2.3 Experiential Learning in Business Process Management Courses
2.3.6 Experiential Learning: Theoretical Underpinnings
Experiential learning, which combines reflective practice with experience, came to the fore in the 1980s. According to Moon (2000), Kolb significantly boosted experiential learning, although Boud may have been more influential in increasing awareness of reflection (Boud et al., 1985). Reflection as a business tool was fostered by the publication of the definitive work on the reflective practitioner by Schön (1983). Nevertheless, Moon (2000) warned that experiential learning remained a broad topic with unclear definitions. A lack of clarity in understanding the levels of experience required for learning obscures the relationships between experience, learning, and reflection. This has exacerbated the lack of understanding of the intentions and attitude of the learner towards learning.
Experiential learning continues to be controversial for learning outcomes (Miller & Maellaro, 2016; Perusso et al., 2020). Whereas Kolb is most associated with experiential learning, Dewey (1925) is recognised as the originator of learning through reflection. Moon (2000) ascribes reflective practice to four founders: Dewey, Habermas, Kolb, and Schön. According to Moon (2000), Dewey and Habermas form the backbone of reflective study. The interest of this study centres on Dewey, who describes reflection as a cognitive method of alleviating doubt (Daudelin, 1996). However, the outcome of experiential learning is a cause of dissension. Miettinen (2000) argues that Kolb is more interested in the experiential stages and learning styles and less concerned with either outcomes or reflection. For Habermas and Schön, the outcome of reflection is crucial, whereas it is of lesser importance for Dewey (Moon, 2000). The limited importance of outcomes for pragmatistic Dewey is problematic, as outcomes dominate pragmatism. Dewey is more concerned with the potential for action and talks of “living forward” (d’Agnese, 2017, p. 100).
Moon (2000, p. 100) provides a list of potential outcomes for reflection: learning or material for further reflection; action or other representation of learning; critical review; reflection on the process of learning; the building of theory; self-development; decisions or resolutions of uncertainty; empowerment and emancipation; unexpected outcomes such as ideas that might become solutions; and emotion. Nevertheless, Moon (2000) misses at least one alternative outcome denoted by the Japanese mu or Chinese wu. Mu is also known as the void and is neither yes nor no, thus avoiding separation (Heine, 2014). Reflection may lead to nothing, thereby extending the range of reflection to include non-reflection. Daudelin (1996,
46 p. 41) indirectly addresses the issue by referring to the reflective outcome as “action or (deciding whether to act)”, which resonates with the view of Dewey.
The vagaries of definitions of reflection extend to the definitions of experience (Moon, 2000).
Lack of definitions adds complexity to understanding experiential learning theories, where reflection is indispensable to learning from experience. Although experience is frequently derived outside the classroom, it ranges from physical action to codified action presented in writing or verbal forms (Moon, 2000). Experience may be derived in several ways, from performing an activity through reading a report on action to listening to a lesson. Boud et al.
(1985) describe multiple forms of experiences, including emotion which is internal and not restricted to the classroom.
Reflection is often autonomous and outside the individual’s awareness, especially during monotonous tasks and relaxation behaviour (Daudelin, 1996). However, a repeatable reflective practice needs to consider the implications of the activity, especially in terms of relevancy. The act of considering is a form of reflection which, in essence, results from doubt (Dewey, 1925). Moon (2000) considers the relevance of the learner's learning intention as a moderator to their learning. The potential for learning viewed through the learner's eyes may help educators tailor experiences to facilitate learning. However, the potential for action is part of the tacit dimension (Polanyi, 1969). Likewise, learners may have difficulties explaining how they interpret their experiences. Perusso et al. (2020) observed that a guided dialogical process is critical to improving experiential learning outcomes.
Outcomes of experiential learning can take several forms, including emotion, self-learning, and higher-order learning (Daudelin, 1996; Moon, 2000). As Miettinen (2000) showed in Dewey’s distinction between everyday material activities, not all experiences increase knowledge. Knowledge increase involves non-reflective habits becoming reflective experiences through disruption of habitual experiences. Disruption leading to reflection implies an awareness of the disruption, which occurs when habitual practices are disrupted (Schatzki, 2016). While Daudelin (1996) considered the potential for reflection to be beyond an individual’s awareness, Schatzki (2016) described reflection as an element of awareness.
47 Awareness comprises two modes, attention and thinking. Attention relates to the five human senses and thinking to cognition, including emotions and reflection. Both Daudelin (1996) and Schatzki (2016) explain how seemingly random thoughts or sensory activities can occur while undertaking a practice. This contrasts with the smooth flow promoted by authors such as Kolb and Dewey, who show reflection as a single stage in a continuous cycle of experience – reflection – (re)action – experimentation. According to Schatzki (2016), awareness disrupts the habitual practice flow resulting in a suspension, hold-up or a hiatus of the activity. In experiential learning, this hiatus represents a time of reflection. However, not every experience results in reflection, nor does every person pause to reflect. One reason for this may be due to the nature of the practice. Schatzki (2016) uses the example of moving at a speed that does not allow enough time to reflect, forcing reliance on instinct or physical reaction times. On the surface, Schatzki’s practice theory appears relatively straightforward;
however, it is appreciably complicated. Practice theory primarily involves social practices, not individualism, even though individual senses and reflection are key elements. Social practice is a set of structured activities that are undertaken in a particular field. Reminiscent of Bourdieu, the field encourages individuals with habitus to operate according to the doxa of the field until a crisis occurs (Koch, 2020; Wacquant, 1989). Practices refer to social practice, which encompasses a set of activities performed by a social group. These social practices are combinations of doings and sayings of multiple individuals organised and regulated by a set of rules and teleoaffective behaviours (Schatzki, 2016). Social practices can be implemented as bundles; thus, cooking could be done simultaneously with the practice of listening to a radio service or a conversation with a group of friends. Disruptions to any of the practices could disrupt each of the concurrent practices. Practice activities are inseparable from the material arrangements of bodies and material artefacts that are interconnected like sinews represented by “contiguity, causality, and physical structures” (Schatzki, 2016, p. 26), much like rhizomes (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).
In the current study, business process management can be considered a bundle of social practices of individuals through material arrangements, processes, and information technologies of organisations (Alter, 2013). Likewise, learning may be regarded as a practice undertaken by learners through the material arrangement of educational instruction, education structures, and related equipment.
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