CHAPTER 4: AFTER THE GENOCIDE: 1994-1999
4.3. The silenced narratives
4.3.2. Counter narratives
Kagame made to the effect that it would take them only a couple of days to ‘clean- up’ the intimidators in the camps (2000, 142).
After 1996, Umutesi describes how the refugee camps in the DRC were forcibly closed down, while at the same time the country was swept into a confusion of uprisings and civil war. She describes her harrowing trek across the DRC, while being pursued, she claims, by the RPF who wanted to eliminate every surviving refugee. At this point, Umutesi describes herself as being forgotten by the international community, labeled a genocidaire, and deserving of the hell she found herself in (2000, 102). Some tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of
refugees were killed either in stampedes, from hunger and disease or as a result of direct violence meted out upon them by the RPF and various factions within the DRC who wanted the camps closed and perceived the refugees as a threat (Umutesi, 2000; Pottier, 2001).
The narrative of the ‘cleaning-up’ of the camps remains a largely silent one.
Further, the many stories of suffering of what are referred to as ‘new case-load’
refugees are also silent as they are said to be incomparable, even unimportant, in the light of genocide. But the implications of these stories, and the suffering and agony they hold, remaining unspoken, unheard, and unacknowledged may become a block in the process of healing and reconciliation.
By August, 1995, the Government of National Unity started to disintegrate when Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu left the cabinet along with the Interior Minister, Seth Sendashonga and three other ministers, four Hutu and one Tutsi.
Sendashonga claimed having been threatened for criticizing RPF measures:
“accusing [the RPA] of creating an atmosphere of tension and insecurity in the country. He quoted arbitrary arrests, the prison system and an oppressive attitude towards the majority community that, in his view, were reversing the process of reconciliation in the country” (Khan, 2000, 148). Twagiramungu claimed there was
‘a government within a government’ that made all the crucial decisions.
Amidst this political critique there was a growing concern with regard to possible human rights abuses committed by the RPF and the new Rwandan Patriotic Army. The RPF was heralded the savior of Rwanda for bringing an end to
genocide, something the international community and United Nations failed to do.
But along with this heroic act also came less praiseworthy reports. The massacres of former government agents and employees, along with their families, at Byumba and Ngarama are perhaps the best known (Prunier, 1995, 359; Des Forges, 1999;
Dallaire, 2001, 378). Des Forges describes how many of those Hutu who did not flee with the former government to the DRC, were rounded up in stadiums and murdered (1999, 801). A commonly known massacre event is that of the three bishops and ten priests who were killed by RPF soldiers in Kabgayi (Des Forges, 1999; Dallaire, 2001, 414). Des Forges reports how people were told that they would receive essential foods if they would assemble at a public place. Once there, the killing sprees would start (Des Forges, 1999, 802).
Apart from massacres, summary and arbitrary executions and assassinations were also common. People seen as a threat to the RPF were often killed at their homes, with former government leaders and officials particularly targeted (Des Forges, 1999, 806). Some people mysteriously ‘disappeared’. Dallaire makes mention of rumours of secret interrogations at checkpoints for returnees. And when UN personnel saw a truckload of returnees being waved to one side, over a hill, at an RPF roadblock and then were prevented from observing what was going on behind the hill, Dallaire saw this as “personal proof that Kagame was allowing the security checks of returnees to go beyond what had been discussed with me and I could only think the worst” (2001, 503).
Prunier describes the high level of confusion in Rwanda after the genocide, where fresh corpses were dumped with old corpses, making evidence for RPF violence difficult to ascertain (1995, 360). In fact he describes a scenario where there were
‘so many unburied corpses lying around’ that ‘a fair amount of killing could easily be passed off as part of the general mayhem’ (1995, 361).
Further, humanitarians as well as the UN were systematically denied entrance to certain parts of the country. International Red Cross staff, refusing to close down their hospital in Nyanza, were repeatedly threatened until they gave in. In this way, access and information were controlled by the RPF, compromising the ability of human rights observers to do their job, and bringing to question what the RPF was up to in these closed areas (Des Forges, 1999, 810).
The RPF leadership maintained that all these acts of violence were random acts by undisciplined soldiers, particularly new recruits from within Rwanda who had survived genocide, and would be dealt with internally. Dallaire makes mention of how this was indeed the case, with guilty soldiers often being summarily shot (1999, 344). However, the RPF denied and still deny the growing evidence that seems to point to possible systematic, planned killing from higher levels of leadership.
A damning report in terms of human rights abuses came from Robert Gersony and a team of two others, who were undertaking research for the UNHCR into speeding up the repatriation of refugees. Their report stated that the RPF had engaged in “clearly systematic murders and persecution of the Hutu population in certain parts of the country” (Des Forges, 1999, 705). “They reported massacres following meetings convoked by the authorities, murders committed by assailants who went from house to house, and the hunting down and murder of people in hiding” (Des Forges, 1999, 705).The Gersony report estimated that between April and August of 1994, between 25 000 and 45 000 people had been killed (Prunier, 1995, 360; Des Forges, 1999, 706).
This report was made available to the United Nations leadership, who immediately briefed the Rwandan government on the findings. Khan describes in his book
how Gersony’s report was taken very seriously, and that an independent UN research team found his claims unfounded. Khan revealed these further
investigations to Gersony, who apparently “expressed his complete satisfaction at the way his report had been received by UNAMIR and the Rwandan government”
(Khan, 2000, 54). From here on, the Gersony report was suppressed. Des Forges writes that when attempting to gain access to the report the reply was: “We wish to inform you that the ‘Gersony Report does not exist” (Des Forges, 1999, 707).
Khan diplomatically suggests that rather than RPF arranged massacres there was an increase of violence from Burundian Tutsi towards returning Rwandan Hutu refugees; he even suggests that some higher leader in the RPA could have played a role in this, but he refuses to give any sway to the idea that it could have been preplanned from the top levels of the RPA (2000, 55).