2.4 Expanding Causal Association: Beyond Theory Building
2.4.3 Climate Change Migration and Conflicts
Migration is acknowledged in many studies as an important mediating factor between climate change and conflict especially in developing countries (Acketoft, 2008; Alam, 2003; Asian Development Bank, 2009). As such, inquiry into the role migration plays in climate induced conflict is gaining increasing traction among climate change human security researchers.
Conley and Werz (2012) point out that the rising number of migrant-settler conflicts in many cases, point to local or regional stress from climate change in already weak or conflict-prone societies. They argue further that areas that are already characterised by weak or brittle states are more likely to experience conflict when confronted with adverse effects of climate change such as resource short-ages, intergroup competition, and mass migrations (Conley and Werz, 2012).
Peters and Vivekananda (2014) highlights the relevance of state capacity and socio-economic components of adaptation noting that the likelihood of climate change resulting in conflict rests on ‘intermediary factors’ which condition the transition from exposure to adverse effects of climate change on one hand, and conflicts among peoples and groups on the other. Hence they point out that:
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Effects of climate change, such as more frequent natural disasters, long-term changes in precipitation and temperature, and sea-level rise, could combine with other factors to increase the risk or prevalence of violent conflict. Increased vulnerability to conflict depends on a mix of factors: the context of poverty, effectiveness of governance and institutions, adaptive capacity, political inclusion and financial management. These factors affect the capacity of individuals and institutions to adapt to climate change and manage conflict in a peaceful manner (Peters and Vivekananda, 2014: vii).
Illustrating migratory interface between environmental degradation and conflict, Libiszewski (1999) explains that loss of livelihood among Bangladeshis as a result of drought and flood resulted in migratory adaptation—a move supported by the regional government in the Bangladesh province of Khulna. This resulting emigration of a large population of Bangladeshis into the Indian states of West Bengal and Assam was met with hostility from the local community toward the migrants—a reaction which saw the migrants forming resistance movements to prevent forced deportation and leading to violent clashes between immigrants, police and nationalist Hindus (Libiszewski, 1999: 115-135).
Bauhaug; Gleditsch and Theisen (2008) identify four different ways through which climate- induced migration is likely to lead to violent conflict in migrant receiving areas. First, competition may ensue over diminishing natural or economic resources following the arrival of newcomers as share per capita decreases. There is particularly in ethnically diverse regions, a second linkage in which a wave of migrants from a different ethnic background to those of the original local population forms the basis for tensions along ethnic lines with a solidification in-group versus out-group identities. A third potential linkage concerns the animosity that may arise between two or more states: the one from which large out-flow of migrants has occurred and the ones to which they are migrating. Four, and lastly, migration induced by climate change has the potential to create fault-lines or aggravate traditional ones as is the case between peripatetic pastoral farmers and local sedentary farmers who compete with them over rights and use of land.
Withagen (2014) identifies two aspects in which greater attention is needed in climate change-conflict linkages especially as it relates to migratory pressures: one is the absence of legal frameworks that recognise migration arising from climatic pressures or what he terms
‘climate refugees’. Studies have in this regard, shown that there is a need for legal instruments on refugees displaced by climate-related pressures—a gap they argue, exists in the 1951 UN Convention on the status of refugees (See for examples, Biermann and Boas,
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2010; Cournil and Mazzega, 2006; Environmental Justice Foundation, 2009). The second factor identified by Withagen pertains to the need for a theory capable of explaining transition and also testing for causality. He therefore advocated the integration of the climate change–migration–conflict dimension to existing Integrated Assessment Models as climate change problems can no longer be adequately be tackled without paying attention to demography and conflict issues.
In his analysis of the transition from climate change to conflict, Reuveny (2005, 2007) identifies four factors that are likely to influence in vital ways, the occurrence of violent conflict as a result of climatic pressures. These include competition over scarcer resources, the existence of ethnic distrust, tensions, and fault lines as may occur when migrants move into other territories. Out of 38 major cases of climate-related migration resulting into conflict, Reuveny found that 19 cases significantly exhibited these traits. He however emphasized the importance of purely local conditions as very potent factors that may influence the trajectory of conflict occurrence.
Other extensive discussions on climate change, migration and conflict nexus are found in literature (See for example: Funder, Cold-Ravnkilde and Ginsborg, 2012; Kahl, 2006;
Homer-Dixon, Boutwell and Rathjens, 1993; Gleditsch, 2011; Green, 2005; Hendrix and Glaser, 2007). The following section focuses on the focus of this study—conflicts in migrants’ host community.
2.4.3.1 Environmental Displacement and Conflict in Migrant-Receiving Communities
The receiving community vulnerability dimension is rarely discussed in the environment and conflict linkage. Yet, studies show that migratory adaptation extends the spatial scope of vulnerability to climate change (Bowles, Buttler and Friel, 2013; Green, 2005; Onuoha, 2010;
Raleigh, Jordan and Salehyan, 2008). Through migration, the potential for conflicts associated with environmental change and degradation reaches far beyond physically affected regions as people move into less affected areas triggering conflicts and violent contestations for resources in the receiving communities (Bowles, Buttler and Friel, 2013; Green, 2005;
Homer-Dixon, 1999; 1994; Onuoha, 2010; Raleigh, Jordan and Salehyan, 2008; Msuya, 2013).
Kolmanskog (2008: 4) argues that “while in transit or at the place of destination, migration can (be perceived to and/or) contribute to a competition for already scarce resources such as
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land and water”. Because most environment-driven conflict occurs within countries, movement of groups often lead to greater competition for access to, and protection of valuable natural resources. Conflict in migrant receiving locations can be traced to competition arising from the degradation of the critical resources in sending locations. In addition to primary migration from resource depleted regions to areas with relatively greater abundance, competition and conflict in receiving communities also increases the likelihood of secondary migrations from rural to urban or suburban areas thereby aggravating the risk of other forms of insecurity. Kolmanskog captures this dynamics of migration-conflict linkage thus:
During a drought people may move to a less affected region, resulting in rising demand there. A competitive situation is more likely where population growth is strong. Climate change may also lead to further increases in rural-urban migration because of the degradation of land and people searching for better livelihoods. This may result in growing slums and an increased competition for resources in cities. There may also be competition and potential for conflict when migrants return to areas of origin and issues arise such as ownership or rights of use. The conflict potential of migration depends to a significant degree on how the government and people in the place of transit, destination or return respond.
Governance, the degree of political stability, the economy and whether there is a history of violence are generally important factors (Kolmannskog, 2008:
21).
Highlighting the role of migration in spreading the impacts of climate change vulnerability including the potentials for tension over use of shared resources, Raleigh, Jordan and Salehyan (2008) argues that areas not directly affected by climate change will nonetheless experience its adverse effects. They cite cases from Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia and Tanzania, where the adverse effects of climate events are being felt due to labour migration shifts from neighbouring regions (Raleigh, Jordan and Salehyan, 2008: 8- 16).
In the same vein, Green (2005) notes that natural resource scarcity will have direct and indirect effects among which is social breakdown manifesting through migration or expulsion. Social breakdown according to the study includes migration/expulsion, receptiveness to insurgency, decreased economic productivity, weakened state, as well as potentially negative effects of social adaptability on conflict. This will likely aggravate if human migration directly, create competition between groups over resources, or indirectly
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contribute to social inequality that accompanies migration of relatively poor groups into more resource rich areas (Green, 2005: 6).
Other studies have also examined the secondary forms of movement which occur in receiving communities in response to secondary stressor, particularly from the influx of environment- induced migrants. Both Toulmin (2009) and Deonarain (2014) note the wave of migration from physically vulnerable regions, and warn that such waves will likely result in new forms of resource constrictions thereby altering social relations and exacerbating the potentials for conflicts. As such, apart from conflict between migrants and their hosts, resource declines and conflicts between immigrants and hosts in receiving communities will further aggravate rural-urban outmigration especially in host communities as rural youths faced with destruction of investment and livelihood insecurity will be forced to migrate in search of alternative means of livelihood (Toulmin, 2009). Toulmin traces the high rate of conflicts associated with environmental migration in Africa to the continents pervasive poverty, weak institutions and underdevelopment, which leaves vast populations to remain dependent on natural resources with adverse changes in the climate system leading many people to migrate to areas with better condition as millions of environmental refugees result from drought and other hazardous changes to weather systems.
Toulmin further maintained that a “major reason for conflict in Africa is the large flow of people seeking land where they can settle and farm because relations between incomers and indigenous inhabitants are often tense, especially where there are few social and cultural values shared in common” (Toulmin, 2009: 119). Illustrating this, he points out that the droughts in West Africa and the Horn of Africa in the 1970s and 80s resulted in substantial movements of people into the wetter higher potential regions far south, from the low-rainfall Sahel region. This event, in his view, is testimony to how climatic extremes may result into widespread impoverishment of large numbers of people due to crop failures and other events with effect for migration and conflict. Alluding to the case of Ethiopia in 2008, Toulmin highlights the challenge climate change migration may pose to political stability in Africa explaining that the fear of urban influx of rural migrants left the government battling to “keep impoverished rural people on the land in their villages or camps”, in order to prevent environmentally impoverished people whose lands had been degraded, from seeking shelter and livelihoods in the cities—a potential threat to political instability because “riots by a large and hungry urban mass can threaten and topple an unpopular government” (p. 119).
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The likely implication of environment-driven migration for health in receiving communities is also noted. For example, Bowles, Butler and Friel (2013) points out that the movement of environmentally stressed population potentially carries with it, the risk of transfer and transmission of diseases as migrants such as the pastoralist who suffer a higher risk of exposure to diseases along the migration channels may expose receiving communities to new health risks upon contact with the migrants. Hence, their observation that “climate change will increase migration, potentially exposing migrants to endemic diseases for which they have limited resistance, transporting diseases and fostering conditions conducive to disease transmission” (Bowles, Butler and Friel, 2013: 1).
Addressing the Nigerian context of environment-related migration, Onuoha (2010) observes that “when people no longer have access to basic necessities of life, such as water, food, shelter, or physical security critical for survival, they adapt by switching livelihood systems or migrating to greener pastures”, consequently generating security challenges which arise
“when the capacity of the receiving communities are stretched to a tipping point where interactions and relations become conflictual rather than cooperative” (Onuoha, 2010: 259).
He notes further that the outcome of influx into host communities depends on the carrying capacity of the receiving communities in terms of its ability to accommodate influxes at any particular point in time.
Similarly, in examining the impact of climate change on population drift and violent conflict in Nigeria, Obioha (2008) explains that effects of environmental variability has the potential to cause other social effects which in turn are likely to result in conflict as illustrated in the linkage between desert encroachment and on landmass which may produce large-scale migration which also creates ethnic tension and conflict. This results from clashes between migratory groups and indigenous or settled population. In view of these security linkages, it is imperative to ensure that provisions are made to accommodate all sectors affected in order to limit the likelihood of conflict that may result from climate-related migration. Taking due consideration for the communities where displaced persons migrate as an adaptation measure and forestalling outbreaks of conflicts offers a broader sphere of coverage in enhancing security-sensitive adaptation.
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