CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 9: SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
9.2 FROM DE-MOBILISATION TO RE-MOBILISATION AND RENEWAL
The lull in working class struggle or civil soCiety activation was longer and deeper than
suggested by some authors (Ballard, et 01. 2006a; Dawson, 2010). It involved both physical and ideological (discursive) decline of the movement of struggle such as the dismantling of
organisations such as the UDF and retreat from more radical forms of democracy propounded by sections of the anti-apartheid movement (McKeever, 2001; Seekings, 2000). The role of the working class was discursively displaced by the adulatory history of great heroes and amazing organisations that liberated the nation (Sihlongonyane, 2010). Historical agency was attributed to elites. There was attenuation of the vision of socialist transformation that inspired many (Jacquin, 1999). Big capital was redefined as a "social partner" rather than an adversary (Butler, 2007; Gevisser, 2009; Naidoo, 2010). The working class movement was dismembered and the unity that proved so formidable against apartheid was politically scuttled. It is argued here that the literature on the post-apartheid "new social movements" tends to emphasise the newness of these struggles to an extent that obscures the continuities and inherited problems
emanating from the (apartheid) era of demobilisation. These problems have not been
adequately identified, addressed and overcome in order to give impetus to the re-mobilisation and renewal of struggle.
A major feature of the community protests is their isolation from one another. There appears to be little solidarity. It can be argued that solidarity is the heart and soul of the working class movement because workers need support from other workers if they are to win their demands given the power configuration in capitalist society (Grossman, 1985; Lebowitz, 1992). The findings suggest that the isolation of struggles tends to make it easier for the state to quell the protests and re-assert its hegemony over rebellious communities. Victories are attenuated, for example, despite Khutsong's victory, this has only indirectly informed and strengthened similar struggles around demarcation (Duncan, 2010). The Harrismith movement inspired a series of similar eruptions in nearby Free State towns but it had to face state repression alone. If the protest movement continues divided, it will fall or not achieve much. The power-holders will learn to remove its counter-hegemonic sting and the protests might become "normalised"
happenings in the South African political landscape. This is likely to weaken the protests' challenge to the dominant neoliberal order and generally undermine the re-mobilisation and renewal of struggle.
In line with Gramsci's (1971) observations, the South African ruling class deploys force and persuasion against the protests. From the case studies it emerged that open challenge provokes a concerted propaganda campaign against protest leaders and the incipient
oppositional movements. In addition to demon ising the protests, the ruling elite find means to co-opt selected protest leaders and buy community support through the granting of
concessions. These hegemonic moves are also accompanied by more direct forms of
repression: teargas, rubber bullets, live ammunition, arrests, beatings, torture and homicide are just some of the methods used by the state police against the protesters (Sinwell, Kirshner, et 01. 2009). It is my contention that the mix of force and persuasion in the state response
depends on several factors but, in general, the struggle by the ruling class and party to assert its hegemony is key. For example, the response to the Harrismith protest in 2004, one of the earliest of the "service delivery protests", was severe with leaders singled out and made to face sedition, treason and other disproportionately hyperbolic charges. But it is noteworthy that as the community protests proliferate, the state's response has been more considered, less panic- stricken and even tolerant of the protests aiming at isolating and containing the protests rather than using naked brute force. The expulsion of a hated mayor or councillor, visits by the premier, minister of local government or even the state president himself, are some of the methods used to placate restive communities. But as Gramsci has pointed out, the softer approach does not entirely remove the big stick which is now and again wielded, but always subject to hegemonic considerations.
Another obstacle to the renewal of the working class movement of struggle is the new, divisive and dangerous emergence of xenophobia which some commentators have cast as a form of popular protest (Glaser, 2008). Some commentators have insisted that there is a line of demarcation between xenophobic violence and service delivery protests (Alexander, 2010).
The evidence in this study supports the latter view but is concerned with the lack of a political
outlet and relief for the frustration building up in poor working class communities which, in the absence of progressive leadership and political project, sometimes can assume the form of xenophobia. Research into xenophobia suggests that it is often anger and frustration around service delivery issues and the deteriorating living standards that provides the backdrop to such attacks (Everrat, 2010). A chauvinist-nationalistic understanding of the "democracy-delivery dialectic" can also be partly blamed for the attacks.
Xenophobia is a real danger in a militant movement that has not fully clarified its politics, that is diverse and that appears to lack solid grounding in working class politics and solidarity.
Neoliberal ideology promotes a form of competitive individualism that can feed into
xenophobia. In Alexandra township, the epicenter of the 2008 attacks, the state delivered too few houses and allocated them on the basis of unclear criteria leading to the development of explosive tensions in this working class community (Sinwell, 2010b). The community
organisations in Alexandra, because of working within the neoliberal hegemony and its budgetary constraints, ended up engaged in a zero-sum competition for housing (ibid). These considerations underline the importance of the post-apartheid protest movement developing a set of ideas that are counter-hegemonic in an inclusive and progressive way in the course of the
re-mobilisation and renewal of struggle. The progressive role played by some social movement
organisations, such as the SECC, APF and TAC, in the formation of the timely Coalition Against Xenophobia that organised the biggest mass demonstration against this scourge in the aftermath of the 2008 attacks, suggests that the resistance movement can contribute to the eradication rather than promotion of xenophobia (Ngwane and Vilakazi, 2010). This requires progressive social movements to consciously develop and commit themselves to anti-
xenophobic forms of oppositional knowledge. Often this involves, inter alia, a critique of the historical basis of the birth of African national states in colonial borders drawn up by Africa's colonisers (ibid); that is, developing counter-hegemonic perspectives.