2.4 Expanding Causal Association: Beyond Theory Building
2.4.1 Climate Change, Vulnerability and Resource Scarcity
The World Economic Forum42 in 2014, ranked the failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation as the fifth greatest security risk globally for the year 2014 (WEF, 2014). Such an assessment is attributable to the diverse ways through which humans are directly and indirectly vulnerable to its impact. Studies show that human societies are increasingly confronted with climate-related security threats at both primary and secondary risk levels arising from geophysical changes. Impacts of changes are felt across ecological, social, economic or political systems, and experienced in hazards like coastal erosion, flooding, loss of soil moisture, decline in levels of precipitation, intense storm, desert-encroachment, and extreme heat among others (McCarthy et al., 2001; Stern, 2007).
In 2007, two authoritative reports on climate research—the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—separately published reports focusing on how the manifestations of climate change indicated in rising sea level, water stress, and severe loss of arable land, among other extreme weather events, will affect populations across the globe. Highlighting the global nature of human vulnerability to environmental change, both reports emphasize the peculiar and disproportionate impacts that climate change will have on populations and governments in the developing regions. These reports highlight the greater threats both manifest and imminent across Asia in Africa where socio-economic stress may stretch civil society towards anarchy as environmental problems converge with other development challenges (CNA, 2007; IPCC, 2007).
Similarly, a 2001 report of the IPCC noted that about 1.7 billion people currently live in water stressed countries, i.e., within countries using more than 20% of the supply of renewable water, and projects that the number will increase from the combined effects of population and industrial growth, with climate change related decreases in stream flow and ground water as an aggravating factor (IPCC, 2001: 31). The report notes that while similar effects may result in increases in freshwater supply in some other countries, higher water temperatures will likely degrade the quality of water, and the much in reduction of
42 World Economic Forum is an independent international organization with broad interest ranging from economic development to environmental security. The body organizes annual review on global challenges.
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vulnerability to shortages in freshwater availability and quality will rely on water management (IPCC, 2001: 31). The import of the IPCC’s observation is that “where vulnerability increases and water management fails, increased freshwater scarcity is a likely outcome” (Raleigh and Urdal, 2007: 678).
Kelly and Adger (2000) posit that social vulnerability concerns the capacity of individuals and social groups to respond—that is, it concerns the capacity to cope with, recover from, or adapt to any external stress on people’s livelihoods and wellbeing. The authors identify indices of social vulnerability as measurable in terms of risks that may arise when existing social conditions are stretched by climate-related problems. These social factors include subsisting levels of poverty, proportion of loss in income diversification, loss in commonly held property or management rights, as well as losses in collective action among individual or groups in affected communities (Kelly and Adger, 2000: 326-329). An assessment of social vulnerability in their view therefore, entails an assessment of risks that society and its established social, economic or political order may face in the advent of climatic events.
Cutter et al. (2009) describe climate change and variability as environmental stressors underlying certain hazards to which societies are vulnerable. The stressors associated with climate change may be differentiated into two classes: sudden onset hazards (hazards which appear rapidly but lasts for short periods e.g. flooding or hurricanes); and chronic or slow onset hazards (slow events that are barely perceptible by the affected society e.g. drought, desertification, or sea level rise). Slow onset events have longer lasting incremental effects and often transcend into disasters only when some tipping point is reached. Whereas sudden onset events are amenable to policy aimed at adaptation or mitigation, chronic events are often difficult to manage because the immediate impacts are less clear and it is often hard to distinguish between “just a little dry spell” and a full-blown drought (Cutter et.al 2009: 2).
Some studies also identify specific climatic elements of social vulnerability. Building upon the IPCC 2001 report which identified climate change as a likely cause of extreme temperatures, intensified precipitation events, heightened risk of drought, increased flooding, increased tropical cyclone and intensified peak wind, Raleigh, Jordan and Salehyan (2008: 5- 8) identified drought and famine, floods and slides, cyclones, hurricanes and waves, extreme temperatures and seas level rise as some of the key vulnerability patterns in climate change.
The authors further highlighted the unique patterns of migration which result from these forms of vulnerability.
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In the same vein, UN-OHRLLS (2009)43 identifies a number of sectors that will be impacted adversely by climate change in high risk regions. Notable sectors include water resources, human health, agriculture and fisheries, ecosystems and biodiversity, coastal areas and deltas, tourism, settlements, industry and infrastructure. In the Nigerian context, such sectors as agriculture, forest and forestry, water and water resources, human activities and habitations around coastal areas, health and tourism, industry, and transport are often noted as highly vulnerable (see for example Adesina et al, 2010; Federal Ministry of Environment, 2010;
FGN, 2009; Oladipo, 2008).
Scholars differ in their focus and approach to explaining social vulnerability. Approaches range from regional impact analysis mostly highlighting vulnerability contrasts between the developed and the developing world, some highlight vulnerability of sectors such as health and economy, and some adopt a spatial approach by focusing on geospatial frames such as vulnerability differentials between arid and humid areas. For example, Carter and Makinen (2011) emphasize timeline of impacts and identified two vulnerability patterns: the current (the actual exposure of social systems to observable environmental change), and the futuristic (projections of likely impacts such as flooding in coastal regions or of drought in arid regions).
Focusing on the domain of impact, Brooks (2003) identifies two spheres of vulnerability: the social and the biophysical. Similarly, the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) (2014) emphasized the sequence of vulnerability to climate stressors and characterized patterns into direct vulnerability i.e. vulnerability resulting from such events as drought or flood, or indirect vulnerability i.e. those experienced through receptor systems such as shared resources or economic relations, human migration and others.
Highlighting regional variations in vulnerability, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in a 2007 report for example, assess vulnerability differentials between developed regions and their developing counterparts including Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Small Island States. The report noted that billions of people in developing regions risked water shortages, food insecurity, and greater health risks due to climate change, and called for a concerted global effort in support of adaptation assistance as climate change unfolds and will likely worsen. The UNFCCC report puts it succinctly:
43United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States
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Developing countries are the most vulnerable to climate change impacts because they have fewer resources to adapt: socially, technologically and financially. Climate change is anticipated to have far reaching effects on the sustainable development of developing countries including their ability to attain the United Nations Millennium Development Goals by 2015 (UNFCCC, 2007: 5).
The exposure of populations in the developing world is further aggravated by the close linkage between environmental and social systems since vulnerability at the geophysical levels threaten socio-economic survival at the secondarily impacts level. Carter and Gulati (2014) show for example, that climate change adversely affects a wide range of systems including food, energy, health, natural resources and habitats. It is also widely acknowledged to play important roles in shaping socio-political interactions among people especially in poor societies where livelihoods are linked to climate sensitive resources (Barnett and Adger, 2007; Homer-Dixon, 2001).
Africa Climate Change Environment and Security (ACCES) advances a sector based analysis of climate change focusing on the vulnerability of system under extreme variability. Using the sector analysis approach, ACCES highlights five security sectors in which vulnerability to climate change poses a major challenge especially in Africa as follows: water security, energy security, migration, natural hazards, and food security (ACCES, 2010: 7-32). The report notes that climate change will potentially alter the patterns of precipitation, including the frequency of droughts, storms and floods. These changes, the report notes, are already manifesting and are evident in increased aridity in sub-tropical zones as well as desertification in the Sahara (ACCES, 2010: 8).
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Figure 7: Drought-stricken cattle, South of Nairobi, Kenya. September 16, 2009
Source: BBC News (2009).
Although adverse effects of climate change on flora and fauna, as well as its impact on human welfare are some of the greatest concerns to the security research community, its extended social effects (i.e. on human populations and relations) may be described as secondary. This differentiation implies that changes in weather attributed in extremes such as drought, desertification, flooding, and other alterations which are felt across the physical, biological and social systems are considered as primary (UNEP, 2013). In other words, the changes that occur in the quality of the environment and its capacity to support and sustain human livelihood constitute the linkage between human security and climate change since it undermines the capacity of the environment to support life and human development (ADB et al. 2003).
It is against this background that climate change is seen as a threat multiplier with consequences cutting across social, political and environmental spheres of life (Barnett and Adger, 2007; CNA, 2007; Funder, Cold-Ravnkilde and Ginsborg, 2012; Tjossem, 2012). In view of its wide ranging impacts, especially on the social and ecological system, Barnet and Adger admonished that “there remains valid reason for concern about the continued changes in the climate system” (Barnett and Adger, 2007: 640). While the threat associated with climate change is believed to be a future issue in some quarters, studies increasingly highlight
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that it is already contributing to conflicts and wars with mention of such cases as the Darfur conflicts (Byers and Dragojlovic, 2004: 2).
To Reuveny (2007), the fact that environmental problems in the past have played significant roles in human migration is suggestive that unfolding climate change will induce or aggravate migration which will likely increase conflict risks particularly in less developed countries that are constrained in their capacity for adaptation and mitigation. Reuveny puts this succinctly:
...people can adapt to environmental problems in three ways: stay in place and do nothing, accepting the costs; stay in place and mitigate changes; or leave affected areas. The choice between these options depends on the extent of the problems and mitigation capabilities.
Developed countries (DCs) are likely to mitigate problems through technological innovation and institutional redesign. Less developed countries (LDCs) are less likely to mitigate such problems since they lack wealth and expertise. Facing severe environmental problems, people in LDCs may have to leave affected areas, which, in turn, may cause conflict in receiving areas due to several reasons (Reuveny, 2007: 657).
Similar links between population pressure and communal tension—albeit differently applied, is noted in a study of Melanesian countries by Ware (2005) who found that links between pressures from population density, limited opportunities for migration, and increased inter- communal tension.
Schwartz and Randall (2003), project that the consequences of climate change-related environmental pressures will threaten US national interest because “abrupt climate change lowers the world’s carrying capacity, [and as a result,] aggressive wars are likely to be fought over food, water and energy” (Schwartz & Randall, 2003: 15). This scenario, according to them will further impose humanitarian interventions responsibilities for the United States.
While emphasizing the need for caution in order not to overstate the causal linkage between climate change and armed conflict, both Pervis and Busby (2004) as well as Barnett (2001) acknowledge that depletion of natural resources as well as the resultant changes in the patterns of access and distribution of available ones (resources) have the potential, under certain conditions, to aggravate the risk of some forms of violent conflict.
Raleigh and Urdal (2007) explain three processes which are expected to be triggered by climate change thereby leading to conflict. These include increased degradation of cropland, increased freshwater scarcity and increased population displacement. Reasons why these will impact on social systems are due to their relationship with livelihood. They explain that:
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Climate change is likely to influence the food-producing capacity in many areas. While some areas may experience a reduction in crop yields, others are likely to benefit. One important factor is temperature. While an increase in temperature of a few degrees is projected to generally increase crop yields in temperate areas, greater warming may reduce agricultural output. In tropical areas, where dry land agriculture dominates, even minimal increases in temperature may be detrimental to food production (Raleigh and Urdal, 2007:
677).
He points out however that although degradation of soil and water resources is likely to be intensified by adverse changes in temperature and precipitation, the nature of adaptation strategies and interventions may help in mitigating the impacts of these changes (ibid: 677).
How then does vulnerability transform into violent conflicts?