Part 3 Summary of Findings, Conclusions and
2.4 The Challenge of Xenophobia and Xenophobic Violence in Post-apartheid South Africa
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observations have been made. Firstly, as a newly established nation state and constitutional democracy, post-apartheid South Africa has enshrined principles of human rights and due process into its legislative, administrative and policy frameworks. Yet, there are concerns that this overall change in orientation and approach has not filtered down sufficiently to the level at which civil servants are tasked with implementing the new legal and policy regime.
Secondly, even though the post-apartheid emphasis on due process and human rights serves to constrain previous overt and excessive forms of labour exploitation, it appears that in the current context of economic globalisation, the preceding regime’s emphasis on migrants’
economic utility has not changed. Yet, as noted in Section 2.2, South Africa’s formal economy has become progressively less labour, and more capital intensive, and thus lost much of its former ability to absorb migrants into mainstream labour markets. Consequently, South Africa’s main urban centres, where informal economic opportunities seem more readily available than elsewhere, have replaced South Africa’s mines as key destination points for both domestic and cross-border migrants. In the process, these urban centres have become marked by high population density, exploitative rental markets and structural degeneration, where the socio-economic needs of foreign and local, resident and mobile populations, are not met, and where access to public resources and services, though formally extended to all South Africans and certain cross-border migrants, is not assured. Thus, it is left largely to urban residents themselves to find ways and means of getting by. In this regard, the post- apartheid state’s approach to migration governance might be interpreted as not just a laissez- faire approach, but as a government confronting a field which somewhat eludes governability in that in important respects, the South African state appears institutionally weaker than is required to resolve the problems facing both its local and foreign residents.
2.4 The Challenge of Xenophobia and Xenophobic Violence in
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Gordon Allport’s (1954) original work, Jonathan Crush and Sujata Ramachandran (2009:6) define xenophobia as a social and political phenomenon that –
… Consists of highly negative perceptions and practices that discriminate against non-citizen groups on the basis of their foreign origin or nationality. It affects all categories of migrants ...
Xenophobia is perpetuated through a dynamic public rhetoric that actively stigmatizes and vilifies some or all migrant groups ... Xenophobia is not simply an attitudinal orientation.
Hostile and skewed perceptions of migrant groups generally go hand in hand with discriminatory practices and poor treatment of such groups. Acts of violence, aggression and brutality towards migrant groups represent extreme and escalated forms of xenophobia.
Xenophobic attitudes and actions intersect with other forms of discrimination such as racism and sexism, and thus result in varying degrees of social, economic, political marginalisation and exclusion of members of the targeted groups (cf. Pease 2010). Crush and Ramachandran (2009:46), noting that xenophobic attitudes and actions on the interpersonal and intergroup levels are co-dependant on discriminatory discourses, rules and practices at the level of public institutions (including, for example, the media and political parties, legislative and policy making bodies, public administration and law enforcement agencies), stress that there is a connection between xenophobia and ‘the exclusionary impulse of nation-building’, which in the context of globalisation has taken a historically specific dynamic. In this regard, Crush and Ramachandran (2009:53) observe that accelerated ‘flows of capital, goods and people heighten citizens’ anxieties and fears, stimulating a stronger fixation with belonging and identities, which in turn exaggerates exclusionary tendencies’. The authors add that both ‘real competition over limited resources’ and ‘perceived … economic threats’ play a role in the ensuing xenophobic dynamics (Crush and Ramachandran 2009:53). As globalisation deepens, the increasing inability of states to fulfil those functions traditionally considered to be the prerogative and duty of the nation state – such as the provision of education, health and welfare services, preservation of public infrastructure, and the maintenance of public order – may prompt politically expedient debates about nation, nationality and citizenship. For example, myths regarding the limits of public resources, and the depiction of non-nationals as an illegitimate drain on these resources, may be cultivated (cf. Bauman 2004; Hayes and Humhries 2004). In the process, ‘national identity is increasingly tied to racist and xenophobic expressions’ (Crush and Ramachandran 2009:56).
Colonial rule in Africa either disregarded or manipulated pre-existing social formations, and colonial boundaries cut across, rather than corresponded with, the ethnic organisation of
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African societies. Systems of patronage were created along ethnic lines to facilitate and augment colonial subjugation, administration and exploitation, thus amplifying pre-existing inter-group tensions, and sewing division where previously there had been none (Reader 1998). As a result, nation building in postcolonial Africa, too, has been linked to attempts by some ethnic groups to dominate others, in the hope of securing, and maintaining access to, privileges and resources (Mamdani 1996; Mbembe 2001; Meredith 2011). In the experience of many Africans therefore, the notion of nation building and the question of ethnic conflict have become intertwined. South Africa is no exception to this dynamic. Indeed, apartheid’s
‘enormous emphasis on boundary maintenance’ is said to have undermined people’s ability
‘to be tolerant of difference’ (Morris 1998:1125) and thus, the relatively sudden increase in the number of foreign nationals in the country’s urban centres has ‘created a space for hostility and misunderstanding to develop’ (Harris 2002:173).
The suggestion that popular xenophobic sentiments and actions are connected to public discourse, administrative and law enforcement practices, is supported by a wealth of recorded incidents and studies conducted during South Africa’s first fifteen post-apartheid years. As early as 1994, then-Home Affairs Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi described ‘illegal aliens as a direct threat’, alleging that foreign nationals were responsible for ‘criminal activities such as drug-trafficking, prostitution and money-laundering in what can only be described as typical Mafia-activity’ (Crush, McDonald, Williams, Lefko-Everett, Dorey, Taylor and la Sablonniere 2008:16). Similar sentiments were echoed, among others, by South Africa’s late President Nelson Mandela (Crush, McDonald, Williams, Lefko-Everett, Dorey, Taylor and la Sablonniere 2008). In 1998 and 2005, Human Rights Watch published reports which documented in detail how foreign citizens in South Africa were subjected to ‘serious abuse’ (HRW 1998:11), including ‘harassment, mistreatment and extortion’ (HRW 2005:36).
Jean Pierre Misago, Tamlyn Monson, Tara Polzer and Loren Landau (2010:33-34) contend:
There are [several] areas … that illustrate how non-nationals have been turned into the violable alien … [including] a … general lack of access to constitutional [rights and] protections ... Taken singly, none of these exclusions are unique to non-nationals … What separates the experience of non-nationals from that of poor and minority nationals is the degree to which exclusion is both bureaucratically and socially institutionalised.
The Southern African Bishop’s Conference, Black Sash, the South African Human Rights Commission, and the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa warned of
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growing levels of xenophobia as early as the mid-1990s, and the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) documented, through its periodically repeated opinion surveys, the extent to which xenophobic sentiments were spreading among the South African citizenry, morphed into sporadic acts of xenophobic violence and ultimately, into the May 2008 pogroms. SAMP found that between 1994 and 1997, the South African public had become increasingly intolerant of foreign nationals, irrespective of whether these were ‘legal or illegal, immigrants or migrants, refugees or asylum seekers’ (Crush, McDonald, Williams, Lefko-Everett, Dorey, Taylor and la Sablonniere 2008:19). Repeating their attitudinal survey in 1999, SAMP noted that ‘very little had changed’ (Crush, McDonald, Williams, Lefko-Everett, Dorey, Taylor and la Sablonniere 2008:19) and in 2001, cautioned ‘that xenophobic attitudes could turn violent’
(Crush, McDonald, Williams, Lefko-Everett, Dorey, Taylor and la Sablonniere 2008:48). In 2006, yet another opinion survey was conducted, finding further hardening of South African attitudes towards foreigners (Crush, McDonald, Williams, Lefko-Everett, Dorey, Taylor and la Sablonniere 2008). The authors conclude that,
Facilitated by a decade of in-fighting on immigration policy, irresponsible political statements and an uncritical and xenophobic press, the cancer spread. At first, with some exceptions, it remained in the heads and words of South Africans. But when thoughts turned to action, xenophobic thugs discovered that they could act with virtual impunity. Increasingly, their
‘cause’ became less random and took on the character (and eventual horror) of ‘ethnic cleansing’ campaigns in other parts of the world’ (Crush, McDonald, Williams, Lefko- Everett, Dorey, Taylor and la Sablonniere 2008:6).
Indeed, Misago, Monson, Polzer and Landau’s (2010:38-40) account of ‘major’ incidents of xenophobic violence in the period of 1994 to 2008, demonstrates an escalation from three incidents over six years (December 1994 to October 2000), four incidents across 13 months (August 2005 to August 2006) and another four across nine months (February to October 2007), to ten incidents in only four months (January to April 2008). On 11 May 2008, xenophobic violence finally erupted into nationwide pogroms that lasted about three weeks.
A total of 95 major excesses were recorded, at the end of which over one hundred thousand people had been displaced, dozens of women raped, more than 60 persons killed, hundreds wounded, and millions of Rand worth of property looted and destroyed (Crush, McDonald, Williams, Lefko-Everett, Dorey, Taylor and la Sablonniere 2008; Misago, Monson, Polzer and Landau 2010). Since then, there have been no pogroms at a national scale; still, xenophobic violence erupts regularly. The most recent, high-profile xenophobic utterances entered the
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public domain in March 2015: Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini reportedly asked ‘those who come from outside to please go home’ (Ndou 2015), a request that was endorsed by President Jacob Zuma’s son Edward, who suggested that due to the continued presence of foreign nationals, ‘South Africa was sitting on a ticking time bomb’ (Khoza 2015). The latest two waves of violence occurred in January and March 2015 in Johannesburg and Durban respectively, costing more than ten lives, while displacing an estimated 7000 foreign nationals (Essa 2015;
Moftah 2015; News24 2015). In response, complaints were lodged against both King Zwelithini and Edward Zuma whose remarks are being investigated by the SAHRC (Khoza 2015; News24 2015). In Johannesburg, over 150 arrests were made (Essa 2015; Moftah 2015), and in April, Home Affairs Minister Malusi Gigaba visited the displaced families in Durban to assure them that ‘everyone … within [South Africa’s] borders is entitled to dignity [and] to shelter’ (News24 2015).
How could the May 2008 pogroms have happened? Why, following the large-scale condemnation of these excesses, do xenophobic sentiments continue to be expressed and anti-foreign violence continue to flare up? Jörg Barberowski’s (2008) study of the 1905 anti- Jewish and anti-Armenian campaigns in pre-revolutionary Russia characterises pogroms and massacres in ways that transcend their historical context. Barberowski (2008) notes that pogroms tend to occur during times of perceived crisis in the context of institutionally weak states, stating that at the point at which violence against ethnic or religious minorities erupts, the targeted population is already stigmatised, visibly disadvantaged in their interactions with state institutions, generally considered to be deserving of a lower social status, yet perceived to be economically more successful than most members of majority groups. Minority group members have become marked as of little moral worth, and their mere presence has come to signify an unstable and insecure social, economic, political and ideological order. All of this renders the stigmatised groups ideal scapegoats, and a growing number among the majority group develop a desire to see them erased. However, for actual pogroms to erupt, two additional conditions need to be present:
- State institutions do not respond effectively to concerns and complaints and seem unable to ameliorate social injustices or to maintain social peace. In response, potential perpetrators begin to regard violence as an appropriate means of gaining power and making themselves heard; and –
- State institutions refrain from openly displaying sympathy, siding with, helping or protecting the potential targets of violence, for this might erode the majority’s confidence
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in the state’s ability to represent their interests; and that is something a weak state cannot risk (Barberowski 2008).
At the same time, no functioning state – weak or strong – will surrender its power voluntarily by allowing popular violence to occur unchecked and to spread uncontrollably. Hence, although pogroms are likely only if there are leaders who provide sufficient organisation and a clear-enough purpose, pogroms are normally prepared clandestinely and therefore appear to break out spontaneously. As crowd dynamics set in, instigators tend to lose control (Barbarowski 2008; cf. Canetti 1960). It is for these reasons that pogroms spread unpredictably and dissipate as perpetrators tire and increasingly direct attention to looting.
Many of the displaced return once the violence is over and when police and army appear to restore the state’s authority and to re-assert its power and control (Barberowski 2008).
Misago, Monson, Polzer and Landau’s (2010) study of the May 2008 xenophobic violence evidences the extent to which the events typify Barbarowski’s (2008) notion of pogroms. The global recession of 2007/2008 led to ‘record increases in the price of food and other basic commodities’ (Misago, Monson, Polzer and Landau 2010:169), which many would have experienced as a crisis. Misago, Monson, Polzer and Landau (2010:36) also found that most residents in affected areas believed that ‘the presence of foreign nationals in their communities’ was a ‘primary cause of challenges to their economic and physical well-being’.
With regard to Barberowski’s (2008) observation that pogroms require that the majority regard the targeted population as less deserving yet benefiting (unfairly) from the prevailing dispensation, Misago, Monson, Polzer and Landau (2010:166-167) produce some pertinent findings:
Some South African residents complain that … local businesses are closing down because they cannot compete [with foreign nationals] … [and] that foreign nationals are ‘stealing’ jobs ...
[In addition,] there is a belief that foreign nationals … should not be living in any government housing while any South Africans remain homeless … Other accusations are that foreign nationals are] accessing social grants using fraudulent IDs … ‘stealing’ women … [and are failing to participate] in local practices and struggles.
Then, there are several references to institutional weaknesses of the contemporary South African state. These include, firstly, the suggestion that, ‘in many of the affected areas … poor service delivery may have played a role in … delegitimising political leadership’ (Misago, Monson, Polzer and Landau 2010:171). The authors also find ‘strong evidence’ of a lack in trust ‘in the state’s ability or will to provide services … [or] to protect its citizens from
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perceived outside threats’ (Misago, Monson, Polzer and Landau. 2010:168). Added to this is
‘a worrying culture of impunity’ with regard to attacks on foreign nationals (Misago, Monson, Polzer and Landau 2010:172) and a ‘lack of effective conflict resolution mechanisms’, with evidence of ‘local authorities’ failure to engage … during the events that precede the attacks’
(Misago, Monson, Polzer and Landau 2010:175). Against this background, it seems entirely plausible that indeed, the ‘absence of institutionalised, legitimate and trusted leadership … led to the emergence of informal, self-appointed structures … operating as an untouchable … leadership’ and running parallel to the ‘constitutionally mandated … local government structures’ (Misago, Monson, Polzer and Landau 2010:173):
The xenophobic violence in most affected areas was organised by those parallel structures and/or by some self-serving members of formal institutions who capitalised on residents’
feelings, fears and negative attitudes towards non-nationals … While to many outside observers, violence against foreign nationals … appeared to be a spontaneous community uprising, the study shows that it [was] in all observed cases engineered and fuelled by influential individuals and groups that have direct and self-centred interests to serve (Misago, Monson, Polzer and Landau 2010:174-175).
Eventually, the South African Defence Force was called in to help end the violence (Crush, McDonald, Williams, Lefko-Everett, Dorey, Taylor and la Sablonniere 2008), but this does not mean that the pogroms ceased due to the state’s intervention as opposed to tapering out.
Either way, in Chapters 8 and 9, I describe how ultimately, the targets of aggression were encouraged to, and indeed often did, return to those areas from which they were supposed to have been erased. The South African state’s responses to more recent attacks against foreigner impress as somewhat more decisive and authoritative than was the case in 2008.
However, it appears that important underlying causes remain and continue to fuel xenophobic attitudes and practices, as well as triggering periodic outbreaks of xenophobic violence.
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Image 2.1: A Person Looting a Foreign-owned Shop