2.6 Reflective Practices
2.6.1 Reflexivity
Cunliffe (2016) takes a pragmatic stance when defining reflexivity as questioning what is taken for granted and examining the effect it may cause. Reflexivity operates at multiple levels, from self-reflexive and constructive to a group level as critical reflexivity (Cunliffe, 2016). Allen et al. (2017) extend reflexivity to action research and call for recognising an ontology for reflexivity different from reflection. Johnson and Duberley (2003) define three types of reflexivity that embrace combinations of ontological and epistemological assumptions centred around change: methodological, deconstructive, and epistemic reflexivity.
Methodological reflexivity sustains objectivity, while deconstructive reflexivity seeks to unpack and revise constructive processes, and epistemic reflexivity is critical and emancipatory.
Change is central to reflexivity and is approached through reflection (Hibbert, 2013).
Recognition of change in reflexivity is fundamental in Archer’s morphogenetic approach (Archer, 2010). For Archer, reflexivity is the internal conversation that mediates agents’
internal and external worlds (Vogler, 2016). Reflexivity is a mediator between structure and agency, referred to as morphostasis and morphogenesis (Archer, 2010). Morphostasis is the process in complex systems that preserves the status quo, while morphogenesis is the process
70 that brings about a change of state, form, or structure (Archer, 2010). Fast-paced globalisation has resulted in 'unprecedented morphogenesis' (Archer, 2010, p. 284), which has produced instabilities in social structures and increased reliance on agents’ powers, further destabilising structures. While this makes morphostatic decisions uncertain, it unlocks agents' opportunity to make morphogenetic changes of new connections between existing structures through reflexivity (Archer, 2010). Archer’s morphogenetic explanatory framework outcomes can be reproductory or transformative based on intertwining the stratified ontology of structure, culture, and agency. However, the layers are not inseparable as in the agential theory of Barad (2003) but resemble the imbrication of Leonardi (2013). Archer (2010) relates the inseparability to emergence and double morphogenesis, whereby agents themselves change to pursue social change.
Archer situates the morphogenetic approach between pragmatism and critical realism and criticises extreme versions of each as either too internally focused on agents (pragmatism) or externally focused on structure (critical realism). Pragmatism exploits reflexivity to overcome habitual personal action blocked by problematic situations, while the layered ontology of critical realism uses reflexivity to understand and adjust action to conform to underlying structures (Archer, 2010). Although this view may hold appeal, it is confounded by social structures concealed in the real domain beyond the veiled actual domain and observable empirical domains (Bhaskar, 2008). Efforts to understand the hidden social dispositions have found Bourdieu meaningful (Archer, 2010; Elder-Vass, 2007; Vogler, 2016). According to Archer (2010, p. 272), “many scholars accord routine action a central role in social theory and defend the continuing relevance of Bourdieu’s habitus. Simultaneously many recognise the importance of reflexivity.” Similarities of the morphogenetic approach of Archer are seen in Bourdieu’ habitus. Like Archer, Bourdieu’s habitus takes a middle ground between structure and agency (Koch, 2020). Habitus guides practice through doxa, unquestioned social practices until a state of crisis occurs (Koch, 2020). Crises result in either an authoritative power with a limited range of possibilities for action referred to by Bourdieu as orthodoxy (Koch, 2020).
While orthodoxy brings about restoration and is the most common result of a crisis, heterodoxy opens the future to bring about change through conscious action (Koch, 2020). In the advent of disruption, morphogenesis may be compared to heterodoxy and morphostatic to orthodoxy.
71 Consequently, habit and habitus reinforce existing social structures. Habit reframes the structural, cultural, and agential domains to the extent of maintaining them. In Archer’s terms, the ruling status quo is retained in a morphostatic position. However, this does not reduce everything to a static role, as habits must be formed and reformed to fit the culture and social structure, much like Bourdieu’s habitus. On the other hand, morphogenesis is observed in the layer of agency constrained by higher layers of structure and culture. Thus, there is a continuum between morphostasis and morphogenesis with unlimited hybridisation between the state's extremes (Archer, 2010).
Archer (2010) prefers the term parity to hybridisation, representing variances across populations compared to hegemonic positioning between the two poles. Archer (2010) provides a broad differentiation for different reflexivity modes: communicative, autonomous;
meta; and fractured reflexives.
• Communicative reflexives
Communicative reflexives are internal conversations that require completion and confirmation by others before resulting in courses of action.
• Autonomous reflexives
Autonomous reflexives are self-contained internal conversations that lead directly to action.
• Meta-reflexives
Metareflexives are critically reflexive internal conversations that are critical about effective action in society.
• Fractured reflexives
Fractured reflexives are internal conversations that intensify distress and disorientation rather than leading to purposeful courses of action.
The mirror metaphor for reflectively observing actions may lead to change in practice, but transformation occurs only through reflexive action (Hibbert et al., 2010; McIntosh, 2010).
Reflective practice causes change through a recursive reflexivity process (Hibbert et al., 2010).
Thus, reflexive habits lead to action derived from the relationship between reflection and recursion mediated by a process of change. Reflection and recursion are the main aspects of experiential learning theory (Dewey, 1938; Kolb, 2015). Hibbert et al. (2010) encourage examining reflection and recursion in relation to each other. From a Peircean perspective,
72 reflexivity can be viewed as a second formed from the firsts of reflection, recursion, and change to form a third (Plowright, 2016).
Hibbert et al. (2010) propose a four-quadrant reflexivity model to describe relationships between reflection and recursion. In the model, reflection is either closed to self or open to others, and recursion can be active or passive. Superimposing reflection as a continuum perpendicular to the recursion continuum portrays the four dimensions of the reflexivity model as depicted in Figure 2.7. Hibbert et al. (2010) emphasise that the model is a method of understanding the relationship between reflection and recursion relative to reflexivity and is not intended as a taxonomy.
Figure 2.7. Four dimensions of reflexivity (Hibbert et al., 2010).
• Extension – Reflective Self and Active Recursion
Reflection is self-focused, but a level of shock or stuckness leads to active recursivity.
Comparable to Archer’s autonomous reflexivity.
• Disruption – Reflective Other and Active Recursion
Disruptive reflexivity with active recursion and reflection focuses on others and may become disruptive to self. Comparable to Archer’s fractured reflexivity.
• Repetition – Reflective Self and Passive Recursion
Reflexivity is bounded by passive recursivity and self-focused reflection. Comparable to Archer’s communicative reflexivity and possibly Bourdieu’s reflexivity.
• Participation – Reflective Other and Passive Recursion
Participatory reflexivity is reflectively open to others and passively recursive, leading to trust and dialogue. Comparable to Archer’s meta-reflexive.
73 Reflexivity is central to ethical living for Cunliffe (2016), who defines reflexive practice as 'subjective understandings of reality as a basis for thinking more critically about the impact of our assumptions, values, and actions on others' (Cunliffe, 2004, p. 407). Thus, Cunliffe (2004) combines subjectivity and objectivity in reflexivity. Subjective dealings with others challenge the subjective understanding of reality and critically think about social interactions. Critical thinking is mediated by assumptions, values, and actions, thereby linking critical reflexivity to disconcerting or disturbing a person’s equilibrium. Subsequently, Cunliffe (2016) defined reflexive practice as “[q]uestioning what we, and others, might be taking for granted—what is being said and not said—and examining the impact this has or might have” (Cunliffe, 2016, p. 741). The change towards a more robust ethical intersubjective stance reveals a more in- depth focus on relationships and a socially constructed understanding of the world. From a Peircean perspective, Cunliffe moves deeper into the territory of secondness. Cunliffe (2004) provided a sense-making map of reflex interaction, reflective analysis and critical reflexive questioning with reflexive class activities and the use of reflexive journals. Reflex journals 'are incredibly useful in terms of helping students understand the difference between reflection and reflexivity and how to be reflexive' (Cunliffe, 2016, p. 744). Thus, Cunliffe separates reflection from reflexivity and consequently from the practice of being reflexive. Together reflection, reflexivity, and reflexive action reflect pragmatist views from disrupted habit that leads to action through reflection. Figure 2.8 shows Cunliffe’s concept of reflexivity concerning objectivity and subjectivity. The reflex action mediates objective reflective analysis and subjective critical reflexive examination.
Figure 2.8. Reflex interaction, reflective analysis and critically reflexive questioning (Cunliffe, 2004).
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