89
atrocities and that it would contribute to the broader transformation of global society.
However, its application in Libya did not abide by this promise.
Before the death of Gaddafi in October 2011, the chain of command holding the AU together seemed to have broken. The member states became divided over Libya and could neither enforce the R2P principle nor military intervention as provided by the AUCA. According to African Economic Outlook (2012: 24) the two most powerful states in Africa, the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa were clearly divided on critical issues in Libya; as was in the case in Cote d’Ivoire other member states took sides with either Nigeria or South Africa. This crack in Africa’s unity and the AU’s lack of military capacity diminished the continent’s capacity to protect civilians and may have allowed for the death of Gaddafi. The disunity regarding Libya was once again reflected when Nigeria and 34 other African countries recognised the leadership of the Transitional National Council (TNC) as the legitimate Libyan government. South Africa, Zimbabwe and Uganda did not recognise the TNC regime until they were bullied into doing so by the US, Britain and France and the majority of the African states.
90
not British, French and US citizens. In Hehir’s view, the R2P contains structural barriers to effective action; until these barriers are removed, the use of force to subdue an enemy state will continue. Hehir (2011) argues that the laws governing the use of force and the structure of the UN are the same in 2011 as they were in 1991. For all the hype surrounding the R2P it constitutes no more than a slogan which has served to embolden those who are convinced that eloquent appeals to behave responsibly influence world politics.
Since the R2P was officially recognised at the World Summit a number of mass atrocities have occurred which undeniably warranted external intervention. Yet, in the face of “state- sponsored slaughter in Sri Lanka, Darfur and the DRC, the Security Council chose not to sanction effective action” (Hehir, 2011). If R2P meant something and had real influence, why was this so? Pro-R2P scholars argue that the R2P constitutes more than military intervention and that such action is not always prudent. A more accurate explanation, however, is that the response of the international community remains dependent on the interests of the P5; in the absence of a duty to act, the R2P constitutes no more than a ‘discretionary entitlement’.
Hence inconsistency and inertia are inevitable.
O’Connell (2011) supports this viewpoint, noting that just hours after Gaddafi’s Benghazi threat, the UNSC responded with Resolution 1973 authorising military force to protect civilians; the bombing campaign began within hours of the UN vote. Only one month after the civil war began, in comparisons with Rwanda and Bosnia, and President’s Obama’s statement that the use of force would last only a few days, there were clear indications that neither the Security Council nor the states—Britain, France, and US—involved in the intervention were focused on the test based on the principle of necessity. The principle of necessity requires that even the use of force with a lawful basis in the UN Charter, such as Security Council authorisation, must nevertheless be a last resort and have the prospect of achieving more good than harm. The interveners failed at the outset to demonstrate either aspect of necessity.
Serious analysis prior to the intervention would have revealed the likelihood of high casualties resulting from the intervention, as well as alternatives to it. O’Connell (2011) argues that, due to NATO’s intervention, a violent insurrection that might have been suppressed in a few days gained a new lease on life with fighting continuing for more than six months. Resolution 1973 authorised military action to prevent civilian slaughter, not
91
intervention in the civil war. Though it is generally accepted that one cannot kill a frog with a gun as response must be in line with the aggravation, Ramesh Thakur (2011:13) insists that any state has the right to use force to suppress armed uprisings within its borders. In light of the above the 2011 Libyan uprising would have been best managed if the NATO allies did not get involved, as was the case in Tunisia and Egypt. Thus, the mission that effected regime change and targeted and killed Gaddafi acted outside of the confines of the guiding principles of R2P and the principle of state sovereignty. This is why Thakur (2011) maintains that, to the extent that Gaddafi was targeted, NATO exceeded UN authority in breach of the Charter law.
In The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Regime Change, Alex Bellamy (2011) concurs with Thakur. He observes that the use of attack helicopters by the UN mission in Cote d’Ivoire to oust Laurent Gbagbo from power in April 2011 and NATO’s decision to interpret UN Security Council Resolution 1973 as permission for the use of airpower to overthrow the Gaddafi regime and install the TNC provoked strong responses from several UN member states. Long-standing critics of the R2P, Nicaragua and Venezuela, for example, used particularly blunt language to criticise the UN-backed NATO intervention in Libya as complicity in neo-imperialist interventionism dressed up in humanitarian garb. Bellamy (2011) notes that Nicaragua and Venezuela complained thus:
Once again we have witnessed the shameful manipulation of the slogan protection of civilians for dishonourable political purposes, seeking unequivocally and blatantly to impose regime change, attacking the sovereignty of a State Member of the United Nations [Libya] and violating the Organization’s Charter. Once again, the logic of interventionism and hegemony has prevailed through a disastrous decision with incalculable potential consequences for tens of millions of individuals worldwide.
Furthermore, Venezuela added that:
It is regrettable that certain countries are seeking regime change in Libya, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations. Those actions contravene resolution 1973 (2011), which calls for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya.
More worrying than these harsh criticisms from two of the half dozen or so opponents of the R2P, however, was the fact that three members of the emerging ‘BRICS’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) group – all of whom had moved over the past two years towards
92
an accommodation with the new principle – also spoke out strongly against the UN and NATO actions in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya. The Chinese Government—a permanent member of the Security Council—(Bellamy, 2011: 5) also argued that, “The responsibility to protect civilians lies first and foremost with the Government of the country concerned”. The international community and external organizations can provide constructive assistance, but they must observe the principles of objectivity and neutrality and fully respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the country concerned. There must be no attempt at regime change or involvement in civil war.