) which are inherent to human experience (Figure 9.1).
The subjective dimension is represented by a vertical vector. Any human reality is the reality experienced by a subject and therefore inten- tional. The intention can take different expressions – desire, motivation, inclination, will, aspiration – and through this dimension individuals are considered as beings of sense.
The objective dimension is associated with the horizontal, leftwards- oriented vector. The object is what can be distinguished from a context and from ourselves. This dimension consequently expresses our experience of otherness. Both dimensions cannot be dissociated: neither is it possible to have an objectifying process without an objectifying subject, an observation without an observer, nor can a subject exist without an object: subjectivity can express itself only through the relation to an object, whatever it is. Berkeley (quoted by Morgan, 1988, p. 482) already drew our attention in the eighteenth century to this point: ‘objectivity is as part of the observer as of the observed object’.
The projective (or rational) dimension of reality appears as the vecto- rial product of the subject and object vectors: things are ordered in time and in space according to the subject’s logic. Reason therefore is neither causal, nor does come first; it is subsequent and comes second. The concept of bounded rationality, developed by Simon (1959), is nowa- days widely accepted, but it is usually presented in relation with our
Subjective dimension
Objective dimension Projective (or rational) dimension Figure 9.1 The three dimensions of reality
Dominique Bessire 157 limited capacities. Here, we have a different perspective: reason depends on intentionality in a way which is in some way similar to the approach developed by Crozier and Friedberg (1981): conflicting rationalities express dissent about the sense which has to be given to a definite situation.
Implications for evaluating
From this conceptualization, we can infer principles, criteria and instruments, which have to be used in any evaluation.
Principles. Evaluation is a judgement, which refers to a scale of values.
This hierarchy of values is always, implicitly or explicitly, underpinned by the reference to a greater good and consequently by a specific concep- tion of what is good for an individual or a community (grandeur according to Boltanski and Thévenot, 1987). Any evaluation implies a reference to the sense and the criteria of ‘good’.
Criteria. To each of the dimensions, we have to associate a specific criterion: relevance to the subjective dimension, coherence to the rational one and performance (in the narrow sense6) to the objective dimension (Figure 9.2).
Relevance brings into play the responsibility of the actors: it forbids an evaluation, which could be presented as purely ‘rational’ or ‘objective’.
Relevance, whatever it applies to, is understood with reference to an intention, to political choices, viewed as fundamental choices underpinned by a scale of values.
Subjective dimension Relevance
Objective dimension Performance∗
Rational dimension Coherence
∗in the narrow sense Figure 9.2 Evaluation criteria
158 CSR and Stakeholders: Measuring or Discussing?
In order to make a judgement on coherence, it is necessary to check that all dimensions of reality are taken into account and kept under control, that they are correctly articulated together, that they well-match with their context and, finally, that they are in accordance with the original intention.
Performance (in the narrow sense) allows us to take into account (in the different senses of the term) the objective dimension of reality. It expresses the progress towards an objective (Capron and Quairel, 1998, p. 578) or the degree of achievement of a plan of action (Mascré, 1994, p. 60).
The three criteria cannot be dissociated and must be taken into account according to a fixed hierarchy. Relevance comes first. Coher- ence depends on relevance since indeed it only makes sense with reference to an intention. Performance, finally, is subordinated to the two other criteria: it cannot be conceived as an absolute or as an isolated criterion; it must always be considered with regard to a definite, explicit or implicit, intention. A number of scholars agree on this perspective, see for instance Lebas (1995, p. 68) who notes that
‘performance is defined by the users of the information bearing in mind the organizational context which, in its turn, is characterised by a specific span of time and space’ (our free translation) or Le Maitre (1998, p. 820), who states that ‘there is no such a thing as a neutral evaluation: it always favours the point of view of some actors’ (our translation). However, though performance is the last criterion to be taken into consideration, it is as important as the two others: objecti- fying, however difficult it may be, is necessary; without it there is a great risk of being caught in the trap of subjectivism which is as limiting in its way as objectivism.
Instrumentation. Professionalism in evaluation requires an appropriate instrumentation for each dimension of reality and for each criterion.
For the objective dimension, we have a large set of tools thanks to a science of measurement which is continuously being improved and enriched. In order to fully take into account the rational dimension, we have a great variety of more and more sophisticated models. But for the subjective dimension, which necessitates a qualitative approach more than a quantitative one, there is a great paucity of tools (Figure 9.3).
Indeed, since the subjective dimension is the most difficult to appre- ciate because of cultural as well as technical reasons, it is the first to be put aside in the process of evaluation: this constitutes a denial of any reference to an intention and to a system of values, and the negation of the evaluation principle itself (Nifle, 1996b, p. 2).
Dominique Bessire 159
A first step for a better consideration of the subjective dimension is to ask, before any evaluation, two questions: for whom and for what?
Patton (quoted by Mermet, 1997) thinks that the answer to these two questions is crucial for any evaluation.
Summary
This epistemological detour allows us to put measurement into its proper context in the process of evaluation; it is only one step in this complex process and not the most important. The rational and objective dimensions are usually kept under control. However, this is not the case with the subjective dimension: our modern societies give an intrinsic value to ‘objectivity’ and to ‘rationality’, but they tend to discard any subjective judgement, which is seen as irrational and arbitrary.
Objectifying, and therefore measuring (which refers to the objective dimension), as well as rationalization and consequently modelling (which come under the heading of the rational dimension) are neces- sary and legitimate. It is true that sometimes measuring and modelling can be difficult, but usually the problems are overestimated; in most cases, approximate measures and simple models can be sufficient insofar as they are appropriate; that is, to the extent that they are used with consideration of the intention which underpins the evaluation process. To know very precisely how many steps have been carried out is less important than to be sure that this has been done in the intended direction. Therefore, it is not from growing sophistication of measuring and modelling tools that we can expect material progress in
Relevance
Performance∗
Measurement
Coherence Modelling
∗in the narrow sense
?
Figure 9.3 Evaluation tools
160 CSR and Stakeholders: Measuring or Discussing?
evaluation, but from advances, however modest, in the mastery of the subjective dimension: this is indeed a wide field to explore.7 At a more fundamental level, the question of the value system has to be raised: that it is no longer sufficient just to ensure that steps are made in the intended direction; it is necessary to question the relevance itself of this direction.
In a world dominated by ‘the evil of common knowledge’ (Morel, 1992, our translation), an epistemological detour may arouse scepticism, but a number of researches in the field of accounting tend to validate our approach of evaluation and of measurement.
Accounting and subjectivity
For Colasse (2002, p. 93), who is an academic member of the Conseil National de la Comptabilité, an official institution which plays an important role in the elaboration of French accounting norms, ‘an accounting set of references is fundamentally a representation, a model of the firm’. He adds:
accounting standards, as well as the process of accounting and the statements it produces, are never neutral. Beyond their technical function, they convey ways of thinking, communicating, behaving, managing human and tangible resources, and also, in a broader sense, values, ideology. (Our free translation)
Apart from ideology, subjectivity expresses itself through two concepts which are well-known to accountants: creative accounting (see for instance Stolowy, 2000, or www.campus.hec.fr/profs/stolowy/
perso.articles/Encyclo.pdf) and ‘comptabilité d’intention’ (purposive accounting, Christophe, 2000).
Moreover, from a simple observation of practices, it is easy to discover the impact of subjectivity. Raffournier (2003) affirms that
we should not hope . . . that a reinforcement of regulation will be able to suppress the subjectivity of accounting numbers. Accounting for an asset indeed means giving to it a value. But this value depends on cash flows that this asset is assumed to generate in the future. These flows being intrinsically uncertain, any evaluation implicitly implies making assumptions on what the future will be . . . To the extent that nobody can affirm that he knows the future with certainty, any evaluation is, by nature, subjective. As detailed as the standards may be, they will always have to allow space, at some point for an individual evaluation. Firms indeed are perfectly aware of this phenomenon: it not necessary to
Dominique Bessire 161 transgress rules or to use questionable accounting methods to influence results; playing on subjectivity is enough. (Our free translation) Subjectivity and responsibility
Without recognition of subjectivity, there is no room for responsibility.
The philosopher Henriot (2003) explains that ‘in the syntax of ethics, responsibility and exercise of the subjective function are only one thing.
To the development of an impersonal process, it not possible to apply a responsibility judgement’. It is of course possible to conceive ‘a world without subjects, [a] system where individuals would be only blind executants, [but] in this world of insects, nor responsibility, nor conscience cannot be allowed any space’ (our translation).
In the domain of critical finance, more and more scholars come to the same conclusions. According to Rainelli-Le Montagner (2002, p. 447), mainstream financial theory (which underpins international accounting standardization) excludes from its field the question of ethical norms:
in the classical paradigm . . . behaviours must not be appreciated with consideration of any moral; they are only evaluated in respect of their conformity to the prescriptions which are implied by the modelizations which result from the assumption of agents’
rationality . . . Those who decide not to behave accordingly to its rules are sanctioned, not in the name of whatever ethical demand, but only because markets remunerate only those who respect its law.