2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.13. Donor Conference, September 1998
This conference was attended by 48 major countries and donor organizations such as Britain, the United States, African countries such as South Africa, Middle Eastern and Asian countries as well as the UN, AU, IMF and the World Bank. The government published its policy framework for the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase II (LRRP II) and gathered financial support for it. The government estimated that it would need US$1.1 billion for the land reform process for the land acquisition, development, infrastructure and services such as roads, schools, clinics and farming implements. The government also required money to provide as credit for the resettled farmers as banks were not willing to lend the money. This plan intended the compulsory purchase over five years of 5 million hectares from the 11 million hectares owned by black and white commercial farmers, parastatals, corporations and multi-national companies. The government intended to purchase 1 million hectares every year for five years from 1998 to 2003 for redistribution. All the participants at this conference agreed and passed a resolution that land reform was essential for poverty reduction, economic growth and political stability. They also agreed with the urgency and fast track aspect of the programme. However, there was little commitment financially, with the major donors only pledging US$100 million. This came with conditions such as that from Britain which insisted that the land acquisition should not be compulsory but on a willing buyer– willing seller basis.
39 2.14 Compulsory Acquisition Of Land
The policy proposed to compensate the infrastructure and capital improvements made on the farms. However, this was challenged constitutionally by the farmers and led to donors cut aid with only US$ 100 million being pledged at the conference. The 1992 Land Acquisition Act was enacted to speed up the land reform process by removing the “willing seller– willing buyer”
clause, limiting the size of farms and introducing a land tax, although the tax was never implemented. The Act empowered the government to buy land compulsorily for redistribution, and a fair compensation was to be paid for land acquired. Landowners could challenge in court the price set by the acquiring authority. Opposition by landowners increased throughout the period of 1992 to 1997.
British contribution in terms of aid to Zimbabwe stood at a half billion pounds since independence. Of this total, £47 million was targeted for land reform, and approximately £100 million was budgetary support which could have been used for land reform. Britain’s initial £44 million resettlement grant, which ran out by 1988, formally expired in 1996.
In the 1990s, less than 1 million hectares (2.47 million acres) were acquired, and fewer than 20,000 families were resettled. Much of the land acquired during what has become known as
“phase one” of land reform was of poor quality, according to Human Rights Watch. Only 19 percent of the almost 3.5 million hectares (8.65 million acres) of resettled land was considered prime, or farmable.
In 1997 the government published a list of 1,471 farmlands it intended to buy compulsorily for redistribution. The list was compiled via a nationwide land identification exercise undertaken throughout the year. Landowners were given thirty days (as the Act demanded) to submit written objections.
On 5 November 1997, Britain described the new Labour government’s approach to Zimbabwean land reform. The British government did not accept that Britain had a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. Notwithstanding the Lancaster House
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commitments, Short stated that the government was only prepared to support a programme of land reform that was part of a poverty eradication strategy.
The British government stated that the programme of rapid land acquisition would be impossible to support, citing concern about the damage which this might do to Zimbabwe's agricultural output and its prospects of attracting investment.
In June 1998, the Zimbabwe government published its “policy framework” on the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase II (LRRP II), which envisaged the compulsory purchase over five years of 50,000 square kilometres from the 112,000 square kilometres owned by white commercial farmers, public corporations, churches, non-governmental organisations and multinational companies. Broken down, the 50,000 square kilometres meant that every year between 1998 and 2003, the government intended to purchase 10,000 square kilometres for redistribution.
In September 1998, the government called a donors’ conference in Harare on LRRP II to inform the donor community and involve them in the programme. Forty-eight countries and international organisations attended and unanimously endorsed the land programme, saying it was essential for poverty reduction, political stability and economic growth. They agreed that the inception phase, covering the first 24 months, should start immediately, particularly appreciating the political imperative and urgency of the proposal.
The Commercial Farmers’ Union freely offered to sell the government 15,000 sq. kilometres for redistribution, but landowners once again dragged their feet. In response to moves by the National Constitutional Assembly, a group of academics, trade unionists and other political activists, the government drafted a new constitution. The draft was discussed widely by the public in formal meetings and amended to include restrictions on presidential powers, limits to the presidential term of office, and an age limit of 70 for presidential candidates. This was not seen as a suitable outcome for the government, and subsequently the proposals were amended to replace those clauses with one to compulsorily acquire land for redistribution without
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compensation. The opposition mostly boycotted the drafting stage of the constitution, claiming that this new version was set to entrench Mugabe politically.