CHAPTER 2: NON-VIOLENCE, THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE AND THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH IN ZIMBABWE
4.3 Understanding violence
4.3.1 Galtung’s theory of violence
Johan Galtung (1990; 1996; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2004; and in many other publications), one of the founding scholars of the discipline of peace studies whose pioneering work influences much of the contemporary work done so far, distinguishes between direct and indirect violence.
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Galtung (1998) elaborates this distinction in a simplified way by describing direct violence as visible while indirect violence is invisible.
Direct violence
Direct violence refers to physical or verbal abuse, or threat of abuse. This is the most commonly identified and visible form of violence as it is a direct act. It is visible as behaviour seen in a person, group or organisation that carries out the act of violence. It includes physical as well as emotional, verbal and psychological violence. Galtung (1999) argues that because it is the most common, it is also the most feared. All the acts of violence that were perpetrated by youth militias in Gutu district during election periods, just like in many other parts of Zimbabwe, fit in this categorisation. The tension, polarisation and general culture of fear being experienced in Zimbabwe can be traced back to the acts of direct violence that the people experienced. The ending or prevention of direct violence results in what Galtung calls negative peace, a concept explained in Section 4.6 below.
Structural violence
Galtung coined the term structural violence as a result of fieldwork in Zimbabwe during colonial rule, then known as Rhodesia. He became increasingly aware of the limitations of defining peace as the absence of violence. He noticed that while there was little direct violence by the colonial authorities against the native population, there were structures in society which had significant negative effects on them:
In a certain sense, there was harmony, cooperation and integration. But was this peace?
With the blatant exploitation, with blacks being denied most opportunities for development given to whites, with flagrant inequality whereby white were making about twenty times as much for exactly the same job as blacks? Not to mention the basic fact that this was still a white colony (Galtung, 1985, p145)
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In agreeing with Galtung, Jeong (2000) and Harris (2003) also elaborate that structural violence describes the structures which maintain the dominance of one group at the centre of power over another group at the periphery. At a practical level for those at the periphery, it can mean low wages, landlessness, illiteracy, poor health, limited and or non-existent political representation or legal rights and, in general, limited control over their lives. If those that suffer structural violence resist or try to change it, they may be met with direct violence. The exploitation, neglect and exclusion, which are features of structural violence, kill slowly by comparison with direct violence but kill vastly more people. Galtung (1999) argues that structural violence may be as bad as, or worse than, direct violence. As Paulo Freire (1998, p37) aptly posits, oppression can be camouflaged in a “situation in which one person exploits another person or hinders his or her pursuit of self affirmation as a responsible person. Such a situation in itself constitutes violence, even when sweetened by false generosity, because it interferes with the individual’s ontological and historical vocation to be more fully human”. In that sense, oppression as a form of structural violence can be maintained by manipulation of relations.
Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2004, p viii-xxii) confirms the existence of structural violence in Zimbabwe, which he traces back to “gross inequalities inherited from settler colonial rule”. He also notes the continuing legacy of structural inequality in the sphere of the economy after independence in 1980, and highlights a particularly damaging feature of the ruling party’s response to the crisis in Zimbabwe which he refers to as “the state’s overarching articulation of an intolerant, selective and racialised nationalist discourse”. This is corroborated by Muzondidya, (2004), who notes that Colonial Rhodesia, like most colonies of the region, was a fragmented or bifurcated state in which race, colour and historic origin determined one’s access to resources and position in society. Muzondidya’s analysis of the land reform process after independence led him to conclude that the post-independence order has not led to the disappearance of the old segmented, racial and ethnic order. He argues that since its defeat in the constitutional referendum of 2000, the Zimbabwean government abandoned both its conciliatory political approach and the inclusive nationalism of the early period and adopted a radical, exclusive nationalist stance, coupled with the extensive deployment of violence which
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resulted in a serious polarisation of society. Such discrimination, as Jeong (2000, p20-21) explains, results in denying people important rights such as economic opportunities, social and political equality and a sense of autonomy and freedom. The gross violation of human rights and dignity prevents the optimum development of each human being. If human beings are denied decent education, housing, an opportunity to work and freedom to express themselves, they become marginalised. Conditions for social fragmentation are created by a lack of equity and freedom. In some societies, an oppressive structure is maintained simply by its ability to put down revolts and other types of challenges. Organised struggle against repression is very difficult under tight social control and fear of prosecution. This explanation succinctly reflects the situation that prevailed in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2008, a period of unprecedented economic downturn and political repression, as described in Section 1.2 and Section 2.3 of this thesis which discuss the context in Zimbabwe.
Cultural Violence
According to Galtung (1996, p196), cultural violence refers to those aspects of culture that are exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, science and other symbols that can be used to justify or legitimise direct or structural violence. He postulates that “cultural violence makes direct and structural violence look, even feel right – or at least not wrong.” He proffers that the study of cultural violence highlights the way in which the act of direct violence and the fact of structural violence are legitimised and thus rendered acceptable in society. Galtung says that one way cultural violence works is by changing the moral colour of an act from wrong to right or at least to being acceptable. Cultural violence teaches, preaches, admonishes and dulls people into submission and acceptance of exploitation and inequality. Such a situation favours those that benefit from the system, especially the ruling elite who view any challenge to their privileges as promoting instability or ‘anarchy’. Indeed, a major form of cultural violence indulged in by the ruling elites is to blame the victims of structural violence to protect the status quo.
Jeong (2000, p75) highlights cultural violence by using the example of gender. He argues that violence against women represents a form of social control that limits their ability in every
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aspect of life. “While both women and men are victims of sexism, racism, human rights abuses and poverty, there are particular types of violence that afflict women more than men”, he says.
He blames this on patriarchy, which he says is the central concept that determines virtually all human enterprises while illustrating the historical and social dimensions of women’s exploitation and oppression. It represents a set of beliefs and values supported by dominant social and political institutions that are backed by the threat of punishment, as Galtung argues above.
In Zimbabwe, besides the institution of patriarchy that generally favours men, a culture of violence was systematically institutionalised among the youths who underwent training under the banner of National Youth Service, and to them, committing violence in the name of patriotism became ‘acceptable’. Patriotism was narrowed down to protecting the interests of ZANU-PF and President Robert Mugabe against any forms of dissent or political opposition, perceived or real.