2.3. A Review of Knowledge Gaps 1. China-Africa Relations
2.3.3. China-DRC Relations
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construction and civil engineering contracts approved by the government of China.
One of the major Chinese oil companies that is operating in Angola is the Sinopec which has historically been marred with controversy as its entry into Angola in the last two decades was accompanied by China Exim Bank’s US$2 billion loan facility awarded to the government of Angola to finance the reconstruction of their infrastructure. This is said to be a loan to support Sinopec’s entrance into a strategic African country.
Although this is the case, Sinopec had since experienced several challenges in bidding for other state-financed oil contracts over time as Angola sought to diversify its finance partners including the incorporation of the USA engineering firm Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) for refinery purposes and competition and the China Sonangol international holding (CSIH), Canada’s Export Development Bank, Brazil’s Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Económico e Social (BNDES) to showcase the thawing of relations between international financial institutions and Angola. The trade relations between the two countries have over time shown that even if Angola is seen as a Chinese important source of oil, Angola is not regarded as an important strategic location of investment beyond the oil acquisition. This is in contrast to South Africa and DRC as important strategic locations of Chinese investment beyond the acquisition of minerals.
In the final analysis, Corkin indicates that Angola’s relations with China had matured from a heady embrace of “mutual convenience to a reassessment of each other’s strategic significance as partners” (2011: 4). This is because they both see each other as strategic allies for the foreseeable future. Notably, the study did not broadly examine China’s debt-trap diplomacy strategies and the key mineral resources that serve as China’s interests in Angola.
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Africa with that of Europe, the USA and other western countries that have prospered there before? Kushner noted that in 1999, China introduced its Policy of ‘Going out’
which encouraged the businesses to go invest outside the country as well as families to open electronic businesses, restaurants and distribute medicines.
Kushner says that when there was an increase in the copper and cobalt value as well as other minerals, many Chinese businesses started their operations abroad such as in the province of Katanga in Congo to buy mineral processes dug by artisans in Congo mines. Kushner demonstrated that China saw Africa as a continent of mineral wealth needed for its economy, which is driven by manufacturing. According to Kushner, Congo has half of the world’s cobalt reserves and supplies cobalt with a high grade.
These minerals are what drove China to make the largest deal with Congo in its history known as Sicomines. This deal will ensure that China can extract 6.8 million tons of Copper and 427, 000 tons of cobalt. Kushner has observed that this new type of investment model led by China took Africa’s economic edge and replaced the USA as its largest partner in trade. He argues that China will strip Congo of its natural wealth as did the Belgians in colonial times. Despite the usefulness of his work in understanding what the dynamics and implications of Chinese investment in Congo could be; there was no attempt to project both countries’ historical relations. Equally, his report is too narrow to address all other fundamental aspects of both countries’
relations such as the key drivers of China’s foreign policy towards DRC and a broader explanation of all the trade and economic agreements of China with DRC.
Kabemba (2016) wrote a very informative article titled “China-Democratic Republic of Congo Relations: From a Beneficial to a Developmental Cooperation”. In this article he attempted to unpack whether a win-win cooperative relationship is possible between China and the DRC using a Neo-extractivism theory. Kabemba has placed much of his emphasis on the Sicomines deals, which were signed between China and DRC. Firstly, Kabemba argues that the deal does not represent straight-forwardness and equity. He says that this deal was met with castigations and doubts upon its implementation. Kabemba postulates that its secrecy encouraged the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and civil society’s suggestion for it to be made public. According to Kabemba, the Sicomines deals serve to increase DRC’s foreign debt to an unacceptable level.
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Even after the IMF advised both countries to reduce its size, this deal could still not solve the imbalances it came with. This is because it did not address the reduction of China’s capital investment in DRC which comes with the reduction of DRC minerals for Chinese MNCs. Secondly, Kabemba argues that Sicomines is no different to the western mining companies in DRC. He stated that Sicomines has enabled Chinese companies to receive fiscal, holiday and customs exemptions, which generally strip resource rich African nation-states of their minerals. Kabemba argued this is the case as most of the companies are operating in the informal sector. Hence, Sicomines was meant to accelerate commercial ties between the two countries. Thirdly, he demonstrated that Sicomines does not address the political economy of costs and risks which means that mineral pricing and infrastructural costs have never been discussed and the main analysis presented agree that DRC is likely to lose.
Fourthly, the problem with the deal is that it is solely administered by China.
Gecamines which is the passive partner plays no administrative role and the decision making is left with Chinese companies especially in production and exports, equipment importation, and use of Chinese personnel. According to Kabemba, the discussion outlines the importance of taking into consideration that Sicomines has not changed the colonial extractivism approach of the west. Kabemba also asserts that despite China’s lies of a win-win partnership with DRC, this partnership, in reality, demonstrates the nature of international relations made in the pursuits of national interests through which the powerful nation-states dictate the terms of cooperation.
This situation, among others, serves as a fertile ground for this research and future studies in this area. It should be noted however that CSR as a key element in the current research has been overlooked in this work. There was no attempt to project China’s CSR in DRC. Unfortunately, Kabemba did not demonstrate the role of Chinese companies in ensuring corporate responsibility nor highlight the epoch in which such links can be traced including a broader analysis of some of the neo-colonial Chinese practices in DRC. Kabemba only gave a narrative of how both countries should strengthen their relations, China’s ambition in DRC, historical relations, DRC’s failure and its implications, reasons behind the non-interference policy of China and how it does not benefit DRC including how both countries' relations are not a win-win
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scenario. There was no attempt to analyse the above-mentioned issues although the two former (China’s ambition in DRC and historical relations) are presented as key variables of the current study. Regardless of this, Kabemba (2016: 83) believes that China’s international relations with the DRC are to achieve two important things;
“support the building of a capable state and build an economy that is inclusive and sustainable”. The argument’s crux is ensuing in that; “as long as China does not help the DRC to achieve stability, the infrastructure development approach is not sustainable” (Kabemba 2016: 82). The DRC is massively losing its trade relations with China. The relations between China and DRC are not based on win-win cooperation.
Wu (2013) made a major contribution to this study through his online publication titled
“China’s Foreign Policy towards Africa”. Wu’s study provides insights into the status of the Sino-Africa relationship using a theory of comparative advantage. Although this publication is not based on the topic of the current research but around some of the crucial aspects shaping Chinese investment in Africa, Wu argues that China’s policy towards Africa has moved from unconditional assistance to mutual benefits, which is now a priority. Wu also argues that China’s policy towards Africa is not solely oil and mineral resources driven but the continent also plays a key strategic significance, premised on three considerations, namely diplomatic, commercial and resource imperatives. Wu stated that some African countries have become critical oil-exporters for China as extreme instability of the Middle East supply has increased.
Wu (2013) study is worth mentioning in the current study because it provides a rich existing knowledge of how Chinese foreign policy towards Africa is driven by oil, resource imperatives and Africa’s strategic importance. What is more relevant about his study is that it corrects the naïve claims, which show that Chinese investment in Africa is good. Even though Wu’s study concludes with the remarks that China and Africa’s cooperation is grounded on mutual respect and complementary trade, it also considers the influence of the developing countries in global affairs, especially the political economy. Despite his contribution, Wu did not channel his views towards the comparison or contrasting of China’s foreign policy relations with both Angola and DRC including a broader analysis of major steps undertaken by China when African countries like Angola and DRC default in their loan repayments.
21 2.4. Theoretical perspectives
Most of the already conducted studies are informed by the three predominant and/or mainstream theories of Marxism, Realism and Idealism. Correctly put, these theories have played a huge role in International Relations by theoretically and contextually guiding the analysis of the state behaviour; understanding of individuals and alternative actors in the international system. Equally, their reference to foreign policy analysis has also been very much helpful and cannot be easily overlooked as their significance is also catalogued. Accordingly, it is an almost impossible task to assess their significance individually as none is highly valued than another (Shai 2016).
Marxism which focuses on economic nationalism is also an honourable ally within the fraternity of the Social Sciences, but it is often claimed that this school of thought has been overhauled by realism. This simply means that the belief that “Karl Marx had followed realist principles way before critical realism gained the required recognition of a theory within the academic circles” may be true (Ehrbar, 2013).
In the same vein, both Rapanyane and Maphaka (2019) including Milan (1992) understand and recognise that Marxism would not be suitable for adoption in studies that are directly linked to the Africans. The sentiment insinuates that Marxism is broadly understood and suitably adopted within the European knowledge production fraternities where it can best be conceptualised. This is the case because it does not consider the African ground conditions, and value systems in any analysis (Rapanyane & Maphaka 2019). Therefore, in dissolving and disputing the adoption of the principles of these theories in the critical reflection of the Afrocentric phenomenon, Dunn (2004: 149) does not shy away from indicating that this undoubtedly shows that
“African experiences indicate a far more complicated picture of current international relations”. Put differently, any African study on the IR scholarship ought to make the most of the African evidenced perspectives (Dunn 2004).
22 2.4.1. Realism
Far different from Afrocentricity, Realism is an advocate of the following propositions:
The international system is anarchic. Sovereign states are the principal actors in the international system; States are rational actors acting in their national interests; The overriding goal of each state is its security and survival and State survival is guaranteed best by power, principally military (McGowan & Nel, 2006: 26-30).
As broadly explained, realism has been shaped and/or moulded with the trio elements of historical importance. One is classical realism which was advanced by Hans Morgenthau (renowned IR Scholar). The second is structural realism which was advanced by both Rousseau and Waltz. The last one was Neo classical realism that shaped the development of this theory. It is important to highlight that the theory’s key elements have been self-help and survivalism including statism which have all shaped the central features of the theory (Dunne & Schmidt, 2008).