The AU’s objectives of preventing conflict from occurring and protecting civilians when it occurs, attainable as they might be, have been fraught with the security challenges that have confronted leadership in Africa since independence. After fair attempts in Togo, Sao Tome and Principe, it became difficult for the AU to gain full control of other conflicts in affected African states, from the Rwandan genocide, to Sudan-Darfur, to DRC, to Cote d’Ivoire, and especially the 2011 Libyan crisis. Thus, international organisations such as the UN and NATO have taken centre stage in these conflicts. This is despite the AU’s introduction of the Constitutive Act which discusses the organisation’s intervention plan and provides the AU with the legal backing to intervene in a conflict-ridden member state in order to curtail threats such as “war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity” (Kalu, 2009: 17).
The AU aims to: achieve greater unity and solidarity between African countries and peoples;
to promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples; to promote peace, security and stability on the continent; and to promote democratic principles and institution, popular participation and good governance. These are the foundation pillars of the peace initiative that was established with a view to enhancing the
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cohesion, solidarity and integration of the peoples of Africa. Sadly, this creed was entirely absent in Libya and Gaddafi died as a result of the failure to invoke and implement it.
When 43 African heads of state met in Durban in July 2002, the transition from the OAU to AU was motivated by the need to make changes to the fundamental hubris in the pan-African peace and security schema (Yobo, 2009: 81). This has a deep-seated respect both for the parameters of sovereignty and for the need for intervention in order to protect human lives.
Elements of the R2P were used to strengthen the AU’s emerging peace and security regime.
This is evident in the Constitutive Act of 2002, even before the R2P was globally accepted as an international norm for intervention in the 2005 World Summit Document. According to Kalu (2009:18), for example, “Article (4)h of the Constitutive Acts provides right to intervene, impose sanctions, and override sovereignty of the affected member state and follow up in terms of conflict prevention, issues of genocide, crime against humanity, human rights among others”. Yobo (2009) adds that the necessary intervention should be conducted within the guiding rules and regulations of mediation and especially in accordance with the
“African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and other relevant human rights instruments” and (Yobo, 2009: 81). This is in order to guarantee human rights during intervention in any conflict.
With regards to the lessons drawn from AU’s response to conflict situations as in Darfur 2003, it has entrusted its peace-keeping capabilities to the Peace and Security Council (PSC).
According to Yobo (2009), the PSC is composed of an African Standby Force, a body of multidisciplinary military and civilian contingents for rapid response and deployment. In keeping with the principle of the Charter, part of the duties of the PSC is to ensure the signing of peace/ceasefire agreements and provide care to those who are in the midst of humanitarian crises as a result of conflict. She adds that, “the prevention-reaction-rebuilding field of protection” as articulated by the Responsibility to Protect Act, the emerging frameworks and the founding documents therefore underscore the importance of conflict prevention and sustainable post-conflict reconstruction through development and transformation as a means of achieving conflict-free states on the continent (Yobo, 2009:45).
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4.5.1. African Union’s capacity to respond to the Libyan crisis
Michael Doyle’s (2006) assertion that “peace, law and order cannot be enforced on any resistant population” is pertinent in examining conflict-affected areas in Africa and beyond.
Human-induced conflicts such as the 2011 Libyan conflict which some expert observers such as International Crisis Group (2011)blamed on the Western-led UN Security Council and NATO, are, on the one hand, a reflection of the AU’s inability to assert itself and, on the other hand, a demonstration of the lack of unity on the continent. The AU through the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative and the PSC, developed its capacity by means of a “comprehensive continental plan and diplomatic strategy to marshal resources from both within and outside the continent” to provide African solution to African problems (Yobo, 2009: 94). This includes taking appropriate, collective decisions as a unit to intervene and take the lead in resolving African conflicts.
A few weeks after the uprising in Libya, the AU condemned the conflict in the strongest of terms and unanimously maintained that it would be resolved through the AU’s conflict response mechanisms. The AU “reaffirm[ed] its strong commitment to the respect of the unity and territorial integrity of Libya, as well as its rejection of any foreign military intervention, whatever its form” (AUPSC/PR/COMM.2(CCLXV)). While this declaration presented the AU as an organisation that sought to instill peace in Libya, it did not take long for the organisation to crack. This first became apparent when NATO ignored the AU’s calls for non-foreign military intervention and invaded Libya with the UNSC’s support. NATO departed only after the Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was killed.
The targeted killing of Gaddafi by the Western-led NATO and UNSC elements not only questioned the efficiency and the capacity of the AU to defend African leaders who found themselves in conflict with powerful Western states; it also leads to the question: asks, what does the AU’s R2P doctrine entails in the current continental and international conflict resolution and transformation system? The selective application of intervention and the shift from civilian protection to regime change practiced by NATO and the UNSC in Libya also calls into question whether or not the AU enjoys decisive leadership and whether theR2P can become anything more than a tool for regime change or ad hoc responses to violence against civilians. The doctrine’s major promise when it was unanimously adopted at the World Summit in 2005 was that it would become the needed corrective measure in episodes of mass
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atrocities and that it would contribute to the broader transformation of global society.
However, its application in Libya did not abide by this promise.
Before the death of Gaddafi in October 2011, the chain of command holding the AU together seemed to have broken. The member states became divided over Libya and could neither enforce the R2P principle nor military intervention as provided by the AUCA. According to African Economic Outlook (2012: 24) the two most powerful states in Africa, the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa were clearly divided on critical issues in Libya; as was in the case in Cote d’Ivoire other member states took sides with either Nigeria or South Africa. This crack in Africa’s unity and the AU’s lack of military capacity diminished the continent’s capacity to protect civilians and may have allowed for the death of Gaddafi. The disunity regarding Libya was once again reflected when Nigeria and 34 other African countries recognised the leadership of the Transitional National Council (TNC) as the legitimate Libyan government. South Africa, Zimbabwe and Uganda did not recognise the TNC regime until they were bullied into doing so by the US, Britain and France and the majority of the African states.