It has been seen above that the human being is identified by Aristotle, with his/her function, as a rational and social animal. It makes sense then that for one to safeguard the interaction and relationship among humans in society, one would need a set of guiding rules and principles, which would aid one in acting well: morality. Aristotle maintains that even though all humans share rationality by nature, yet not all humans know how and when to use this rationality in order to produce the desired effects of proper human action (activity). He also reasons that people do not act in a moral way either because they are ignorant of what comprises rational moral actions or because they do not know how to apply this rationality well. Therefore, in this section, we will look at Aristotle’s doctrine of mean-state, as a moral tool to aid one in determining the best kind of rational choice when confronted with any moral dilemma in society. In other words, man is a moral being because he/she is a rational and social being. This supports Aristotle’s claim, as has been seen above, that the proper function of the human being consists in being a rational and social (political) animal in pursuit of happiness (NE 1098a 3; NE 10997b 10). For Aristotle, one needs rationality so as to be able to determine the “mid-point” of any virtuous (moral) activity in order to act well in
22 Aquinas also adopted this principle in his moral philosophy.
any situation. Aristotle bases this claim on the fact that eudaimonia (happiness) is a reward of virtuous activity23. Aristotle, basically, sees virtue as that which “makes its possessor good”
and possessed as a mean-state between two extremes of “excess and deficiency” (NE 1119a1- 1119a 20; MM 1186a 30-35; EE 1220b 30-35). From this, it looks as if Aristotle is saying that human virtues are like technical skills, where every technician knows exactly how to avoid excess and deficiency in order to find the condition that will be an intermediate between the two extremes (of “excess and deficiency”). It is clear that Aristotle does not consider that in our moral life, at times, there are grey areas, which are not as “clear cut” as he thought. For Aristotle, virtue is just a condition intermediate between two other states, where one involves excess, and the other deficiency (NE 1106a26-1106b 28). The question here, in regard to Aristotle’s view on this, is how does one know what will make one a good (virtuous) person, when confronted by a moral dilemma? Aristotle would argue that it is the deliberation, which will reach its peak in choosing the middle point of any moral action. Hence, he defined virtue as “a property of happiness [...] a mean of the... excess or defect” (MM 1186a 30-35)24.
Putting these together, one may ask that if virtue is “a sort of mediety” (EE 1220b 30- 35), that is, the “middle position” between the two extremes of excess and defect (NE 1119a1- 1119a 20), how does one determine this middle position? In answering this question, Aristotle however, admits that to determine the mid-point of every situation is not as easy as it sounds. As he puts it, “for in everything it is no easy task to find the middle” (NE 1109a 20- 1109a 29), but whenever we succeed in finding that middle ground, “then, we stand [...] in a good position to make the right judgment” (EE 1222b10). For example, according to Aristotle, one who fears everything that one sees becomes a coward, while one who fears nothing at all in the face of all dangers, becomes “rash” (NE 1104a10-1104a27). The question is, what determines when one flees from danger and when one confronts the danger head-on?
It is obvious here that Aristotle does not, precisely, tell how to find the “middle point” or the mean of every moral situation that might come our way. As Kraut Richard rightly stated:
“the right amount is not some quantity between zero and the highest possible level, but rather the amount, whatever it happens to be, that is proportionate to the seriousness of the situation” (“Aristotle’s Ethics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Kraut goes on to explain that there are two distinct theses that can each be called a doctrine of the “mean-
23 I shall look at this in detail in the next chapter
24 Cf. M.M.1191b 22-27
state”. The first one is the thesis that every virtue is a state that lies between two vices, one of excess and the other of deficiency. The second one is the idea that whenever a virtuous person chooses to perform a virtuous act, the person is said to be aiming at an act that is in one way or another intermediate between alternatives that the person rejects. The second thesis is the more criticised one because virtuous acts cannot be quantitatively or mathematically calculated or analysed.25 As I have just mentioned above, this is one of the main criticisms against virtue ethics in general (not only Aristotle’s), because it does not produce codified principles to guide one’s action in a situation of moral dilemma as Aristotle claims in his doctrine of mean state. However, Aquinas will also battle with this in his moral philosophy, but he solves his own problem by introducing the virtues of infused prudence and infused temperance as God’s special way of helping one, who possesses them in making the right decisions when confronted with such moral dilemmas. Therefore, to ascertain the mean- state of any moral situation, will mean taking into cognisance, the peculiarity and specificity of every situation at hand.
Furthermore, Aristotle insists that the doctrine of the mean-state simply signifies
“moderation, i.e. not to act too much or too little in any given moral situation” (NE 1106b8- 1106b28). This means that whatever one is doing that constitutes a virtuous act with eudaimonia (happiness) in mind, must be done “[...] at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right aim, and in the right way [...]” (NE 1106b18-19). Virtue really lies in the middle, so to speak. Therefore, the mean-state is the appropriate and adequate response in any particular situation. This involves a lot of difficult decisions. As I have said above, it is to determine the right thing to do in any given situation.
This makes virtue, actually, “praiseworthy” (NE 1103a4-1103a13). In fact, for one to be on either extreme is actually not hard, but to maintain the balance and find the middle position between both extremes is considered a daunting task. Hence it is called a virtue. This is true because virtue is not Science or Mathematics, where one can accurately calculate and pin- point the mid-point of any given situation on a board (MM 1182a 15). In other words, there are many grey areas involved in our everyday moral situations and decisions. However, it is true that Aristotle acknowledges the difficulty involved in arriving at the mean-state of any moral decision, but he seems to trivialise it as he argues that “[...] to fix upon the mean point [...] is hard and this is the point for which we are praised; for which reason the good is rare”
25 Available online at 2001 “Aristotle’s Ethics” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/. Accessed on 26th July, 2014.
(MM. 1187a 1-4). However, Aristotle comes very close, in his Eudemian Ethics, to suggesting that the ability to determine this mean-state, apart from rationality, could also be aided either through blind luck or through “divine inspiration” “[...] owing to which the fortunate man’s success is thought to be due to the aid of the God [...]” (EE 1248 b3-8). Whether there is a point in this argument or not, Aristotle has introduced another concept here, “God” (“divine inspiration”). It must be noted that there is a metaphysical difference between Aristotle’s concept of God and that of Aquinas. Aquinas believes that the introduction of the supernatural (infused) virtues will help one in making the right decision in every moral situation, while Aristotle believes that one has to use one’s natural ability to reason it out. In other words, for Aquinas, since God intends human beings to enjoy a life of happiness that surpasses their nature, it means that this life cannot be attained merely by the cultivation of the natural capacity of their virtuous life. Aquinas believes that this supernatural human life is a gift from God, not a human accomplishment of some sort achieved through reasoning out the mean-state of every moral situation.
Therefore, Aquinas seems not to have confidence in one’s natural capability to choose correctly in every moral dilemma, hence, his claim about God’s infused virtues. This is a clear indication that Aristotle and Aquinas have different notions of
“God” as well as the role their respective God plays in their ethical views.