Part 3 Summary of Findings, Conclusions and
1.6 Explication of Key Terms
The discussion so far would have revealed some of my preferences with regard to the use of certain terminologies. In some instances, I deviate from their mainstream uses; in others, there are competing uses in relation to which I have adopted particular positions. In this section, I briefly explicate my terminological choices; however, more comprehensive empirical and theoretical justifications are contained in Chapters 2 to 10. The terms concerned are: displacement, fleeing, migrating and crossing borders; justice, social and other forms of justice; injustice and oppression; social work and other practices of care; as well as ethics and morality.
1.6.1 Displacement: Migrating, Fleeing, and Crossing Borders
In this thesis, I treat all cross-border migrants as having been displaced. In this understanding, displaced people have been uprooted, will seek to re-root, and for that reason, some may migrate. Some migrants will cross borders. Depending on how their reasons for displacement are assessed by those who receive them, they will be classified. Some will be categorised
‘labour’, ‘voluntary’, or simply ‘migrants’; others will apply for asylum. If the latter are found to be ‘forced migrants’ in the sense of having fled, for example, persecution or war, they may be granted formal refugee status. In their new countries of residence, refugees and other cross-border migrants may be displaced further, as was, on account of xenophobic violence, the case in this study. Thus, I use the term ‘cross-border migration’ to denote a variety of practices that involve people crossing borders; ‘cross-border migrant’ to denote people who have crossed borders for a variety of reasons and in a variety of ways; the term ‘displacement’
to denote a loss of place that can occur at different points in a person’s life; and ‘displacees’
or ‘the displaced’ to denote people who are currently uprooted, or out of place. For a detailed discussion and referencing of these terms, refer to Chapters 2.3 to 2.4, 7.3.1, 8.3, and 10.4.1.
17
1.6.2 Social and other Forms of Justice
In this thesis, I use the terms ‘justice’ and ‘social justice’ interchangeably, and understand the term ‘social justice’ inclusively to denote economic, political, social, cultural, and ideological dimensions of social life (see Fraser 2008a). As socially just structures, processes, dynamics, and relationships require different experiences of injustice and competing conceptions of social justice to be articulated, heard, and considered, social justice is not merely an ethical but an inherently political concern. Phenomena of social justice, and injustice, are explored in the chapters that follow, with each drawing on different theorists to emphasise different dimensions, and to explore the different ways in which they were interconnected and interacted. For an explication and justification of these choices, refer to Chapter 5.4.3 and Table 5.3.
1.6.3 Injustice and Oppression: Othering, Exclusion, Powerlessness, Exploitation, and Violence
Drawing on Iris Marion Young (1990), I understand ‘social injustice’ as made up of a range of structures, processes, dynamics, relationships, and the experiences to which they lead. These different aspects of social injustice have been theorised in conjunction by some writers and independently of one another by others. Social injustices are constituted through, but are not limited to, discourses and practices of Othering; social, economic and political forms of exclusion; the systematic rendering as powerless of certain groups and individuals;
exploitation; as well as structural and interpersonal forms of violence. These facets of injustice are interlinked and co-dependent on one another and are subsumed in the overall idea of
‘oppression’. If the aim is to engage in just practice and to promote just social arrangements, then all the aspects of oppression require attention.
1.6.4 Social Work and Other Practices of Care
In this study, there were a range of participants, who responded to cross-border migrants, including those who were displaced by xenophobic violence. Some of them were paid for
18
what they did, others volunteered. Of those who responded in their role of paid professionals, some were social workers, but there were also community development workers, theologians and other pastoral staff. Those research participants who responded as volunteers, also cared and provided care. This is therefore the meaning of ‘care’, ‘practices of care’, or ‘caring practices’ as I use the terms in this thesis: they are the responses of social workers, other practitioners of care and members of a receiving community who cared about the issues of cross-border migration and displacement, and cared about cross-border migrants and the displaced. Thus, they took care of things on behalf of the cross-border migrants’ and the displacees’, provided care for them, and received feedback in the course of relationships that varied in duration, and were characterised by varying degrees of trust (Tronto 1993, 2013).
As providers, rather than recipients of care, they had to be able to do what they did, and in this regard, they were more privileged than those about whom they cared, for whom they provided care, and on behalf of whom they took care of things. See Chapter 4.2 for a detailed consideration of the relationship between justice and care.
1.6.5 Ethics and Morality
The complex relationship between ethics and morality is explored throughout this thesis.
Even though in my understanding, there is an overlap, I follow Zygmunt Bauman (1993) in my usage of terms. Thus, I speak of ‘ethics’ and ‘ethical’ to denote a more formalised notion of morality (as, for example, in ‘ethical practice’, or ‘the ethics of social work’), while using the terms ‘morality’ and ‘moral’ when referring to the preferences, choices, and actions of individuals or groups of individuals as they tried to work out in particular instances what was
‘just’, or ‘the right thing to do’ (as, for instance, in ‘moral humility’, ‘moral judgement’, ‘moral impulse’ or ‘moral action’). Whether I refer to ‘ethics’ or ‘morality’, I use ‘challenge’ to denote something difficult, and ‘dilemma’ when a preferred choice or action required the individual or the group of individuals concerned to do something as a result, that they did not consider
‘just’ or ‘the right thing to do’ (cf. Banks 2006).
19