VNU. JOURNAL O F SCIENCE, ECONOMICS-LAW, N01E, 2004
U SIN G THE IN T E R E ST RATE TOOL TO CONTROL INFLATIO N IN VIETNAM
V u T h i D a u (*
Inflation is considered as a phenomenon associating w ith th e m a r k e t economy, so in modern economic circumstances, controlling inflation is one of th e esse n tial ta rg e ts of each nation. However, how to control inflation is not easy as inflation re s u lts from different causes and occurs in different economic a n d social circ u m stan c es in different nations, which m a k es use of the different in te re s t r a te tools in controlling inflation to gain various goals. This article discusses th e use of th e in te r e s t ra te tool in controlling inflation in V ie tn am - based on th e successful lessons an d th e lim itations of th is tool.
1. The B a sis o f C o n tro llin g In fla tio n by In te r e s t Rate
W ith re g a rd to th e re latio nsh ip betw een in te re s t r a te a n d inflation, th e re h av e been m a n y re s e a rc h w orks an d a s h a r e d adm ission is t h a t th e y a re closely related . The economist, F ish e r described a n equation:
i = ir + n * (1) -> ir = i - n e (
2)
i = in te re s t ir: re a l in te re s t
n e : e stim a te d inflation ra te
n Faculty o f Economics, Vietnam N ational University, Hanoi.
F o rm u la (2) shows t h a t w hen the e stim a te d inflation r a te increases, it wil m ake th e re a l in te re s t ra te decrease reflecting th e decrease in th e real costs 01 in te re s ts of th e people pa rtic ip a tin g the credit m a rk e t, which is beneficial for borrowing money, b u t d a m ag es lending Therefore, th e d e m a n d s for borrowing money increases, b u t th e supply O- borrow m g money decreases, the interest r a te grows. T he increase in the estim ated inflation r a te will re s u lt in the in crease in in te re s t rate, which is th e effect cited bv the economist, F is h e r a n d is called Fisher
• effect. This effect im plies t h a t if you fight a g a in s t inflation by lowering in te re st ra tf, it is c e rta in t h a t you will fail: th e inflation will increase.
Econom ists stu d ie d a n d illu s tra te d the re la tio n sh ip betw een inflation r a te and in te re s t r a te in th e nine developed countries including Italy, France, C anada, Holland, J a p a n , G e rm a n y , Sw itzerland, B russels in th e period of 1982 an d 1 9 8 3 (This is an in te rn a tio n a l re sea rc h on the re la tio n sh ip betw een in te re s t r a te and inflation. T he re s e a rc h shows t h a t co untries which experience the hi£ib inflation r a te a re th e ones which have hib'h in te r e s t ra te s. T h re e n a tio n s which have th e h ig h e st inflation r a te s a re Italy 1
5 3
Fnce and C a n a d a a n d th e y a re a l s o
tfee nation s w hich h a v e th e h ig h e st lirtst rates; four n a tio n s w hich have low in to n r a te a re J a p a n , G erm an y, H a id a n d S w itz e rla n d , a n d th e y a re a) he n a tio n s which h a v e low in te r e s t n s
ỈI brief, th e y a d m itte d in th e o ry a n d in p:tce t h a t th e re la tio n s h ip b etw een ir n s t r a te a n d inflation is u nd eniable. It isu basis for u sin g th e in te r e s t ra te tool icoitrolling inflation in m any different nois in modern economic circumstances.
Tie F ederal R eserv e S y stem of th e Lt(d S ta te s of A m erica (FED), to g e th e r W1 )ther tools, actively u sed th e in te re s t n t)ol in controlling inflation d u rin g th e daces w h e n th e economy faced th e ĨDhable s itu a tio n of inflation ra te . In th e y rs o f 1979 a n d 1982, th e inflation r a te (Anerica w as a lw a y s a t th e two digit le k By ra is in g th e d iscoun t ra te to a hi evel in A m e ric a ’s h isto ry (10.5 % in 10 and 11.5 % in 1981), a n d therefore, t iite re s t r a te a m o u n te d to 13.36 % in 19 and 16.38 % in 1981, did FED reduce t ilflation r a t e from 13.7 % in 1979 to 8 ° / in 1980 a n d 6.1 % in 1981, 1982. In tn:e, a t th e end of 1978, th e economy f< irto th e s itu a tio n of two digit inflation uil 1981, 1982. In 1981, th e C e n tra l h b of F ran c e h a d to ra is e th e discount rs o 17.5% a n d th e m a r k e t in te r e s t r a t e t'lf.28% - th e h ig h e s t i n te r e s t r a te in Fn:e’s history, in o rd e r to repel th e iiaton. W ithin only six m on th s, th e dxnnt r a te w as ra is e d twice as m uch as t t n 1980. The solution to th e problem
of ra is in g i n te r e s t r a t e in re a lity is considered as th e solu tion of m a n y na tio n s, including developing n ations. Since 1983, controlling th e i n t e r e s t r a te h a s been p o p u la r in L a tin A m e ric a n c o u n trie s a n d it h a s also become th e p r im a r y factor in th e stab iliza tio n p ro g r a m m e s of K orea a n d T a iw a n in th e m id dle of th e 1960s, a n d Ind onesia in 1986 a n d 1974. Som e o th e r n a tio n s such as J a p a n , C h in a fell into inflation in th e 1990s of th e tw e n tie th century . The in flation r a t e of th e se c o u n tries w as a t th e m in u s level (J a p a n : - 2 % / year, C h in a: - 2.6 % / year). The g o v e rn m e n ts of th e s e c o u n trie s h a d to use m an y different m e a s u r e s a n d tools to overcome deflation, in clu d in g low ering in te r e s t r a te ( J a p a n im p le m e n te d th e zero in te r e s t ra te , C h in a from 1996 to Ju ly , 1997 seven tim e s low ered th e in te r e s t rate).
However, u s in g th e i n te r e s t r a t e tool in controlling inflatio n c a n n o t s ta y for a long time. If th e in c re a s e in th e i n te r e s t r a te la sts to fight a g a i n s t th e inflation, it will decrease in v e s tm e n t, to ta l d e m a n d an d o u tp u t a n d u n e m p lo y m e n t will rise. The fact in th e c o u n trie s fig hting a g a in s t inflation by u s in g th e s e tools h a s proved this. W hen A m erica controlled th e inflation a t th e one digit level in 1980, 1981, th e price th e y h a d to pay w as th e reg ressio n of to ta l d e m a n d a n d o u tp u t, so from th e end of 1982, Fed lowered th e in te r e s t r a t e from 11.5 % in 1981 to 9.25 % in 1982. The s a m e s itu a tio n h a p p e n e d in France, fig hting a g a in s t th e two digit inflation by r a is in g i n te r e s t rate, th e to ta l
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U sin g the interest rate tool to. )
d e m a n d decreased a t - 5% in November, 1981. T his implies t h a t using th e in te re s t ra te tool in controlling inflation can affect the im p le m e n ta tio n of o th e r economic ta rg e ts a n d t h a t u s in g th e in te re s t ra te tool should be carefully considered.
Moreover, it is im possible to use th e in te re s t r a te tool to overcome inflation in a n y cases because inflation re s u lts from different causes. T h e in te r e s t r a te tool is b e st used w h e n th e g ro w th of money is too high; a t t h a t tim e r a is in g th e in te re s t ra te will r e s tr a in inflation.
2. C o n tr o llin g I n fla tio n by th e In te r e s t Rate Tool in V ie tn a m
By 1981, in flation in V ie tn am h ad not been a d m itte d , b u t th e re tail prices of com m odities a n d services in th e m a rk e t increased by 20 % p e r year. From 1981, inflation w as a t th e level of 69.6 % per year, b u t it w as not a d m itte d in th e official docum ents. The g o v e rn m e n t d e alt w ith it in the a sp ects of “price, salary , m oney”, m ainly by a d m in is tr a tiv e m e asu re s. In 1986, inflation re a c h e d th e level of 747 % per y e ar a n d a fte r t h a t it re m a in e d a t the th re e digit level for th r e e years, which placed V ie tn a m ’s economy in th e
“galloping in flation” of high level. The two digit in flation w e n t on u n til 1995 (in 1995:
5.3 % / year). T h u s, e n te r in g th e economic ren o v atio n , V ie tn a m confronted the inflation which w a s very high a n d lasted m a n y years. Such a seriou s inflation level forced th e S ta te to issue th e money c o n tin u a lly in o rd e r to m eet th e sp end in g re q u ire m e n ts of th e economy, and this
ag ain m ade inflation continue to gr«wf th e sala ry in circulation in 1976 \3 considered as th e survey marker, t increased by 2.2 tim e s in 1980; 29.9 iis in 1985; 131.1 tim e s in 1986; 548 tir.ea 1987. The a m o u n t of money is s u d i circulation w as so high t h a t it mac? 0 prices of commodities increase constin.
In such high inflation, it was th e firs te th e S ta te of V ie tn am ra ised the ques\0)f fighting a g a in s t inflation. T h e n a*
inflation p ro g ra m m e s w ere d ra w n ipi many offices un der different level d bran ch es. Thus, a t t h a t tim e th e r e Via renov atio n in th e view a n d w y if acknow ledging inflation. From th e n ci,e m e a s u re s of fighting a g a in s t inflation we defined, associating w ith th e stQS>f im p le m e n tin g th e economic r e n o a n such as c a rry in g out th e m a rk e t pe m echan ism , w iden in g th e self-on>l r i g h t s of e n t e r p r i s e s , r e f o r m in g ecQGC policies etc. Especially, th e refom)f financial a n d m o n e ta ry policies alo’d usin g th e tools of m o n e ta ry plies, including th e in te r e s t r a te tol n controlling th e inflation.
By 1989, in te r e s t r a te h a d onl bn considered as a tool to im plem e.t le reallocation of n a tio n a l income, decraan product prices, a n d r e t u r n of hk expenses. B ecause of such a po in t c vv in te r e s t r a te w as not considered a s I id of price a n d t h u s it w as not u sed a a n economic tool. The in te re s t r a t e Dies d u rin g th is tim e period m a in ly 18 a political aim a n d content, describngic discriminatory tre a tm e n t betw een eonii(
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‘cors and u n its a n d show ing th e s ta t e ’s ikidization to th e s ta t e enterp rises, socially, it is th e re a l i n te r e s t r a te t h a t a ‘ m inus, th u s th e in te r e s t ra te 'Scribed by th e s ta t e w as alw ays lower a i zero for a long time. W ith such te e s t r a te policies, in te r e s t r a te Ofcened inflation.
?irst, in te r e s t r a te did not encourage e saving in th e economy. In 1993, if a ie*t k ept 1000 VND in th e bank, th e
^ le of t h a t sum of m oney would be [Uvalent to ab o u t 700 VND; sim ilarly, in it would be e q u iv a le n t to only
’O/ND. W ith low income, th e households 'i ^ t n a m only h a d a very little a m o u n t Sivings, th e y couldn’t allow t h a t sum of 01ey to devalu e w hen k eeping it in th e
so they often u sed t h a t a m o u n t of 01ey to buy commodities, gold and h a rd
rfcncies. As a re s u lt, th e prices of iwiodities of different k in d s w ere oving a n d inflation w as w orsened.
tecond, th e m in u s in te r e s t r a te n<fited th e c ap ital borrowing u p r i s e s . In th e condition t h a t mnod ities w ere scarce a n d commodity
1C-S increased strongly, enterp rises, ptcially s ta t e e n te r p ris e s ru s h e d to r o w capital from th e b a n k s to m a in ta in ei‘ p roduction a n d b u s in e s s o perations d t h e n stored commodities, w aitin g for e lig h e r prices in o rd e r to get benefits. It
*(e th e c ap ital s c a rc er a n d th e prices of m n o d itie s con tinu ed increasing.
nh ir d , b a n k s m ainly loaned th e s ta te n econom y a n d th e collective economy
th e capital issu ed w ith the subsidized in te r e s t ra te , m e a n w h ile th e se clients used c ap ital ineffectively, re q u irin g th e co m p en sa tio n s for losses from th e s ta te b u d g e t a n d c o n trib u tin g to th e ov e rsp en d in g of th e s t a t e ’s budget. In tu rn , th e b u d g e t o v e rs p e n d in g re q u ire d to be solved by issu in g money. Therefore, th e volum e of cu rre n cy in circulation increased rapidly.
The ren ov ation in th e condition t h a t th e economy fell in to serious economic crisis, inflation w a s v e ry high a n d th e financial m a r k e t w a s underdeveloped, m ade objective re q u ire m e n ts for re n o v a tin g th e b a n k in g system, tra n s fe rrin g th e one level b a n k in g system (built in 1951) to th e tw o level b an k in g system . W hen Decree N o.53 (March, 1988) w as pro m u lg ate d , to g e th e r with th e renovation model of t h e ban k in g system, th e C en tral B a n k d e te rm in e d a n d im p le m e n te d m o n e ta ry policies, including laying down as a policy th e su rp lu s real interest rate and considering the interest r a te as a n im p o r ta n t tool of the m onetary policy. At t h a t tim e i n t e r e s t r a te consisted of two kinds: S u b sidized in te re s t ra te a n d agreed in te r e s t ra te . The subsidized in te re s t r a t e fa c ilita te d e n terp rises to ch ange d ra m a tic a lly in to operation in th e m a rk e t m ech anism . T h e agreed in te re st ra te consisted of th e a g re e d in te re st ra te of th e specialized b a n k s a n d the agreed in te re st ra te of the n o n -state organizations.
This a w a re n e s s re n o v a tio n of in te re st r a te w as significant to c o ntro l the economy in th e m a rk e t m e ch a n ism , im plem ented in
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Using the interest rate tool to.
V ietnam . T h e i n te r e s t r a te w as initially re g a rd ed a s price of cu rre n cy and w as g rad u ally d e te r m in e d by th e m a rk e t, th u s , it m a n ifested a sig n al in V ie tn a m ’s c re d it
market.
In re a lity from J u ly in 1987 to F e b ru a ry in 1989, th e in te r e s t ra te w as ad ju sted twice in th e direction of lessening sub sidization d ra m a tic a lly th ro u g h credit and inflation factor. The G overn or director of the S ta te B a n k s tip u la te d th e agreed in te re s t r a t e b a se d on two principles:
agreed loan i n te r e s t ra te w as eq ual to th e high est deposit i n te r e s t r a t e (at t h a t tim e it was 8%) plus a d d itio n a l b a n k charge (at th a t tim e w as 0.3 - 0.4 %), th u s th e in te re s t r a te s in c re a s e d re m a rk a b ly . This in te re s t r a te policy played a n active role, avoiding th e s titu a tio n of ta k in g ad v a n ta g e of b a n k ’s capital to store commodities a n d w a itin g for profits w hen th e price of th e m increases, a n d freeding billions of com m odity m oney considered s ta g n a n t. T his policy also m ade e n te rp ris e s to c o n sid er plu ses a n d m inuses, revoke c ap ital a n d increase the circle of capital. T herefore, th e price index dropped to 7.2 % p e r m on th in th e la st six m on th s of 1988 a n d 5 % p er m o n th in th e first six m o n th s of 1998.
Moreover, com m ercial b a n k s dealt w ith in te re s t ra te u n m e th o d ic a lly a n d ra ised th e i n te r e s t r a t e to th e level t h a t w as h ig h e r th a n th e g uided one. In pa rtic u la r, the guided in te r e s t ra te of th e s ta te b a n k on J u n e 6th, 1988 w as 8.3 %, b u t some b a n k s im p le m e n te d w ith th e level of 8.4 %, commonly w ith 9 - 10 % a n d even 11- 12%.
The com petition of th e u n its which da w ith money p u s h e d th e in te re s t rate 0 h ig h e r level. The in te r e s t r a te apple* 1 re a lity w as too high, exceeded the caoait of the m arket and caused the Ciptc borrow ing c lie n ts’ stro n g reaction. At h end of 1988, b a n k s h a d to reject the zg?e lending. From M arch in 1989 -h g o v e rn m e n t decided to ch ange the inteet r a te policy fu n d a m e n ta lly a n d accorii g’
th e re w as a difference betweer th effective in te r e s t r a te and th e estinite in te re s t rate. It is e s tim a te d t h a t intee:
r a te consisted of th e basic interest at plus th e inflation ra te . D etective N0.&5T d a ted M arch 13, 1989 of th e Counc M in isters assign ed th e Governor of tl S ta te B an k of V ie tn a m the right d e te rm in e th e loan in te r e s t rate ư a d ju st it to th e fluctu atio n of mak prices. T h is w as a new progress in tl a w a re n e s s of in te r e s t r a te in Victrii which allowed to use th e in te re s t ra'^et-o more effectively. T h us, in te r e s t rate Ml re g a rd e d a s a criterio n t h a t needed t> 1 reckoned, im p le m e n te d a n d laid ov more actively. Decision No.39 / d a ted on April 10, 1989 set up the b a n k ’s f u n d a m e n ta l p rinciples of Oi
in te r e s t r a t e a n d deposit in te re s t rat*
follows:
1) The in te r e s t r a te m u s t be enouih pre serv e th e c ap ital a n d profit.
2) A u n ite d in te r e s t is applie*
economic sectors a n d a d ju sted to t fluctuation of m a r k e t prices.
3) All th e sources of c ap ital mobiiz by b a n k s for loan get in te r e s t a n d <ve
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ln° ư t of money loaned by b a n k s is paid
n e > e i:t.
*9 T he difference b e tw ee n th e loan n e )e^t r a t e and th e in te r e s t r a te of sa'iiigg on average is 0.5 % p e r month.
*) The s tru c tu re of th e in te re s t r a te of
’S/Digg an(j th e loan in te r e s t ra te consists basic in te re s t r a t e a n d th e index of ủ n ịajre in m a r k e t prices.
•phe principles above were
npieifiented, from th e s itu a tio n t h a t th e nniis i n te r e s t r a te s la s te d for m a n y years, k in te re s t r a te s b ecam e th e s u rp lu s ifectiye ones in 1989. M oreover, th e ne>e$t r a te s w ere a d ju ste d to th e nlation ra te (from M arch, 1989 to
<(D1U'iry, 1990 th e r e w ere five tim es to ia u 3t th e in te re s t rates). T he policy of
;u’Plus effective in te re s t ra te s, applied in a t t h a t tim e, w a s significant in
>oh theory a n d practice, w hich ex pressed hi Hew a w a re n e s s of th e in te r e s t rate: th e nehegt r a t e is not only a sim ple economic ra ’i«‘ible b u t also a tool to fight a g a in s t th e n lation effectively.
^ihce th e n , th e inflation in V ietn am ia5 been identified as re s u ltin g from m any liferen t causes, of w hich th e most
;1£ntfic a n t factor is m o n e ta ry . R aising th e newest r a t e of saving s over th e inflation a e w as considered as a fu n d a m e n ta l ntasvire of th e a n ti-in fla tio n m e a s u re s in h s Period. The s u rp lu s a n d high deposit n e i 'est r a t e e n su re d th e m oney p roperty
* th e public, w hich m ade th e new ir?Unistance emerge: In s te a d of storing oruttodities, th e people k e p t th e ir money
in th e b a n k s for safe a n d ste a d y profits.
The U n ite d N ations, th e In te r n a tio n a l M on etary F u n d a n d World B an k ap p re cia te d V ie tn a m ’s fight a g a in s t inflation. The d e v elo pm ent p ro g ra m m e report of th e U n ite d N a tio n s in December, 1989 stated : The m e a s u re s to stabilize finance a n d money ta k e n by th e go vern m ent of V ietn am in fighting a g a in s t inflation w ere re m a rk a b ly successful in 1989. In fact, to control inflation w a s the re s u lt of im p le m e n tin g m a n y different m e asu re s a n d tools in controlling inflation, of w hich the effective c o n trib u tio n of th e in te re s t r a te tool w as prim ary .
In 1989, m a r k e t prices grew on a verage by 2.5 % / m o n th (15% / m o n th in 1988), th e inflation w as re d u ced from the th re e digit level in 1986, 1987 a n d 1988 to the level of 34.7 % in 1989 a n d th e two digit level of inflation re m a in e d u n til 1995 in th e direction of b e tte rin g the high ra te of inflation (14.4 % in 1994, 12.7 % in
1995).
However, th e policy of s u rp lu s effective in te re s t r a t e w as ab solutely im p lem en ted only in 1992 because in 1990, 1991, the h a p p e n in g of inflation w as too complicated, w hich m ade th e a d ju s tm e n t of in te r e s t r a te impossible to catch up w ith the situatio n. It show ed t h a t th e flexible application of th e in te r e s t r a t e policy w as not easy, which m ade th e in te re s t ra te u n s u ita b le to th e fluctu atio n of inflation.
In general, V ie tn a m ’s inflation control before 1986 (m ainly th e fight a g ain st high inflation) c re ate d good conditions for th e
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Using the interest rate tool to.
economy to g a m im p o r ta n t achievem ents:
G DP w as twice as much as t h a t before th e renovation, th e economy overcam e the crisis, com m odities becam e plentiful and diversified, m a te ria l a n d s p iritu a l life of the people w as g ra d u a lly im proved.
From 1996, th e price index alw ays re m a in e d a t one digit level, b u t the situ a tio n becam e complicated: th e price index of 1996, 1997 w as 4.5 % a n d 3.6 %, 1998, 9.2 %; 2000, - 0.6 %; 1999 a n d 2001, 0.1 % a n d 0.8 %. T h a t s itu a tio n placed V ietn am in a long la stin g a n d strong deflation. If in 1996 th e deflation lasted four m o n th s (from May to A ugust) w ith the total deflation r a te of 1.6 %, in 1999, the deflation continually la ste d e ig h t m onths (from M arch to October) w ith th e total deflation r a te of 4.4 %. In 2000, deflation w as more complicated; how ever, it lasted five m o n th s (from M arch to Ju ly ) w ith the total deflation r a t e of 3.4 % - n o t as much as t h a t in 1999, b u t it show ed more serio u sn e ss because th e price level in th e first m o n th s of 2000 w a s n ot a s high as t h a t in th e sam e period of 1999 (2 % as co m p ared w ith 3.6 %). T h a t s itu a tio n led to the g eneral price base of th e economy in 2000, w hich w as much lower t h a n t h a t in 1999 (- 1.6 % as c om pared w ith + 0.1 %). In 2001, d u e to th e g o v e rn m e n t’s m e a s u re of s tim u la tin g d e m a n d to aim a t overcoming deflation (im p lem entin g th e no-more- th a n - 5 % inflation objective proposed by the N a tio n a l Assembly), th e economy couldn’t overcome this situ atio n: th e deflation la sted th re e m o n th s successively (from M arch to J u n e ) a n d in 2001, th e co n su m e r
price index grew by 0.8 %. Although the co n su m e r price index in 2001 w as ii>hei th a n t h a t in 2000, th e economy w as stil ir deflation a n d th e economic grow th d d n i reach th e ta r g e t of 7.5 % p e r yea ae proposed by th e N a tio n al A ssem bly C-t )nb re a ch e d 6.8 % per year).
W hen a n alyzing th e c au se s <’f th*
deflation, opinions w ere varied. ],,u 11 brief, th e deflation re s u lte d from econ^nii m echanism a n d s tru c tu re , low a n d v.nivei inc om e of t h e public, ineffe'tiv in v e s tm e n t a n d flu c tu a tio n in th e vorl m arket. In 1997, th e s ta te p u t fpr^ar four groups o f solution t o s t i m u l a t e t h
d e m a n d in th e economy. In 1999, Ifi^rke prices te n d e d to fall down sharply, th e g o v e rn m e n t’s Resolution 08/ 19í*9 Q - C P con tinu ed b rin g in g o u t ^eve solutions to fighting a g a in s t deflation-
Of th e solutions above, th e s ta te use th e loosened m o n e ta ry policy a n d active re n o v a ted th e in te r e s t r a t e policy ÌI’ ^ direction of liberalization to improve tỉ situ atio n . T he in te r e s t r a t e policy v.nd<
th is direction loosened th e interference the C e n tra l B ank a n d th e liberalization in te re s t r a t e w as g ra d u a lly im p le in ant(
th ro u g h m any steps. From 1996. tl in te re s t r a te w as ou t of control u n d e r tl in te re s t ra te m a x im u m to g e th e r w ith t]
c o n s tr a in t of the averag e differen betw een th e loan in te r e s t r a te an<l t- deposit in te r e s t ra te . From A u g u s t - 20 to M ay - 2002, it w as m a n a g e d undc-r t basic in te r e s t ra te . Sinca J u n e - 200-> t in te re s t r a t e h a s been liberalized. l n t im p le m e n ta tio n of th is in te r e s t r a t e I)0^1(
VN U. J o u rn a l o f Science, E conom ic S - L u w , N„J E. 2004
to use th e in te re s t r a t e tool a im in g a t overcoming th e deflation, th e in te r e s t ra te was continuously a d ju ste d to s tim u la te th e investm ent a n d con su m p tio n dem an d. The deflation la sted for a long tim e, so the C entral B an k c on tinu ou sly re d uced th e in te re st rate: four tim e s in 1996, twice in
1997, a n d five tim e s in 1995. T h e re p e ate d in te re st r a te lowering in th e se years aim ing a t stopping th e deflation did n ’t gain the re s u lt as expected, th e deflation continued to get worse in th e y e a rs of 2000 a n d 2001 (the price index in 2000 w as — 0.6 % a n d in 2001 w as 0.8 %). I t showed th a t w hen in v e s tm e n t w as ineffective a n d consum ption w as no t sen sitiv e to in te re s t rate, lowering in te r e s t r a t e w a s n ’t effective enough to s tim u la te th e d e m an d . In 2002 a n d 2003, th e deflation r a te decreased, th e norm of no more t h a n 4% inflation as proposed by th e N a tio n a l A ssem bly w as fulfilled due to th e im p le m e n ta tio n of various com p rehen siv e solutions.
The situ a tio n becam e more unsolvable w h e n from th e b e g in n in g of 2004, inflation te n d e d to grow. According to th e figures of th e B u re au of S tatistics, p a rtic u la rly in F e b ru a ry , 2004, th e index of price increase in the m a rk e t w as 3 % (equal to th e level of price in c re ase of th e whole y e a r 2003).
G e n era lly calculating, in th e first two m on th s, it in c re ase d by 4.1 %, th is h a s b e e n the h ig h e s t level of price in c re ase of th e first two m o n th s over th e p a s t te n years. If we c alcu lated eig h t m o n th s of the y e a r 2004, th e level of price increase w as 8.3 %, exceeding th e p la n n e d norm of th e w hole y e ar of 2004. T he s itu a tio n of price
in crease orig inated from m a n y different causes such as th e influence of th e fluctuation of prices in th e w orld m a r k e t (petrol price and gold price in the world grew high continuously), th e in c re ase in th e im p o rt price of nitrogen, th e in c re ase in steel price, and th e bird flu epidem ic in our c o u ntry a n d in some o th e rs. The situ a tio n above h a p p e n e d while th e whole co untry m ade a n effort to im p le m e n t th e objective of high a n d solid economic grow th in th e period of 2001 a n d 2005, which posed a difficult question for th e economic policy m akers. The S ta te B a n k of V ie tn am advocated m a in ta in in g th e basic in te r e s t r a te a t 0.625 % p e r m onth, a im in g at re a ch in g th e norm of economic g ro w th of 2004, which is 7.5 % - 8%. However, the in te re s t r a te s in th e m a r k e t te n d e d to grow slightly, especially m edium a n d long te rm in te re s t rates.
It is possible to find t h a t the inflation which h a s occurred since th e be g in n in g of 2004 is m ainly du e to th e p u s h of e x p e n d itu re a n d th e increase in th e price of production factors, th u s th e m e a s u re s of curbing inflation have to aim a t controlling th e prices of in p u t commodities. W h a te v e r th e causes are, to overcome inflation, it is n e cessary to a d ju s t th e in te re s t r a t e to th e re la tio n sh ip b e tw ee n supply a n d d e m a n d for capital in th e m a rk e t.
3. L e s s o n s from E x p e r ie n c e
T h ro u g h th e rea lity of u sin g th e in te re s t r a te tool in controlling inflation in o th e r cou ntries a n d in V ietn am , some lessons a re d ra w n from experiences as follows:
V N U , Jo u rn a l o f Science, Econom ic S 'Law, N 0JE, 2004
Using the interest rate tool to. 6 1
F irst, inflation re s u lts from various causes, so it is im possible to u se in te re s t ra te in all c ases a s a tool to achieve the goal as expected.
Third, in te r e s t r a t e is one of th e tools of economic policy in general and of m o n e ta ry policy in p a rtic u la r; therefore, w h e n u sed to control inflation, it is nece ssa ry to combine different tools to g e th e r to get th e b e st result.
Second, in te r e s t r a te is a special kind of price, t h u s w h e n u sed a s th e tool in controlling inflation, it should be carefully and fully considered. The d e te rm in a tio n of in te re s t r a t e in each n a tio n is different, but th e com m on tendency in th e m a rk e t economy is to liberalize th e in te r e s t ra te w hen n ecessary.
F o u rth , w h e n inflation becomes complex, th e in te r e s t r a te should be carefully u sed in o rd e r to achieve th e defined economic ta rg e ts (do not allow th e in te r e s t r a te to be a n obstacle to th e im p le m e n ta tio n of o th e r objectives).
R E F E R E N C E S
1. Lê Vinh Danh, C hính sách tiền tệ và sự điều tiết vĩ mô của N gàn hàng trung ương ớ các nước tư bản p h á t triền.
2. Fredric s. Mishkin, Tiền tệ-Ngản hàng và th ị trường tài c h ín h, NXB Khoa học Kỷ th u ậ t, Hà Nội, 1994.
3. Ngân hàng Nhà nước Việt Nam, Ngân h àng Việt N am , quá trình xây dựng và p h á t triẽn, NXB Chính trị Quồc gia, Hà Nội, 1996.
4. Ngân hàng N hà nước Việt Nam, Báo cáo thường niên các năm từ 1996 - 2003.
5. Ngân hàng N hà nước Việt Nam, Báo cáo chính sách lãi suất ở Việt N a m (Bản sô 1), th á n g 11- 20 0 2.
6. Ngân hàng N hà nưốc Việt Nam, Tài liệu hội thảo “J3àn về cho vay theo lãi suất thoả thuận bằng đồng Việt N a m ”, Hà Nội, 2002.
7. Nguyễn M inh Phong, L ý thuyết lạm phát, g iả m p h á t và thực tiễn ở Việt N a m, NXB Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội, 2000.
8. Thời báo kinh tế Việt Nam, K inh tế V iệ t N am và Thê giới'. 2000 - 2001, 2001 - 2002, 2002 - 2003, 2003 -2004.
9. Viện tiền tệ tín dụng, N gân hàng Nhà nước Việt Nam, Thông tin chuyên để lãi su ả t ngàn hàng tập 1, tập 2, 1991.
V NU, Journal o f Science. Ecotiom ics-Luw , N„IE, 2004
TAP CHÍ KHOA HỌC ĐHQGHN, KINH TẾ - LUẢT, s ố 1E, 2004
SỬ DỤNG CỒNG CỤ LÃI SUAT TRONG KIEM
s o á t l ạ m p h á tở VIỆT NAM
V ũ Thị D ậu
K hoa K in h tê\ Đ ại học Quốc g ia H à N ội
Kiểm soát lạm p h á t là m ột tro n g n h ữ n g m ục tiêu q u a n trọ n g n h ấ t c ủa mỗi nước. Để đ ạ t được mục tiêu này, mỗi nưốc p h ả i sử d ụ n g n h iề u biện p h á p và công cụ k h á c n h a u . Một tron g n h ữ n g công cụ kiểm soát lạm p h á t phổ biến n h ấ t là công cụ lãi su ất. T ron g th ự c tế, sử d ụ n g công cụ n à y đã m a n g lại bài học th à n h công cho n h iề u nước.
Việt N am là một quốc gia đã th à n h công tro n g việc đẩy lùi lạm p h á t ba con sô' b ằ n g các sử dụ ng công cụ lãi s u ấ t vào cuối th ậ p kỷ 80 của t h ế kỉ 20. B ằng cách thực h iệ n d ẩ n dần công cụ này, từ 1986 đến này, lạm p h á t được kiểm soát ở mức một con sô".
Tuy nhiên, sử d ụ n g công cụ lãi s u ấ t có hiệu quả vì mục tiêu kiểm so át lạm p h á t, hiện nay còn nhiều vấn đề cần p h ả i giải quyết: từ b ả n t h â n việc thực h iệ n công cụ lãi s u ấ t tới việc thực hiện nó và k ế t hợp với các công cụ và biện p h á p khác.
V N i f , Journal o f Science, E conom ics-Luw\ NnI E, 2004
