CHAPTER 2: NON-VIOLENCE, THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE AND THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH IN ZIMBABWE
2.2 The philosophy of non-violence
2.2.3 The Non-violent Action according to Gene Sharp
In advancing the knowledge and understanding of the technique of non-violent struggle and its potential, Gene Sharp has pushed the frontiers of non-violence to new levels by carefully studying and being influenced by Gandhi’s ideas on power and strategy. Although he admits that the ways non-violent struggles operate are complex and variable to the effect that no two cases of this technique are identical, his work offers new insights that deliberately refines the way the strategy works (Sharp, 1973; 2002; 2005).
While acknowledging the crucial roles played by Gandhi and King to popularize the strategy through the movements that they led or were involved in, Sharp warns people not to limit themselves to the work of the two as those movements are by no means representative of all non-violent action. He postulates that non-violent struggles are not new historically as “they have occurred in widely differing cultures, periods of history and political conditions” although historians have generally neglected this type of struggle (Sharp, 2005, p15).
Sharp (2005) postulates that a multitude of specific methods of non-violent action or non- violent weapons exist, with more than two hundred having been identified, while more will certainly emerge in future conflicts. They include protest marches, flying forbidden flags,
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massive rallies, vigils, leaflets, picketing, social boycotts, economic boycotts, labour strikes, rejection of legitimacy, civil disobedience, boycott of government positions, boycott of rigged elections, strikes by civil servants, non-cooperation by police, establishment of alternative institutions and creation of parallel governments. These methods may be used symbolically, to put an end to cooperation, or to disrupt the operation of the established system. Sharp concedes that individuals and groups may hold differing opinions about the general political usefulness and the ethical acceptability of the methods of non-violent struggle. Yet everyone can benefit from more knowledge and understanding of their use and careful examination of their examination and their potential relevance and effectiveness. In that regard, it is important to mention here that all these methods mentioned here were used in Zimbabwe, mainly be civil society organizations and opposition political parties, though with very limited success.
Sharp’s conformity to Gandhi’s influence on power and strategy is in his much publicised guidelines on waging successful non-violent struggles against dictatorships, which he refers to as ‘a conceptual framework for liberation’ (Sharp, 2002). In that framework which rests on strategic skill, organization and planning, Sharp conceptualizes that: prevention of tyranny might be possible; successful struggles against dictatorships could be waged without mass mutual slaughters; dictatorships could be destroyed; and, new ones can be prevented from rising out of the ashes. Though conceding that fighting dictators would not be easy, Sharp’s guidelines try to spur resistance leaders to consider strategies that may increase their effective power while reducing the relative level of casualties. He warns against complacency and being hoodwinked by dictators. As if he had Zimbabwe in mind, as events reveal later in this chapter, he reminds resistors that elections are not available under dictatorships as an instrument of significant change. He argues that “dictators are not in the habit of allowing elections that could remove them from their thrones” Sharp (2002, p6).
Sharp (2005) identifies three broad classes of non-violent methods: non-violent protest and persuasion; non-cooperation; and, non-violent intervention. In that regard, he defines non- violent action as a generic term covering dozens of specific methods of protest, non- cooperation and intervention. Symbolic protests, though in most situations quite mild, he says,
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can help make it clear that some of the population is opposed to the present regime and can help to undermine its legitimacy. Social, economic and political non-cooperation, when practiced strongly and long enough, can weaken the opponent’s control, wealth, domination, and power, and potentially produce paralysis. The strategies of non-violent intervention which disrupt the established order by psychological, social, economic, physical or political methods can dramatically threaten the opponent’s control. Sharp (1973, p31) admits getting these ideas from Gandhi, who experimented widely with the political potentialities of disobedience, emphasised the importance of a change of will as a pre-requisite for a change in patterns of obedience and co-operation. There was, Gandhi argued, a need for: i) a psychological change away from passive submission to self-respect and courage; ii) recognition by the subject that his assistance makes the regime possible; and, iii) the building of a determination to withdraw co- operation and obedience.
In the context of Zimbabwe, particularly in Gutu District where this study will take place, it is anticipated that the training of youths in AVP will create new individuals who can create new ways of relating at community level that has potential to disrupt established order where violence is influenced from outside by the powers that be in the political formations that they are affiliated to. As Sharp postulates, in larger political struggles, strategists of non-violent struggle would be wise to attempt to weaken and remove as many sources of power as possible, in a sequence of priorities. This requires that the weapons of non-violent struggle be applied against crucial targets, primarily the ‘pillars of support’ that sustain a violent system.
All systems depend upon the cooperation and assistance of their subjects, of the groups and organizations of society. “When these bodies do not sufficiently supply the several needed sources of power, or when they carry out the regime’s wishes and orders slowly or inefficiently – or even flatly refuse to assist and obey – the power of the regime is weakened” (Sharp, 2005, p481). This is relevant to Zimbabwe where youths are sources of political power through acts of violence and vigilantism (as explained later in this chapter). Training them in AVP could be one of the ‘priorities’ to weaken a ‘pillar of support’.
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