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This means that Aquinas's theological background undoubtedly had a tremendous influence on his development of Aristotle's ethical views, especially his concept of happiness. With this in mind, Hughes insists that Aquinas's moral philosophy, in particular, his concept of happiness "transcends" Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia.

Aristotle’s Twofold Functions of the Human Being

The Characteristic Activity of Human Beings: Rationality

This is precisely what distinguishes human activities from the behaviors of non-human animals. This means that human moral action is judged as moral because of human rational ability.

Human Beings: Sociable by Nature

Aristotle would argue that man is a social animal because his activity or behavior must conform to the norms, rules and expectations of the society in which he lives. In this case, a person has no other option than to live in a society with constant interaction with other people.

Human beings as Moral beings: Observing Mean-State

However, since happiness is central to Aristotle's ethics (as well as Aquinas's), it would be appropriate, before further investigation into what happiness is and where it can be found, to consider one of the most fundamental ethical principles of To examine Aristotle: the doctrine of common -state22. Kraut goes on to explain that there are two distinct theses, each of which can be called a doctrine of the "average". The second thesis is the more criticized one because virtuous actions cannot be calculated or analyzed quantitatively or mathematically.25 As I just mentioned above, this is one of the main criticisms against virtue ethics in general (not only Aristotle's not), because it does not produce codified principles to guide one's actions in a situation of moral dilemma as Aristotle claims in his doctrine of common condition.

Aquinas believes that the introduction of the supernatural (infuse) virtues will help one to make the right decision in every moral situation, while Aristotle believes that one must use one's natural ability to reason it out.

Aristotle’s Notion of God: The Unmoved Mover

Practical Wisdom (Phronesis): An Excellence of Deliberation

However, Aristotle insists that "man's function is accomplished only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral excellence [..]" (NE 1144a7-1144a11). As mentioned earlier, practical wisdom has to do with moral deliberation, and this deliberation has to do with the choice of the ultimate human good: eudaimonia (happiness). In other words, practical wisdom has to do with "the reason for choice that is desired and reasoning directed to some end" (EE 1139a 32 – 34).

In this case, human excellence, or rather, practical wisdom will be the tendency that leads us to achieve our ultimate good: happiness.

Happiness: The Human Ultimate Good

Aristotle gives a formal definition of the good as "that to which all things aim" (NE 1094a2). In other words, to be eudaimon (happy) means to experience the completeness of man's ultimate (highest) good, which would mean achieving his/her full potential. The human good then becomes the excellent activity on the part of the soul which has reason, as I noted above (NE 1098a16-20).

Aristotle presents an example of the person who has successfully followed Aristotle's road map of virtuous activities and arrived at the ultimate human good (happiness): the magnanimous statesman.

The Magnanimous Statesman: An Embodiment of Happiness

The Human Soul-Body Makes Man A “Knower”

This means that, for Aquinas, man is not only a rational and social animal, but a substance endowed with the Spirit of God. As a result, Aquinas concludes that man must be understood as a composite soul and body as a complement to the spiritual and intellectual nature of the soul. Aquinas believes that human action is the defining feature of human nature (ST Ia, Q.76, Article 1, or. & co.).

This leads Aquinas to the interpretation that "the object of the will is the end and good" of human actions (ST, Ia-IIæ, Q.1, Art.1, respectively).

Aquinas’ Concept of “God”: A Pure and First Act

For Aquinas, it is "self-evident" to say that God exists, because it is the same thing as saying that the predicate is included in the essence of the subject (ST, Ia, Q. 2, Art.1, co.) . And the only thing that can initiate this process, Aquinas argues, is the First Law, called God (ST, Ia, Q.2, Art.3, co.). Therefore, since it cannot continue forever, it is "necessary to recognize a first efficient cause to which all give the name of God" (ST, Ia, Q.2, Art.3, co.).

In conclusion, Aquinas argues that “the First Act is the universal principle of all actions, because it is infinite and virtually 'contains all things beforehand'” (ST, Ia, Q.75, Art.5, ad. 1).

The Human Person as an Imago Dei

This participation of man with this "higher being" is what Aquinas meant by Imago Dei. In other words, the human person as an image of God would mean a creature that. However, Aquinas makes a clear but philosophical distinction between his understanding of the human highest good and Aristotle's.

Furthermore, Aquinas also insists that the human being is the Imago Dei (Image) of this final cause called God, because since this God is a purely intelligent act, man as an intelligent being (rational being) participates in the Supreme Intelligence called God.

Aquinas’ Categorisation of Virtue: Natural and Supernatural Virtues

Aquinas’ Categorisation of Virtue: Natural virtues

  • Intellectual and Practical (Moral) Virtues
  • Prudence as the Co-ordinating Virtue: A Development Beyond Aristotle’s Phronesis

For Aquinas, intellectual virtue does not imply or require 'sincerity of the will', because even the person without good moral character can still possess the intellectual virtues (ST, Ia-IIæ, Q.58, Art. 5, resp.1 ). . Therefore, Aquinas further explains that .. the speculative virtues and arts confer only the fitness for action” and not “the right use of the fitness” ST, Ia-IIæ, Q.56, Art. 3, respectively). Therefore, the intellectual virtues are not defined in relation to the unity of the ultimate goal.

Apparently it is the duty of the virtue of prudence to moderate and coordinate all other virtues (ST, IIa-IIæ, Q. 47, Art.4, ad, 3).

Aquinas’ Categorisation of Supernatural Virtues: A Step

Infused Moral Virtues

For Aquinas, moral virtues are naturally acquired for the sake of our human happiness on earth outside of our rationality. However, the acquired moral virtues would be the kind of moral virtues that Aristotle deals with in his virtue ethics, which are based on the activity, rationality and good of the individual in the polis. However, going beyond these Aristotelian "acquired" moral virtues, Aquinas develops what he calls ingrained moral virtues.

The acquired moral virtues also differ from the infused moral virtues because of their respective purposes and measures.

One of the ways in which God can assist people to achieve this supernatural happiness is by instilling in them the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity (ST, Ia-IIæ, V.62, Art. 1 resp.) . Similarly, Aquinas explains that these virtues are called "divine" because "they correspond to the nature that man shares with God" (ST Ia-IIæ, V.62, Art.1, resp.1). So, in this chapter I will look at Aquinas' concept of happiness, which undeniably has Aristotle's concept of happiness as its starting point.

It will be good to first look at Aquinas's basic understanding of happiness, which derives from Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia.

The point is that Aristotle should have posited two "ends" as the human ultimate end, for which "everything else is desired for its sake" (NE 1094a19). In other words, either happiness is the end for which "everything else" is desired, or it is not, in which case "something else" will be the human ultimate goal. In other words, Aristotle finally realizes that the kind of happiness he advocates does not fit into the picture he paints of what the ultimate human goal is.

Aquinas's notion of man's "end" is slightly different from Aristotle's, for Aristotle claims that happiness is the ultimate human end in this life, an idea that Aquinas also accepts, but he also advocates a kind of happiness that is perfect and supernatural.

That Human Ultimate End is Happiness

In other words, what is the ultimate cause or purpose of man. Moreover, for Aquinas, the human ultimate end is the same as the human “final cause,” namely the beatific vision (perfect happiness). This means that the first cause in this series is the ultimate cause, which, for Aquinas, is God.

We can say that the end of the rich man here is the possession or enjoyment of the money he has.

Aquinas’ Concept of Happiness: A Step Beyond Aristotle

Natural (Imperfect) Happiness: Aristotle’s Eudaimonia

Therefore, Stephen Wang concludes with Aquinas in mind that “our desire for understanding (and thus for happiness) can never be fully satisfied in this life. Aquinas insists that this imperfection or limitation of human natural happiness in this life is not due to the circumstances that surround us, but to our human nature. Therefore, for Aquinas, it is "contradictory" and against human nature to speak of human "temporal perfect" or "natural perfect" happiness in this life (ST Ia-IIae, Q.11, Art.3, co. ).

He cannot assert that “it is impossible to have true and perfect happiness in this life,” and at the same time assert that.

Supernatural (Perfect) Happiness: Beatitudo Perfecta

  • Perfect Happiness: A Contemplation of the Divine Essence Aristotle surprisingly argues that “complete happiness is a contemplative activity” and

Thomas Aquinas concludes that human “ultimate and perfect happiness cannot consist in anything other than the vision of the divine essence” (ST, Ia-IIæ, Q. 3, Art.8, resp.). In other words, for Aquinas, since Aristotle's natural kind of happiness involves more of the human body (matter), which is something with potential (not actuality), it follows that the supernatural kind of happiness will have to do. with the human immaterial (spiritual) part, the soul. For Aquinas, since a natural kind of happiness, which is Aristotle's kind of happiness, stops at the level of the human body (matter), which is something with potential (not actual), it follows that the supernatural kind of happiness must transcend. kind of happiness to reach another level of human functioning, which is immaterial (spiritual), the soul.

This difference between the views of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas on the soul, man and God is great.

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