CHAPTER 10: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION(S) & RECOMMENDATIONS 199-208
2.1 Concept of Freedom
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terms will be used interchangeably in this study: Press, Media; Media Independence, Editorial Independence; and Media Freedom and Press Freedom / Expression.
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In his work On Liberty (1859), John Stuart Mills argued extensively on freedom of expression on the premise that people need to freely express their opinion in society, pointing out that traditionally, if governments are not accountable to the citizens, they will rule in their own interests instead of the interests of the citizens (Brink, 2008:40). Thus citizens need to be informed appropriately because without this, the governed will not be in a position to hold to account the governors (Opuamie-Ngoa, 2010:2). Mills‟ position on the above argument gives an indication that he did not preach free speech absolutism (Gauthier, 1999:203; Riley, 2008:166), but rather a general policy of laissez-faire which postulates that unless expressions directly inflicts grievous harms on others without consent, they should be left alone (Riley, 2008:166).
The original notion of freedom in the liberal thinking carried a positive connotation instead of negative. It sought “freedom for something, not freedom from something” (Nordenstreng, 2007:19).
In the same vein, Cohen-Almagor (2006:241) explained that “the freedoms the media enjoy in covering events are respected as long as they do not oppose the basic values that underlie the society in which they operate: not harming others, and respecting others.” The press undoubtedly plays a fundamental role in ensuring that citizens‟ right of freedom of expression is enjoyed because the press functions as a canal for information conveyance with a spill-over effect of contributing to the development of entire societies. In the absence of the press, “society would remain in the darkness of ignorance” (Mohd Sani, 2004:343). This is further expounded by the words of Alexis de Tocqueville.
The more I observe the main effects of a free press, the more convinced I am that, in the modern world, freedom of the press is the principal and, so to say, the constitutive element in freedom (Alexis de Tocqueville, 1805-1859; cited in Ahrend, 2002).
The freedom to publish has remained a central feature in the liberal theory of a free press.
Through this freedom, the press is deemed a representative because anyone is at liberty to begin to publish a newspaper once the publisher could find audience to buy to sustain it economically.
Pluralism and interests in society are the objectives for warranting this freedom of the press because papers were not censored prior to publication. This sets the platform for every citizen with an opinion to find a place to express it (Royal Commission on the Press [RCP], 1977:9;
cited in Curran, 1979:68). For instance, under the French Press Law of 1881, freedom of the
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media was defined vividly as the “right of every individual to publish their own newspapers or books within the legal restrictions of their protecting the interests of other citizens and the institutions of the republic” (Barbrook, 1995:4). It is argued that the liberty granted the press was premised on two major lines: firstly, the freedom of a publisher to publish what he wishes and secondly, the freedom of the reader to read what he wants (RCP, 1962:98; cited in Curran, 1979:77). This purports that freedom of the media is essentially a demand of the right to free speech of opinions and without press, freedom of expression is non-existent. Consequently, any form of control of the press connotes direct control of citizens‟ freedom of speech (Mohd Sani, 2004:358-361). Buttressing this stance, Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001) pointed out that journalism is so essential that entities that intend to repress freedom must first repress the media because they represent the voice of the people.
Through the blend of the philosophical works of Locke, J. J. Rousseau, Marie Voltaire Milton, Jefferson, Adam Smith, Stuart Mill, and Oliver Holmes, the „marketplace model‟ of communication in society evolved. The media are defined as the „market‟ in this model, and serve at the information and opinion level of society as the major basis of this market. The paradigm holds that as much as possible the marketplace should be essentially free because a free market by the dictates of this model paves way to finding the truth which is believed to be the surest avenue to get ideas, information and opinions (Merrill, 1989:12). According to Merrill, the assumptions of the marketplace model are three-fold, and take as their starting point that:
the audience of the media can control these media and keep them accountable for their actions;
the audience is knowledgeable and concerned, and to some degree, a potent and largely monolithic as well; and
when people know the good, they will see to it that others [e.g. managers] know and do the good (Merrill, 1989:13).
Thus, through the liberal view, the freedom that the market offers enables anyone to put across an opinion in the media. This enlarges the participation net for public debate and ensures that all important viewpoints can be published (Curran, 2002:225).
However, the liberal-democratic custom which recognises that press freedom as a precondition to finding the truth in a „market place of ideas‟ has been contested and critiqued for
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its potential of worsening tensions and rivalry, thus benefitting the opinions of groups who have access to mediated communication (Voltmer, 2006:3; cited in Wasserman, 2010:568). The liberal belief that anyone is at liberty to publish a paper in the commercial market has been deemed an illusion (Curran, 1979:68). This is because the enjoyment of the right of freedom of speech relies exclusively on information access through the communication outlets which, currently, are deemed to be commodities and highly commercialised. The majority of the poor historically have been denied access to such freedoms. Freedom of the media from this perspective is viewed as hindered by commercial interests with a spill over effect to a narrow concept of the public and its interests (Wasserman, 2010:574).
Writing on boundaries of the free expression debate, Cohen-Almagor (2006:244) suggested that “we should take into account four factors – the content of the expression, the manner of expression, the intention of the speaker and the circumstances”. Moreover, this concern is made clear in manner in which Glasser and Ettema (1989) have shaped the definition of news as “news is what will sell papers”, “news is what the public wants to read”, and “news is what raises eyebrow” (cited in Zelizer, 2004:26). Supporting this stance, Lapham (1989:78) argued that “journalists are storytellers subject to the superstitions of their audiences. Like any other storyteller, the journalist is obliged to drum up a crowd. To keep the crowd‟s attention, he‟s got to tell the crowd more or less what the crowd expects to hear”. These assertions are reminiscent of why the concepts of framing and agenda-setting have taken a broader spectrum in mass media generally. They are among the reasons that Cohen-Almagor (2006:241-2) observed that media is one of the major institutions that would be undermined, and democracy could not function as expected if freedom of speech is not ensured. For instance, although documentation from the International Community, for instance, the 1945 UNESCO Constitution, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the Millennium Declaration of 2000 made mention of the notion of media freedom, their contexts were quite distinct and distant from the absolutist position being advocated by the media fraternity, especially commercial media owners who define freedom to exclude of state control and the employment of legal regulation. The latter is a concept of negative freedom and does not receive backing from International law.
What the libertarian position proposes is an idea of positive freedom whereby freedom itself is not deemed as a finished product requiring protection, but a mechanism to ensure that other
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elements like peace and democracy are able to flourish (Nordenstreng, 2007:16). Furthermore,
“no one can reasonably make a demand for freedom in an unqualified sense – a freedom to do anything one pleases. For it is morally impossible to approve all freedoms” (Hook, 1970:10).